A SYNTHESIS OF THOMISTIC THOUGHT
BY
REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O. P.
REALITY
PREFACE
CHAPTER 1: PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
BRIEF ANALYSIS
ON INTERPRETATION
LATER ANALYTICS []
THE PHYSICA
DE COELO ET MUNDO
DE ANIMA
METAPHYSICA
The Introduction
Ontology
Natural Theology
COMMENTARIES ON THE ETHICS
The Nicomachean Ethics
The Politica
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL WORKS
CHAPTER 3: THE THOMISTIC COMMENTATORS
FIRST PART: METAPHYSICAL SYNTHESIS OF THOMISM
CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGIBLE BEING AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 5: ACT AND POTENCY
ARTICLE ONE: POTENCY REALLY DISTINCT FROM ACT
ARTICLE TWO: ACT LIMITED BY POTENCY
ARTICLE THREE
THE IDEA OF BEING
METAPHYSICAL IDEA OF GOD
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DISTINCTION
ARTICLE FOUR
SECOND PART: THEOLOGY AND DE DEO UNO
CHAPTER 6: THE NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL WORK
ARTICLE ONE: THE PROPER OBJECT OF THEOLOGY
ARTICLE TWO: STEPS IN THEOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
ARTICLE THREE: THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA
CHAPTER 7: THE PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE
1. SYNTHETIC EXPOSITION
2. FUNDAMENTAL VALIDITY OF THE FIVE WAYS
3. POINT OF CULMINATION
CHAPTER 8: DIVINE EMINENCE
ARTICLE ONE: THE ESSENTIALLY SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF THE
BEATIFIC VISION []
ARTICLE TWO: ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD []
ARTICLE THREE: COROLLARIES
CHAPTER 9: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE
ARTICLE 1: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL []
ARTICLE 2: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDITIONAL FUTURE
CHAPTER 10: GOD'S WILL AND GOD'S LOVE
ARTICLE ONE: GOD'S SOVEREIGN FREEDOM OF WILL
ARTICLE TWO: THE CAUSALITY OF GOD'S WILL
ARTICLE THREE: THE THOMISTIC DILEMMA
ARTICLE FOUR: DIFFICULTIES
SUMMARY
CHAPTER 11: PROVIDENCE AND PREDESTINATION
ARTICLE ONE: DIVINE PROVIDENCE
1. The Nature of Providence
2. Scope and Reach of Providence
ARTICLE TWO: PREDESTINATION
1. Scriptural Foundation
2. Definition of Predestination
3. Questions
CHAPTER 12: OMNIPOTENCE
1. CREATION
a) Creation ex Nihilo.
b) Creation a Free Act
c) Creation in Time
ARTICLE TWO: DIVINE PRESERVATION
ARTICLE THREE: DIVINE MOTION
THIRD PART: THE BLESSED TRINITY
CHAPTER 13: AUGUSTINE AND THOMAS
CHAPTER 14: THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS
1. GENERATION
2. SPIRATION
CHAPTER 15: THE DIVINE RELATIONS
CHAPTER 16: THE DIVINE PERSONS
CHAPTER 17: THE NOTIONAL ACTS
CHAPTER 18: EQUALITY AND UNION
CHAPTER 19: THE TRINITY NATURALLY UNKNOWABLE
CHAPTER 20: PROPER NAMES AND APPROPRIATIONS
CHAPTER 21: THE INDWELLING OF THE BLESSED TRINITY
FOURTH PART: ANGEL AND MAN
CHAPTER 22: THE SOURCES
CHAPTER 23: ANGELIC NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE
1. NATURE OF ANGELS
2. ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER 24: THE ANGELIC WILL
CHAPTER 25: ANGELIC MERIT AND DEMERIT
1. NATURAL HAPPINESS
2. INSTANTANEOUS CHOICE
3. SOURCE OF ANGELIC MERIT
CHAPTER 26: THE TREATISE ON MAN
CHAPTER 27: THE NATURE OF THE SOUL
ITS SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY []
CHAPTER 28: THE UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY []
CHAPTER 29: THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL []
CHAPTER 30: THE SEPARATED SOUL []
1. SUBSISTENCE
2. KNOWLEDGE []
3. THE WILL
CHAPTER 31: ORIGINAL SIN
FIFTH PART: REDEMPTIVE INCARNATION
CHAPTER 32: INTRODUCTION []
CHAPTER 33: THE HYPOSTATIC UNION
CHAPTER 34: CONSEQUENCES OF THE HYPOSTATIC UNION
CHAPTER 35: FREEDOM AND IMPECCABILITY []
CHAPTER 36: CHRIST'S VICTORY AND PASSION
CHAPTER 37: MARIOLOGY []
ARTICLE ONE: MARY'S PREDESTINATION
ARTICLE TWO: THE DIVINE MATERNITY
ARTICLE THREE: MARY'S SANCTITY
1. St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception
2. Mary's Fullness of Grace
ARTICLE FOUR: MARY'S UNIVERSAL MEDIATION
SIXTH PART: THE SACRAMENTS OF THE CHURCH
CHAPTER 38: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 39: TRANSUBSTANTIATION
CHAPTER 40: THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS []
CHAPTER 41: ATTRITION AND CONTRITION []
CHAPTER 42: THE REVIVISCENCE OF MERIT
CHAPTER 43: THE TREATISE ON THE CHURCH
CHAPTER 44: THE SOUL'S IMMUTABILITY AFTER DEATH
SEVENTH PART: MORAL THEOLOGY AND SPIRITUALITY
CHAPTER 45: MAN'S ULTIMATE PURPOSE AND GOAL []
CHAPTER 46: HUMAN ACTS []
ARTICLE ONE: PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN ACTS []
ARTICLE TWO: CONSCIENCE AND PROBABILISM
ARTICLE THREE: THE PASSIONS
CHAPTER 47: VIRTUES AND VICES
ARTICLE ONE: HABITS []
ARTICLE TWO: CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES
ARTICLE THREE: THE GIFTS
ARTICLE FOUR: THE VICES
ARTICLE FIVE: SIN
CHAPTER 48: LAW
CHAPTER 49: A TREATISE ON GRACE
ARTICLE ONE: THE NECESSITY OF GRACE []
ARTICLE TWO: THE ESSENCE OF GRACE
ARTICLE THREE: DIVISION OF GRACE []
ARTICLE FOUR: GRACE, SUFFICIENT AND EFFICACIOUS
ARTICLE FIVE: THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF GRACE
ARTICLE SIX: JUSTIFICATION []
ARTICLE SEVEN: THE MERITS OF THE JUST []
1. Definition and Division
2. Principle and Qualities of Merit
CHAPTER 50: THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
ARTICLE ONE: FAITH []
ARTICLE TWO: HOPE []
1. Hope tends to eternal life, i. e.: God possessed eternally
2. The Certitude of Hope []
ARTICLE THREE: CHARITY []
CHAPTER 51: THE MORAL VIRTUES
ARTICLE ONE: PRUDENCE
ARTICLE TWO: JUSTICE []
ARTICLE THREE: FORTITUDE []
ARTICLE FOUR: TEMPERANCE
CHAPTER 52: CHRISTIAN PERFECTION
CHAPTER 53: CHARISMATIC GRACES
1. PROPHETIC REVELATION
2. BIBLICAL INSPIRATION []
CHAPTER 54: CONCLUSION
ARTICLE ONE: THOMISM AND ECLECTICISM
ARTICLE TWO: THE ASSIMILATIVE POWER OF THOMISM
1. The Generative Principle
1. Cosmology
2. Anthropology
3. Criteriology
4. Freedom and morality
5. Natural theology
EIGHTH PART: DEVELOPMENTS AND CONFIRMATIONS
CHAPTER 55: THE TWENTY-FOUR THOMISTIC THESES
ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-FOUR THESES
DERIVATIVE PROPOSITIONS
FORGETTING THE TWENTY-FOUR THESES
CHAPTER 56: REALISM AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
CONTRADICTION AND EXAGGERATED REALISM
CONTRADICTION AND NOMINALISM
CONTRADICTION AND LIMITED REALISM
REALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY
CHAPTER 57: REALISM AND PRAGMATISM
1. PRAGMATISM AND ITS VARIATIONS
II. THE TWO NOTIONS COMPARED
III. PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCES
Pragmatism Must Return to Tradition
Difficulties
CHAPTER 58: ONTOLOGICAL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER 59: EFFICACIOUS GRACE
THE PROBLEM
THE DIVINE WILL, ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES
THE MYSTERY
CONCLUSION
PREFACE
IN THIS work we are incorporating the article on Thomism which we
wrote for the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique. To that
article we add: first, occasional clarifications; secondly, at the
end, a hundred pages on the objective bases of the Thomistic
synthesis, chiefly philosophic pages, which were not called for in
a dictionary of theology.
Contradictory views, intellectual and spiritual, of St. Thomas
have been handed down to us. The Averroists reproached him as but
half-Aristotelian; the Augustinians saw in him an innovator too
much attached to the spirit, principles, and method of Aristotle.
This second judgment reappeared, sharply accented, in Luther, [1]
and again, some years ago, in the Modernists, who maintained that
St. Thomas, a Christian Aristotelian, was rather Aristotelian than
Christian.
In other words, some scholars saw in the work of St. Thomas "a
naturalization of revealed truth, " [2] a depreciation of
Christian faith, faith losing its sublimity, by a kind of
rationalism, by exaggeration of the power and rights of reason.
Now this rationalization of faith is indeed found in Leibnitz. [3]
It is certainly not to be found in St. Thomas.
But these contrary judgments, however inadmissible, serve by
contrast to set in relief the true physiognomy of the master, whom
the Church has canonized and entitled Doctor Communis.
His whole life, all his intelligence, all his forces, were bent to
the service of the Christian faith, both in his doctrinal battles
and in the serenity of contemplation. Justification of this
statement appears in the way he conceived his vocation as teacher.
You find therein an ascending gradation which arouses admiration.
1. Whereas on the one hand he fully recognizes all that is
excellent, from the philosophical standpoint, in the teaching and
method of Aristotle, he shows, on the other hand, against the
Averroists, that reason can prove nothing against the faith. This
latter task he accomplished by demonstrating against them from
philosophy itself, that God's creative act is free, that creation
need not be ab aeterno, that man's will is free, that the human
soul is characterized by personal immortality.
2. In opposition to the Augustinians, who, repeating their master
by rote, were in large measure unfaithful to that master, he
carefully distinguishes reason from faith, but, far from
separating these two, he rather unites them. [4].
3. He shows that philosophy deserves to be studied, both for its
own sake, and also to establish, by arguments drawn simply from
reason, that the praeambula fidei are attainable by the natural
force of human intelligence.
4. As regards the purposes of theology, which he calls "sacred
doctrine, " he shows, first, that it is not to be studied merely
for personal piety or for works of edification or to comment on
Holy Scripture or to assemble patristic compilations or, finally,
to explain the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Theology must rather,
he goes on to show, be studied as a branch of knowledge, which
establishes scientifically a system of doctrine with objectivity
and universal validity, a synthesis that harmonizes supernatural
truths with the truths of the natural order. Theology is thus
conceived as a science, in the Aristotelian sense of the word, a
science of the truths of faith. [5].
5. This position granted, it follows that reason must subserve
faith in its work of analyzing the concepts and deepening the
understanding of revealed truths, of showing that many of these
truths are subordinated to the articles of faith which are
primary, and of deducing the consequences contained virtually in
the truths made known by revelation.
6. Nor does faith by thus employing reason lose aught of its
supernatural character. Just the contrary. For St. Thomas, faith
is an infused virtue, essentially supernatural by its proper
object and formal motive, a virtue which, by an act that is simple
and infallible, far above all apologetic reasoning, makes us
adhere to God revealing and revealed. [6]. Infused faith,
therefore, is superior not only to the highest philosophy, but
also to the most enlightened theology, since theology can never be
more than an explanatory and deductive commentary on faith.
7. Further, this conception of theology does not in any way lower
Christian faith from its elevation. For, as the saint teaches, the
source of theology is contemplation, [7] that is, infused faith,
vivified, not only by charity, but also by the gifts of knowledge,
understanding, and wisdom, gifts which make faith penetrating and
pleasant of taste. Thus theology reaches a most fruitful
understanding of revealed mysteries, by finding analogies in
truths which we know naturally, and also by tracing the
intertwining of these mysteries with one another and with the last
end of our life. [8].
Such is the conception formed by St. Thomas on his vocation as
Catholic doctor and particularly as theologian. And his sanctity,
added to the power of his genius, enabled him to reply fully to
his providential calling.
In his doctrinal controversies carried on exclusively in defense
of the faith, he was always humble, patient, and magnanimous,
courageous indeed, but always prudent. Trust in God led him to
unite prayer to study. William de Tocco, his biographer, writes of
him: "Whenever he was to study, to undertake a solemn disputation,
to teach, write, or dictate, he began by retiring to pray in
secret, weeping as he prayed, to obtain understanding of the
divine mysteries. And he returned with the light he had prayed
for. " [9].
The same biographer [10] gives two striking examples. While
writing his commentary on Isaias, the saint came to a passage
which he did not understand. For several days he prayed and fasted
for light. Then he was supernaturally enlightened. To his
confrere, Reginald, he revealed the extraordinary manner in which
this light came to him, namely, by the apostles Peter and Paul.
This account was confirmed by one of the witnesses in the saint's
canonization process.
A second example is reported. [11] In the friary at Naples, when
the saint was writing of the passion and the resurrection of
Christ, [12] he was seen, while praying before a crucifix in the
church, to be lifted up from the floor. Then it was that he heard
the words: "Thomas, thou hast written well of Me. ".
Daily, after celebrating Mass, he assisted at a second, where
often he was the humble server. To solve difficulties, he would
pray before the tabernacle. He never, we might say, went out of
the cloister, he slept little, passed much of the night in prayer.
When, at compline during Lent, he listened to the antiphon: "Midst
in life we are in death, " [13] he could not restrain his tears.
Prayer gave him light and inspiration when he wrote the Office of
the Blessed Sacrament. William de Tocco tells us also that the
saint was often seen in ecstasy, and that, one day, while he was
dictating a long article of the Trinity, he did not notice that
the candle in his hand had gone so low that it was burning his
fingers. [14].
Toward the end of his life he was favored with an intellectual
vision, so sublime and so simple that he was unable to continue
dictating the treatise on Penance which he had commenced. He told
his faithful companion that he was dying as a simple religious, a
grace he had prayed the Lord to grant him. His last words were
given to a commentary on the Canticle of Canticles.
Let these traits suffice to show that St. Thomas reached the
heights of contemplation, and that in his own life he exemplified
his own teaching on the source of theology: theology pouring forth
"from the fullness of contemplation. " [15] This truth the Church
recognizes by calling him Doctor Communis and by commending his
teaching in numerous encyclicals, especially by the Aeterni Patris
of Leo XIII.
The present work is an exposition of the Thomistic synthesis, an
exposition devoted to the principles often formulated by the saint
himself. We do not undertake to prove historically that all the
doctrinal points in question are found explicitly in the works of
St. Thomas himself, but we will indicate the chief references to
his works. And our main task will be to set in relief the
certitude and universality of the principles which underlie the
structure and coherence of Thomistic doctrine.
First, then, we will note the chief works that expound this
Thomistic synthesis, and likewise point out the most faithful and
most penetrating among the saint's commentators. There will follow
a philosophic introduction, to underline that metaphysical
synthesis which is presupposed by Thomistic theology. Then we will
emphasize the essential points in this doctrine by noting their
force in the three treatises, De Deo uno, De Verbo incarnato, De
gratia. Finally we will note briefly their importance in the other
parts of theology.
CHAPTER 1: PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
THE Thomistic synthesis, prepared gradually by the saint's
commentaries on Scripture, on Aristotle, on the Master of the
Sentences, by the Summa contra Gentes, by the Disputed Questions,
reached definite form in the Summa theologiae. We will speak first
of his philosophical writings, then of his theological works.
Here come first the commentaries on Aristotle.
1. On interpretation (Peri hermenias, on the act of judgment).
2. The Later Analytics (a long study of method in finding
definitions, of the nature and validity of demonstration).
3. The Physica (natural philosophy).
4. De coelo et mundo.
5. De anima.
6. The Metaphysica.
7. Ethical works.
In searching Aristotle the saint fastens attention, not so much on
the last and highest conclusions concerning God and the soul, but
rather on the first elements of philosophy, just as we go to
Euclid for the axioms of geometry. Nevertheless Aquinas often
finds that these elements are deepened and their formulation most
exact when Aristotle transcends the contrary deviations, first of
Parmenides and Heraclitus, secondly of Pythagorean idealism and
atomistic materialism, thirdly of Platonism and Sophistry. In
Aristotle the saint discovers what has justly been called the
natural metaphysics of human intelligence, a metaphysics which,
commencing from sense experience, rises progressively till it
reaches God, the pure act, the understanding of understanding
(Noesis noeseos).
In commenting on the Stagirite, St. Thomas discards Averroistic
interpretations contrary to revealed dogma, on Providence, on
creation, on the personal immortality of the human soul. Hence it
can be said that he "baptizes" Aristotle's teaching, that is, he
shows how the principles of Aristotle, understood as they can be
and must be understood, are in harmony with revelation. Thus he
builds, step by step, the foundations of a solid Christian
philosophy.
In these commentaries St. Thomas also combats certain theses
sustained by his Augustinian predecessors, but held by the saint
to be irreconcilable with the most certain of Aristotle's
principles. Aristotle conceives the human soul as the only
substantial form of the human body. He maintains the natural unity
of the human composite. Human intelligence, he maintains, is on
the lowest rank of intelligences, and has as object the lowest of
intelligible objects, namely, the intelligibility hidden in things
subject to sense. Hence the human intelligence must use the sense
world as a mirror if it would know God. And only by knowing the
sense world, its proper object, can the human soul come, by
analogy with that sense world, to know and define and characterize
its own essence and faculties.
BRIEF ANALYSIS
At the court of Urban IV, St. Thomas had as companion William de
Moerbecke, O. P.: who knew Greek perfectly. The saint persuaded
William to translate from Greek into Latin the works of Aristotle.
This faithful translator assisted the saint in commenting on
Aristotle. Thus we understand why Aquinas has such a profound
understanding of the Stagirite, an understanding far superior to
that of Albert the Great. On many points of Aristotelian
interpretation St. Thomas is the authentic exponent.
Here we proceed to underline the capital points of Aristotle's
teaching, as presented by St. Thomas.
In the saint's commentaries we often meet the names of Aristotle's
Greek commentators: Porphyry, Themistius, Simplicius, Alexander of
Aphrodisia. He is likewise familiar with Judaeo-Arabian
philosophy, discerning perfectly where it is true and where it is
false. He seems to put Avicenna above Averroes.
In regard to form, as is observed by de Wulf, the saint
substituted, in place of extended paraphrase, a critical procedure
which analyzes the text. He divides and subdivides, in order to
lay bare the essential structure, to draw out the principal
assertions, to explain the minutest detail. Thus he appears to
advantage when compared with most commentators, ancient or modern,
since he never loses sight of the entire corpus of Aristotelian
doctrine, and always emphasizes its generative principles. These
commentaries, therefore, as many historians admit, are the most
penetrating exposition ever made of Greek philosophy. Grabmann
[16] notes that scholastic teachers [17] cited St. Thomas simply
as "The Expositor. " And modern historians [18] generally give
high praise to the saint's methods of commentating.
Aquinas does not follow Aristotle blindly. He does point out
errors, but his corrections, far from depreciating Aristotle's
value, only serve to show more clearly what Aristotle has of
truth, and to emphasize what the philosopher should have concluded
from his own principles. Generally speaking, it is an easy task to
see whether or not St. Thomas accepts what Aristotle's text says.
And this task is very easy for the reader who is familiar with the
personal works of the saint.
St. Thomas studied all Aristotle's works, though he did not write
commentaries on all, and left unfinished some commentaries he had
begun.
ON INTERPRETATION
From Aristotle's corpus of logic, called Organon, Thomas omitted
the Categories, the Former Analytics, the Topics, and the
Refutations. He explained the two chief parts.
1. De interpretatione (Peri hermenias) [19].
2. The Later Analytics [20].
In De interpretatione he gives us a most profound study of the
three mental operations: concept, judgment, reasoning. The
concept, he shows, surpasses immeasurably the sense image, because
it contains the raison d'etre, the intelligible reality, which
renders intelligible that which it represents. Then he proceeds to
arrange concepts according to their universality, and shows their
relation to objective reality. He finds that the verb "to be" is
the root of all other judgments. We see that Aristotle's logic is
intimately related to his metaphysics, to his teaching on
objective reality, to his principle of act and potency. We have
further a penetrating study of the elements in the proposition:
noun, verb, and attribute. We see how truth is found formally, not
in the concept, but in the objectively valid judgment. We are thus
led to see ever more clearly how the object of intelligence
differs from the object of sensation and imagination, how our
intellect seizes, not mere sense phenomena, but the intelligible
reality, which is expressed by the first and most universal of our
concepts, and which is the soul of all our judgments, wherein the
verb "to be" affirms the objective identity of predicate with
subject.
The saint proceeds to justify Aristotle's classification of
judgments. In quality, judgments are affirmative or negative or
privative, and true or false. In modality they are possible or
contingent or necessary. And at this point [21] enter problems on
necessity, on contingency, on liberty. Finally we are shown the
great value of judgments in mutual opposition, as contradictories,
or contraries, and so on. We know how often this propositional
opposition, studied by all logicians since Aristotle, is employed
in the theology of Aquinas.
LATER ANALYTICS [22]
St. Thomas expounds and justifies the nature of demonstration.
Starting with definition, demonstration leads us to know
(scientifically) the characteristics of the thing defined, e. g.:
the nature of the circle makes us see the properties of the
circle. Then, further, we see that the principles on which
demonstration rests must be necessarily true, that not everything
can be demonstrated, that there are different kinds of
demonstration, that there are sophisms to be avoided.
In the second chapter of this same work, he expounds at length the
rules we must follow in establishing valid definitions. A
definition cannot be proved since it is the source of
demonstration. Hence methodical search for a real definition must
start with a definition that is nominal or popular. Then the thing
to be defined must be put into its most universal category, whence
by division and subdivision we can compare the thing to be defined
with other things like it or unlike it. St. Thomas in all his
works follows his own rules faithfully. By these rules he defends,
e. g.: the Aristotelian definitions of "soul, " "knowledge, "
"virtue. " Deep study of these commentaries on the Later Analytics
is an indispensable prerequisite for an exact knowledge of the
real bases of Thomism. The historians of logic, although they have
nearly all recognized the great value of these Thomistic pages,
have not always seen their relation to the rest of the saint's
work, in which the principles here clarified are in constant
operation.
THE PHYSICA
Here the saint shows, in the first book, the necessity of
distinguishing act from potency if we would explain "becoming, "
i. e.: change, motion. Motion we see at once is here conceived as
a function, not of rest or repose (as by Descartes): but of being,
reality, since that which is in motion, in the process of
becoming, is tending toward being, toward actual reality.
Attentive study of the commentary on the first book of the Physica
shows that the distinction of act from potency is not a mere
hypothesis, however admirable and fruitful, nor a mere postulate
arbitrarily laid down by the philosopher. Rather it is a
distinction necessarily accepted by the mind that would reconcile
Heraclitus with Parmenides. Heraclitus says: "All is becoming,
nothing is, nothing is identified with itself. " Hence he denied
the principle of identity and the principle of contradiction.
Parmenides, on the contrary, admitting the principle of identity
and of contradiction, denied all objective becoming. St. Thomas
shows that Aristotle found the only solution of the problem, that
he made motion intelligible in terms of real being by his
distinction of act from potency. What is in the process of
becoming proceeds neither from nothingness nor from actual being,
but from the still undetermined potency of being. The statue
proceeds, not from the statue actually existing, but from the
wood's capability to be hewn. Plant or animal proceeds from a
germ. Knowledge proceeds from an intelligence that aspires to
truth. This distinction of potency from act is necessary to render
becoming intelligible as a function of being. The principle of
identity is therefore, for Aristotle and Thomas, not a hypothesis
or a postulate, but the objective foundation for demonstrative
proofs of the existence of God, who is pure act.
From this division of being into potency and act arises the
necessity of distinguishing four causes to explain becoming:
matter, form, agent, and purpose. The saint formulates the
correlative principles of efficient causality, of finality, of
mutation, and shows the mutual relation of matter to form, of
agent to purpose These principles thereafter come into play
wherever the four causes are involved, that is, in the production
of everything that has a beginning, whether in the corporeal order
or in the spiritual.
Treating of finality, St. Thomas defines "chance. " Chance is the
accidental cause of something that happens as if it had been
willed. The grave-digger accidentally finds a treasure. But the
accidental cause necessarily presupposes a non-accidental cause,
which produces its effect directly (a grave). Thus chance can
never be the first cause of the world, since it presupposes two
non-accidental causes, each of which tends to its own proper
effect.
This study of the four causes leads to the definition of nature.
Nature, in every being (stone, plant, animal, man): is the
principle which directs to a determined end all the activities of
the being. The concept of nature, applied analogically to God,
reappears everywhere in theology, even in studying the essence of
grace, and of the infused virtues. In his Summa the saint returns
repeatedly to these chapters, [23] as to philosophical elements
comparable to geometric elements in Euclid.
In the following books [24] Aquinas shows how the definition of
motion is found in each species of motion: in local motion, in
qualitative motion (intensity): in quantitative motion
(augmentation, growth). He shows likewise that every continuum
(extension, motion, time): though divisible to infinity, is not,
as Zeno supposed, actually divided to infinity.
In the last books [25] Of the Physica we meet the two principles
which prove the existence of God, the unchangeable first mover.
The first of these principles run thus: Every motion presupposes a
mover. The second thus: In a series of acting movers, necessarily
subordinated, we cannot regress to infinity, but must come to a
first. In a series of past movers accidentally subordinated an
infinite regression would not be self-contradictory (in a supposed
infinite series of past acts of generation in plants, say, or
animals, or men). But for the motion here and now before us there
must be an actually existing center of energy, a first mover,
without which the motion in question would not exist. The ship is
supported by the ocean, the ocean by the earth, the earth by the
sun, but, in thus regressing, you are supposing a first, not an
interminable infinity. And that first, being first, must be an
unchangeable, immovable first mover, which owes its activity to
itself alone, which must be its own activity, which must be pure
act, because activity presupposes being, and self-activity
presupposes self-being.
DE COELO ET MUNDO
St. Thomas commented further, on the two books of De generatione
et corruptione. [26] Of the.
De meteoris [27] he explained the first two books. Of the De coelo
et mundo, [28] the first three books.
Reading the work last mentioned, De coelo, [29] we see that
Aristotle had already observed the acceleration of speed in a
falling body and noted that its rate of speed grows in proportion
to its nearness to the center of the earth. Of this law, later to
be made more precise by Newton, St. Thomas gives the following
foundation: The speed of a heavy body increases in proportion to
its distance from the height whence it fell. [30].
In regard to astronomy, let the historians have the word.
Monsignor Grabmann [31] and P. Duhem [32] give Aquinas the glory
of having maintained, [33] speaking of the Ptolemaic system, that
the hypotheses on which an astronomic system rests do not change
into demonstrated truths by the mere fact that the consequences of
those hypotheses are in accord with observed facts. [34].
DE ANIMA
In psychology Aquinas expounds the three books of De anima, [35]
the opusculum De sensu et sensato, [36] and the De memoria. [37].
In De anima, he examines the opinions of Aristotle's predecessors,
particularly those of Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato. He
insists on the unity of the soul in relation to its various
functions. [38] Following Aristotle, he shows that the soul is the
first principle of vegetative life, of sense life, of rational
life, since all vital faculties arise from the one soul. [39].
How are these faculties to be defined? By the objects to which
they are proportioned. [40] Having studied vegetative functions,
he turns to sensation. Here we have penetrating analysis of the
Aristotelian doctrine on characteristic sense objects (color,
sound, and so on): and on sense objects per accidens (in a man,
say, who is moving toward us). These sense objects per accidens
(called in modern language "acquired perceptions") explain the so-
called errors of sense. [41].
St. Thomas gives also [42] a profound explanation of this text
from Aristotle: "As the action of the mover is received into the
thing moved, so is the action of the sense object, of sound, for
example, received into the sentient subject: this act belongs both
to the thing sensed and to the thing sentient. " St. Thomas
explains as follows: Sonation and audition are both in the
sentient subject, sonation as from the agent, audition as in the
patient. " [43].
Hence the saint, approving realism as does Aristotle, concludes
that sensation, by its very nature, is a relation to objective
reality, to its own proper sense object, and that, where there is
no such sense object, sensation cannot exist. Hallucination indeed
can exist where there is no sense object, but hallucination
presupposes sensation. Echo, says Aristotle, presupposes an
original sound, and even before Aristotle it had been observed
that a man born blind never has visual hallucinations.
The commentary [44] insists at length that the thing which knows
becomes, in some real sense, the object known, by the likeness
thereof which it has received. Thus, when the soul knows necessary
and universal principles, it becomes, in some real fashion, all
intelligible reality. [45] This truth presupposes the
immateriality of the intellective faculty. [46].
This same truth further presupposes the influence of the "agent
intellect, " [47] which, like an immaterial light, actualizes the
intelligible object, contained potentially in sense objects, [48]
and which imprints that object on our intelligence. That
imprinting results in apprehension from which arises judgment and
then reasoning. [49] The saint had already formulated the precise
object [50] of human intelligence, namely, the intelligible being
in sense objects. In the mirror of sense we know what is
spiritual, namely, the soul itself, and God.
Just as intelligence, because it reaches the necessary and
universal, is essentially distinct from sense, from sense memory,
and from imagination, so too, the will (the rational appetite):
since it is ruled only by unlimited universal good and is free in
face of all limited, particular good, must likewise be distinct
from sense appetite, from all passions, concupiscible or
irascible. [51].
Immortality, a consequence of spirituality, immortality of the
human intellect and the human soul, may seem doubtful in certain
texts of Aristotle. [52] Other texts, more frequent, [53] affirm
this immortality. These latter texts are decisive, if the agent
intellect is, as St. Thomas understands, a faculty of the soul to
which corresponds a proportionate intelligence which knows the
necessary and universal, and hence is independent of space and
time. These latter texts are further clarified by a text in the
Nicomachean Ethics, [54] which seems to exclude all hesitation.
METAPHYSICA
The saint's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysica has three chief
divisions:
1. Introduction to the Metaphysica.
2. Ontology.
3. Natural Theology.
The Introduction
Metaphysics is conceived as wisdom, science pre-eminent. Now
science is the knowledge of things by their causes. Metaphysics,
therefore, is the knowledge of all things by their supreme causes.
After examining the views of Aristotle's predecessors, Thomas
shows that it is possible to know things by their supreme causes,
since in no kind of cause can the mind regress to infinity. The
proper object of metaphysics is being as being. From this superior
viewpoint metaphysics must again examine many problems already
studied by the Physica from the viewpoint of becoming.
This introduction concludes with a defense, against the Sophists,
of the objective validity of reason itself, and of reason's first
principle, the principle of contradiction. [55] He who denies this
principle affirms a self-destructive sentence. To deny this
principle is to annihilate language, is to destroy all substance,
all distinction between things, all truths, thoughts, and even
opinions, all desires and acts. We could no longer distinguish
even the degrees of error. We would destroy even the facts of
motion and becoming, since there would be no distinction between
the point of departure and the point of arrival. Further, motion
could have none of the four causes as explanation. Motion would be
a subject which becomes, without efficient cause, without purpose
or nature. It would be attraction and repulsion, freezing and
melting, both simultaneously.
A more profound defense of the objective validity of reason and
reason's first law has never been written. Together with the
saint's defense of the validity of sensation, it can be called
Aristotle's metaphysical criticism, Aristotelian criteriology.
"Criticism" is here employed, not in the Kantian sense of the
word, but in its Greek root (krinein): which means "to judge" and
the correlate noun derived from that verb (krisis) [56] Genuine
criticism, then, is self-judgment, judgment reflecting on its own
nature, in order to be sure it has attained its essential, natural
object, namely, objective truth, to which it is naturally
proportioned, as is the eye to color, the ear to sound, the foot
to walking, and wings to flying. He who wishes to understand the
saint's work De veritate must begin by absorbing his commentary on
the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysica.
Ontology
This name may be given to the saint's commentary on the fifth
book. It begins with Aristotle's philosophic vocabulary. Guided by
the concept of being as being, St. Thomas explains the principal
terms, nearly all of them analogical, which philosophy employs.
Here is a list of these terms: principle, cause, nature,
necessity, contingence, unity (necessary or accidental):
substance, identity, priority, potency, quality, relation, and so
forth.
Further, he treats of being as being in the sense order, where he
considers matter and form, not now in relation to becoming, but in
the very being of bodies inanimate or animated. [57] Then he shows
the full value of the distinction between potency and act in the
order of being, affirming that, on all levels of being, potency is
essentially proportioned to act; whence follows the very important
conclusion: act is necessarily higher than the potency
proportioned to that act. In other words, the imperfect is for the
sake of the perfect as the seed for the plant. Further, the
perfect cannot have the imperfect as sufficient cause. The
imperfect may indeed be the material cause of the perfect, but
this material cannot pass from potentiality to actuality unless
there intervenes an anterior and superior actuality which acts for
that superior end to which it is itself proportioned. Only the
superior can explain the inferior, otherwise the more would come
from the less, the more perfect from the less perfect, contrary to
the principles of being, of efficient causality, of finality. Here
lies the refutation of materialistic evolutionism, where each
successive higher level of being remains without explanation,
without cause, without reason. [58].
Book X treats of unity and identity. The principle of identity,
which is the affirmative form of the principle of contradiction,
is thus formulated: "That which is, is, " or again: "Everything
that is, is one and the same. " From this principle there follows
the contingence of everything that is composed, of everything that
is capable of motion. Things that are composite presuppose a
unifying cause, because elements in themselves diverse cannot
unite without a cause which brings them together. Union has its
cause in something more simple than itself: unity.
Natural Theology
The third part of Aristotle's Metaphysica can be called natural
theology. St. Thomas comments on two books only, the eleventh and
the twelfth, omitting the others which deal with Aristotle's
predecessors.
The eleventh book is a recapitulation, dealing with the
preliminaries for proving the existence of God. The twelfth book
gives the actual proofs for the existence of God, of pure act.
Since act is higher than potency, anything at all which passes
from potency to act supposes, in last analysis, an uncaused cause,
something that is simply act, with no admixture of potentiality,
of imperfection. Hence God is "thought of thought, "
"understanding of understanding, " not only independent,
subsistent being, but likewise subsistent understanding, ipsum
intelligere subsistens. Pure act, being the plenitude of being, is
likewise the Supreme Good, which draws to itself all else. In this
act of drawing, in this divine attraction, St. Thomas, in
opposition to many historians, sees not merely a final cause, but
also an efficient cause, because, since every cause acts for an
end proportioned to itself, the supreme agent alone is
proportioned to the supreme end. Subordination of agents
corresponds to subordination of ends. Since the higher we rise,
the more closely do agent and purpose approach, the two must
finally be one. God, both as agent and as goal, draws all things
to Himself. [59].
Let us note on this point the final words of St. Thomas. "This is
the philosopher's conclusion: [60} There is one Prince of the
universe, namely, He who is the first mover, the first
intelligible, and the first good, He who above is called God, who
is unto all ages the Blessed One. Amen. ".
But what he does not find in Aristotle is the explicit concept of
creation from nothing, nor of eternal creation, and far less of
free and non-eternal creation.
COMMENTARIES ON THE ETHICS
St. Thomas comments on two works of Aristotle's ethical and moral
treatises.
1. The Nichomachean Ethics. [61].
2. The Politica. [62].
The Nicomachean Ethics
Following Aristotle, the saint here shows that ethics is the
science of the activity of the human person, a person who is free,
master of his own act, but who, since he is a rational being, must
act for a rational purpose, a purpose that is in itself good,
whether delectable or useful, but higher than sense good. In this
higher order of good man will find happiness, that is, the joy
which follows normal and well-ordered activity, as youth is
followed by its flowering. Man's conduct, therefore, must be in
harmony with right reason. He must pursue good that is by nature
good, rational good, and thus attain human perfection, wherein, as
in the goal to which nature is proportioned, he will find
happiness. [63].
By what road, by what means do we reach this goal, this human
perfection? By the road of virtue. Virtue is the habit of acting
freely in accord with right reason. This habit is acquired by
repeated voluntary and well-ordered acts. It grows thus into a
second nature which these acts make easy and connatural. [64].
Certain virtues have as goal the control of passions. Virtue does
not eradicate these passions, but reduces them to a happy medium,
between excess and defect. But this medium is at the same time the
summit. Thus fortitude, for example, rises above both cowardice
and rashness. Temperance, above intemperance and insensibility.
[65].
Similarly, generosity holds the highway, between prodigality and
avarice. Magnificence, between niggardliness and ostentation.
Magnanimity, between pusillanimity and ambition. Meekness defends
itself, without excessive violence, but also without feebleness.
[66].
But disciplining the passions does not suffice. We must likewise
regulate our relations with other persons by giving each his due.
Here lies the object of justice. And justice has three fields of
operation. Commutative justice acts in the world of material
exchanges, where the norm is equality or equivalence. Above it
lies distributive justice, which assigns offices, honors, rewards,
not by equality, but by proportion, according to each man's
fitness and merit. Highest of all is legal justice, which upholds
the laws established for the well-being of society. Finally we
have equity, which softens the rigor of the law, when, under the
circumstances, that rigor would be excessive. [67].
These moral virtues must be guided by wisdom and prudence. Wisdom
is concerned with the final purpose of life, that is, the
attainment of human perfection. Prudence deals with the means to
that end. It is prudence which finds the golden middle way for the
moral virtues. [68].
Under given circumstances, when, for instance, our fatherland is
in danger, virtue must be heroic. [69].
Justice, indispensable for social life, needs the complement which
we call friendship. Now there are three kinds of friendship. There
is, first, pleasant friendship, to be found in youthful
associations devoted to sport and pleasure. There is, secondly,
advantageous friendship, as among business-men with common
interests. Finally there is virtuous friendship, uniting those,
for example, who are concerned with public order and the needs of
their neighbor. This last kind of friendship, rising above
pleasure and interest, presupposes virtue, perseveres like virtue,
makes its devotees more virtuous. It means an ever active good
will and good deed, which maintains peace and harmony amid
division and partisanship. [70].
By the practice of these virtues man can reach a perfection still
higher, namely, that of the contemplative life, which gives
genuine happiness. Joy, in truth, is the normal flowering of well-
ordered activity. Hence the deepest joy arises from the activity
of man's highest power, namely, his mind, when that power is
occupied in contemplating its highest object, which is God, the
Supreme Truth, the Supreme Intelligible. [71].
Here we find those words of Aristotle which seem to affirm most
strongly the personal immortality of the soul. St. Thomas is
pleased to underline their importance. Aristotle's words on
contemplation run as follows: "It will in truth, if it is
lifelong, constitute perfect happiness. But such an existence
might seem too high for human condition. For then man lives no
longer as mere man, but only is as far as he possesses some divine
character. As high as this principle is above the composite to
which it is united, so high is the act of this principle above
every other act. Now if the spirit, in relation to man, is
something divine, divine likewise is such a life. Hence we must
not believe those who counsel man to care only for human affairs
and, under pretext that man is mortal, advise him to renounce what
is immortal. On the contrary, man must immortalize himself, by
striving with all his might to live according to what is most
excellent in himself. This principle is higher than all the rest.
It is the spirit which makes man essentially man. ".
Many historians have noted, as did St. Thomas, that in this text
the Greek [72] word for mind signifies a human faculty, a part of
the soul, a likeness which is participated indeed from the divine
intelligence, but which is a part of man's nature. Man it is whom
Aristotle counsels to give himself to contemplation, thus to
immortalize himself as far as possible. He goes so far as to say
that this mind [73] constitutes each of us.
This summary may let us see why St. Thomas made such wide use of
these ethical doctrines in theology. They serve him in explaining
why acquired virtue is inferior to infused virtue. They serve
likewise to explore the nature of charity, which is supernatural
friendship, uniting the just man to God, and all God's children to
one another. [74].
The Politica
St. Thomas commented the first two books, and the first six
chapters of the third book. What follows in the printed commentary
comes from Peter of Auvergne. [75].
We note at once how Aristotle differs from Plato. Plato,
constructing a priori his ideal Republic, conceives the state as a
being whose elements are the citizens and whose organs are the
classes. To eliminate egoism, Plato suppresses family and
property. Aristotle on the contrary, based on observation and
experience, starts from the study of the family, the first human
community. The father, who rules the family, must deal, in one
fashion with his wife, in another with his children, in still
another with his slaves. He remarks that affection is possible
only between determinate individuals. Hence, if the family were
destroyed there would be no one to take care of children, who,
since they would belong to everybody, would belong to nobody, just
as, where property is held in common, everyone finds that he
himself works too much and others too little.
Aristotle, presupposing that private ownership is a right, finds
legitimate titles to property in traditional occupation, in
conquest, in labor. He also holds that man is by his nature
destined to live in society, since he has need of his fellow men
for defense, for full use of exterior goods, for acquiring even
elementary knowledge. Language itself shows that man is destined
for society. Hence families unite to form the political unity of
the city, which has for its purpose a good common to all, a good
that is not merely useful and pleasurable, but is in itself good,
since it is a good characteristic of rational beings, a good based
on justice and equity, virtues that are indispensable in social
life.
These are the principal ideas proposed by Aristotle in the first
books of the Politica, and deeply expounded by St. Thomas. In the
Summa [76] he modifies Aristotle's view of slavery. Still, he
says, the man who cannot provide for himself should work for, and
be directed by, one wiser than himself.
In the second book of the Politica we study the constitutions of
the various Greek states. Thomas accepts Aristotle's inductive
bases, and will employ them in his work De regimine principum.
[77] In the nature of man he finds the origin and the necessity of
a social authority, represented in varying degree by the father in
the family, by the leader in the community, by the sovereign in
the kingdom.
He distinguishes, further, good government from bad. Good
government has three forms: monarchical, where one alone rules,
aristocratic, where several rule, democratic, where the rule is by
representatives elected by the multitude. But each of these forms
may degenerate: monarchy into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy,
democracy into mob-rule The best form of government he finds in
monarchy, but, to exclude tyranny, he commends a mixed
constitution, which provides, at the monarch's side, aristocratic
and democratic elements in the administration of public affairs.
[78] Yet, he adds, if monarchy in fact degenerates into tyranny,
the tyranny, to avoid greater evils, should be patiently
tolerated. If, however, tyranny becomes unbearable, the people may
intervene, particularly in an elective monarchy. It is wrong to
kill the tyrant. [79] He must be left to the judgment of God, who,
with infinite wisdom, rewards or punishes all rulers of men.
On the evils of election by a degenerate people, where demagogues
obtain the suffrages, he remarks, citing St. Augustine, that the
elective power should, if it be possible, be taken from the
multitude and restored to those who are good. St. Augustine's
words run thus: "If a people gradually becomes depraved, if it
sells its votes, if it hands over the government to wicked and
criminal men, then that power of conferring honors is rightly
taken from such a people and restored to those few who are good. "
[80].
St. Thomas commented [81] also the book De causis. This book had
been attributed to Aristotle, but the saint shows that its origin
is neo-Platonic. He likewise expounded [82] a work by Boethius: De
hebdomadibus. His commentary on Plato's Timaeus has not been
preserved.
All these commentaries served as broad and deep preparation for
the saint's own personal synthesis. In that synthesis he reviews,
under the double light of revelation and reason, all these
materials he had so patiently analyzed. The synthesis is
characterized by a grasp higher and more universal of the
principles which govern his commentaries, by a more penetrating
insight into the distinction between potency and act, into the
superiority of act, into the primacy of God, the pure act.
The saint knew and employed some of Plato's dialogues: Timaeus,
Menon, Phaedrus. He also knew Plato as transmitted by Aristotle.
And St. Augustine passed on to him the better portion of Plato's
teaching on God and the human soul. Neo-Platonism reached him
first by way of the book De causis, attributed to Proclus, and
secondly by the writings of pseudo-Dionysius, which he also
commented.
Among the special philosophic books which the saint wrote, we must
mention four: De unitate intellectus (against the Averroists): De
substantiis separatis, De ente et essentia, De regimine principum.
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL WORKS
The saint's chief theological works are:
1. Commentaries.
a) on Scripture.
b) on the Sentences.
c) on the Divine Names.
d) on the Trinity.
e) on the Weeks.
2. Personal works.
a) Summa contra Gentes.
b) Disputed Questions.
c) the Quodlibets.
d) The Summa theologiae.
St. Thomas commented on these books of the Old Testament:
a) the Book of Job.
b) b) the Psalms (I-5 I).
c) the Canticle of Canticles.
d) the Prophet Isaias.
e) the Prophet Jeremias.
f) the Lamentations.
In the New Testament, he commented on the following books:
a) the Four Gospels.
b) the Epistles of St. Paul.
He wrote further a work called Catena aurea ("chain of gold"): a
running series of extracts from the Fathers on the four Gospels.
Here follows a list of those Fathers of the Church whom,
throughout these works, the saint cites most frequently:
Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Leo the Great, Gregory the
Great, Basil, John Damascene, Anselm, Bernard.
In his commentary on the Sentences, we see that the saint is
keenly aware of the omissions and imperfections of previous
theological work, and we observe how his own personal thought
becomes more precisely established. Peter the Lombard had divided
theology, not according to its proper object, but in relation to
two acts of the will: to enjoy; to use.
a) Things to be enjoyed: the Trinity, God's knowledge, power, and
will.
b) Things to be used: the angels, man, grace, sin.
c) Things to be both enjoyed and used: Christ, the sacraments, de
novissimis.
St. Thomas sees the necessity of a more objective division, based
on the proper object of theology, namely, God Himself. Hence his
division of theology:
1. God, the source of all creatures.
2. God, the goal of all creatures.
3. God, the Savior, who, as man, is man's road to God.
In the Sentences, moreover, moral questions are treated,
accidentally, as occasioned by certain dogmatic questions. Thomas
notes the necessity of explicit treatment, on beatitude, on human
acts, on the passions, on the virtues, on the states of life, and
he becomes ever more conscious of the value of the principles
which underlie his synthesis, on God, on Christ, on man.
The work Contra Gentes defends the Christian faith against the
contemporary errors, especially against those which came from the
Arabians. In the first books the saint examines truths which are
demonstrable by reason, the preambles of faith. Then in the fourth
book he deals with supernatural truths. Here St. Thomas treats
especially of the mysteries, of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the
sacraments, the way to heaven.
In each chapter of this work he sets forth a great number of
arguments bound together by simple adverbs: "again, " "further, "
"likewise, " "besides. " You may at first think the arguments
proceed by mere juxtaposition. Nevertheless they are well ordered.
Some are direct proofs, others are indirect, showing how his
opponent tends to absurdity or inadmissible consequences. We do
not have as yet the simple step-by-step procedure of the Summa
theologiae, where we often find, in the body of the article, only
one characteristic proof, ex propria ratione. And, when many
proofs do occur, we clearly see their order, and the reason why
each is introduced (e. g.: a special kind of causality).
In the Disputed Questions the saint examines the more difficult
problems, beginning each article with as many as ten or twelve
arguments for the affirmative, proceeding then to give as many to
the negative, before he settles determinately on the truth.
Through this complexity, for and against, he marches steadily
onward to that superior simplicity which characterizes the Summa,
a simplicity pregnant with virtual multiplicity, a precious and
sublime simplicity, unperceived by many readers who see there only
the platitudes of Christian common sense, because such readers
have not entered by patient study of the Disputed Questions. Here,
in these extended questions, the saint's progress is a slow, hard
climb to the summit of the mountain, whence alone you can survey
all these problems in unified solution.
The most important of the Disputed Questions are these four: De
veritate, De potentia, De malo, De spiritualibus creaturis. The
Quodlibets represent the same mode of extended research on various
contemporary questions.
The Summa itself, then, gives us that higher synthesis, formed
definitively in the soul of St. Thomas. This work, he says, in the
prologue, was written for beginners. [83] Its order is logical.
[84] It excludes everything that would hinder the student's
advance: overlapping, long-windedness, useless questions,
accessory and accidental arguments.
For this end he first determines theology's proper object: God, as
revealed, inaccessible to mere reason. [85] This proper object
determines the divisions, [86] as follows:
1. God, one in nature, three in person, Creator of the world.
2. God, the goal of creatures.
3. God, incarnate in Christ, who is the road to God.
This work reveals the saint at his best. He is master of all
details studied in previous works. More and more he sees
conclusions in their first principles. He exemplifies [87] his own
teaching on "circular" contemplation, which returns always to one
central, pre-eminent thought, better to seize all the force of its
irradiation. His principles, few in number but immense in reach,
illumine from on high a great number of questions.
Now intellectual perfection is based precisely on this unity, on
this pre-eminent simplicity and universality, which imitates that
one simple knowledge whereby God knows all things at a glance.
Thus, in the Summa, we may single out, say, fifty articles which
illumine the other three thousand articles, and thus delineate the
character of the Thomistic synthesis. We think therefore that the
proper kind of commentary on the Summa is one which does not lose
itself in long disquisitions, but rather emphasizes those higher
principles which illumine everything else. Genuine theological
science is wisdom. Its preoccupation is, not so much to elicit new
conclusions, as to reduce all conclusions, more numerous or less,
to the same set of principles, just as all sides of a pyramid meet
at the summit. This process is not lifeless repetition. Rather
this timely insistence on the supreme point of the synthesis is a
higher fashion of approaching God's manner of knowing, whereof
theology is a participation.
This permanent value of the saint's doctrine finds its most
authoritative expression in the encyclical Aeterni Patris. Leo
XIII speaks there as follows: "St. Thomas synthesized his
predecessors, and then augmented greatly this synthesis, first in
philosophy, by mounting up to those highest principles based on
the nature of things, secondly by distinguishing precisely and
thus uniting more closely the two orders of reason and faith,
thirdly by giving to each order its full right and dignity. Hence
reason can hardly rise higher, nor faith find more solid support.
" Thus Leo XIII.
Definitive recognition of the authority of St. Thomas lies in the
words of the Code of Canon Law: "Both in their own study of
philosophy and theology, and in their teaching of students in
these disciplines, let the professors proceed according to the
Angelic Doctor's method, doctrine and principles, which they are
to hold sacred. " [88].
CHAPTER 3: THE THOMISTIC COMMENTATORS
WE deal here with those commentators only who belong to the
Thomistic school properly so called. We do not include eclectic
commentators, who indeed borrow largely from Thomas, but seek to
unite him with Duns Scotus, refuting at times one by the other, at
the risk of nearly always oscillating between the two, without
ever taking a definite stand.
In the history of commentators we may distinguish three periods.
During the first period we find defensiones against the various
adversaries of Thomistic doctrine. In the second period
commentaries appear properly so called. They comment the Summa
theologiae. They comment, article by article, in the methods we
may call classical, followed generally before the Council of
Trent. In the third period, after the Council, in order to meet a
new fashion of opposition, the commentators generally no longer
follow the letter of the Summa article by article, but write
disputationes on the problems debated in their own times. Each of
the three methods has its own raison d'etre. The Thomistic
synthesis has thus been studied from varied viewpoints, by
contrast with other theological systems. Let us see this process
at work in each of these periods.
The first Thomists appear at the end of the thirteenth century and
the beginning of the fourteenth. They defend St. Thomas against
certain Augustinians of the ancient school, against the
Nominalists and the Scotists. We must note in particular the works
of Herve de Nedellec against Henry of Ghent; of Thomas Sutton
against Scotus, of Durandus of Aurillac against Durandus of Saint-
Pourcain and against the first Nominalists.
Next, in the same period, come works on a larger scale. Here we
find John Capreolus, [89] whose Defensiones [90] earned him the
title princeps thomistarum. Capreolus follows the order of the
Lombard Sentences, but continually compares the commentaries of
Thomas on that work with texts of the Summa theologiae and of the
Disputed Questions. He writes against the Nominalists and the
Scotists. Similar works were written in Hungary by Peter Niger,
[91] in Spain by Diego of Deza, [92] the protector of Christopher
Columbus. With the introduction of the Summa as textbook, explicit
commentaries on the Summa theologiae began to appear. First in the
field was Cajetan (Thomas de Vio). His commentary [93] is looked
upon as the classic interpretation of St. Thomas. Then followed
Conrad Kollin, [94] Sylvester de Ferraris, [95] and Francis of
Vittoria. [96] Vittoria's work remained long in manuscript and was
lately published. [97] A second work of Vittoria, Relectiones
theologicae, was likewise recently published. [98].
Numerous Thomists took part in the preparatory work for the
Council of Trent. Noted among these are Bartholomew of Carranza,
Dominic Soto, Melchior Cano, Peter de Soto. The Council [99]
itself, in its decrees on the mode of preparation for
justification, reproduces the substance of an article by St.
Thomas. [100] Further, in the following chapter on the causes of
justification, the Council again reproduces the teaching of the
saint. [101] When on April 11 1567, four years after the end of
the Council, Thomas of Aquin was declared doctor of the Church,
Pius V, [102] in commending the saint's doctrine as destruction of
all heresies since the thirteenth century, concluded with these
words: "As clearly appeared recently in the sacred decrees of the
Council of Trent. " [103].
After the Council of Trent, the commentators, as a rule, write
Disputationes. Dominic Banez, an exception, explains still article
by article. The chief names in this period are Bartholomew of
Medina, [104] and Dominic Banez. [105] We must also mention Thomas
of Lemos 1629): Diego Alvarez (1635): John of St. Thomas (1644):
Peter of Godoy (1677). All these were Spaniards. In Italy we find
Vincent Gotti (1742): Daniel Concina (1756): Vincent Patuzzi
(1762): Salvatore Roselli (1785). In France, Jean Nicolai (1663):
Vincent Contenson (1674): Vincent Baron (1674): John Baptist Gonet
(1681): A. Goudin (1695): Antonin Massoulie (1706): Hyacinth Serry
(1738). In Belgium, Charles Rene Billuart (1751). Among the
Carmelites we mention: the Complutenses, Cursus philosophicus,
[106] and the Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus. [107].
Let us here note the method and importance of the greatest among
these commentators. Capreolus [108] correlates, as we saw above,
the Summa and the Disputed Questions with the Sententiae of the
Lombard. Answering the Nominalists and the Scotists, he sets in
relief the continuity of the saint's thought.
Sylvester de Ferraris shows that the content of the Contra Gentes
is in harmony with the higher simplicity of the Summa theologiae.
He is especially valuable on certain great questions: the natural
desire to see God [109]: the infallibility of the decrees of
providence; [110] the immutability in good and in evil of the soul
after death, from the first moment of its separation from the
body. [111] Sylvester's commentary is reprinted in the Leonine
edition of the Summa contra Gentes.
Cajetan comments on the Summa theologiae article by article, shows
their interconnection, sets in relief the force of each proof,
disengages the probative medium. Then he examines at length the
objections of his adversaries, particularly those of Durandus and
Scotus. His virtuosity as a logician is in the service of
intuition. Cajetan's sense of mystery is great. Instances will
occur later on when he speaks of the pre-eminence of the Deity.
Cajetan is likewise the great defender of the distinction between
essence and existence. [112] His commentary on the Summa
theologiae was reprinted in the Leonine edition. [113].
Dominic Banez is a careful commentator, profound, sober, with
great powers, logical and metaphysical. Attempts have been made to
turn him into the founder of a new theological school. But, in
reality, his doctrine does not differ from that of St. Thomas.
What he adds are but more precise terms, to exclude false
interpretations. His formulas do not exaggerate the saint's
doctrine. Even such terms as "predefinition" and
"predetermination" had been employed by Aquinas in explaining the
divine decrees. [114] A Thomist may prefer the more simple and
sober terms which St. Thomas ordinarily employs, but on condition
that he understands them well and excludes those false
interpretations which Banez had to exclude. [115].
John of St. Thomas wrote a very valuable Cursus philosophicus
thomisticus. [116] Subsequent authors of philosophic manuals, E.
Hugon, O. P.: J. Gredt, O. S. B.: X. Maquart, rest largely on him.
J. Maritain likewise finds in them much inspiration. In John's
theological work, Cursus theologicus, [117] we find disputationes
on the great questions debated at his time. He compares the
teaching of St. Thomas with that of others, especially with that
of Suarez, of Vasquez, of Molina. John is an intuitionist, even a
contemplative, rather than a dialectician. At the risk of
diffusiveness, he returns often to the same idea, to sound its
depths and irradiations. He may sound repetitious, but this
continual recourse to the same principles, to these high
leitmotifs, serves well to lift the penetrating spirit to the
heights of doctrine. John insists repeatedly on the following
doctrines: analogy of being, real distinction between essence and
existence, obediential potency, divine liberty, intrinsic
efficaciousness of divine decrees and of grace, specification of
habits and acts by their formal object, the essential
supernaturalness of infused virtue, the gifts of the Holy Spirit
and infused contemplation. John should be studied also on the
following questions: the personality of Christ, Christ's grace of
union, Christ's habitual grace, the causality of the sacraments,
the transubstantiation, and the sacrifice of the Mass.
In their methods the Carmelites of Salamanca, the Salmanticenses,
resemble John of St. Thomas. They first give, in summary, the
letter of the article, then add disputationes and dubia on
controverted questions, discussing opposed views in detail. Some
of these dubia on secondary questions may seem superfluous. But he
who consults the Salmanticenses on fundamental questions must
recognize in them great theologians, in general very loyal to the
teaching of St. Thomas. You may test this statement in the
following list of subjects: the divine attributes, the natural
desire to see God, the obediential potency, the absolute
supernaturalness of the beatific vision, the intrinsic
efficaciousness of divine decrees and of grace, the essential
supernaturalness of infused virtues, particularly of the
theological virtues, the personality of Christ, His liberty, the
value, intrinsically infinite, of His merits and satisfaction, the
causality of the sacraments, the essence of the sacrifice of the
Mass.
Gonet, who recapitulates the best of his predecessors, but also,
on many questions, does original work, is marked by great clarity.
So likewise is Cardinal Gotti, who gives a wider attention to
positive theology. Billuart, more briefly than Gonet, gives a
substantial summary of the great commentators. He is generally
quite faithful to Thomas, often quoting in full the saint's own
words.
While we do not cite in detail the works of contemporary Thomists,
we must mention N. del Prado's two works: De veritate fundamentali
philosophiae christianae, [118] and De Gratia et libero arbitrio.
[119] He closely follows Banez. Further, A. Gardeil's three works:
La credibilite et l'apologetique, [120] Le donne revele et la
theologie, [121] and La structure de l'ame et l'experience
mystique. [122] Inspired chiefly by John of St. Thomas, his work
is still personal and original.
Among those who contributed to the resurgence of Thomistic study,
before and after Leo XIII, we must mention eight names:
Sanseverino, Kleutgen, S. J.: Cornoldi, S. J.: Cardinal Zigliara,
O. P.: Buonpensiere, O. P.: L. Billot, S. J.: G. Mattiussi, S. J.:
and Cardinal Mercier.
FIRST PART: Metaphysical Synthesis of Thomism
The metaphysical synthesis is above all a philosophy of being, an
ontology, differing entirely from a philosophy of appearance
(phenomenalism): from a philosophy of becoming (evolutionism): and
from a philosophy of the ego (psychologism). Hence our first
chapter will deal with intelligible being, the primary object of
intelligence, and with the first principles arising from that
object. A second chapter will show the precision given to the
metaphysical synthesis by the first principle of act and potency,
with the chief applications of this rich and fruitful principle.
CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGIBLE BEING AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
ST. THOMAS, following Aristotle, teaches that the intelligible
being, the intelligible reality, existing in sense objects is the
first object of the first act of our intellect, i. e.: that
apprehension which precedes the act of judging. Listen to his
words: "The intellect's first act is to know being, reality,
because an object is knowable only in the degree in which it is
actual. Hence being, entity, reality, is the first and proper
object of understanding, just as sound is the first object of
hearing. " [123] Now being, reality, is that which either exists
(actual being) or can exist (possible being): "being is that whose
act is to be. " [124] Further, the being, the reality, which our
intellect first understands, is not the being of God, nor the
being of the understanding subject, but the being, the reality,
which exists in the sense world, "that which is grasped
immediately by the intellect in the presence of a sense object. "
[125] Our intellect, indeed, is the lowest of all intelligences,
to which corresponds, as proper and proportioned object, that
intelligible reality existing in the world of sense. [126] Thus
the child, knowing by sense, for example, the whiteness and the
sweetness of milk, comes to know by intellect the intelligible
reality of this same sense object. "By intellect he apprehends as
reality that which by taste he apprehends as sweet. " [127].
In the intelligible reality thus known, our intellect seizes at
once its opposition to non-being, an opposition expressed by the
principle of contradiction: Being is not non-being. "By nature our
intellect knows being and the immediate characteristics of being
as being, out of which knowledge arises the understanding of first
principles, of the principle, say, that affirmation and denial
cannot coexist (opposition between being and non-being): and other
similar principles. " [128] Here lies the point of departure in
Thomistic realism.
Thus our intellect knows intelligible reality and its opposition
to nothing, before it knows explicitly the distinction between me
and non-me. By reflection on its own act of knowledge the
intellect comes to know the existence of that knowing act and its
thinking subject. Next it comes to know the existence of this and
that individual object, seized by the senses. [129] In
intellective knowledge, the universal comes first; sense is
restricted to the individual and particular.
From this point of departure, Thomistic realism is seen to be a
limited realism, since the universal, though it is not formally,
as universal, in the individual sense object, has nevertheless its
foundation in that object. This doctrine rises thus above two
extremes, which it holds to be aberrations. One extreme is that of
absolute realism held by Plato, who held that universals (he calls
them "separated ideas") exist formally outside the knowing mind.
The other extreme is that of Nominalism, which denies that the
universal has any foundation in individual sense objects, and
reduces it to a subjective representation accompanied by a common
name. Each extreme leads to error. Platonist realism claims to
have at least a confused intuition of the divine being (which it
calls the Idea of Good). Nominalism opens the door to empiricism
and positivism, which reduce first principles to experimental laws
concerning sense phenomena. The principle of causality, for
example, is reduced to this formula: every phenomenon presupposes
an antecedent phenomenon. First principles then, conceived
nominalistically, since they are no longer laws of being, of
reality, but only of phenomena, do not allow the mind to rise to
the knowledge of God, the first cause, beyond the phenomenal
order.
This limited moderate realism of Aristotle and Aquinas is in
harmony with that natural, spontaneous knowledge which we call
common sense. This harmony appears most clearly in the doctrine's
insistence on the objective validity and scope of first
principles, the object of our first intellectual apprehension.
These principles are laws, not of the spirit only, not mere
logical laws, not laws merely experimental, restricted to
phenomena, but necessary and unlimited laws of being, objective
laws of all reality, of all that is or can be.
Yet even in these primary laws we find a hierarchy. One of them,
rising immediately from the idea of being, is the simply first
principle, the principle of contradiction; it is the declaration
of opposition between being and nothing. It may be formulated in
two ways, one negative, the other positive. The first may be given
either thus: "Being is not nothing, " or thus: "One and the same
thing, remaining such, cannot simultaneously both be and not be. "
Positively considered, it becomes the principle of identity, which
may be formulated thus: "If a thing is, it is: if it is not, it is
not. " This is equivalent to saying: "Being is not non-being. "
Thus we say, to illustrate: "The good is good, the bad is bad, "
meaning that one is not the other. [130] According to this
principle, that which is absurd, say a squared circle, is not
merely unimaginable, not merely inconceivable, but absolutely
irrealizable. Between the pure logic of what is conceivable and
the concrete material world lie the universal laws of reality. And
here already we find affirmed the validity of our intelligence in
knowing the laws of extramental reality. [131].
To this principle of contradiction or of identity is subordinated
the principle of sufficient reason, which in its generality may be
formulated thus: "Everything that is has its raison d'etre, in
itself, if of itself it exists, in something else, if of itself it
does not exist. " But this generality must be understood in senses
analogically different.
First. The characteristics of a thing, e. g.: a circle, have their
raison d'etre in the essence (nature) of that thing.
Secondly. The existence of an effect has its raison d'etre in the
cause which produces and preserves that existence, that is to say,
in the cause which is the reason not only of the "becoming, " but
also of the continued being of that effect. Thus that which is
being by participation has its reason of existence in that which
is being by essence.
Thirdly. Means have their raison d'etre in the end, the purpose,
to which they are proportioned.
Fourthly. Matter is the raison d'etre of the corruptibility of
bodies.
This principle, we see, is to be understood analogically,
according to the order in which it is found, whether that order is
intrinsic (the nature of a circle related to its characteristics):
or extrinsic (cause, efficient or final, to its effects). When I
ask the reason why, says St. Thomas, [132] I must answer by one of
the four causes. Why has the circle these properties? By its
intrinsic nature. Why is this iron dilated? Because it has been
heated (efficient cause). Why did you come? For such or such a
purpose. Why is man mortal? Because he is a material composite,
hence corruptible.
Thus the raison d'etre, answering the question "why" (propter
quid): is manifold in meaning, but these different meanings are
proportionally the same, that is, analogically. We stand here at a
central point. We see that the efficient cause presupposes the
very universal idea of cause, found also in final cause, and in
formal cause, as well as in the agent. [133] Thus the principle of
sufficient reason had been formulated long before Leibnitz.
We come now to the principle of substance. It is thus formulated:
"That which exists as the subject of existence [134] is substance,
and is distinct from its accidents or modes. " [135] Thus in
everyday speech we call gold or silver a substance. This principle
is derived from the principle of identity, because that which
exists as subject of existence is one and the same beneath all its
multiple phenomena, permanent or successive. The idea of substance
is thus seen to be a mere determination of the idea of being.
Inversely, being is now conceived explicitly as substantial. Hence
the conclusion: The principle of substance is simply a
determination of the principle of identity: accidents then find
their raison d'etre in the substance. [136].
The principle of efficient causality also finds its formula as a
function of being. Wrong is the formula: "Every phenomenon
presupposes an antecedent phenomenon. " The right formula runs
thus: "Every contingent being, even if it exists without
beginning, [137] needs an efficient cause and, in last analysis,
an uncreated cause. " Briefly, every being by participation (in
which we distinguish the participating subject from the
participated existence) depends on the Being by essence. [138].
The principle of finality is expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas in
these terms: "Every agent acts for a purpose. " The agent tends to
its own good. But that tendency differs on different levels of
being. It may be, first, a tendency merely natural and
unconscious, for example, the tendency of the stone toward the
center of the earth, or the tendency of all bodies toward the
center of the universe. Secondly, this tendency may be accompanied
by sense knowledge, for example, in the animal seeking its
nourishment. Thirdly, this tendency is guided by intelligence,
which alone knows purpose as purpose, [139] that is, knows purpose
as the raison d'etre of the means to reach that purpose. [140].
On this principle of finality depends the first principle of
practical reason and of morality. It runs thus: "Do good, avoid
evil. " It is founded on the idea of good, as the principle of
contradiction on the idea of being. In other words: The rational
being must will rational good, that good, namely, to which its
powers are proportioned by the author of its nature. [141].
All these principles are the principles of our natural
intelligence. They are first manifested in that spontaneous form
of intelligence which we call common sense, that is, the natural
aptitude of intelligence, before all philosophic culture, to judge
things sanely. Common sense, natural reason, seizes these self-
evident principles from its notion of intelligible reality. But
this natural common sense could not yet give these principles an
exact and universal formulation. [142].
As Gilson [143] well remarks, Thomistic realism is founded, not on
a mere postulate, but on intellectual grasp of intelligible
reality in sense objects. Its fundamental proposition runs thus:
[144] The first idea which the intellect conceives, its most
evident idea into which it resolves all other ideas, is the idea
of being. Grasping this first idea, the intellect cannot but grasp
also the immediate consequences of that idea, namely, first
principles as laws of reality. If human intelligence doubts the
evidence of, say, the principle of contradiction, then -as
Thomists have repeated since the seventeenth century -the
principle of Descartes [145] simply vanishes. If the principle of
contradiction is not certain, then I might be simultaneously
existent and non-existent, then my personal thought is not to be
distinguished from impersonal thought, nor personal thought from
the subconscious, or even from the unconscious. The universal
proposition, Nothing can simultaneously both be and not be, is a
necessary presupposition of the particular proposition, I am, and
I cannot simultaneously be and not be. Universal knowledge
precedes particular knowledge. [146].
This metaphysical synthesis, as seen thus far, does not seem to
pass notably beyond ordinary natural intelligence. But, in truth,
the synthesis, by justifying natural intelligence, does pass
beyond it. And the synthesis will rise higher still by giving
precision to the doctrine on act and potency. How that precision
has been reached is our next topic.
CHAPTER 5: ACT AND POTENCY
THE doctrine on act and potency is the soul of Aristotelian
philosophy, deepened and developed by St. Thomas. [147].
According to this philosophy, all corporeal beings, even all
finite beings, are composed of potency and act, at least of
essence and existence, of an essence which can exist, which limits
existence, and of an existence which actualizes this essence. God
alone is pure act, because His essence is identified with His
existence. He alone is Being itself, eternally subsistent.
The great commentators often note that the definition of potency
determines the Thomistic synthesis. When potency is conceived as
really distinct from all act, even the least imperfect, then we
have the Thomistic position. If, on the other hand, potency is
conceived as an imperfect act, then we have the position of some
Scholastics, in particular of Suarez, and especially of Leibnitz,
for whom potency is a force, a virtual act, merely impeded in its
activity, as, for example, in the restrained force of a spring.
This conceptual difference in the primordial division of created
being into potency and act has far-reaching consequences, which it
is our task to pursue.
Many authors of manuals of philosophy ignore this divergence and
give hardly more than nominal definitions of potency and act. They
offer us the accepted axioms, but they do not make clear why it is
necessary to admit potency as a reality between absolute nothing
and actually existing being. Nor do they show how and wherein real
potency is distinguished, on the one hand, from privation and
simple possibility, and on the other from even the most imperfect
act.
We are now to insist on this point, and then proceed to show what
consequences follow, both in the order of being and in the order
of operation. [148].
ARTICLE ONE: POTENCY REALLY DISTINCT FROM ACT
According to Aristotle, [149] real distinction between potency and
act is absolutely necessary if, granting the multiplied facts of
motion and mutation in the sense world, facts affirmed by
experience, we are to reconcile these facts with the principle of
contradiction or identity. Here Aristotle [150] steers between
Parmenides, who denies the reality of motion, and Heraclitus, who
makes motion and change the one reality.
Parmenides has two arguments. The first runs thus: [151] If a
thing arrives at existence it comes either from being or from
nothing. Now it cannot come from being (statue from existing
statue). Still less can it come from nothing. Therefore all
becoming is impossible. This argument is based on the principle of
contradiction or identity, which Parmenides thus formulates: Being
is, non-being is not; you will never get beyond this thought.
Multiplicity of beings, he argues again from the same principle,
is likewise impossible. Being, he says, cannot be limited,
diversified, and multiplied by its own homogeneous self, but only
by something else. Now that which is other than being is non-
being, and non-being is not, is nothing. Being remains eternally
what it is, absolutely one, identical with itself, immutable.
Limited, finite beings are simply an illusion. Thus Parmenides
ends in a monism absolutely static which absorbs the world in God.
Heraclitus is at the opposite pole. Everything is in motion, in
process of becoming, and the opposition of being to non-being is
an opposition purely abstract, even merely a matter of words. For,
he argues, in the process of becoming, which is its own sufficient
reason, being and non-being are dynamically identified. That which
is in the process of becoming is already, and nevertheless is not
yet. Hence, for Heraclitus, the principle of contradiction is not
a law of being, not even of the intelligence. It is a mere law of
speech, to avoid self-contradiction. Universal becoming is to
itself sufficient reason, it has no need of a first cause or of a
last end.
Thus Heraclitus, like Parmenides, ends in pantheism. But, whereas
the pantheism of Parmenides is static, an absorption of the world
into God, the pantheism of Heraclitus is evolutionist, and
ultimately atheistic, for it tends to absorb God into the world.
Cosmic evolution is self-creative. God, too, is forever in the
process of becoming, hence will never be God.
Aristotle, against Heraclitus, holds that the principle of
contradiction or of identity is a law, not merely of the inferior
reason and of speech, but of the higher intelligence, and
primarily of objective reality. [152] Then he turns to solve the
arguments of Parmenides.
Plato, attempting an answer to Parmenides, had admitted, on the
one side, an unchangeable world of intelligible ideas, and on the
other, a sense world in perpetual movement. To explain this
movement, he held that matter, always transformable, is a medium
between being and nothing, is "non-being which somehow exists. "
Thus, as he said, he held his hand on the formula of Parmenides,
by affirming that non-being still in some way is. [153]
Confusedly, we may say, he prepared the Aristotelian solution,
deepened by St. Thomas.
Aristotle's solution, more clear and profound than Plato's, rests
on his distinction of potency from act, a distinction his thought
could not escape. [154].
In fact, that which is in process of becoming cannot arise from an
actual being, which already exists. The statue, in process of
becoming, does not come from the statue which already exists. But
the thing in process of becoming was at first there in potency,
and hence arises from unterminated being, from real and objective
potency, which is thus a medium between the existing being and
mere nothing. Thus the statue, while in process, comes from the
wood, considered not as existing wood, but as sculptilis. Further,
the statue, after completion, is composed of wood and the form
received from the sculptor, which form can give place to another.
The plant is composed of matter and specific (substantial) form
(oak or beech): and the animal likewise (lion, deer).
The reality of potency is thus a necessary prerequisite if we are
to harmonize the data of sense (e. g.: multiplicity and mutation)
with the principle of contradiction or of identity, with the
fundamental laws, that is, of reality and of thought. That which
begins, since it cannot come either from actuality or from
nothing, must come from a reality as yet undetermined, but
determinable, from a subject that is transformable, as is the
prime matter in all bodies, or as is second matter, in wood, say,
or sand, or marble, or seed. In the works above cited St. Thomas
gives explicit development to this conception of the Stagirite.
Let us briefly note these clarifications.
a) Potency, that which is determinable, transformable, is not mere
nothing. "From nothing nothing comes, " [155] said Parmenides. And
this is true, even admitting creation ex nihilo, because creation
is instantaneous, unpreceded by a process of becoming, [156] with
which we are here concerned.
b) Potency, the transformable, is not the mere negation of
determined form, not the privation, in wood, say, of the statue
form. For negation, privation, is in itself nothing, hence again
"from nothing comes nothing. " Further, the privation of statue-
form is found in gases and liquids, say, out of which the statue
cannot be made.
c) Potency, the determinable, out of which arises the statue, is
not the essence of the wood, which makes wood to be actually wood.
Neither is it the actual figure of the wood to be carved, because
what already is is not in process of becoming. [157].
d) Neither is potency identified with the imperfect figure of the
statue that is in process of becoming, for that figure is
imperfect actuality. The imperfect figure is not the determinable
potency, but is already motion toward the statue to be.
But now this determinableness, transformableness: what is it
positively? What is this real, objective potency, presupposed to
motion, to mutation, to transformation? It is a real capacity to
receive a definite, determined form, the form, say, of the statue,
a capacity which is not in air or water, but is in wood, or
marble, or sand. This capacity to become a statue is the statue in
potency.
Here lies Aristotle's superiority to Plato. Plato speaks of "non-
being which in some way is. " He seems to be thinking of privation
or simple possibility, or of an imperfect actuality. His
conception of matter, and of non-being in general, remains quite
obscure when compared with the Aristotelian concept of potency,
passive or active.
St. Thomas excels in explaining this distinction, just now noted,
between passive potency and active potency. Real passive potency
is not simple possibility. Simple possibility is prerequired and
suffices for creation ex nihilo. But it does not suffice as
prerequisite for motion, change, mutation. Mutation presupposes a
real subject, determinable, transformable, mutable, whereas
creation is the production of the entire created being, without
any presupposed real potency. [158] Now, since active potency,
active power, must be greater in proportion to its passive
correlative, it follows that when passive potency is reduced to
zero, the active potency must be infinite. In other words, the
most universal of effects, the being of all things, cannot be
produced except by the most universal of all causes, that is, by
the Supreme Being. [159].
Real potency admitted, we have against Parmenides the explanation,
not merely of mutation and becoming, but also of multiplicity.
Form, of itself unlimited, is limited by the potency into which it
is received. The form then, say of Apollo, can be multiplied by
being received into different parts of wood or marble. And from
this viewpoint, as long as that which was in potency is now in
act, this real potency remains beneath the act. The wood, by
receiving the statue-form, limits and holds this form and can even
lose it and receive another form. The form of Apollo, as long as
it remains in this particular piece of wood, is thereby limited,
individualized, and as such, irreproducible. But a similar form
can be reproduced in another portion of matter and that in
indefinitum.
ARTICLE TWO: ACT LIMITED BY POTENCY
Act, being completion, perfection, is not potency, which is the
capacity to receive perfection: and act, perfection, is limited
only by the potency which is its recipient. This truth is thus
expressed in two texts of St. Thomas: "Form, even the lowest
material form, if it be supposed, either really or mentally,
separate from matter, is specifically one and one only. If
whiteness, e. g.: be understood as apart from any subject of
whiteness, it becomes impossible to suppose many whitenesses. "
[160] Again: "Things which agree in species and differ by number,
agree in form and differ only in matter. Hence since the angels
are not composed of matter and form, it is impossible to have two
angels agreeing in species. " [161].
This doctrine is embodied in the second of the twenty-four theses,
approved by the Sacred Congregation of Studies in 1914. That
thesis runs thus: "Act, perfection, is limited only by potency,
which is the capability of receiving perfection. Hence, in an
order of pure act, only one unlimited act can exist. But where act
is limited and multiplied, there act enters into real composition
with potency. " [162].
From this principle, upheld by St. Thomas and his entire school,
follow many consequences, both in the order of being and in the
order of activity, since activity is proportioned to the agent's
mode of being.
ARTICLE THREE
First we will indicate, rising from lower to higher, the
consequences in the order of being.
a) Matter is not form; it is really distinct from form. Let us
look attentively at substantial mutation. We take two instances.
First, a lion is burned, and there remain only ashes and bones.
Secondly, food, by assimilative, digestive power, is changed into
human flesh. These substantial mutations necessarily presuppose in
the thing to be changed a subject capable of a new form but in no
way as yet determined to that form, because, if it had already
some such determination, that determination would have to be a
substance (like air or water): and the mutations in question would
no longer be substantial, but only accidental.
The subject of these mutations, therefore, must be purely
potential, pure potency. Prime matter is not combustible, not
"chiselable, " and yet is really determinable, always
transformable. This pure potency, this simple, real capacity, to
receive a new substantial form, is not mere nothing (from nothing,
nothing comes) ; nor is it mere privation of the form to come; nor
is it something substantial already determined. It is not, says
St. Thomas, [163] substance or quality or quantity or anything
like these. Nor is it the beginning (inchoatio) of the form to
come. It is not an imperfect act. The wood which can be carved is
not yet, as such, the beginning of the statue-form. the imperfect
act is already motion toward the form. It is not the potency
prerequired before motion can begin.
This capacity to receive a substantial form is therefore a
reality, a real potency, which is not an actuality. It is not the
substantial form, being opposed to it, as the determinable, the
transformable, is opposed to its content. Now, if, in reality,
antecedently to any act of our mind, matter, pure potency, is not
the substantial form, then it is really distinct from form.
Rather, it is separable from form, for it can lose the form it has
received, and receive another though it cannot exist deprived of
all form. Corruption of one form involves necessarily the
generation of another form. [164].
From the distinction, then, of potency from act arises between
prime matter and form that distinction required to explain
substantial mutation. Consequently prime matter has no existence
of its own. Having no actuality of itself, it exists only by the
existence of the composite. Thomas says: "Matter of itself has
neither existence nor cognoscibility " [165].
In this same manner Aquinas, after Aristotle, explains the
multiplication of substantial form, since matter remains under
form, limits that form, and can lose that form. The specific form
of lion, a form which is indefinitely multipliable, is, by the
matter in which it exists, limited to constitute this individual
lion, this begotten and corruptible composite.
Aristotle already taught this doctrine. In the first two books of
his Physica he shows with admirable clearness the truth, at least
in the sense world, of this principle. Act, he says, is limited
and multiplied by potency. act determines potency, actualizes
potency, but is limited by that same potency. The figure of Apollo
actualizes this portion of wax, but is also limited by it,
enclosed in it, as content in vessel, and as such is thus no
longer multipliable, though it can be multiplied in other portions
of wax or marble. [166].
Aristotle studied this principle in the sense world. St. Thomas
extends the principle, elevates it, sees its consequences, not
only in the sense world, but universally, in all orders of being,
spiritual as well as corporeal, even in the infinity of God.
b) Created essence is not its own existence, but really
distinguished from that existence. The reason, says St. Thomas,
why the substantial, specific form is limited in sense objects (e.
g.: lion) lies precisely in this: Form, act, perfection, precisely
by being received into a really containing capacity, is thereby
necessarily limited (made captive) by that container. Under this
formula, the principle holds good even in the supersense order:
Act, he says, being perfection, can be limited only by the
potency, the capacity which receives that perfection. [167] Now,
he continues, existence is actuality, even the ultimate actuality.
[168] And he develops this thought as follows: "Existence is the
most perfect of realities. It is everywhere the ultimate
actuality, since nothing has actuality except as it is. Hence
existence is the actuality of all things, even of forms
themselves. Hence existence is never related as receiver is
related to content, but rather as content to receiver. When I
speak of the existence of a man, say, or of a horse, or of
anything else whatever, that existence is in the order of form,
not of matter. It is the received perfection, not the subject
which receives existence. " [169].
Further, since existence (esse) is of itself unlimited, it is
limited in fact only by the potency into which it is received,
that is, by the finite essence capable of existence. By
opposition, then "as the divine existence (God's existence) is not
a received existence, but existence itself, subsistent,
independent existence, it is clear that God is infinitely and
supremely perfect. " [170] Consequently God is really and
essentially distinct from the world of finite things. [171].
This doctrine is affirmed by the first of the twenty-four
Thomistic theses: Potency and act divide being in such fashion
that everything which exists is either pure act, or then is
necessarily composed of potency and act, as of two primary and
intrinsic principles. [172].
For Suarez, on the contrary, everything that is, even prime
matter, is of itself in act though it may be in potency to
something else. Since he does not conceive potency [173] as the
simple capacity of perfection, he denies the universality of the
principle: act is limited only by potency. Here are his words:
"Act is perhaps limited by itself, or by the agent which produces
the act. " [174].
The question arises: Does this principle, "act is limited only by
potency, " admit demonstration? In answer, we say that it cannot
be proved by a direct and illative process of reasoning, because
we are not dealing here with a conclusion properly so called, but
truly with a first principle, which is self-evident (per se
notum): on condition that we correctly interpret the meaning of
its terms, subject and predicate. Nevertheless the explanation of
these terms can be expressed in a form of reasoning, not illative,
but explicative, containing at the same time an indirect
demonstration, which shows that denial of the principle leads to
absurdity. This explicative argument may be formulated as here
follows.
An act, a perfection, which in its own order is of itself
unlimited (for example, existence or wisdom or love) cannot in
fact be limited except by something else not of its own order,
something which is related to that perfection and gives the reason
for that limitation. Now, nothing else can be assigned as limiting
that act, that perfection, except the real potency, the capacity
for receiving that act, that perfection. Therefore that act, as
perfection of itself unlimited, cannot be limited except by the
potency which receives that act.
The major proposition of this explicative argument is evident. If,
indeed, the act (of existence, of wisdom, of love) is not of
itself limited, it cannot in fact be limited except by something
extraneous to itself, something which gives the reason for the
limitation. Thus the existence of the stone (or plant, animal,
man) is limited by its nature, by its essence, which is
susceptible of existence (quid capax existendi). Essence, nature,
gives the reason of limitation, because it is intrinsically
related to existence, it is a limited capability of existence.
Similarly wisdom in man is limited by the limited capacity of his
intelligence, and love by the limited capacity of his loving
power.
Nor is the minor proposition of the argument less certain. If you
would explain how an act, a perfection, of itself unlimited is in
point of fact limited, it is not sufficient, pace Suarez, to
appeal to the agent which produces that act, because the agent is
an extrinsic cause, whereas we are concerned with finding the
reason for this act's intrinsic limitation, the reason why the
being, the existence, of the stone, say (or of the plant, the
animal, the man): remains limited, even though the notion of
being, of existence implies no limit, much less of different
limits. Just as the sculptor cannot make a statue of Apollo
limited to a portion of space, unless there is a subject (wood,
marble, sand) capable of receiving the form of that statue: so
likewise the author of nature cannot produce the stone (or the
plant, the animal, the man) unless there is a subject capable of
receiving existence, and of limiting that existence according to
the different capacities found in stone, plant, and animal.
Hence St. Thomas says: "God produces simultaneously existence and
the subject which receives existence. " [175] And again: "In the
idea of a made thing lies the impossibility of its essence being
its existence because subsistent, independent existence is not
created existence. " [176].
Were this position not admitted, the argument of Parmenides,
renewed by Spinoza, would be insoluble. Parmenides denied
multiplicity in the sense world, because being cannot be limited,
diversified, multiplied of itself, he says, but only by something
other than itself, and the only thing other than being is non-
being, is pure nothing.
To this argument our two teachers reply: Besides existence there
is a real capacity which receives and limits existence. [177] This
capacity, this recipient, which limits existence, is not nothing,
is not privation, is not imperfect existence; it is real objective
potency, really distinct from existence, just as the transformable
wood remains under the statue figure it has received, just as
prime matter remains under the substantial form, really distinct
from that form which it can lose. As, antecedently to
consideration by our mind, matter is not form, is opposed to form,
as that which is transformable is opposed to that which informs,
thus likewise the essence of the stone (the plant, the animal) is
not its existence. Essence, as essence (quid capax existendi):
does not contain actual existence, which is a predicate, not
essential, but contingent. Nor does the idea of existence as such
imply either limitation or diversity in limitation (as, say,
between stone and plant).
To repeat: Finite essence is opposed to its existence as the
perfectible to actualizing perfection, as the limit to the limited
thing, as the container to the content. Antecedently to any
thought of ours, this proposition is true: Finite essence is not
its own existence. Now, if in an affirmative judgment, the verb
"is" expresses real identity between subject and predicate, [178]
then the negation denies this real identity and thus affirms real
distinction.
How is this distinction to be perceived? Not by the senses, not by
the imagination, but by the intellect, which penetrating more
deeply (intus legit): sees that finite essence, as subject, does
not contain existence, which is not an essential predicate, since
it is contingent.
A wide difference separates this position from that which says:
Being is the most simple of ideas, hence all that in any way
exists is being in act, though it may often be in potency to
something else. Thus prime matter is already imperfectly in act,
and finite essence is also in act, and is not really distinct from
its existence Thus Suarez. [179].
A follower of Suarez, P. Descoqs, S. J.: writes thus concerning
the first [180] of the twenty-four Thomistic theses: "Now if it is
maintained that this thesis reproduces faithfully the teaching of
Cajetan, and of subsequent authors inspired by Cajetan, I would
certainly not demur. But however hard he tries, no one will show,
and the chief commentators, however hard they have tried, have not
been able to show, that the said teaching is found in the Master.
" [181].
Must we then say that the Congregation of Studies was in error,
when, in 1914, it approved as genuine expression of the doctrine
of St. Thomas, both that first thesis here in question and the
other theses derived from that first? Is it true, as the article
just cited maintains, [182] that St. Thomas never said that, in
every created substance there is, not merely a logical
composition, but a real composition of two principles really
distinct, one of these principles, essence, subjective potency,
being correlated to the other, existence, which is its act?
Now surely St. Thomas does say just this, and says it repeatedly.
Beyond texts already cited, listen to the following passage:
"Everything that is in the genus of substance is composed by a
real composition, because, being substance, it is subsistent
(independent) in its being. Hence its existence is something other
than itself, otherwise it could not by its existence differ from
other substances with which in essence it agrees, this condition
being required in all things which are directly in the
predicaments. Hence everything that is in the genus of substance
is composed, at least of existence and essence (quod est). " [183]
The beginning of this passage shows that the composition in
question is not merely logical, but is real. Thus the passage says
exactly what the first of the twenty-four theses says.
Let us hear another passage. "Just as every act (existence) is
related to the subject in which it is, just so is every duration
related to its now. That act however, that existence, which is
measured by time, differs from its subject both in reality
(secundum rem): because the movable thing is not motion, and in
succession, because the substance of the movable thing is
permanent, not successive. But that act, which is measured by
aevum, namely, the existence of the thing which is aeviternal,
differs from its subject in reality, but not in succession,
because both subject and existence are each without succession.
Thus we understand the difference between aevum and its now. But
that existence which is measured by eternity is in reality
identified with its subject, and differs from it only by way of
thought. " [184].
The first text just quoted says that in every predicamental
substance there is a real composition between potency and act. The
second text says that in substances measured by aevum (the angels)
there is real distinction between existence and its subject. This
is exactly the doctrine expressed by the first of the twenty-four
theses.
We may add one more quotation from St. Thomas: "Hence each created
substance is composed of potency and act, that is, of subject and
existence, as Boethius says, [185] just as the white thing is
composed of white thing and whiteness. " [186] Now the saint
certainly holds that there is real distinction between the white
subject and its whiteness, between substance and accident. In both
cases then, between substance and accident, and between essence
and existence, we have a distinction which is not merely logical,
subsequent to our way of thinking, but real, an expression of
objective reality.
Antecedently to our way of thinking, so we may summarize
Aristotle, matter is not the substantial form, and matter and form
are two distinct intrinsic causes. St. Thomas supplements
Aristotle with this remark: In every created being there is a real
composition of potency and act, at least of essence and existence.
[187] Were it otherwise, the argument of Parmenides against
multiplicity of beings would remain insoluble. As the form is
multiplied by the diverse portions of matter into which it is
received, just so is existence (esse) multiplied by the diverse
essences, or better, diverse subjects, [188] into which it is
received.
To realize this truth you have but to read one chapter in Contra
Gentes. [189] The composition there defended is not at all merely
logical composition (of genus and differentia specifica, included
in the definition of pure spirits): but rather a real composition:
essence is not really identified with existence, which only
contingently belongs to essence.
Throughout his works, St. Thomas continually affirms that God
alone is pure act, that in Him alone is essence identified with
existence. [190] In this unvaried proposition he sees the deepest
foundation of distinction between uncreated being and created
being. [191] Texts like these could be endlessly multiplied. See
Del Prado, [192] where you will find them in abundance.
The first of the twenty-four theses, then, belongs to St. Thomas.
In defending that thesis we are not pursuing a false scent, a
false intellectual direction, on one of the most important points
of philosophy, namely, the real and essential distinction between
God and the creature, between pure act, sovereignly simple and
immutable, and the creature always composed and changing. [193].
On this point, it is clear, there is a very notable difference
between St. Thomas and Suarez, who in some measure returns to the
position of Duns Scotus. Now this difference rests on a difference
still more fundamental, namely, a difference in the very idea of
being (ens): which ontology deals with before it deals with the
divisions of being. To this question we now turn.
THE IDEA OF BEING
Being, for St. Thomas, [194] is a notion, not univocal but
analogous, since otherwise it could not be divided and
diversified. A univocal idea (e. g.: genus) is diversified by
differences extrinsic to genus (animality, e. g.: by specific
animal differences). Now, nothing is extrinsic to being (ens).
Here Parmenides enters. Being, he says, cannot be something other
than being, and the only other thing than being is nothing, is
non-being, and non-being is not. St. Thomas replies: "Parmenides
and his followers were deceived in this: They used the word being
(ens) as if it were univocal, one in idea and nature, as if it
were a genus. This is an impossible position. Being (ens) is not a
genus, since it is found in things generically diversified. "
[195].
Duns Scotus [196] returns in a manner to the position of
Parmenides, that being is a univocal notion. Suarez, [197] seeking
a middle way between Aquinas and Scotus, maintains that the
objective concept of being (ens) is simply one (simpliciter unus):
and that consequently everything that is in any manner (e. g.:
matter and essence) is being in act (ens in actu). This viewpoint
granted, we can no longer conceive pure potency. It would be extra
ens, hence, simply nothing. The Aristotelian notion of real
potency (medium between actuality and nothing) disappears, and the
argument of Parmenides is insoluble.
We understand now why, shortly after the Council of Trent, a
Thomist, Reginaldus, O. P.: [198] formulated as follows the three
principles of St. Thomas:
Ens (being) is a notion transcendent and analogous, not univocal.
God is pure act, God alone is His own existence.
Things absolute have species from themselves; things relative from
something else.
METAPHYSICAL IDEA OF GOD
From this initial ontological divergence we have noted between St.
Thomas and Suarez there arises another divergence, this time at
the summit of metaphysics. Thomists maintain that the supreme
truth of Christian philosophy is the following: In God alone are
essence and existence identified. Now this is denied by those who
refuse to admit the real distinction between created essence and
existence.
According to Thomists this supreme truth is the terminus, the
goal, of the ascending road which rises from the sense world to
God, and the point of departure on the descending road, which
deduces the attributes of God and determines the relation between
God and the world. [199].
From this supreme truth, that God alone is His own existence,
follow, according to Thomists, many other truths, formulated in
the twenty-four Thomistic theses. We will deal with this problem
later on, when we come to examine the structure of the theological
treatise, De Deo uno. Here we but note the chief truths thus
derived.
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DISTINCTION
God, since He is subsisting and unreceived being, is infinite in
perfection. [200] In Him there are no accidents, because existence
is the ultimate actuality, hence cannot be further actualized and
determined. [201] Consequently He is thought itself, wisdom
itself, [202] love itself. [203].
Further, concerning God's relations to creatures we have many
other consequences of the real distinction between act and
potency. Many positions which we have already met on the ascending
road now reappear, seen as we follow the road descending from on
high. There cannot be, for example, two angels of the same
species, for each angel is pure form, irreceivable in matter.
[204] The rational soul is the one sole substantial form of the
human composite, since otherwise man would not be simply a
natural, substantial unity, [205] but merely one per accidens (as
is, e. g.: the unity between material substance and the accident
of quantity). For substantial unity cannot arise from actuality
plus actuality, but only from its own characteristic potency and
its own characteristic actuality. [206] Consequently the human
composite has but one sole existence (see the sixteenth of the
twenty-four Thomistic theses). Similarly, in every material
substance there is but one existence, since neither matter nor
form has an existence of its own; they are not id quod est, but id
quo [207] (see the ninth of the twenty-four). The principle of
individuation, which distinguishes, e. g.: two perfectly similar
drops of water, is matter signed with quantity, the matter, that
is, into which the substantial form of water has been received,
but that matter as proportioned to this quantity (proper to this
drop) rather than to another quantity (proper to another drop).
[208].
Again, prime matter cannot exist except under some form, for that
would be "being in actuality without act, a contradiction in
terms. " [209] Prime matter is not "that which is (id quod est): "
but "that by which a thing is material, and hence limited. " [210]
Consequently "matter of itself has no existence, and no
cognoscibility. " [211] Matter, namely, is knowable only by its
relation to form, by its capacity to receive form. The form of
sense things, on the contrary, being distinct from matter, is of
itself and directly knowable in potency. [212] Here is the reason
for the objectivity of our intellectual knowledge of sense
objects. Here also the reason why immateriality is the root of
both intelligibility and intellectuality. [213].
ARTICLE FOUR
We come now to the applications of our principle in the order of
action, operation, which follows the order of being. [214] Here we
will briefly indicate the chief consequences, on which we must
later dwell more at length.
Powers, faculties, habitudes differ specifically, not of
themselves, but by the formal object, the act to which they are
proportioned. [215] Consequently the soul faculties are really
distinct from the soul, and each is really distinct from all
others. [216] No sense faculty can grasp the proper object of the
intelligence, nor sense appetite the proper object of the will.
[217].
"Whatever is moved (changed) is moved by something else. " [218]
This principle is derived from the real distinction between
potency and act. Nothing can pass from potency to act except by a
being already in act, otherwise the more would come from the less.
In this principle is founded the proof from motion, from change,
for God's existence. [219] Now, for Suarez, this principle is
uncertain, for he says, "there are many things which, by virtual
acts, are seen to move and reduce themselves to formal acts, as
may be seen in appetite or will. " [220] Against this position we
must note that if our will is not its own operation, its own act
of willing, if "God alone is His own will, as He is His own act of
existence, and His own act of knowing, " then it follows that our
will is only a potency, only a capability of willing, and cannot
consequently be reduced to act except by divine motion. Were it
otherwise, the more would come from the less, the more perfect
from the less perfect, contrary to the principle of causality.
[221] St. Thomas speaks universally: "However perfect you conceive
any created nature, corporeal or spiritual, it cannot proceed to
its act unless it is moved thereto by God. " [222].
The next consequence deals with causal subordination. In a series
of causes which are subordinated necessarily (per se, not per
accidens): there is no infinite regress; we must reach a supreme
and highest cause, without which there would be no activity of
intermediate causes, and no effect. [223].
We are dealing with necessary subordination. In accidental
subordination, regress in infinitum is not an absurdity. In human
lineage, for example, the generative act of the father depends,
not necessarily, but accidentally, on the grandfather, who may be
dead. But such infinite regress is absurd in a series necessarily
subordinated, as, for example, in the following: "the moon is
attracted by the earth, the earth by the sun, the sun by another
center, and thus to infinity. Such regress, we must say, is
absurd. If there is no first center of attraction, here and now in
operation, then there would be no attraction anywhere. Without an
actually operating spring the clock simply stops. All its wheels,
even were they infinite in number, cause no effect. " [224].
This position Suarez denies. He speaks thus: "In causes
necessarily (per se) subordinated, it is no absurdity to say that
these causes, though they be infinite in number, can nevertheless
operate simultaneously. " [225] Consequently Suarez [226] denies
the demonstrative validity of the proofs offered by St. Thomas for
God's existence. He explains his reason for departing from the
Angelic Doctor. He substitutes for divine motion what he calls
"simultaneous cooperation. " [227] The First Cause, he says, does
not bring the intermediate second cause to its act, is not the
cause of its activity. In a series of subordinated causes, higher
causes have influence, not on lower causes, but only on their
common effect. All the causes are but partial causes, influencing
not the other causes, but the effect only. [228] All the causes
are coordinated rather than subordinated. Hence the term:
simultaneous concursus, illustrated in two men drawing a boat.
[229].
This view of Suarez is found also in Molina. Molina says: "When
causes are subordinated, it is not necessary that the superior
cause moves the inferior cause, even though the two causes be
essentially subordinated and depend on each other in producing a
common effect. It suffices if each has immediate influence on the
effect. " [230] This position of Molina supposes that active
potency can, without impulse from a higher cause, reduce itself to
act. But he confuses active potency with virtual act, which of
itself leads to complete act. Now, since a virtual act is more
perfect than potency, we have again, contrary to the principle of
causality, the more perfect issuing from the less perfect.
St. Thomas and his school maintain this principle: No created
cause is its own existence, or its own activity, hence can never
act without divine premotion. In this principle lies the heart of
the proofs, by way of causality, for God's existence. [231].
All these consequences, to repeat, follow from the real
distinction between potency and act. From it proceed.
the real distinction between matter and form,
the real distinction between finite essence and existence,
the real distinction between active potency and its operation.
In the supernatural order we find still another consequence from
the idea of potency, namely, obediential potency, that is, the
aptitude of created nature, either to receive a supernatural gift
or to be elevated to produce a supernatural effect. This potency
St. Thomas conceives as the nature itself, of the soul, say, as
far as that nature is suited for elevation to a superior order.
This suitableness means no more than non-repugnance, since God can
do in us anything that is not self-contradictory. [232].
For Suarez, [233] on the contrary, this obediential potency, which
he regards as an imperfect act, is rather an active potency, as if
the vitality of our supernatural acts were natural, instead of
being a new, supernatural life. Thomists answer Suarez thus: An
obediential potency, if active, would be natural, as being a
property of our nature, and simultaneously supernatural, as being
proportioned to an object formally supernatural. [234].
A last important consequence, again in the supernatural order, of
the real distinction between potency and act, between essence and
existence, runs as follows: In Christ there is, for both natures,
the divine and the human, one sole existence, the existence,
namely, of the Word who has assumed human nature. [235] Suarez, on
the contrary, who denies real distinction between created essence
and its existence, has to admit two existences in Christ. This
position reduces notably the intimacy of the hypostatic union.
Such then are the principal irradiations of the Aristotelian
distinction between potency and act. Real, objective potency is
not act, however imperfect. But it is essentially proportioned to
act. [236] Next come consequences in the four kinds of causes,
with the absurdity, in necessary causal subordination, of regress
in infinitum, either in efficient causality or in final causality.
Culmination of these consequences is the existence of God, pure
act, at the summit of all existence, since the more cannot come
from the less, and in the giver there is more than in the
receiver. The first cause, therefore, of all things cannot be
something that is not as yet, but is still in process of becoming,
even if you call that process self-creating evolution. The first
cause is act, existing from all eternity, is self-subsisting
Being, in whom alone essence and existence are identified. Already
here we see that nothing, absolutely no reality, can exist without
Him, without depending on Him, without a relation to Him of causal
dependence on Him. Our free act of will, being a reality, has to
Him the same relation of causal dependence, and is thereby, as we
shall see, not destroyed, but on the contrary, made an actual
reality. [237].
This metaphysical synthesis, as elaborated by Aquinas, while far
more perfect than the doctrine explicitly taught by Aristotle, is
nevertheless, philosophically speaking, merely the full
development of that doctrine. In Aristotle the doctrine is still a
child. In Aquinas it has grown to full age. Now this progress,
intrinsically philosophic, was not carried on without the
extrinsic concurrence of divine revelation. Revelation, for St.
Thomas, was not, in philosophy, a principle of demonstration. But
it was a guiding star. The revealed doctrine of free creation ex
nihilo was, in particular, a precious guide. But under this
continued extrinsic guidance, philosophy, metaphysics, guarded its
own formal object, to which it is by nature proportioned, namely,
being as being, known in the minor sense world. By this formal
object, metaphysics remains specifically distinct from theology,
which has its own distinctive formal object, namely, God as He is
in Himself, [238] God in His own inner life, known only by divine
revelation. And here we can already foresee what harmony, in the
mind of St. Thomas, unites these two syntheses, a harmony wherein
metaphysics gladly becomes the subordinated instrument of
theology. [239].
SECOND PART: Theology and De Deo Uno
CHAPTER 6: THE NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL WORK
MUCH has been written in recent years on the nature of theological
development and in widely divergent directions, also by disciples
of St. Thomas. One much ventilated question is that of the
definability of theological conclusions properly so called,
namely, conclusions obtained by a genuinely illative process, from
one premise of faith and one premise of reason. On this question
Father Marin-Sola [240] is far from being in accord with Father
Reginald M. Schultes, O. P. [241] We have personally written on
this subject, refusing with Father Schultes to admit definability
of the theological conclusion as above defined. [242].
Father Charlier, [243] still more recently, has entered the lists
in diametrical opposition to Father Marin-Sola. His thesis runs
thus: Demonstration, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be
employed in theology. Theology, he argues, cannot of itself arrive
with certitude at these conclusions, which belong to the
metaphysics that the theologian employs rather than to theology
itself. Theology must be content to explain and to systematize the
truths of faith. But, of itself, it can never deduce with
certitude conclusions which are only virtually revealed. [244].
One position then, that of Marin-Sola, holds that theological
reasoning strictly illative can discover truths capable of being
defined as dogmas of faith. The contrary position, that of
Charlier, holds that theology is of itself incapable even of
discovering such truths with certitude.
Neither of these opposed positions is, we think, in accord with
the teaching of St. Thomas and his chief commentators. Genuine
Thomistic teaching, we hold, is an elevated highway, running above
these two extremes. Extended quotation, from the saint and his
best interpreters, would sustain our view. We have elsewhere [245]
followed this method. Here we must be content to attain our goal
by enumerating and outlining the various steps of theological
procedure.
ARTICLE ONE: THE PROPER OBJECT OF THEOLOGY
Theology is a science made possible by the light of revelation.
Theology, therefore, presupposes faith in revealed truths. Hence
the proper object of theology is the inner life of God as knowable
by revelation and faith. By this object theology rises above
metaphysics, which sees in God the first and supreme being, the
author of nature, whereas theology attains God as God (sub ratione
Deitatis). [246].
How does theology differ from faith? The object of theology, in
the theologian who is still viator, is not the Deity clearly seen,
[247] as in the beatific vision, but the Deity known obscurely by
faith. [248] Theology, then, is distinguished from faith, which is
its root, because theology is the science of the truths of faith,
which truths it explains, defends, and compares. Comparing these
truths with one another, theology sees their mutual relations, and
the consequences which they virtually contain. But to use this
method for attaining its proper object, the inner life of God as
God, theology must presuppose metaphysics which sees God as the
Supreme Being. That this is the object of metaphysics is clear, we
may note, from revelation itself. When God says to Moses: "I am
who am, " [249] we recognize in those words the equivalent
statement: God alone is subsistent existence. [250].
Theology, therefore, though here below it proceeds from principles
which are believed, not seen as evident in themselves, is
nevertheless a branch of knowledge, a science in the proper sense
of the word. The characteristic of science is to show "the reason
why this thing has just these properties. " Theology does just
that. It determines the nature and properties of sanctifying
grace, of infused virtue, of faith, of hope, of charity. St.
Thomas, in defining theology, uses the Aristotelian definition of
science which he had explained in his commentary on the Later
Analytics. [251] To know scientifically, he says, is to know this
thing as what it is and why it cannot be otherwise. Theology then
is a science, not merely in the broad sense of certain knowledge,
but also in the strict sense of conclusions known by principles.
[252].
Such is theology here below. But when the theologian is no longer
viator, when he has received the beatific vision, then, without
medium, in the Word, he will behold the inner life of God, the
divine essence. Then he will know, with fullest light, what before
he knew by faith. And beyond that, extra Verbum, he will see the
conclusions derivable from faith. In heaven, theology will be
perfect, its principles evident. But here below, theology is in an
imperfect state. It has not, so to speak, become adult.
Hence theology, as attainable here below, while it is a science,
and is a subalternate science, resting on the mind of God and the
blessed in heaven, is nevertheless, when compared with all merely
human knowledge, a wisdom specifically higher than metaphysics,
though not as high as the infused faith which is its source.
Theology then, generated by the theological labor, is by its root
essentially supernatural. [253] If, consequently, the theologian
loses faith (by grave sin against that virtue): there remains in
him only the corpse of theology, a body without soul, since he no
longer adheres, formally and infallibly, to revealed truths, the
sources of the theological habit. And this is true, even if,
following his own will and judgment, he still holds materially one
or the other of these truths.
So much on the nature of theology. We must now consider the
different steps, the different procedures, to be followed by the
theologian, if he would avoid opposed and exaggerated extremes.
ARTICLE TWO: STEPS IN THEOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
These steps are pointed out by St. Thomas, first in the first
question of the Summa, [254] secondly, more explicitly, when he
treats of specific subjects: eternal life, for example,
predestination, the Trinity, the mysteries of the Incarnation, the
Redemption, the Eucharist, and the other sacraments. We
distinguish six such successive procedures.
1. The positive procedure.
2. The analytic procedure.
3. The apologetic procedure.
4. The manifestative procedure.
5. The explicative procedure.
6. The illative procedure.
a) of truths explicitly revealed.
b) of truths not explicitly revealed.
c) of truths virtually revealed.
1. Theology accepts the depositum fidei, and studies its
documents, Scripture and tradition, under the guidance of the
teaching Church. This is positive theology, which includes study
of biblical theology, of the documents and organs of tradition, of
the various forms of the living magisterium.
2. The next step is analysis of revealed truths, in particular of
the more fundamental truths, to establish the precise meaning of
the subject and the predicate by which that truth is expressed.
Take, for example, this sentence: The Word was made flesh.
Theological analysis shows that the sentence means: The Word, who
is God, became man. This labor of conceptual analysis appears in
his first articles when St. Thomas begins a new treatise, on the
Trinity, for example, or the Incarnation. In these articles you
will search in vain for a theological conclusion. You will find
but simple analysis, sometimes grammatical, but generally
conceptual, of the subject and predicate of the revealed
proposition.
3. On the next step theology defends revealed truths by showing
either that they are contained in the deposit of faith, or that
they contain no manifest impossibility. [255] No effort is made to
demonstrate positively the intrinsic possibility of the mystery.
If such possibility could be demonstrated by reason alone, then
would the existence of the mystery be likewise demonstrated, for
the Trinity is a being, not contingent, but necessary. The only
thing attempted in this apologetic procedure is to show that there
is no evident contradiction in the proposition which enunciates
the dogma. God is triune, and one. He is "one" by nature, and
"triune" in so far as this unique nature is possessed by three
distinct persons, as in a triangle, to illustrate, the three
angles have the same surface.
4. On the fourth level theology uses arguments of appropriateness,
to illumine, not to demonstrate, revealed truth. Thus, to clarify
the dogma, say, of the Word's eternal generation or that of the
redemptive Incarnation, theology appeals to the following
principle: God is by nature self-diffusive; and the more elevated
good is, the more intimately and abundantly does it communicate
itself. [256] Hence it is appropriate that God, the supreme Good,
communicate His entire nature in the eternal generation of the
Word, and that the Word be incarnate for our salvation. [257]
These mysteries, so runs the common theological doctrine, cannot
be proved, and cannot be disproved, and although they do have a
persuasive probability, they are held with certitude by faith
alone. [258].
5. Further, theology has recourse to explicative reasoning, to
demonstrate, often in strictest form, a truth, not new, but
implicitly contained in a revealed truth. This procedure passes
from a confused formulation of a truth to a more distinct
formulation of the same truth. To illustrate: take the sentence,
The Word, which was God, was made flesh. Against the Arians, that
sentence was thus expressed: The Word, consubstantial with the
Father, was made man. This consubstantiality with the Father,
whatever some writers say, is much more than a theological
conclusion, deduced illatively from a revealed truth. It is a
truth identical, only more explicitly stated, with that found in
the Prologue of St. John's Gospel.
A second illustration: Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will
build My church, and gates of hell shall not prevail against it.
[259] This same truth is expressed, only more explicitly, as
follows: The sovereign pontiff, successor of St. Peter, is
infallible when ex cathedra he teaches the universal Church in
matters of faith and morals. This latter formula does not
enunciate a new truth deduced from the first. In each sentence we
have the same subject and the same predicate, joined by the verb
"to be. " But the language, metaphorical in the first formula,
becomes proper, scientific, in the second.
6a. Again, theology uses reasoning, not merely explicative, but
strictly and objectively illative, to draw from two revealed
truths a third truth, revealed elsewhere, often less explicitly,
in Scripture and tradition. This kind of illative reasoning,
frequent in theology, unites to the articles of the Creed other
truths of faith, and thus forms a body of doctrine, with all
constituent truths in mutual relation and subordination. This body
of doctrine [260] stands higher than all theological systems,
higher even than theological science itself. Thus we understand
the title: De sacra doctrina, given by St. Thomas to the first
question in the Summa theologiae. The first article of that
question is entitled, doctrina fidei. In the following articles,
the subject is doctrina theologica, sacra theologia, which is
declared to be a science, itself superior to systems that have
not, properly speaking, attained the status of science. How the
various elements of this body of doctrine are grouped around the
articles of faith becomes apparent only by that objective illative
procedure, of which we are now speaking, which from two revealed
truths deduces a third which has also been revealed, even at times
explicitly, in Scripture or tradition. To illustrate, let us take
these two statements: first, "Jesus is truly God, " second, "Jesus
is truly man. " From these two statements there follows, by a
strictly illative process, this third statement: Jesus has two
minds and two wills. And this third truth is elsewhere explicitly
revealed, in the words of Jesus Himself: "Not as I will, but as
Thou wilt. " [261].
Now a conclusion of this kind, a conclusion revealed elsewhere,
can evidently be defined by the Church as a dogma of faith. Does
it follow, then, as is sometimes said, that in such cases
theological reasoning is useless? Not at all. Reasoning in such
cases gives us understanding of a truth which before we accepted
only by faith. The characteristic of demonstration is not
necessarily to discover a new truth, but to make the truth known
in its source, its cause. In this kind of reasoning we realize the
full force of the classic definition of theology: faith seeking
self-understanding. [262] This realization is very important.
[263].
6b. Theology uses reasoning, illative in the proper sense, to
deduce from two revealed truths a third truth not revealed
elsewhere, that is, not revealed in itself, but only in the other
two truths of which it is the fruit. Thomists generally admit that
such a conclusion, derived from two truths of faith, is
substantially revealed, and hence can be defined as dogma.
Reasoning enters here only to bring together two truths which of
themselves suffice to make the third truth known. The knowledge of
the third truth depends on the reasoning, not as cause, but only
as condition. [264].
6c. Lastly, from one truth of faith and one of reason, theology,
by a process strictly illative, deduces a third truth. Such a
truth, since it is not revealed simply and properly speaking
(simpliciter): is revealed only virtually, that is, in its cause.
A truth of this kind, strictly deduced, lies in the domain, not of
faith, but of theological science.
A subdivision enters here. In every reasoning process the major
proposition, being more universal, is more important than the
minor. Now, in the present kind of argument the truth of faith may
be either the major or the minor. If the major is of faith, the
conclusion is nearer to revelation than is a conclusion where the
truth of faith forms the minor.
Many theologians, in particular many Thomists, [265] maintain that
a conclusion of this kind, where either premise is a truth of
reason, cannot be defined as a dogma of faith. They argue thus:
Such a conclusion has, simply speaking, not been revealed. It has
been revealed only in an improper sense (secundum quid): only
virtually, in its cause. It is, properly speaking, a deduction
from revelation. It is true, the Church can condemn the
contradictory of such a conclusion, but if she does, she condemns
it, not as heretical, that is, as contrary to the faith, but as
erroneous, that is, contrary to an accepted theological
conclusion.
Exemplifications of the six theological procedures we have now
outlined appear throughout the Summa, particularly in the first
question, and in the structure of all the theological treatises of
St. Thomas.
The reason is now clear, we think, why we cannot admit the two
contrary opinions we spoke of at the beginning of this section.
Not all theological conclusions can be defined as dogmas of faith.
In particular, we cannot admit that the Church can define as
dogma, as simply revealed by God, a truth which is not revealed
simpliciter, but only virtually, secundum quid, in causa.
On the other hand, theology can very well reach certitude in such
a conclusion which lies in its own proper domain, which is more
than a conclusion of metaphysics placed at the service of
theology. Further, the most important task of theology is
evidently not the drawing of these conclusions, but rather the
explanation of the truths of faith themselves, penetration into
their deeper meaning, into their mutual relation and
subordination. In this task theology has, as aids, the gifts of
knowledge and wisdom, by which theological labor becomes more
penetrating and savorous. Conclusions are thus sought, not for
their own sake, but as a road to more perfect understanding of the
truths of faith. Such labor, manifesting the deep inner power of
faith, is proportioned to the scope so beautifully expressed by
the Council of the Vatican: to attain, God granting, some
understanding of the mysteries, an understanding in every way most
fruitful. [266].
ARTICLE THREE: THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA
The conception of theology outlined in the foregoing pages, though
it denies the definability of theological conclusions properly so
called, still occupies an important place in the evolution of
dogma.
St. Thomas is certainly not unacquainted with dogmatic progress.
Let us but recall his remarks concerning venatio ("hunting"): in
his commentary on the Later Analytics, [267] on how to find, first
a definition that is merely nominal (quid nominis): which
expresses a confused notion of the thing to be defined, and,
second, how to pass from this nominal definition to one that is
clear, distinct and real. The most important task both of
philosophy and of theology lies in this methodic step from the
confused concept of common sense (or of Christian sense) to a
concept that is clear and distinct. This process is not that from
premise to conclusion. Rather, we deal with one concept all the
way through, a concept, at first generic, becoming by precision
specific, and then, by induction, distinguished from concepts
which more or less closely resemble it. In this fashion have been
reached the precise definitions now prevailing, of substance, of
life, of man, of soul, of intellect, of will, of free will, of all
the various virtues.
This same conceptual analysis has furnished great contributions to
the refining of concepts indispensable in dogmatic formulas, of
being, say, created and uncreated, of unity, of truth, of
goodness, ontological and moral; concepts, further, of analogy
relative to God, of divine wisdom, of the divine will, of
uncreated love, of providence, of predestination; or again, of
nature, of person, of relation, in giving precise formulas to the
teaching on the Trinity and the Incarnation; of grace, free will,
merit, sin, virtue, faith, hope, charity, justification; of
sacrament, character, sacramental grace, transubstantiation,
contrition; of beatitude, pain in purgatory and in hell, and so
on.
Thus we see that immense conceptual labor is prerequired before we
can proceed to deduce theological conclusions. Confused concepts,
expressed in nominal definitions or in current terms of Scripture
and tradition, must become distinct and precise, if we would
refute the heresies that deform revelation itself. Long schooling
is needed before we can grasp the profound import, sublimity, and
fertility of the principles which faith gives us.
Here lies the most important contribution of theological science
to dogmatic development. And the degree of merit which a
theological system will have in efficacious promotion of this
development will depend on the universality of its synthesis. A
synthesis generated from the idea of God, author of all things in
the order both of nature and of grace, must necessarily be
universal, whereas a synthesis dominated by particular, partial,
and subordinated concepts, the free will of man, say, cannot reach
a true universality, attainable only under a spiritual sun which
illumines all parts of the system.
As image of the relation between theological systems and faith, we
suggest a polygon inscribed in a circle. The circle stands for the
simplicity and superiority of the doctrines of faith. The
inscribed polygon, with its many angles, contains the rich details
of the theological system. The polygon traced by Nominalism
differs by far from that initiated by St. Augustine and elaborated
by St. Thomas. But even if it is conceived as perfect as possible,
the polygon can never have the transcendent simplicity of the
circle. Theology, likewise, the more it advances, the more does it
humiliate itself before the superiority of that faith which it
never ceases to set in relief. Theology is a commentary ever
drawing attention to the word of God which it comments on.
Theology, like the Baptist, forgets itself in the cry: Behold the
Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.
CHAPTER 7: THE PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE
To show the structure and style of the treatise De Deo uno, as
that treatise is found in the Summa, as understood by the
Thomistic school, our first consideration must be given to the
proofs there given for God's existence, since these proofs are
starting points in deducing all divine attributes. Next, we will
dwell on the pre-eminence of the Deity, and the nature and limits
of our knowledge, natural and supernatural, of that divine nature.
The last chapters, then, will speak of God's wisdom, of His will
and His love, of providence and predestination.
In the Summa, St. Thomas reassumes, from a higher viewpoint,
proofs for God's existence already given by Aristotle, Plato, Neo-
Platonists, and Christian philosophers. After a synthetic
exposition of these five arguments, we will examine their validity
and point of culmination.
1. SYNTHETIC EXPOSITION
Examining these five ways, the saint finds in them generic types
under which all other proofs may be ranged. We have given
elsewhere [268] a long exposition of this problem.
St. Thomas does not admit that an a priori proof of God's
existence can be given. [269] He grants indeed that the
proposition, God exists, is in itself evident, and would therefore
be self-evident to us if we had a priori face-to-face knowledge of
God; then we would see that His essence includes existence, not
merely as an object of abstract thought, but as a reality
objectively present. [270] But in point of fact we have no such a
priori knowledge of God. [271] We must begin with a nominal
definition of God, conceiving Him only confusedly, as the first
source of all that is real and good in the world. From this
abstract knowledge, so far removed from direct intuition of God's
essence, we cannot deduce a priori His existence as a concrete
fact.
It is true we can know a priori the truth of this proposition: If
God exists in fact, then He exists of Himself. But in order to
know that He exists in fact, we must begin with existences which
we know by sense experience, and then proceed to see if these
concrete existences necessitate the actual objective existence of
a First Cause, corresponding to our abstract concept, our nominal
definition of God. [272].
This position, the position of moderate realism, is intermediary,
between the agnosticism of Hume on the one hand, and, on the
other, that excessive realism, which in varying degree we find in
Parmenides, Plato, and the Neoplatonists, and which in a certain
sense reappears in St. Anselm, and later, much accentuated, in
Spinoza, in Malebranche and the Ontologists, who believe that they
have an intuition and not merely an abstract concept of God's
nature.
The five classical proofs for God's existence rest, one and all,
on the one principle of causality, expressed in ever deepening
formulas, as follows. First: whatever begins has a cause. Second:
every contingent thing, even if it should be ab aeterno, depends
on a cause which exists of itself. Third: that which has a share
in existence depends ultimately on a cause which is existence
itself, a cause whose very nature is to exist, which alone can
say: I am who am. Wherever, then, we do not find this identity,
wherever we find composition, union between essence and existence,
there we must mount higher, for union presupposes unity.
Most simply expressed, causality means: the more does not come
from the less, the more perfect cannot be produced by the less
perfect. In the world we find things which reach existence and
then disappear, things whose life is temporary and perishable, men
whose wisdom or goodness or holiness is limited and imperfect;
then above all this limited perfection we must find at the summit
Him who from all eternity is self-existing perfection, who is life
itself, wisdom itself, goodness itself, holiness itself.
To deny this is to affirm that the more comes from the less, that
the intelligence of a genius, that the goodness of a saint, come
from blind material fatality. In this general formula are
contained all a posteriori proofs, all founded on the principle of
causality.
To see the validity of these arguments we may recall here what was
said above on the law of necessary subordination in causes. In
looking for the cause here and now required for this and that
existent reality, we cannot have recourse to causes that no longer
exist. Without grandfather and father this son would not exist.
But he can now exist, though they and all his ancestors may be
dead. They too, like himself, were contingent, not necessary, and,
like him, compel us to look for a cause that gave them existence.
They had each received existence, life, intelligence. None among
them, progenitor or descendant, could ever say: I am the life. In
all forms of life the same principle holds good. The first source,
the first ancestor, would have to be its own cause. [273].
Further, must we admit at all that contingent existences
necessarily had a beginning? St. Thomas says: No, this is a
question of past fact which we cannot know a priori. [274] But
contingent existence, though it should be without beginning, can
simply not be conceived without origin, without a cause, which had
and has an unreceived existence and life, the eternal source of
received existence and life.
The saint gives us an illustration. The footprint on the sand
presupposes the foot from which it came, but if the foot were
eternally placed on the sand, the footprint too would be eternal,
without beginning, but not without origin. The priority of the
foot is a priority, not of time and duration, but of origin and
causality. Thus the whole world, with or without beginning, has
its origin in the Supreme Cause. [275].
The cause demanded by existing facts, therefore, is not to be
found in a series accidentally subordinated, in which previous
causes are just as poor as subsequent causes, whose order itself
might have been inverted. [276] The cause necessarily required for
this existing fact can be found only in a series of causes
essentially subordinated, and here and now actually existing. This
is what metaphysicians term the "search for the proper cause, "
that is, the cause necessarily required here and now for the
effect in question. This is the meaning of the words: Any effect
suffices to show that its proper causes exists. [277] We do not
say "that its proper cause once existed. " From a son's actual
existence we cannot conclude that his father still exists. The
son's existence which, in becoming, in fieri, at the moment of
generation depended on the father's existence, does not thus
depend quoad esse, for continued existence. [278].
This dependence of effect on its proper cause is as necessary and
immediate as is the dependence of characteristic properties on the
nature of the circle, from which they are derived. Illustrative
examples: the murderer murders, light illuminates, fire heats.
Let us see this principle at work in the first of the five ways of
proving God's existence. Motion is not self-existent; we
instinctively ask for the source, the moving agent. If motion is
not self-explanatory, then nothing else that is in motion is self-
explanatory. Hence the proper cause of motion is something that is
not in motion, an unmoved mover, the source of all movement, of
all change, local, quantitative, qualitative, vital, intellectual,
voluntary, a mover which is its own uncaused and unreceived
activity.
In illustration, take an example already given: the sailor
supported, in ascending order, by the ship, by the waves, by the
earth, by the sun, by some still higher cosmic center. Here we
have a series of causes, necessarily subordinated and here and now
existent. Were there here no ultimate and supreme center, no
unmoved mover, then there could not be any intermediate center,
and the fact we started from would be nonexistent. For the whole
universe, with its all but numberless movements and intermediate
sources of movement, you still need a supreme mover, just as
necessarily, to illustrate, as you need a spring in your watch if
the hands are to move. The wheels in the watch, whether few or
many, can move the hands only so far as they are themselves moved
by the spring. This proof is valid. But a wrong conception of
causality can render it invalid. [279].
Let us now look at the five different ways on which St. Thomas
follows the applications of the principle of causality.
1. If movement is not self-explanatory, whether the movement is
corporeal or spiritual, it necessitates a first mover.
2. If interconnected efficient causes are here and now actually
operating, air and warmth, say, to preserve my life, then there
must be a supreme cause from which here and now these causes
derive their preservative causality.
3. If there exist contingent beings, which can cease to exist,
then there must be a necessary being which cannot cease to exist,
which of itself has existence, and which, here and now, gives
existence to these contingent beings. If once nothing at all
existed, there would not be now, or ever, anything at all in
existence. To suppose all things contingent, that is, of
themselves non-existent, is to suppose an absurdity.
4. If there are beings in the world which differ in their degree
of nobility, goodness, and truth, it is because they have but a
share, a part, because they participate diversely, in existence,
in nobility, goodness, and truth. Hence there is, in each of them,
a composition, a union, between the subject which participates and
the perfection, existence, goodness, truth, which are participated
to them. Now composition, union, presupposes the unity which it
participates. [280] Hence, at the summit, there must be one cause,
one source of all perfection, who alone can say, not merely "I
have existence, truth, and life, " but rather "I am existence,
truth, and life. ".
5. Lastly, if we find in the world, inanimate and animated,
natural activities manifestly proportioned to a purpose, this
proportioned fitness presupposes an intelligence which produces
and preserves this purposeful tendency. If the corporeal world
tends to a cosmic center of cohesion, if plant and animal tend
naturally to assimilation and reproduction, if the eye is here for
vision and the ear for hearing, feet for walking and wings for
flying; if human intelligence tends to truth and human will to
good, and if each man by nature longs for happiness, then
necessarily these natural tendencies, so manifestly ordained to a
proportioned good, a proportioned purpose, presuppose a supreme
ordinator, a supreme intelligence, which knows and controls the
raison d'etre of all things and this supreme ordinator must be
wisdom itself and truth itself. For again, union presupposes
unity, presupposes absolute identity. A thing uncaused, says St.
Thomas, [281] is of itself, and immediately (i. e.: without
intermediary) being itself, one by nature, not by participation.
[282].
2. FUNDAMENTAL VALIDITY OF THE FIVE WAYS
All these proofs rest on the principle of causality: Anything that
exists, if it does not exist of itself, depends in last analysis
on something that does exist of itself. To deny this principle
leads to absurdity. To say "a thing contingent, that is, a thing
which of itself does not have existence, is nevertheless uncaused"
is equivalent to saying: A thing may exist of itself and
simultaneously not exist of itself. Existence of itself would
belong to it, both necessarily and impossibly. Existence would be
an inseparable predicate of a being which can be separated from
existence. All this is absurd, unintelligible. Kant here objects.
It is absurd, he says, for human intelligence, but not perhaps in
itself absurd and unintelligible.
In answer, let us define absurdity. Absurd is that which cannot
exist because it is beyond the bounds of objective reality,
without any possible relation to reality. It is agreement between
two terms which objectively can never agree. Thus, an uncaused
union of things in themselves diverse is absurd. [283] The only
cause of union is unity. [284] Union means a share in unity,
because it presupposes things which are diverse, brought together
by a higher unity. When you say: "Anything (from angel to grain of
sand) can arise without any cause from absolute nothing, " then
you are making a statement which is not merely unsupported and
gratuitous, but which is objectively absurd. Hence, we repeat: A
being which is not self-existent, which only participates in
existence, presupposes necessarily a Being which by nature is
self-existent. Unity by participation presupposes unity by
essence. [285].
We have here presented the principle of causality, as St. Thomas
does in question three, by the way that ascends from effect to
cause. [286] The same truth can be treated in the descending
order, from cause to effect, [287] as it is in fact treated later
in the Summa. [288] Many modern authors proceed from this second
viewpoint. But the first order ought to precede the second. [289].
To proceed. The denial of the principle of causality is not, it is
true, a contradiction as immediately evident as if I were to say:
"The contingent is not contingent. " St. Thomas [290] gives the
reason why this is so. In denying causality, he says, we do not
deny the definition itself of the contingent. What we do deny is,
not the essence [291] Of the contingent, but an immediate
characteristic (proprium) [292] Of that essence. But to deny the
principle as thus explained is as absurd as to affirm that we
cannot, knowing the essence of a thing (e. g.: of a circle):
deduce from that essence its characteristics. Hence to deny
essential dependence of contingent being on its cause leads to
absurdity, because such denial involves the affirmation that
existence belongs positively to a thing which is not by nature
self-existent and still is uncaused. Thus we would have, in one
subject, the presence both of unessential existence and of non-
dependence on any cause of its existence: a proposition
objectively absurd.
But we find the denial of this principle of causality in ways that
are still less evidently contradictory (in Spinoza, for example)
where the contradiction is, at first sight, hidden and unapparent.
To illustrate. Some who read the sentence, "Things incorporeal can
of themselves occupy a place, " cannot at once see that the
sentence contains a contradiction. And still it is absurd to think
that a spirit, which lives in an order higher than the order of
quantity and space, should nevertheless be conceived as of itself
filling place, place being a consequence of quantity and space.
[293].
Likewise there are contradictions which emerge only under the
light of revelation. Suppose, as illustration, a man says there
are four persons in God. Faith, not reason, tells us the
proposition is absurd. Only those who enjoy the beatific vision,
who know what God is, can see the proposition's intrinsic
absurdity.
If denial or doubt of the principle of causality leads to doubt or
denial of the principle of contradiction, then the five classic
proofs, truly understood, of God's existence cannot be rejected
without finding absurdity at the root of all reality. We must
choose: either the Being who exists necessarily and eternally, who
alone can say "I am truth and life, " or then a radical absurdity
at the heart of the universe. If truly God is necessary Being, on
which all else depends, then without Him the existence of anything
else becomes impossible, inconceivable, absurd. In point of fact,
those who will not admit the existence of a supreme and universal
cause, which is itself existence and life, must content themselves
with a creative evolution, which, lacking any raison d'etre,
becomes a contradiction: universal movement, without subject
distinct from itself, without efficient cause distinct from
itself, without a goal distinct from itself, an evolution wherein,
without cause, the more arises from the less. Contradiction,
identity, causality, all first principles go overboard. Let us
repeat. Without a necessary and eternal being, on which all else
depends, nothing exists and nothing can exist. To deny God's
existence and simultaneously to affirm any existence is to fall
necessarily into contradiction, which does not always appear on
the surface, in the immediate terms employed, but which is always
there if you will but examine those terms. Many of Spinoza's
conclusions contain these absurdities. A fortiori, they lie hidden
in atheistic doctrine which denies God's existence. Hence
agnosticism, which doubts God's existence, can thereby be led to
doubt even the first principle of thought and reality, the
principle of contradiction.
Having thus shown the validity of the five ways to prove God's
existence we now turn to dwell on their unity, the point where
they all converge and culminate.
3. POINT OF CULMINATION
This point is found in the idea of self-subsistent being. [294]
This idea unifies the five ways as a common keystone unifies five
arches. Five attributes appear, one at the end of each way, in
ascending order thus: first mover of the universe, corporeal and
spiritual, first efficient cause, first necessary being, supreme
being, supreme directing intelligence. Now these five attributes
are to be found only in self-subsistent being, who alone can say:
"I am who am. " Let us look at each of the five.
The prime mover must be his own activity. But mode of activity
follows mode of being. Hence the prime mover must be his own
subsistent being.
The first cause, being uncaused, must have in itself the reason
for its existence. But the reason why it cannot cause itself is
that it must be before it can cause. Hence, not having received
existence, it must be existence.
The first necessary being also implies existence as an essential
attribute, that is, it cannot be conceived as merely having
existence, but must be existence.
The supreme being, being absolutely simple and perfect, cannot
have a mere participated share of existence, but must be of itself
existence.
Lastly, the supreme directing intelligence cannot be itself
proportioned to an object other than itself; it must itself be the
object actually and always known. Hence it must be able to say,
not merely "I have truth and life, " but rather "I am truth and
life. ".
Here, then, lies the culminating keystone point, the metaphysical
terminus of the road that ascends from the sense world to God.
This ascending road [295] ends where begins the higher road, [296]
the road of the wisdom which, from on high, judges the world by
its supreme cause. [297].
Thus again, at the summit of the universe reappears the
fundamental Thomistic truth. In God alone are essence and
existence identified. [298] In this supreme principle lies the
real and essential distinction of God from the world. This
distinction reveals God as unchangeable and the world as
changeable (the first three proofs for His existence). It becomes
more precise when it reveals God as absolutely simple and the
world as multifariously composed (fourth and fifth proofs). It
finds its definitive formula when it reveals God as "He who is, "
whereas all other things are only receivers of existence, hence
composed of receiver and received, of essence and existence. The
creature is not its own existence, it has existence after
receiving it. If the verb "is" expresses identity of subject and
predicate, the negation "is not" denies this identification.
This truth is vaguely grasped by the common sense of natural
reason, which, by a confused intuition, sees that the principle of
identity is the supreme law of all reality, and hence the supreme
law of thought. As A is identified with A, so is supreme reality
identified with absolutely one and immutable Being, transcendently
and objectively distinct from the universe, which is essentially
diversified and mutable. This culminating point of natural reason,
thus precisioned by philosophic reason, is at the same time
revealed in this word of God to Moses: "I am who am. " [299].
Now we understand the formulation given to the twenty-third of the
twenty-four theses. It runs thus: The divine essence, since it is
identified with the actual exercise of existence itself, that is,
since it is self-subsistent existence, is by that identification
proposed to us in its well-formed metaphysical constitution, and
thereby gives us the reason for its infinite perfection. [300] To
say it briefly: God alone is self-subsistent existence, in God
alone are essence and existence identified. This proposition,
boundless in its range, reappears continually on the lips of St.
Thomas. [301] But it loses its deep meaning in those who, like
Scotus and Suarez, refuse to admit in all creatures a real
distinction between essence and existence.
To repeat. According to St. Thomas and his school God alone is His
own existence, uncaused, unparticipated self-existence, whereas no
creature is its own existence; the existence it has is
participated, received, limited, by the essence, by the objective
capacity which receives it. This truth is objective, a reality
which antecedes all operation of the mind. Hence the composition
of essence and existence is not a mere logical composition, but
something really found in the very nature of created reality.
[302] Were it otherwise, were the creature not thus composed, then
it would be act alone, pure act, no longer really and essentially
distinct from God. [303].
Self-existent understanding [304] is given by some Thomists as the
metaphysical essence of God, as the point where the five ways
converge and culminate. While we prefer the term self-existent
being, self-existent existence, [305] the difference between the
two positions is less great than it might at first seem to be.
Those who see that culminating point in ipsum esse subsistens,
begin by teaching that God is not body but pure spirit. [306] From
that spirituality follow the two positions in question: first,
that God is the supreme Being, self-existent in absolute
spirituality at the summit of all reality; second, that He is the
supreme intelligence, the supreme truth, the supreme directive
intelligence of the universe.
On this question, then, of God's metaphysical essence according to
our imperfect way of understanding, the two positions agree. They
agree likewise when the question arises: What is it that formally
constitutes the essence of God as He is in Himself, as He is known
by the blessed in heaven who see Him without medium, face to face?
The answer runs thus: Deity itself, not self-subsistent existence,
not self-existent understanding. Self-subsisting existence indeed
contains all divine attributes, but only implicitly, as deductions
to be drawn therefrom in order, one by one. But Deity, God as He
is in Himself, contains in transcendent simplicity all these
divine attributes explicitly. The blessed in heaven, since they
see God as He is, have no need of progressive deduction.
The pre-eminence of the Deity, this transcendent simplicity, will
be our subject in the chapter which now follows.
CHAPTER 8: DIVINE EMINENCE
WE give here the chief characteristics of the knowledge creatures
may have of God: first by the beatific vision; secondly by the
analogical knowledge we must be content with here below.
ARTICLE ONE: THE ESSENTIALLY SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF THE
BEATIFIC VISION [307]
The Deity, the divine essence as it is in itself, cannot be
naturally known by any created intelligence, actual or possible.
Created intelligence can indeed know God as being and First Being,
starting from the analogical concept of being as the most
universal of ideas. [308] But such knowledge will never lead to
positive and proper knowledge of the Deity as Deity. [309] No
creature, solely by its own natural powers, can ever see God
without medium. "No one has ever seen God. " [310] "He dwells in
light inaccessible. " [311].
This impossibility, according to St. Thomas and his school, is an
absolute impossibility, resting, not on a decree of God's free
will, as some authors say, but on the transcendence of God's
nature. The proper object of the created intelligence is that
intelligible reality to which, as mirrored in creatures, it is
proportioned. For the angels, that object is mirrored by spiritual
realities, [312] for man by sense realities. [313] Thus man's
faculties are specifically distinguished by their formal objects,
[314] the human intellect, feeblest of intellects, by the
intelligible realities of the sense world, the angel's more
vigorous intellect by the intelligible realities of the spirit
world, the divine intellect by the uncreated reality of the divine
essence itself. [315] Hence, to say that created intelligence can,
solely by its own natural powers, positively and properly know the
divine essence, Deity in itself, can even see that essence without
medium, is equivalent to saying that the created intellect has the
same formal object as has the uncreated intellect. And that is the
same thing as to say that the intellective creature has the same
nature as uncreated intelligence, that is, is God Himself. But a
created and finite God is an absurdity, found in pantheism, which
cannot distinguish uncreated nature from created nature, which
forgets that God is God and creature is creature.
Further, if the created intellect can, by its own natural power,
see God as He is, then elevation to the supernatural order of
grace becomes impossible, since our soul, by its own spiritual
nature itself would be a formal participation in the divine
nature, which is the very definition of supernatural grace. Our
natural intelligence would have the same formal object as have
infused hope and infused charity. Hence these infused virtues
would no longer be essentially supernatural. Only accidentally
could they be infused, as might geometry, if God so willed. And
this holds good also in the angels.
It is then an impossibility that a creature were able, solely by
its own powers, to know, positively and properly, the divine
essence, or even to see it without medium. And this impossibility
is based on objective reality, on the unchangeable transcendence
of the divine nature. Hence this impossibility is a metaphysical
and absolute impossibility. Sense objects, says St. Thomas, which
come from God as cause, are not the adequate effect of their
cause. Hence, by knowing the sense world we cannot know God's full
power nor, consequently, see His essence. [316] These conclusions
are equally valid in the world of spiritual realities. [317].
According to St. Thomas and his school, then, the creature's
natural impossibility to see God, does not arise, as Duns Scotus
maintains, from a decree of divine liberty, but from the
unchangeable transcendence of the divine nature. According to
Scotus, God could have willed that human intelligence could see
Him naturally, that the light of glory and the beatific vision be
properties of created nature, human or angelic, but that in fact
God did not so will. Thus the distinction between the order of
nature and the order of grace would be, not necessary, but
contingent, resting on a decree of God's free will. [318] Hence,
according to Scotus, there is in our soul an inborn natural desire
for the beatific vision. [319] A vestige of this Scotistic
doctrine appears in the "active obediential potency" of Suarez.
[320].
Thomists reply as follows: An inborn natural appetite for the
beatific vision, and also an active obediential potency, would be,
on the one hand, something essentially natural, as being a
property of our nature, and, on the other hand, simultaneously
something essentially supernatural, as being specifically
proportioned to an object which is essentially supernatural.
Thomists in general say further that the natural desire to see
God, of which St. Thomas speaks, [321] cannot be inborn. It is,
they say, an elicited desire, that is, a desire which presupposes
a natural act of knowledge, and that, as elicited, it is not an
absolute and efficacious desire, but one that is conditional or
inefficacious, to be realized in fact only on condition that God
freely raises us to the supernatural order. Let us recall that, in
1567, the Church condemned the doctrine of Baius which admitted
desire of such exigence that elevation to the order of grace would
be due to our original nature and not a gratuitous gift. Thus he
confounds the order of grace with the order of nature. [322] Any
efficacious natural desire would be exigent, grace would be due
(debita) to nature.
St. Thomas, in speaking of conditional and inefficacious desire,
uses the term "first will, " [323] meaning thereby that attitude
of the will which precedes the efficacious intention to attain an
end. To illustrate. The farmer desires rain, really but
inefficaciously. The merchant in a storm wills inefficaciously to
save his goods, but efficaciously he wills to throw them into the
sea. [324] St. Thomas finds this distinction also in God's will.
God wills all men to be saved. If God willed this efficaciously,
all men in fact would be saved. Hence we must admit in God an
antecedent will, not indeed fruitless, but conditional and
inefficacious. [325].
This desire to see God, natural but inefficacious, arises thus:
Our intelligence seeks naturally to know the essence of the First
Cause. But its natural knowledge of this cause rests on analogical
concepts, many indeed, but all imperfect, which cannot make
manifest the nature of that First Cause as it is in itself, in its
absolute perfection and supreme simplicity. In particular, these
limited concepts (justice, say, as contrasted with mercy) cannot
show us how in God infinite mercy is identified with infinite
justice, or omnipotent goodness with permission of evil.
Dissatisfaction with our limitations leads to a natural
inefficacious desire to see God without medium, if He would deign,
gratuitously, to elevate us to see Him face to face.
Is this desire supernatural? Not properly and formally speaking,
say the Thomists, but only materially, because it is by the
natural light of the reason that we know this object to be
desirable, and the object we desire is the immediate vision of the
Author of nature whose existence is naturally known. The desire in
question is not a supernatural desire like that of hope and
charity, which under the light of faith carries us toward the
vision of the triune God, the author of grace. [326] Thus we
safeguard the principle that acts are formally distinguished by
their object, which object must be in the same order as the acts.
This would not be so if the desire in question were inborn, rising
from the weight of nature, [327] anteceding natural knowledge, and
specifically proportioned to an object formally supernatural.
This natural desire is indeed a sign that the beatific vision is
possible. It furnishes an argument of appropriateness for this
possibility, an argument very deep and inviting, but not an
argument that is apodictic. Such at least is the common view of
Thomists, since there is here question of the intrinsic
possibility of a supernatural gift, and what is essentially
supernatural cannot be naturally demonstrated. Mysteries
essentially supernatural are beyond the reach of the principles of
natural reason. [328] We cannot positively demonstrate the
possibility of the Trinity. All that the created intellect, human
or angelic, can at its utmost show, is this: not that the
mysteries are possible, but that their impossibility cannot be
demonstrated.
This then is the proposition upheld generally by Thomists: The
possibility and a fortiori the existence of mysteries essentially
supernatural, cannot naturally be either proved or disproved; and
though they are supported by persuasive arguments of
appropriateness, they are held with certainty by faith alone.
[329].
The entire Thomistic school holds also that the gratuitous gift
called the light of glory is absolutely necessary for the
immediate vision of God. [330] Any created intellectual faculty,
angelic or human, since of itself it is intrinsically incapable of
seeing God without medium, must of necessity, if it be called to
such vision, be rendered capable thereto by a gift which raises it
to a life altogether new, to a life which, since it gives to the
intellectual faculty itself a supernatural vitality, makes also
the intellectual act essentially supernatural. [331] Here appears
the marvelous sublimity of eternal life, which rises not only
above all forces but also above all exigencies of any nature
created or creatable. [332] On this point Thomists differ notably
from Suarez [333] and from Vasquez. [334].
The beatific vision, finally, excludes all mediating ideas, [335]
even all infused ideas however perfect. [336] Any created idea is
only participatedly intelligible, and hence cannot make manifest
as He is in Himself Him who is being itself, who is self-
subsistent existence, who is self-existent intellectual
brightness.
But this beatific vision, which without the medium of any created
idea sees God directly as He is, can still not comprehend God,
that is, know Him with an act of knowledge as infinite as God
Himself. God alone comprehends God. Hence the blessed in heaven,
even while they see God face to face, can still not discover in
Him the infinite multitude of possible beings which He can create.
Their act of intellect, which knows Him without medium, is still a
created act which knows an infinite object in a finite manner,
[337] with a limited penetration, proportioned to its degree of
charity and merit. St. Thomas [338] illustrates. A disciple can
grasp a principle (subject and predicate) just as well as his
master. But his knowledge does not equal that of the master in
seeing all the consequences which that principle contains
virtually. He sees the whole, but not wholly, totally.
ARTICLE TWO: ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD [339]
If the Deity as it is in itself cannot be known naturally, and not
even by the supernatural gift of faith, how can our natural
knowledge, remaining so imperfect, be nevertheless certain and
immutable?
The answer to this question rests on the validity of analogical
knowledge. Here, as we said above, Scotists, and also Suarez, do
not entirely agree with Thomists. This lack of agreement rests on
different definitions of analogy. Scotus admits a certain
univocity between God and creatures. [340] Suarez [341] was
certainly influenced on this point by Scotus.
The teaching of St. Thomas appears in its most developed form in
the thirteenth question of the first part of the Summa. All
articles of that question are concerned to show God's pre-eminent
transcendence. They may be summarized in a formula which is still
current: All perfections are found in God, not merely virtually
(virtualiter): but in formal transcendence (formaliter eminenter).
What is the exact sense of this formula? Our answer, by citing
freely the first five articles, [342] will again show that St.
Thomas runs on an elevated highway between two contrary doctrines:
between Nominalism, which, accepting the opinion attributed to
Maimonides, leads to agnosticism, and a kind of anthropomorphism,
which substitutes for analogy a minimum of univocity.
Our saint, then, establishes three positions.
1. Absolute perfections, [343] which do not imply any imperfection
and which it is always better to have than not to have, existence,
for example, and truth, goodness, wisdom, love, are found formally
in God, because they are in Him essentially and properly. They are
found in Him essentially [344] because, when we say "God is good,
" we do not mean merely that He is the cause of goodness in
creatures. If that were our meaning then we would say "God is a
body, " since He is the cause of the corporeal world. Further,
these perfections are in God properly speaking, that is, not
metaphorically, as when we say "God is angry. ".
The reason for this double assertion is that these absolute
perfections, in contrast to mixed perfections, [345] do not in
their inner formal meaning [346] imply any imperfection, although
in creatures they are always found to be finite in mode and
measure. Manifestly the first cause of perfection must precontain,
in pre-eminent fashion, all those perfections which imply no
imperfection, which it is better to have than not to have. Were it
otherwise, the first cause could not give these perfections to His
creatures, since perfection found in the effect must be first
found in its cause. Hence no perfection can be refused to God
unless it implies attributing to Him also an imperfection. On this
truth theologians in general agree. Absolute perfections, then, we
repeat, are in God essentially and formally.
2. The names which express these absolute perfections are not
synonyms. Here Thomists, Scotists, and Suaresians are in
agreement, and hence opposed to the Nominalists, who hold that
these names are synonymous, distinguished only logically and
quasi-verbally, as "Tullius" is distinguished from "Cicero. " They
argue thus: Since in God all these perfections, being infinite,
are really identified each with all others, we can substitute any
one of them (e. g.: mercy) for any other (e. g.: justice): just as
in a sentence about Cicero we can, without any change of meaning,
write "Tullius" instead of "Cicero. ".
Now this nominalistic position, which would allow us to say, for
example, that God punishes by mercy and pardons by justice, makes
all divine attributes meaningless and leads to full agnosticism,
which says that God is absolutely unknowable.
3. Absolute perfections are found both in God and in creatures,
not univocally, and not equivocally, but analogically. This is the
precise meaning of the term formaliter eminenter, where eminenter
is equivalent to "not univocally, but analogically. " Let us
listen to St. Thomas: [347].
"Any effect which does not show the full power of its cause
receives indeed a perfection like that of its cause, but not in
the same essential fullness [that is, in context, not univocally]:
but in a deficient measure. Hence the perfection found divided and
multiplied in effects pre-exists in unified simplicity in their
cause. " Hence all perfections found divided among numerous
creatures pre-exist as one, absolute, and simple unity in God.
This text is very important. It contains precisely the saint's
idea of analogy, an idea to which Suarez did not remain faithful.
Suaresians often define analogy as follows: [348] The idea
conveyed by an analogous predicate ("being" [ens]: e. g.: in the
expressions "Deus est ens, creatura est ens") is, simply speaking,
one idea, and only in a sense diversified. Thomists, on the
contrary, speak thus: [349] The idea conveyed by an analogous term
(as above) is, simply speaking, diversified, and only in a sense
one, that is, one proportionally, by similarity of proportions.
[350].
This formula agrees perfectly with the text just cited from St.
Thomas. In that same article he adds: [351] "When God is called
'wise' and man is called 'wise', the idea conveyed by the one word
is not found in the same way in both subjects. " Wisdom in God and
wisdom in man are proportionally one, since wisdom in God is
infinite and causative, whereas wisdom in man is a created thing,
measured and limited by its object. And what holds good of wisdom
holds good of all other absolute perfections.
This manner of speaking is entirely in harmony with the common
teaching in logic on the distinction between analogical and
univocal. The genus animal, animality, e. g.: is univocal, because
it everywhere signifies a character found simply in the same
meaning, in all animals, even in such a worm as does not have all
the five exterior senses found in higher animals. In contrast,
take the analogous term "cognition. " It expresses a perfection,
essentially not one, but diversified, which, while found in sense
cognition, is not found there in essentially the same way as it is
found in intellective cognition. It is an idea proportionally one,
in the sense that, just as sensation is related to sense object,
so the intellective act is related to intelligible object. "Love"
is similarly an idea proportionally one, love in the sense order
being essentially different from love in the spiritual order.
Hence it follows that analogical perfection, in contrast to
univocal, is not a perfectly abstract idea, because, since it
expresses a likeness between two proportions, it must actually,
though implicitly, express the two subjects thus proportioned.
Animality is a notion perfectly abstracted from its subjects,
expressing only potentially, in no wise actually, the subjects in
which it is found. But cognition cannot be thought of without
actual, though implicit, reference to the difference between
subjects endowed only with sense and those endowed also with
intellect. Hence the difficulty in so defining cognition as to
make the definition applicable both to sense cognition, and to
intellective cognition, and uncreated cognition.
If, then analogical perfection is only proportionally one, it
follows [352] that when we speak of God, there is an infinite
distance between the two analogues, that is, between God as wise,
say, and man as wise, although the analogical idea (wisdom) is
found in each, not metaphorically, but properly. Wisdom in God is
infinitely above wisdom in man, though wisdom in the proper sense
is found both in God and in man. This truth may surprise us less
if we recall that there is already an immeasurable distance
between sense cognition and intellective cognition, though each is
cognition in the proper sense of the word.
The terminology of St. Thomas and of the Thomistic definition of
analogy are in full accord with these words of the Fourth Lateran
Council: [353] "Between Creator and creature there can never be
found a likeness ever so great without finding in that likeness a
still greater unlikeness. " This declaration is equivalent to
saying that analogical perfection is, in its analogues, simply
diversified, and only in a sense one, proportionally one.
Hence in the formula commonly accepted, viz.: absolute perfections
are in God formally, the word "formally" must be understood thus:
formally, not univocally, but analogically, yet properly, and not
metaphorically. The adverb "formally" thus explained, we now turn
to explain the second adverb, "pre-eminently. ".
4. From what has already been said we see that the infinite mode
in which the divine attributes exist in God remains hidden to us
here below. Only negatively and relatively can we express that
mode, as when we say "wisdom unlimited, " "wisdom supreme, "
"sovereign wisdom. " Listen again to St. Thomas: "When this term
'wise' is said of man, the term somehow circumscribes and incloses
the thing signified [the man's wisdom, distinct from his essence,
from his existence, from his power, etc. ]. But not so when it is
said of God. Said of God, the term presents the thing signified
(wisdom) as uncircumscribable, as transcending the meaning of the
term. " [354] This is the meaning of "preeminently" in the term
"formally pre-eminently"; [355] but we must make that meaning
still more precise.
It is clear from the foregoing conclusion that Scotus is wrong
when he maintains that the divine perfections are distinguished
one from the other by a formal-actual-natural distinction. [356]
This distinction, as explained by Scotus, is more than a virtual
distinction, since it antecedes all act of our mind. Now such a
distinction, anteceding human thought, must be real and objective.
[357] Such distinction in the attributes of God is irreconcilable
with His sovereign simplicity, wherein all His attributes are
identified. "In God all perfections are one and the same reality,
except in terms that are relatively opposed. " [358].
Distinction then among divine attributes must be but a virtual
distinction, even a minor virtual distinction, since each
attribute contains all others actually, but not explicitly, only
implicitly, while genus contains its species, in no wise actually,
but only potentially, virtually. Yet, on the other hand, against
the Nominalists, we must also maintain that the names applied to
God (e. g.: mercy and justice) are not synonyms. The distinction
between them is not merely verbal ("Tullius" and "Cicero").
Hence arises a difficult question: How can these perfections be
really identified with one another in God without destroying one
another? How can each remain in Him formally, that is,
essentially, properly, non-synonymously, and simultaneously be in
Him pre-eminently, transcendently, infinitely? We can easily see,
to illustrate, how the seven rainbow colors are precontained with
virtual eminence in white light, since white light, formally, is
not blue, say, or red. But the pre-eminent Deity is, not merely
virtually, but formally, true and good and intelligent and
merciful. To say that the Deity has all these attributes only
virtually (just as it is virtually corporeal because it produces
bodies) is to return to the error of Maimonides.
Let us repeat our question: How can the divine perfections be
formally in God, if in Him they are all one identical reality?
Scotus answers thus: They cannot be each formally in God unless
they are, antecedently to any action of our mind, formally
distinct one from another. Cajetan gives a profound answer to this
difficulty, and his solution is generally held by Thomists. He
writes: "Just as the reality called wisdom and the reality called
justice are found identified with that higher reality called Deity
and hence are one reality in God: so the idea (ratio formalis) of
wisdom and the idea of justice are identified with the higher idea
called the idea of Deity as such, and hence are an idea, one
indeed in number, but precontaining each of the two ideas
transcendentally, not merely virtually, as the idea of light
contains the idea of heat, but formally. Hence the conclusion
drawn by the divine genius of St. Thomas: the idea of wisdom is of
one order in God, of another in creatures. " [359].
Hence Cajetan elsewhere [360] gives us the formula: An analogical
idea is one idea, not one absolutely (simpliciter): but one
proportionally. Thus we see that Deity, in its formal raison
d'etre, is absolutely preeminent, transcending all realities
expressed by being, unity, goodness, wisdom, love, mercy, justice,
and hence precontains all these realities, eminently and yet
formally. This is equivalent to the truth, admitted by all
theologians, that the Deity, both as it is in itself and as seen
by the blessed, contains, actually and explicitly, all the divine
perfections, which therefore are known in heaven without
deduction, whereas here on earth, where we know God merely as
self-subsistent being, which contains all these perfections,
actually indeed, but implicitly, we can know these divine
attributes only by progressive deduction.
Guided thus by Cajetan, we may now see the Thomistic meaning of
the two adverbs: formaliter, eminenter. Formaliter means:
essentially and not only causally, properly, and not merely
metaphorically, but analogically. Eminenter excludes formal actual
distinction in the divine attributes, and expresses their
identification, better, their identity, in the transcendent raison
d'etre of the Deity, whose mode of being, which in itself is
hidden from us here below, can be known only negatively and
relatively. It is in this sense that we say there is a
transcendent world which, antecedently to the act of our mind,
excludes all real and formal distinction, so that in God the only
real distinction is that of the divine persons relatively opposed
one to another. [361].
Let us listen to another passage from St. Thomas: "Now all these
perfections pre-exist in God absolutely as one unit, whereas they
are received in creatures as a divided multitude. Hence to our
varied and multiple ideas there corresponds in God one altogether
simple unity, which by these ideas is known imperfectly. " And
again: "The many ideas expressed by these many names are not empty
and nugatory, because to each of them there corresponds one simple
unity, represented only imperfectly by all of them taken together.
" [362].
In the transcendental pre-eminence of the Deity, therefore, all
these divine attributes, far from destroying one another, are
rather identified one with another. Each is in God formally, but
not as formally distinct from all others. [363].
Further: these attributes, thus identified and in no way self-
destructive, find in God's transcendence their fullest, purest
perfection. Thus existence in God is essential existence. His act
of understanding is self-subsistent, His goodness is essential
goodness, His love self-subsistent.
This identification is rather easily understood when the
perfections in question are on the same level of thought, and are
thus distinguished, virtually and extrinsically, by reference to
creatures. Thus the faculty of intellect, and its act, and its
object, three distinct realities in the creature, are in the
Creator manifestly identified, since He is the self-subsistent act
of understanding.
But when the perfections in questions are in different lines of
being, identification is less easily explained. Take intelligence
and love, for example, or justice and mercy. But that all such
seemingly opposite perfections are really identified in God is
evidently clear from the foregoing pages. And that this
identification is commonly accepted appears in phrases like the
following: "the light of life, " "affectionate knowledge, " "the
glance of love, " "love awful and sweet. " When God is seen face
to face, this identification becomes clearly seen. But here below,
in the light of faith only, even the mystics [364] speak of the
"great darkness. " Overwhelming splendor becomes obscurity, in the
spirit still too feeble to support that splendor, just as the
shining sun seems dark to the bird of night.
What distinction is there further between the divine essence and
the divine relation, or between the divine nature which is
communicable and the paternity which is incommunicable? This
distinction is not formal and actual, but virtual and minor.
Listen to Cajetan: "Speaking secundum se, not quoad nos, there is
in God one only formal reality, not simply absolute, nor simply
relative, not simply communicable nor simply incommunicable, but
precontaining, transcendentally and formally, all there is in God
of absolute perfection and also all the relative perfection
required by the Trinity. For the divine reality antecedes being
and all its differentiations. That reality is above ens, above
unum, etc. " [365].
We conclude. The divine reality, as it is in itself, transcends
all its perfections, absolute and relative, which it contains
formally preeminently.
ARTICLE THREE: COROLLARIES
From this high doctrine of God's transcendent pre-eminence there
follows a number of corollaries. Here we shall notice only three
of very special importance.
1. Reason, of its own sole force, by discovering the transcendence
and inaccessibility of the Deity, can demonstrate thereby the
existence in God of a supernatural order of truth and life. But to
know that such supernatural truths exist is not the same thing as
knowing what those truths are. The Deity, the whatness of God,
manifestly surpasses all the natural powers of all created or
creatable intelligence. Thus St. Thomas, [366] having granted that
man can clearly know the existence in God of truths which far
surpass man's power of knowing them in their nature, goes on to
show, a few lines farther down, that the Deity as such is
inaccessible to the natural powers even of the angels. [367].
2. Sanctifying grace, defined thus, "a participation in the divine
nature, " is a participation, physical, formal, and analogical, in
the Deity as it is in itself, not merely in God conceived
naturally as self-subsistent existence, or as self-subsisting
intelligence. Hence sanctifying grace, when it reaches
consummation, is the radical principle of the beatific vision
which knows Deity as it is in itself. Is grace, then, a
participation in divine infinity? Not subjectively, because
participation means limitation. But grace does, objectively,
proportion us to see the infinite God as He is.
Created analogical resemblances to God form an ascending scale:
minerals by existence, plants by life, man and angels by
intelligence, all have likeness unto God. But grace alone is like
unto God as God.
3. We cannot, as long as we are here below (in via): see clearly
the harmony between God's will of universal salvation and the
gratuitousness of predestination. That means we cannot see how, in
the transcendent pre-eminence of the Deity, are harmonized and
identified these three attributes: infinite mercy, infinite
justice, and that supreme liberty which in mercy chooses one
rather than another.
Theological contemplation of this pre-eminence of Deity, if it
proceeds from the love of God, disposes us to receive infused
contemplation, which rests on living faith illumined by the gifts
of knowledge and wisdom. This infused contemplation, though
surrounded by a higher and ineffable darkness, still attains that
Deity, whom St. Paul [368] calls "light inaccessible":
inaccessible, that is, to him who has not received the light of
glory.
CHAPTER 9: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE
THE next step in the Thomistic synthesis is to apply its
fundamental principles to the manner and nature of God's
omniscience. The essential points are.
1. God's knowledge in general.
2. God's knowledge of the conditional future.
ARTICLE 1: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL [369]
Immateriality is the root of knowledge. The more immaterial a
being is, the more capable it is of knowing. Now God is altogether
immaterial, because He transcends the limits, not of matter
merely, but even of essence, since He is infinite in perfection.
Hence He is transcendently intelligent. [370].
Hence God knows Himself, rather, comprehends Himself, since He
knows Himself as far as He is knowable, that is, infinitely. [371]
His intellect is not a faculty, distinct from its act and from its
object, since He is the self-subsistent act of understanding. Nor
does He have to form first an idea of Himself, that is, form an
interior accidental concept and word, because His essence is not
only actually intelligible, but is subsistent truth, actually and
eternally understood. [372] When revelation tells us that God the
Father expresses Himself in His Word, we are meant to understand
this as an expression of superabundance, not of indigence.
Besides, the divine Word is not, as in us, an accident, but
substance. Hence all elements of thought (thinking subject,
faculty of thought, actual thinking, idea, and object) are all
identified in God, who is pure act. And His actual thinking, far
from being an accident, is identified with His substance. [373]
God, says Aristotle, is understanding of understanding, an unmixed
intellectual splendor eternally self-subsistent.
How does God know what He Himself is not, that is, realities that
are possible, realities that actually exist, and future events?
First of all, divine knowledge, cannot, like ours, depend on, be
measured by, created things. Such dependence, being passive, is
irreconcilable with the perfection of pure act. On the contrary,
nothing can be possible, existent, or future except in dependence
on essential existence, since it is clear that any conceivable
existence outside of the First Cause must necessarily carry with
it a relation of dependence on that First Cause. Things other than
Himself, says St. Thomas, are known by God not in themselves (by
dependence on them): but in Himself. [374] Whereas we, in order to
know God, must look up from below, from the sense world which
mirrors God, God, on the contrary, does not have to look down, but
knows us there on high, in Himself as mirror. By knowing His own
creative power God knows all that He could do if He willed, all
that He is doing now, all that He still will do, all that He would
do did He not have some higher purpose, all, lastly, that He
permits for the sake of a higher good. There is no need of
neologisms, of new special terms. The traditional terms of common
usage suffice to express well this omniscience of God. In Himself,
the creative mirror, God knows all things.
How does God know the possible world, that absolutely numberless
and truly infinite multitude of worlds which could exist but never
will in fact exist? The answer is: God knows them by knowing the
omnipotence of His creative power. [375].
Further, by knowing what He willed to do in the past and what He
wills to do in the future and what He is actually doing now, God
knows all things, past, present, and future, all that creatures
have done, are doing now, and will do. And all this world of time,
past, present, and future, He knows not in general and confusedly,
but in particular and distinctly, since from Him, the First Cause,
comes all reality, even prime matter, which is the source of all
individual differences in the corporeal world. Hence even the
minutest particularity in creatures, since it is a reality,
depends on God for its existence, even when it gets that
existence, not by creation, but by God's concurrence with created
causes. But this knowledge, infinitely distinct and
particularized, is still not discursive, but intuitive, taking in
with one instantaneous glance all that God does or could do.
[376].
This divine knowledge is the cause of things, since it is united
to God's free will, which, among all possible things, chooses one
particular thing to exist rather than another. [377] God's
knowledge of possible things, since it presupposes no decree of
the divine will, is called simple intelligence. But His knowledge
of actual things, since it does presuppose such a decree, is
called "knowledge of approbation, " approbation, not of evil, but
of all that is real and good in the created universe.
How then does God know evil? He knows it by its opposition to the
good wherein alone evil can exist. Hence God knows evil by knowing
what He permits, what He does not hinder. [378] No evil, physical
or moral, can come to be unless, for a higher good, God permits it
to be. Knowing what He permits, God knows by that permission all
evil that has been, is, or will ever be.
ARTICLE 2: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDITIONAL FUTURE
When God permits evil, what is His will regarding the good opposed
to that evil? That good cannot be willed efficaciously, otherwise
it would be. But it can be willed by God conditionally. Thus God
would wish to preserve the life of the gazelle, did He not will to
permit that death for the life of the lion. He would hinder
persecution, did He not judge good to permit it for the
sanctification of the just and the glory of the martyrs; He would
will the salvation of the sinner, Judas, for example, did He not
permit his loss as manifestation of divine justice.
Starting from this point, we understand how God knows the
conditional future. [379] God knows all that He would will to be
realized, all that He would bring to pass, did He not renounce it
for a higher end. Hence God's knowledge of the conditioned future
presupposes a conditional decree of God's will. The futuribilia
are a medium between a merely possible future and a future really
to be. It would be a grave error to confound them with the merely
possible. This is the teaching of all Thomists, in opposition to
the Molinistic theory, that is, an intermediate knowledge
(scientia media): a knowledge, preceding any divine decree, of the
conditional future free acts of the creature. This theory,
Thomists maintain, leads to admitting in God's knowledge a
passivity, dependent on something in the created order. If God
does not determine (by His own decree): then He is determined
(made to know) by something else. This dilemma seems to Thomists
to be insoluble.
As regards the knowledge of the contingent future, of what a free
creature, say, will be actually willing a hundred years from now,
God knows it not as future, but as present. For this knowledge is
not measured by time, does not have to wait until future becomes
present. It is measured, as God Himself is measured, by the
unchangeable now of eternity, which surrounds [380] and envelops
all other durations. Thus, to illustrate, the culminating point of
a pyramid is simultaneously present to all points of its base. An
observer, on the summit of a mountain, sees the entire army
defiling in the valley below. [381].
Now it is evident that the event, in itself future, would not be
present even in eternity, had not God willed it (if it is good):
or permitted it (if it is evil). The conversion of St. Paul is
present in eternity only because God willed it, and the
impenitence of Judas only because God permitted it.
This knowledge too is intuitive, because it is the knowledge of
what God either wills to be or permits to be. God sees His own
eternal action, creative or permissive, though the effect of that
action is in time, coming into existence at the instant chosen for
it by God from eternity. His eternal permissions He sees in
relation to that higher good of which He alone is judge.
Our free and salutary acts God sees in His own eternal decision to
give us the grace to accomplish those acts. In Himself, in His own
creative light, He sees them freely done, under that grace which,
far from destroying our liberty, actualizes it, strongly and
sweetly, [382] so that we cooperate with that grace for His glory
and our own. This doctrine will become more explicit in the
following chapter, where we study God's will and love.
CHAPTER 10: GOD'S WILL AND GOD'S LOVE
WILL is a consequence of intelligence. Divine intelligence,
knowing the Supreme Being, cannot be conceived without divine
will, which loves the good, pleases itself in good. This will of
God cannot be, as it is in us, a mere faculty of willing. Divine
will would be imperfect if it were not, by its own nature, an
unceasing act of willing, an unceasing act of loving, unceasing
love of good, a love as universal and spiritual as the
intelligence which directs it. All acts of God's will proceed from
His love of good, with its consequent hatred of evil. Hence,
necessarily, there is in God one act, spiritual and eternal, of
love of all good, and primarily of Supreme Good, the Infinite
Perfection. This first divine love is indeed spontaneous, but it
is not free. It is something higher than liberty. Infinite good,
known as it is in itself, must be loved with infinite love. And
the Good and the Love, both infinite, are identified one with the
other. [383].
ARTICLE ONE: GOD'S SOVEREIGN FREEDOM OF WILL
In willing the existence of creatures God is entirely free. This
follows from what has just been said. Only an infinite good
necessitates the will. Hence, while God, we may say, is inclined
to creation, since good is of itself diffusive, He nevertheless
creates freely, without any necessity, physical or moral, because
His happiness in possessing Infinite Good cannot be increased.
Creatures can add nothing to infinite perfection. Inclination to
self-diffusion is not the same thing as actual diffusion. While it
is not free in causes which are non-intelligent (the sun, for
example): it is free in causes which are intelligent (e. g.: in
the sage dispensing wisdom). This free diffusion, this free
communication, does not make God more perfect, but it does make
the creature more perfect.
"God would be neither good nor wise had He not created. " Thus
Leibnitz. [384] Bossuet answers: "God is not greater for having
created the universe. " Bossuet's sentence is a simple and
splendid summary of Aquinas. [385] The creative act does not
impart to God a new perfection. This free act is identified with
the love God has for Himself. In regard to Himself as object,
God's love is spontaneous and necessary, whereas in regard to
creatures it is spontaneous and free, because creatures have no
right to existence, and God has no need of them. Purpose and agent
give perfection to the effect, but are not themselves made more
perfect by that effect. This doctrine, the freedom of creation,
puts St. Thomas high above Plato and Aristotle, for whom the world
is a necessary radiation of God. [386].
ARTICLE TWO: THE CAUSALITY OF GOD'S WILL
God's will is not only free in producing and preserving creatures,
but it is the cause by which He produces and preserves. Herein
God's causality differs, for example, from man's generative
causality. Man is free indeed to exercise this causality, but if
he does exercise it, he is not free to engender aught else than a
man, since his generative faculty is by its nature limited to the
human race. Man's free will is not of itself productive, but
depends on a limited faculty distinct from itself. God's free will
is itself infinitely productive. Let us listen to St. Thomas:
"A natural agent, since it is limited, is in its activity limited
by that nature. Now, since divine nature is not limited within
certain bounds, but contains in itself all the perfection of
being, it follows that its boundless causality does not act by
natural necessity (unless you absurdly conceive God as producing a
second God). And if God does not create by natural necessity, then
it is only by the decrees of God's will and intellect that limited
created effects arise from His infinite perfection. " [387] In
these words lies the refutation of a capital thesis of Averroism.
God, the saint repeats, acts only by His uncaused will. There are
not in God, as in us, two acts of will, one willing the end, the
other willing the means. By one sole act God wills both end and
means. The phrase "for the sake of" modifies, not God's will, but
the object, the effect which God wills. Hence the proper
expression is not: For the sake of life God wills food, but
rather, God wills food to exist for the sake of life. [388].
Now we understand that God's efficacious will is always infallibly
fulfilled. [389] Nothing that is in any way real and good can
reach existence except in dependence on God's universal causality,
because no second cause can act unless actuated by the first
cause, and evil can never come to be without divine permission.
[390].
So much on the efficacious will of God. In what sense, then, do we
speak of God's inefficacious will? This will, says St. Thomas,
[391] is a conditioned will, an antecedent will, which wills all
that is good in itself, independently of circumstances. Now this
conditional, antecedent will remain inefficacious because, in view
of a higher good of which He alone is judge, God permits that this
or that good thing does not come to pass, that defectible
creatures sometimes fail, that this or that evil comes to pass.
Thus, in view of that higher good, God permits, to illustrate,
that harvests do not reach maturity, that the gazelle becomes the
prey of the lion, that the just suffer persecution, that this or
that sinner dies in final impenitence. Sometimes we see the higher
good in question, sometimes we cannot. In permitting final
impenitence, for example, God may be manifesting infinite justice
against obstinacy in evil.
Such is the Thomistic distinction of antecedent (inefficacious)
will from consequent (efficacious) will. On this distinction as
foundation rests, further, the distinction of sufficient grace
(which depends on antecedent will) from efficacious grace (which
depends on consequent will). Sufficient grace is really
sufficient, it makes fulfillment of precepts really and
objectively possible. [392] But efficacious grace gives the actual
fulfillment of the precepts here and now. Actual fulfillment is
something more than real power to fulfill, as actual vision is
something more than the real power of sight. [393].
To illustrate. God willed, by consequent will, the conversion of
St. Paul. This conversion comes to be, infallibly but freely,
because God's will, strong and sweet, causes Paul's will to
consent freely, spontaneously, without violence, to his own
conversion. God did not on the other hand will, efficaciously, the
conversion of Judas, though He, conditionally, inefficaciously,
antecedently, certainly willed it, and He permitted Judas to
remain, freely, in final impenitence. What higher good has God in
mind? This, at least: the manifestation of infinite justice.
[394].
We must add this remark: Resisting sufficient grace is an evil
which comes solely from ourselves. But non-resistance is a good,
which, in last analysis, comes from God, source of all good.
Further, sufficient grace, however rich in the order of power,
proximate power, still differs from efficacious grace, which
effectively causes the salutary act itself, which is something
more than the power. And to say that he who does not have
efficacious grace, which causes the salutary act, cannot have even
the real power to place that act is equivalent to saying that a
sleeping man is blind, because, forsooth, since he does not
actually see, he cannot have even the power of sight. [395].
ARTICLE THREE: THE THOMISTIC DILEMMA
This dilemma runs thus: In regard to any created and limited good,
if God's knowledge is not unlimited and independent, then God's
knowledge would be dependent on, determined by, something created.
But scientia media is dependent on something finite and created,
the creature's act of choice.
The efficacious will of God, far from forcing the sinner at the
moment of conversion, actualizes the free will, carries it on,
strongly and sweetly, to make its own free choice of good. From
all eternity God willed efficaciously that Paul, at that
particular hour, on the road to Damascus, hic et nunc, would
consent to be converted. God's will, entering into all details of
space and time, is infallibly fulfilled by actualizing, not by
forcing created liberty. Similarly, from all eternity God willed
efficaciously that Mary, on Annunciation Day, would freely consent
to the realization of the mystery of the Incarnation and that
divine will was infallibly fulfilled.
On this point Thomists have written much against "simultaneous
concursus" as defended by Molina and Suarez. For this
"simultaneous concursus" is a divine causality which is
indifferent, that is, can be followed, in fact, either by an evil
act or by a good act. Thomists, on the contrary, to defend God's
efficacious acts of will, call these acts "predetermining divine
decrees, " which are all summed up in the term "physical
premotion. " They insist that this physical premotion does not
force the created will, does not destroy created liberty, but, in
us and with us, actualizes the essential freedom of our choice. If
even a beloved creature, they argue, can lead us to choose freely
what that creature wills we would choose, how much more the
Creator, who is more deeply intimate with us than we ourselves
are! [396].
Let us here note the harmony of this doctrine with a commonly
accepted theological principle. All theologians agree in admitting
that, since all good comes from God, the best thing on earth,
sanctity, is a special gift of God. Now what is the chief element
of sanctity, not as it is in heaven, but as it is in the saints
who still live here on earth? It is their meritorious acts,
especially their acts of charity. Even sanctifying grace, a far
higher thing than the soul which has received that grace, even the
infused virtues, and charity in particular, have a purpose beyond
themselves, namely, free and meritorious acts, in particular acts
of love for God and neighbor. Free choice makes these acts what
they are. Without free and self-determined choice the act would
have no merit; and eternal life must be merited.
Hence this free self-determination, this choice as such, must come
from God, who alone by His grace brings it to be a reality in us.
Think of what is best in Peter and Paul at the moment of
martyrdom. Think of the merit of Mary at the foot of the cross.
Think, above all, of that free and self-determined act of love in
the soul of Jesus when He cried: "Consummatum est. ".
According to Molina, this free self-determination of the
meritorious act does not come from the divine motion, from divine
causality, but solely from us, in the presence indeed of the
object proposed by God, but under a grace of light, of objective
attractiveness, which equally solicits both him who is not
converted and him who is converted. [397].
Simultaneous concursus gives no more to the one than it does to
the other. Let us suppose that from God comes the nature and
existence of the soul and its faculties, and sanctifying grace,
and actual grace in the form of objective attractiveness, and also
a general divine concursus under which man can will evil as well
as good. Let us further suppose two just men, who have received
all these gifts in equal measure. If one of these men freely
determines himself to a new meritorious act, even to an act of
heroism, whereas the other freely falls into grievous sin and thus
loses sanctifying grace -- then the first man's free and
meritorious self-determination, that by which he is better than
the second, does not come from God, since He is not the author of
that which precisely distinguishes the first from the second.
Here, then, since God is not the creative and determining source
of this self-determining meritorious act, God's knowledge of that
act is dependent on, determined by, the act of God's creature. God
is spectator, not author, of what is best in the heart of God's
saints. How can this doctrine be reconciled with the infinite
independence of God, the Author of all good?
Now listen to St. Thomas: "Since God's act of love is the source
of all good in creatures, no creature can be better than another,
did not God give to that creature a higher good than He gives to
another. " [398].
And again: "Certain authors, since they cannot understand how God
can cause an act of will without harm to our liberty, give of
these verses [399] a wrong exposition. The words 'to will' and
'fulfill' they expound thus: God gives the power of willing, but
not the actual choice between this and that. [400]... But
Scripture is evidently against this exposition. Isaias, for
example, in 36: 12, speaks thus: 'All our deeds Thou hast wrought
for us, O Lord!' Hence we have from God not only our power of
willing, but also our act of willing. " [401].
Let us now summarize. If God is the cause of our faculties, then a
fortiori He is cause of that which is still better than our
faculties, since a faculty exists only for the sake of its act.
Hence man's free and self-determined choice, which comes entirely
from man as second cause, comes likewise entirely from God as
first cause. Thus, to illustrate, the apple belongs entirely both
to the tree and to the branch.
ARTICLE FOUR: DIFFICULTIES
We must now examine some texts wherein St. Thomas seems at first
sight not to be in accord with his own texts just cited. Here is
one such text. [402].
"God, as universal mover, moves the will of man to the universal
object of the will, to good, namely, and without this universal
motion man cannot will anything. But man by reason determines
himself to will this or that, either to a true good, that is, or
to an apparent good. ".
The text, even as it stands, is thus interpreted by Thomists: Man,
as second cause, certainly determines himself, since he
deliberates only to make a choice. His deliberation ends, either
in a salutary act, under actual operating grace, or then in an
evil act, under that universal motion treated in our text, which
motion is not the cause of the act as evil, just as, to
illustrate, the energy of a lame man is the cause of his walk, but
not of the limp. But the text cited does not at all prove that the
divine motion toward the salutary free act is never
predetermining, or that it remains indifferent, so that from it an
evil act might as equally come forth as a good act.
So far the text as it stands. But, in that same response, [403]
the saint adds these words: "Yet sometimes God moves some men in a
special manner to will determinately something which is good, as
in those whom He moves by grace. " [404] This is particularly true
of gratia operans, of special inspiration. But now, if even in one
sole case divine motion infallibly produces a salutary act, which
must be free (Mary's fiat, for example, or Paul's conversion): it
follows evidently that the divine motion does not destroy the
creature's freedom of will.
Now let us consider another text [405] from which an objection has
been drawn. It runs thus: "The will is an active principle, not
limited to one kind of object. Hence God so moves the will that it
is not of necessity determined to one act, but that its act
remains contingent and not necessary, except in objects to which
it is moved by nature" [406] (e. g.: happiness, beatitude).
Is this text opposed to common Thomistic doctrine? Not at all.
Throughout this whole question the two expressions, non ex
necessitate movet and movet sed non ex necessitate, are used
interchangeably. Similarly, voluntas ab aliquo objecto ex
necessitate movetur, ab alio autem non (in art. 2) and voluntas
hominis non ex necessitate movetur ab appetitu sensitivo (in art.
3). Moreover, in the very same article from which the objection is
taken, the saint in the third response writes as follows: "If God
moves the will to act, then, under this supposition, it is
impossible that the will should not act. Nevertheless, speaking
simply and absolutely, it is not impossible that the will should
not act. Hence it does not follow that the will is moved by God ex
necessitate. " [407].
Clearly, the meaning of the passage is this: The divine motion
obtains infallibly its effect, i. e.: man's act of actual choice,
but without forcing, necessitating, that choice. Thus, on
Annunciation Day, the divine motion infallibly brought Mary to say
freely her fiat. Far from forcing the act, far from destroying
Mary's freedom, the divine motion instead actualized her freedom.
When efficacious grace touches the free will, that touch is
virginal, it does no violence, it only enriches.
Let us listen again to the saint, in a passage where he first
presents an objection incessantly repeated down to our day, and
then gives his own answer. The objection runs thus: If man's will
is unchangeably (infallibly) moved by God, it follows that man
does not have free choice in willing. [408] The answer is this:
[409] God moves the will infallibly (immobiliter) by reason of the
efficacy of His moving power; [410] but, since our will can choose
indifferently among various possibilities, its act remains, not
necessary, but free.
God moves each creature according to its nature. That is the
saint's central thought. If the creature has free will, God
actualizes that freedom to act freely, selectively, by choice,
just as, in plants, He actualizes the vegetative power, or in
animals the sense power, to act without choice, each in accord
with its nature. If the musician can evoke from each instrument
the natural vibrations suited to express his inspirations, how
much more easily can the divine musician, who lives in us more
intimately than our own freedom does, evoke from one free
instrument (e. g.: St. Paul) vibrating chords, fully natural and
fully free, yet so different from those he evokes from a second
free instrument (e. g.: St. John).
Again St. Thomas: "If God's intention is that this man, whose
heart He is moving, shall receive (sanctifying) grace, then that
man receives that grace infallibly. " Why? Because, as he says
three lines earlier: "God's (efficacious) intention cannot fail,
that is, as Augustine says, by God's gifts, all who are saved are
infallibly (certissime) saved. " [411].
Further, St. Thomas often speaks of a divine predetermination
which does not necessitate the will. Thus, in explaining our
Lord's words: [412] "My hour is not yet come, " he says: " 'Hour'
in this text means the time of Christ's passion, an hour imposed
on Him, not by necessity, but by divine providence. [413] And this
holds good of all the acts freely done by Christ in that hour of
His passion. Here are the saint's own words: "That hour was
imposed on Him, not by the necessity of fate, but by the eternal
sentence of the entire Trinity. " [414] Here we have a
predetermining decree, with no allusion to anything like scientia
media, a knowledge, that is, which would depend on prevision of
our free consent. [415].
We must return again and again to the principle: God's knowledge,
being uncreated, can never be dependent on, determined by,
anything created, which, though it be only a future conditional
thing, would never be at all had God not first decided it should
be. And nothing can, here and now, come to pass unless God has
from all eternity efficaciously willed it so, and no evil unless
He has permitted it. In this sense St. Thomas, following St. Paul
and St. Augustine, understands the words of the Psalmist: "In
heaven and on earth whatever God willed, that He has done. "
[416].
Elsewhere our saint reduces this doctrine to a simple formula:
"Whatever God wills simpliciter, comes to pass, though what He
wills antecedently does not come to pass. " Thus, God, who willed
the conversion of one thief simpliciter, willed that of the other
antecedenter. Admitting, as we must, that we are here faced with
an impenetrable mystery, the mystery, that is, of predestination,
we must nevertheless hold that whatever there is of good in our
free choice comes from God as first cause, and that nothing in any
way good come to pass here and now unless God has from all
eternity willed it so.
The saint does not tire of reiteration. Whatever there is of
reality and goodness [417] in our free acts comes from the Author
of all good. Only that which is evil in our acts cannot come from
Him, just as, to repeat, the limp of the lame man does not come
from the energy by which he walks.
In this sense, then, we understand certain formulas coined by
Thomists. The divine motion, they say, prescinds perfectly from
the evil in a bad act, [418] that is to say, malice, moral evil,
is not contained in the adequate object of God's will and power,
just as, to illustrate, sound is not contained in the adequate
object of sight. This leads to a second formula: Nothing is more
precisive (praecisivum) than the formal object of any power. [419]
Thus truth is the precisive object of intelligence, and good is
that of the will. Evil, disorder, cannot be the object of divine
will and divine power, and hence cannot have other source than the
second cause, defectible and deficient.
SUMMARY
To show the harmony between this doctrine and generally received
theological principles, let us recall that all theologians
maintain that what is best in the souls of saints on earth must
come from God. Now that which is best in these saints is precisely
their self-determined free choice of meritorious acts, above all
of love for God and neighbor. To this end are ordained and
proportioned all forms of grace: habitual grace, infused virtues,
the gifts of the Spirit, all illumination, all attractive,
persuasive, actual graces. This general principle, accepted by all
theologians, surely inclines to accepting the Thomist doctrine.
Without that doctrine we rob the divine causality of what is best
in us, and insert into uncreated causality a knowledge dependent
on our free choice, which, as such, would not come from Him.
In the light of this principle the saint shows the nature of God's
love for us, how God loves those who are better by giving them
that by which they are better. 420 He shows further that mercy and
justice are the two great virtues of the divine will, and that
their acts proceed from love of the Supreme Good. Love of the
Supreme Good, which has the right to be preferred to all other
good, is the principle of justice. This love of the Supreme Good,
which is self-diffusive, is the principle of mercy, a principle
higher than justice, since, as radiating goodness, it is the first
expression of love.
CHAPTER 11: PROVIDENCE AND PREDESTINATION
PRESUPPOSING the Thomistic doctrine on God's knowledge and God's
will, we are now to draw from that doctrine a few essential
conclusions on providence and predestination. [421].
ARTICLE ONE: DIVINE PROVIDENCE
The proof a posteriori of the existence of divine providence is
drawn from the fifth proof of God's existence. [422] The proof
quasi a priori rests on what was said in the foregoing chapter
about the divine intelligence and the divine will. It can be
formulated as follows: In every intelligent agent there pre-exists
an intelligent plan, that includes the special reason for each of
the intended results. But God's intelligence is the cause of every
created good, and consequently of the relation which each created
good has to its purpose, above all to its ultimate purpose.
Therefore there pre-exists in God's intelligence an intelligent
plan for the whole created universe, a plan which includes the
special relation of each created being to its purpose, proximate
and ultimate. The name we give to this universal plan is
Providence.
This notion of providence implies no imperfection. On the
contrary, by analogy, starting from created prudence and
prevision, as seen, say, in the father of a family or in the head
of a state, we must assign the word "providence" to God, not in
the metaphorical, but in the proper sense of the word. Divine
providence is the complete and ordered plan of the universe, a
plan pre-existing in God's eternal mind. Divine government is the
execution of that plan. [423] But providence presupposes God's
efficacious will to bring about the purpose of that plan. Whatever
He ordains, whatever He prescribes, is what He must do to attain
His purpose.
1. The Nature of Providence
The nature of providence, so Thomists generally hold, includes
these four elements:
a) God wills, as purpose of the universe, the manifestation of His
goodness.
b) Among possible worlds known to Him by simple intelligence,
anterior to any decree of His will, He selected as suited to that
purpose this present world, which involves, first, an order of
nature subordinated to the order of grace, second, the permission
of sin, third, the hypostatic order of redemptive Incarnation.
c) He freely chooses, as means suited to manifest His divine
goodness, this present world with all its orders and parts.
d) He commands the execution of this choice of decree by the
imperium, an intellectual act, which presupposes two efficacious
acts of will, one the intention of purpose, the other the choice
of means. Divine providence consists, properly and formally, in
this imperium, [424] whereas divine government is the execution in
time of that eternal plan which is providence.
Hence we see that providence presupposes, not merely God's
conditional, inefficacious, antecedent will, but also God's
consequent, absolute, efficacious will, to manifest His goodness
through His own chosen ways and means, by the present orders of
nature and of grace, which includes permission of sin with the
consequent order of redemptive Incarnation. This order manifestly
presupposes, first, God's antecedent will to save all men in
virtue of which He makes really and truly possible to all men the
fulfilling of His precepts. It presupposes, secondly, God's
consequent will to save all men who will in fact be saved. Thus
predestination, by its object, is a part, the highest part of
providence.
Is providence infallible? Thomists in general answer Yes, with a
distinction. Providence, inasmuch as it presupposes God's
consequent will, is infallible, both in the end to be obtained and
in the ways and means that lead to that end. But in as far as it
presupposes solely God's antecedent will, it is infallible only
with regard to ways and means. Here lies the distinction between
general Providence, which makes salvation genuinely possible for
all men, and predestination, which infallibly leads the elect to
their preordained good.
2. Scope and Reach of Providence
All creation down to tiniest detail is ruled by providence. "Not a
sparrow falls to earth without your Father's permission. " "The
very hairs of your head are numbered. " [425] Hence the question
arises: How can providence govern these multitudinous details,
without suppressing contingency, fortune, and liberty, without
being responsible for evil?
We answer with St. Thomas: "Since every agent acts for an end, the
preordaining of ways and means to reach that end extends, when the
First Cause is in question, as far as extends the efficient
causality of that First Cause. Now that causality extends to all
created things, not only as regards their specific characters, but
also to their utmost individual differences. Hence all created
reality must be preordained by God to its end, must be, that is,
subject to providence. " [426] Even the least detail of the
material world is still a reality, hence known by God, since He is
cause not only of its form, but also of its matter, which is the
principle of all individual differences. [427].
When we talk of events which men ascribe to fortune, good or evil,
we must remember that we are dealing only with the second causes
of those events. In relation to the First Cause such events are in
no wise accidental and fortuitous, since God eternally foresees
all results, however surprising to men, that come from complicated
series of created causes.
Evil as such is not a positive something, but is the privation of
good in the created thing. God permits it only because He is
strong enough and good enough to draw from evil a higher good, the
crown of martyrdom, say, from persecution. [428] And God's
causality, as we saw above, far from destroying, actualizes
liberty. [429] The mode of contingency, and the mode of liberty,
says St. Thomas, being modes of created being, fall under divine
Providence, the universal cause of being. A great poet expresses
with equal perfection sentiments the strongest or the sweetest.
God, who can do all things He wills as He wills, can bring it
about that the stone falls necessarily and that man acts freely.
God moves each creature according to the nature which He gave to
that creature.
Here emerges a rule for Christian life. We must work out our
salvation, certainly. But the chief element in that work is to
abandon ourselves to providence, to God's wisdom and goodness. We
rest more surely on God's design than on our own best intentions.
Our only fear must be that we are not entirely submissive to God's
designs. To those who love God, who persevere in His love, all
things work together unto good. [430] This abandonment evidently
does not dispense us from doing our utmost to fulfill the divine
will signified by precepts, counsels, and the events of life. But,
that done, we can and should abandon ourselves completely to God's
pleasure, however hidden and mysterious. Such abandonment is a
higher form of hope; it is a union of confidence and love of God
for His own sake. Its prayer unites petition and adoration. It
does not pray, indeed, to change the dispositions of providence.
But it does come from God, who draws it forth from our heart, like
an earthly father, who, resolved on a gift to his child, leads the
child first to ask for the gift.
ARTICLE TWO: PREDESTINATION
What we here attempt is a summary of the principles which underlie
Thomistic doctrine on the high mystery of predestination. [431].
1. Scriptural Foundation
St. Thomas studied deeply those texts in St. John and St. Paul
which express the mystery of predestination, its gratuitousness,
and its infallibility. Here follow the chief texts.
a) "Those whom Thou gavest Me have I kept: and none of them is
lost but the son of perdition that the Scripture may be fulfilled.
" [432].
b) "My sheep hear My voice. And I know them, and they follow Me.
And I give them life everlasting: and they shall not perish
forever. And no man shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My
Father hath given Me is greater than all: and no one can snatch
them out of the hand of My Father. " [433].
c) "For many are called, but few are chosen. " [434].
St. Thomas, based on tradition, interprets these texts as follows:
There are elect souls, chosen by God from all eternity. They will
be infallibly saved; if they fall, God will raise them up, their
merits will not be lost. Others, like the son of perdition, will
be lost. Yet God never commands the impossible, and gives to all
men genuine power to fulfill His precepts at the moment when these
precepts bind according to the individual's knowledge. Repentance
was genuinely possible for Judas, but the act did not come into
existence. Remark again the distance between potency and act. The
mystery lies chiefly in harmonizing God's universal will of
salvation with the predestination, not of all, but of a certain
number known only to God.
This same mystery we find often affirmed by St. Paul, implicitly
and explicitly. Here are the chief texts.
a) "For what distinguisheth thee? or what hast thou that thou hast
not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as
if thou hadst not received? " [435] This is equivalent to saying:
No one would be better than another, were he not more loved and
strengthened by God, though for all the fulfillment of God's
precepts is genuinely possible. "It is God who worketh in you,
both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. "
[436].
b) "He chose us in Him [Jesus Christ] before the foundation of the
world that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight. He hath
predestinated us to be His adopted children through Jesus Christ,
according to the good pleasure of His will, to make shine forth
the glory of His grace, by which He has made us pleasing in His
eyes, in His beloved son. " [437].
This text speaks explicitly of predestination. So St. Augustine.
So St. Thomas and his school. St. Thomas sets in relief both the
good pleasure of God's will and the designs of God's mind, to show
the eternal freedom of the act of predestination.
c) "We know that to them who love God all things work together
unto good, to those who are called according to His designs. For
those whom He foreknew, these also He predestinated to be made
conformable to the image of His son, that His son might be the
firstborn among many brethren. And whom He predestinated, these He
also called, and whom He called, these He also justified. And whom
He justified, these He also glorified. " [438].
"Those whom He foreknew, these also He predestinated. " How does
St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, understand these salient
words? Nowhere does he understand them of simple prevision of our
merits. Such a meaning has no foundation in St. Paul, and is
excluded by many of his affirmations. [439] The real meaning is
this: "Those whom God foreknew with divine benevolence, these He
predestinated. " And for what purpose? That His Son might be the
first among many brethren. This is the genuine meaning of
"foreknew. ".
d) This same idea appears clearly in the commentary on Romans,
[440] where St. Paul is magnifying the sovereign independence of
God in dispensing His graces. The Jews, the chosen people of old,
have been rejected by reason of their unbelief, and salvation is
being announced to the pagans. St. Paul sets forth the underlying
principle of God's predilection, applicable both to nation and to
individuals:
"What shall we say? Is there injustice in God? Far from it. For He
says to Moses: 'I will have mercy on whom I will, I will have
compassion on whom I will. ' This then depends not on him who
wills, not on him who runs, but on God who shows mercy. " [441] If
predestination includes a positive act of God, hardening of the
heart, on the contrary, is only permitted by God and comes from
the evil use which man makes of his freedom. Let no man, then,
call God to account. Hence the conclusions: "Oh unsounded depth of
God's wisdom and knowledge! How incomprehensible are His
judgments, how unsearchable His ways!. Who hath first given to
Him, that recompense should be made? For of Him and by Him and in
Him are all things. To Him be glory forever. Amen. " [442].
2. Definition of Predestination
The Scripture texts just quoted are the foundation of the
doctrine, Augustinian and Thomistic, of predestination. The
definition of St. Augustine runs thus: Predestination is God's
foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts whereby all those who
are saved are infallibly saved. [443] By predestination, he says
elsewhere, God foreknew what He Himself would do. [444].
The definition of St. Thomas runs thus: That plan in God's mind
whereby He sends the rational creature to that eternal life which
is its goal, is called predestination, for to destine means to
send.
This definition agrees with that of St. Augustine. In God's mind
there is an eternal plan whereby this man, this angel, reaches his
supernatural end. This plan, divinely ordained and decreed,
includes the efficacious ways and means which lead this man, this
angel, to his ultimate goal. This is the doctrine of Scripture.
[445] This is the doctrine of the two saints, Augustine and
Thomas.
3. Questions
Why did God choose certain creatures, whom, if they fall, He
raises ever again, while He rejects others after permitting their
final impenitence?
The answer of St. Thomas, based on revelation, runs as follows: In
the predestined, God manifests His goodness under the form of
mercy. In the reprobate, He manifests His goodness under the form
of justice. This answer comes from St. Paul: "If God, willing to
show His wrath (His justice): and to make His power known, endured
(permitted) with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for
destruction, and if He willed to show the riches of His glory in
the vessels of mercy which He had prepared for glory... (where is
the injustice?). ".
Divine goodness, we recall, tends to communicate itself, and thus
becomes the principle of mercy. But divine goodness, on the other
hand, has the inalienable right to the supreme love of creatures,
and thus becomes the principle of justice. Both the splendor of
infinite justice and the glory of infinite mercy are necessary for
the full manifestation of God's goodness. Thus evil is permitted
only in view of a higher good, a good of which divine wisdom is
the only judge, a good which the elect will contemplate in heaven.
To this doctrine Thomists add nothing. They simply defend it. And
this holds good likewise of the answer to the following question.
Why does God predestine this creature rather than the other?
Our Lord says: "No man can come to Me unless the Father who hath
sent Me draw him. " [446] St. Augustine [447] continues: Why the
Father draws this man, and does not draw that man, judge not
unless you would misjudge. Why did not the saint find an easier
answer? He could have said: God predestines this man rather than
the other because He foresaw that the one, and not the other,
would make good use of the grace offered or even given to him. But
then one man would be better than the other without having been
more loved and strengthened by God, a position contrary to St.
Paul [448] and to our Lord. [449] The merits of the elect, says
St. Thomas, far from being the cause of predestination, are, on
the contrary, the effects of predestination. [450].
Let us here repeat the saint's formula of the principle of
predilection: "Since God's love is the source of all created
goodness, no creature would in any way be better than another, did
God not will to give it a good greater than the good He gives to
another. " [451] Hence, as the saint says elsewhere, [452] God's
love precedes God's choice, and God's choice precedes God's
predestination. And in that same article he adds that
predestination to glory precedes predestination to grace. [453].
The Pelagians thought of God as spectator, not as author, of that
salutary consent which distinguishes the just from the wicked. The
Semi-Pelagians said the same of the initium fidei et bonae
voluntatis. St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, teaches that from
God comes everything there is in us of good, from the beginning of
a good will to the most intimate goodness of our free and self-
determined salutary acts.
To the question, then, of God's motive in choosing one rather than
the other, St. Thomas answers that the future merits of the elect
cannot be the reason of their predestination, since these merits
are, on the contrary, the effect of their predestination. Then he
adds: "Why God chose these for glory and reprobated others finds
answer only in the divine will. [454] Of two dying men, each
equally and evilly disposed, why does God move one to repentance
and permit the other to die impenitent? There is no answer but the
divine pleasure. [455].
Thomists restrict themselves to defending this doctrine against
Molinism and congruism. They add to it nothing positive. The more
explicit terms they employ have no other purpose than to exclude
from the doctrine false interpretations, which favor simultaneous
concursus or premotio indifferens.
Mystery there is in this doctrine, mystery unfathomable but
inevitable. How harmonize God's gratuitous predestination with
God's will of salvation for all men? How harmonize infinite mercy,
infinite justice, and infinite freedom? Mystery there is, but no
contradiction. There would be contradiction, if God's salvific
will were illusory, if God did not make fulfillment of His
precepts really and genuinely possible. For thus He would,
contrary to His goodness, mercy, and justice, command the
impossible. But if these precepts are really possible for all,
whereas they are in fact kept by some and not by all, then those
who do keep them, being better, must have received more from God.
St. Thomas [456] thus sums up the matter: "One who gives by grace
(not by justice) can at his good pleasure give more or less, and
to whom he pleases, if only he denies to no one what justice
demands. [457] Thus, the householder says: 'Take what is thine and
go. Or is it not lawful for me to do as I will? ' " [458].
This doctrine is expressed by the common language of daily life.
When of two great sinners one is converted, Christians say: God
showed him special mercy. This solution of daily life accords with
that of St. Augustine and St. Thomas when they contemplate the
mysterious harmony of infinite mercy and infinite justice. When
God with sovereign freedom grants to one the grace of final
perseverance, it is a gift of mercy. When He does not grant it to
another, it is a deed of justice, due to last resistance to a last
appeal.
Against all deviations in this matter, toward predestinationism,
Protestantism, and Jansenism, on the one hand, and, on the other,
toward Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, we must hold fast these
two truths, central and mutually complementary: first, "God never
commands the impossible, " and second, "No one would be better
than another were he not loved more by God. " Guided by these
truths we can begin to see where the mystery lies. Infinite
justice, infinite mercy, sovereign liberty are all united, are
even identified, in the Deity's transcendent pre-eminence, which
remains hidden from us as long as we do not have the beatific
vision. But in the chiaro oscuro of life here below, grace, which
is a participation of the Deity, tranquillizes the just man, and
the inspirations of the Holy Spirit console him, strengthen his
hope, and make his love more pure, disinterested, and strong, so
that in the incertitude of salvation he has the ever-growing
certitude of hope, which is a certitude of tendency toward
salvation. The proper and formal object of infused hope is not, in
fact, our own effort, but the infinite mercy of the "God who aids
us, " [459] who arouses us here to effort and who will there
crown-that effort. [460].
CHAPTER 12: OMNIPOTENCE
OMNIPOTENCE is the immediate source of God's external works. God's
productive action cannot, properly speaking, be transitive, since
that would imply imperfection, would imply that God's action is an
accident, something emanating from God and received into a
creature. Speaking properly, God's action is immanent, is
identified with the very being of God. But it is virtually
transitive, since it produces an effect distinct from God.
God's active power is infinite because, the more perfect a being
is, the more perfect is its power of acting. Hence God, who is
pure act, who is actuality itself, has a power which is boundless,
which can give existence to whatever is not self-contradictory.
[461] This infinite power is seen, first in creation, secondly in
preservation, thirdly in divine motion. Hence the three articles
which now follow.
1. CREATION
According to revelation, God freely created heaven and earth, not
from eternity, but in time, at the origin of time. Here we have
three truths.
a) God created the universe ex nihilo.
b) God created the universe freely.
c) God did not create the universe ab aeterno.
The first two truths are demonstrable by reason, hence belong to
the preambles of faith. The third, so St. Thomas, is
indemonstrable, is an article of faith. [462] Let us look more
closely at each of these three truths.
a) Creation ex Nihilo.
Creation from nothing means a productive act where there is no
material cause, no subject matter to work on, so that the entire
being of created things comes from their creative cause. Before
creation, nothing of the created thing existed, not even its
matter, however unformed you may suppose it. This production of
the entire created being [463] has indeed an efficient cause and a
final cause and an exemplary cause (the divine idea): but no
material cause.
St. Thomas [464] shows that the distance is infinite between
creation from nothing and production, however masterly, of
something from preexisting matter. The sculptor makes the statue,
not from nothing, but from pre-existing marble or clay. The father
begets the son from the pre-existing germ. The thinker builds a
system from pre-existing facts and principles. Our will produces a
free act from its own pre-existing power to act. The teacher
fashions, he does not create, his pupil's intelligence. No finite
agent can create, properly speaking, it can but transform what
pre-exists. Creative power, says St. Thomas, [465] cannot, even by
miracle, be communicated to any creature. This conclusion, he
says, follows from the distinction between God and the world.
Since in God alone are essence and existence identified, God alone
who is essential existence can bring forth from nothing
participated existence, a being composed of essence and existence.
Though that creature be merely a particle of dust, God alone can
create it. Those who, like Suarez, [466] follow notably different
principles regarding essence and existence, are much less clear
and affirmative in their doctrine on creation.
Between Aristotle and St. Thomas there is also at this point a
great distance. Plato and Aristotle, though they admitted an
eternal creation, did not rise to the explicit notion of creation
from nothing. [467] They did indeed see the dependence of the
world on God, but were unable to make precise the mode of that
dependence. Nor did they see that the creative act is free,
sovereignly free. The world seemed to them a necessary radiation
from God, like the rays from the sun. This double truth, free
creation and creation from nothing, accessible to reason under the
influence of revelation, is of capital importance in Christian
philosophy, and signalizes immense progress beyond Aristotle.
Yet in attaining this truth St. Thomas employs Aristotle's [468]
own principle: "The most universal effect comes from the most
universal cause. " St. Thomas argues from this principle as
follows: "Being as being is the most universal of effects. Hence
the production of being as such, of the whole being (even of the
tiniest thing): must come from the supreme cause, which is the
most universal of causes. As only fire heats, as only light
shines, so that cause alone which is being itself, existence
itself, can produce the whole being of its effect. The adequate
object of omnipotence is being, the whole being, and no created
power can have an object so universal. ".
From this vantage point new light falls on Aristotle's very
definition of metaphysics, which is: Knowledge of things through
their supreme cause, knowledge of being as such. Why? Aristotle
did not give the explicit reason, but St. Thomas did: In every
finite thing being as such is the proper and exclusive effect of
the supreme cause.
This immense progress, though attained under the light of
revelation, is nevertheless a truth of reason, reached by
philosophic demonstration. The traditional doctrine of potency and
act, adolescent still in Aristotle, reaches maturity in Aquinas.
Revelation did indeed facilitate the demonstration, by pointing
out its goal, but did not furnish the principle of that
demonstration. In the Christian milieu, the doctrine of potency
and act can produce new fruits, which rise from this principle,
though Aristotle himself did not see those fruits.
St. Thomas [469] adds a confirmation of this truth: "The poorer is
the matter to be transformed, i. e.: the more imperfect is passive
power, the greater must be the active power. Hence, when passive
power is simply nothing, active power must be infinite. Hence no
creature can create. " [470].
b) Creation a Free Act
The doctrine of free creation is not less important than that of
creation from nothing. Why must creation be a free act of God? We
gave the reason above. God, possessing infinite goodness and
infinite joy, has no need of creatures. The act of creation itself
adds no new perfection to God. God, says Bossuet, [471] is none
the greater by having created the universe. He was not less
perfect before creation, and He would not have been less perfect
had He never created. Revelation, indeed, shows us the infinite
fecundity of the divine nature, in the generation of the Word and
in the spiration of the Holy Spirit. But divine goodness, thus
necessarily self-communicative within (ad intra): is just as
freely self-communicative without (ad extra).
The chief opponents of St. Thomas on the liberty of the creative
act were the Averroists. Against them he speaks frequently. Let us
listen to a few sentences: [472] "God can do all things. "
"Neither the divine intellect nor the divine will is limited to
determined finite effects. " "God can act beyond the order of
nature. ".
The reasons laid down in these articles are equally valid against
the pantheistic determinism of Spinoza and of numerous modern
philosophers, and also against the moral necessity of creation
taught by Leibnitz, [473] who maintained an absolute optimism,
according to which, he says: "Supreme wisdom was obliged to
create, and could not fail to choose the best of possible worlds.
".
This position of Leibnitz was refuted beforehand by St. Thomas.
Here are the saint's words: "The plan in fact realized by infinite
wisdom is not adequate to the ideals and inventive power of that
wisdom. A wise man chooses means proportionate to his purpose. If
the end is proportioned to the means, then those means are imposed
by necessity. But divine goodness, which is the purpose of the
universe, surpasses infinitely all things created (and creatable):
and is beyond all proportion to them. Hence divine wisdom is not
limited to the present order of things, and can conceive another.
" [474].
Leibnitz treated this problem as a mathematical problem: "While
God calculates, the world comes into being. " [475] He forgot
that, whereas in a mathematical problem all elements stand in
mutual and limited proportion, finite things have no such
proportion to the infinite goodness which they manifest.
To the objection of Leibnitz that infinite wisdom could not fail
to choose the best, St. Thomas had already replied: "The
proposition, 'God can do something better than what He actually
does, ' has two meanings. If the term 'better' is understood as
modifying 'something, ' the proposition is true, because God can
ameliorate all existing things and can make things which are
better than those things He has made. [476] But if the term
'better' is understood adverbially, as modifying 'do, ' then the
proposition is false, because God always acts with infinite wisdom
and goodness. " [477].
The actual world, so we conclude, is a masterpiece, but a better
masterpiece is possible. Thus, to illustrate: the plant's organism
is wonderfully adapted to its purpose, but the animal's organism
is still more perfect. Any symphony of Beethoven is a masterpiece,
but does not exhaust his genius.
Thus are solved the difficulties which seem to have held Aristotle
from affirming divine liberty and divine providence.
c) Creation in Time
Revelation teaches that God created the universe in time, at the
origin of time, not from eternity. This truth, says St. Thomas,
[478] since it cannot be demonstrated by reason, is an article of
faith.
Why? Because creation depends on divine freedom, which could have
created millions of ages earlier, and even beyond that still
earlier, in such wise that the world would be without beginning,
but not without origin, since by nature and causality it would be
eternally dependent on God, just as, to illustrate, the footprint
on the sand presupposes the foot that makes it, so that if the
foot were from eternity on the sand, the footprint too would be
without beginning. Further, since, as revelation teaches,
spiritual creatures will never cease to exist, and even men's
bodies, after the general resurrection, will live on without end,
so likewise could the world exist, without beginning, created from
eternity and forever preserved by God. [479].
On the other hand, as the saint [480] shows against the
Averroists, it is not necessary that the world must have been
created from eternity. The creative action in God, yes, that is
eternal, since it is, properly speaking, immanent, and only
virtually transitive, but since it is free, it can make its effect
commence in time, at the instant chosen from eternity. Thus there
would be "a new divine effect without new divine action. " [481].
ARTICLE TWO: DIVINE PRESERVATION
The doctrine of creation, well understood, has as consequence the
doctrine of preservation. [482] If God, even for an instant,
ceased to preserve creatures, they would instantly be annihilated,
just as, if luminous bodies were no more, light too would cease to
be. The reason is that the very being of creatures, composed as
they are of essence and existence, is being by participation,
which always and necessarily depend on Him who is essential being,
in whom alone essence is identified with existence. [483].
God, in fact, is the cause, not only of the creature's coming into
existence, but also, and directly, of its continued being. The
human father who begets a son is the direct cause only of the
son's coming into existence, and hence the son can continue to
exist after the death of his father. But, even in creatures, there
are causes on which depends the continued existence of their
effects. Without atmospheric pressure and solar heat, even the
most vigorous animal will not delay in dying. Light without its
source is no more. Sensation without its sense object disappears.
In the intellectual order, he who forgets principle can no longer
grasp conclusion, and he who no longer wills the end can have no
desire of means.
Where cause and effect belong both to the same specific level of
being, there cause is cause only of the effect's coming into
being. The continued being of that effect cannot depend directly
on that cause, since the cause, equally with the effect, has
participated existence, which each must receive from a cause
higher than both.
It is characteristic, on the contrary, of a cause which is of a
higher order than its effects, to be the direct cause both of
becoming and of continuing to be. Principles, in relation to
consequences, and ends in relation to means, are such causes. Now
God, the supreme cause, is subsistent being itself, whereas His
effects are beings by participation, beings composed of essence
and existence. Hence each and every creature must be preserved by
God if it is to continue in existence. And this preservative
action, outside and above movement and time, is simply continued
creative action, somewhat illustrated by the continued influence
of the sun on light. [484] God, the Preserver, who thus without
medium preserves the very existence of His creatures, is more
intimately inexistent in creatures than are creatures themselves.
[485].
ARTICLE THREE: DIVINE MOTION
Scripture speaks often of God working in us: "Thou hast wrought
all our works in us. " [486] "In Him we live and move and are. "
[487] "He works all things in all. " [488] On texts like these is
based the doctrine that God moves to their operations all second
causes. [489].
We are not to imitate the occasionalists, who understand this
doctrine to mean that God is the sole cause, that fire, for
instance, does not warm us, but that, by the occasion of fire, God
alone warms us. But neither are we to go to the opposite extreme
and maintain that the second cause can act without previous divine
motion, and that consequently the second cause is rather
coordinated than subordinated to the first cause, like a second
man who aids a first man to draw a boat.
Here again the position of St. Thomas is a higher synthesis, which
marches between these two mutually opposed conceptions. Causality
follows being, and the mode of causality follows the mode of
being. Hence, only the causality of God, who is existence itself,
is self-initiated, whereas the creature, existing by
participation, in dependence on God, must also in its causality be
dependent on previous divine motion.
Let us listen to the saint: "God not only gives to creatures the
form which is their nature, but also preserves them in existence
and moves them to act, and is the purpose of their actions. "
[490].
Were it not so, if the creature, without divine motion, could pass
from potency to act, then the more would come from the less, the
principle of causality would fail, and the proofs of God's
existence, proofs based on motion and created causality, would
lose their validity. [491].
Here is another text, still more explicit: "God is the cause of
every created action, both by giving the power of acting and by
preserving that power, and by moving it to act, so that by His
power every other power acts. " [492] Then he adds: "A natural
created thing cannot be raised so as to act without divine
operation. " [493] Thomists have never said anything more
explicit. [494].
Here Molina [495] objects. He cannot see, he says, what that
motion should be, that application to act in second causes, of
which St. Thomas speaks. Molina himself maintains that God's act
of concurring with the second cause does not move that cause to
act, but influences immediately the effect of that cause, as when
two men draw a boat. [496] Suarez [497] retains this manner of
speech.
Thomists reply thus: Then the second cause is, in its causality,
coordinated with, not subordinated to, the first cause. Its
passage from potency to act is inexplicable. We must say, on the
contrary, that the created cause is necessarily subordinated to
the first, and in such manner that the effect is entirely from God
as first cause, and entirely from the creature as second cause,
just as, to illustrate, the fruit comes entirely from the tree as
its radical principle, and from the branch as proximate principle.
And just as God, the first cause, actualizes the vital function of
plant and animal, so also He illuminates our intelligence and
actualizes our freedom of will without violence. [498].
The De Deo uno concludes with a short treatise on God's beatitude,
which rests on His infinite knowledge and love of Himself, whereas
the knowledge and love which even beatified creatures have of God
remain forever finite.
THIRD PART: THE BLESSED TRINITY
On the subject of the Thomistic synthesis as regards the mystery
of the Trinity, we will first examine what St. Thomas owes to St.
Augustine, then the doctrine of St. Thomas himself on the divine
processions and relations and persons, and on the notional acts of
generation and spiration. This doctrine then will enable us to see
better why the Blessed Trinity is unknowable by natural reason.
Next we will study the law of appropriation, and lastly the manner
of the Trinity's indwelling in the souls of the just. Throughout
we will emphasize the principles which underlie the development of
theological science
CHAPTER 13: AUGUSTINE AND THOMAS
IN his commentaries on the New Testament, St. Thomas carefully
examined the principal texts regarding the Blessed Trinity, in the
Synoptic Gospels, in the Gospel of St. John, and in the Epistles
of St. Paul. He analyzes with special emphasis the formula of
baptism, our Lord's discourse before His passion, and especially
St. John's prologue. His guides throughout are the Fathers, Greek
and Latin, who refuted Arianism and Sabellianism.
These scriptural studies led him to see clearly the part played by
St. Augustine in penetrating into the meaning of our Lord's words
on this supreme mystery. This debt of Thomas to Augustine must be
our first study. We find here a very interesting and important
chain of ideas. Unless we recall both the advantages and the
difficulties presented by the Augustinian conception, we shall not
be able to understand fully the teaching of St. Thomas.
Sabellius had denied real distinction of persons in the Trinity.
Arius, on the other hand, had denied the divinity of the Son;
Macedonius, that of the Holy Spirit. In refuting these opposite
heresies, the Greek Fathers, resting on scriptural affirmation of
three divine persons, had sought to show how this trinity of
persons is to be harmonized with God's unity of nature. This
harmony they found in the term "consubstantial, " a term which by
controversy grew more precise, and was definitively adopted by the
Council of Nicaea. The Son, said the Greek Fathers, led
particularly by St. Athanasius, [499] is consubstantial with the
Father, because the Father who begets the Son communicates to that
Son His own divine nature, not a mere participation in that
nature. And since this Son is the Son of God, His redemptive
merits have infinite value. And. the Holy Spirit, proceeding from
the Father and the Son, is likewise God, consubstantial with the
Father and the Son, without which consubstantiality He could not
be the sanctifier of souls. [500].
Now these Greek Fathers thought of the divine processions rather
as donations than as operations of the divine intelligence and the
divine will. The Father, in begetting the Son, gives to that Son
His own nature. And the Father and the Son give that divine nature
to the Holy Spirit. The mode, they add, of this eternal generation
and spiration is inscrutable. Further, following the order of the
Apostles' Creed, they spoke of the Father as Creator, of the Son
as Savior, of the Holy Spirit as Sanctifier. But their
explanations left the road open to many questions.
Why are there two processions, and only two? How does the first
procession differ from the second? Why is that first procession
alone called generation? Why must there be one Son only? And why,
in the Creed, is the Father alone called Creator, since creative
power, being a characteristic of the divine nature, belongs also
to the Son [501] and to the Holy Spirit? The Latin doctrine of
appropriation is not found explicitly in the Greek Fathers.
St. Thomas, reading Augustine's work, [502] realized that this
greatest of the Latin Fathers had taken a great step forward in
the theology of the Trinity. St. Augustine's point of departure is
the unity of God's nature, already demonstrated philosophically.
Guided by revelation, he seeks the road leading from that unity of
nature to the trinity of persons. This road, followed also by St.
Thomas, is the inverse of that followed by the Greek Fathers.
In St. John's prologue, our Lord is called "the Word" and the
"Only-begotten. " These terms struck St. Augustine. Did they not
offer an explanation of that generation which the Greek Fathers
called inscrutable? The Son, proceeding from the Father, is called
the Word. That divine Word is, not an exterior, but an interior
word, a mental, intellectual word, spoken by the Father from all
eternity. The Father begets the Son by an intellectual act, as our
spirit conceives its own mental word. [503] But while our mental
word is an accidental mode of our intellectual faculty, the divine
word, like the divine thought, is substantial. [504] And while our
spirit slowly and laboriously conceives its ideas, which are
imperfect, limited, and necessarily manifold, to express the
diverse aspects of reality, created and uncreated, the Father, on
the contrary, conceives eternally one substantial Word, unique and
adequate, true God of true God, perfect expression of all that God
is and of all that God does and could do. Much light is thus
thrown on the intimate mode of the Word's eternal generation.
[505].
The saint also explains, in similar fashion, the eternal act of
spiration. [506] The human soul, created to the image of God, is
endowed with intelligence and with love. It not only understands
the good, but also loves the good. These are its two highest
faculties. If then the Only-begotten proceeds from the Father as
the intellectual Word, we are led to think that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from both by a procession of love, and that He is the
terminus of this latter procession. Here, then, enter the divine
relations. [507] The saint speaks thus: "It is demonstrated that
not all predicates of God are substantial, but that some are
relative, that is, as belonging to Him, not absolutely, but
relatively to something other than Himself. " The Father is Father
by relation to the Son, the Son by relation to the Father, the
Holy Spirit by relation to the Father and the Son. [508] This
doctrine is the basis of Thomistic doctrine on the divine
relations.
So far, then, we have the reason why there are two processions in
God, and only two, and why the Holy Spirit proceeds, not only from
the Father, but also from the Son, just as in us love proceeds
from knowledge. St. Augustine, however, does not see why only the
first procession is called generation, and why we are not to say
that the Holy Spirit is begotten. On this point, and on many
others, St. Augustine's doctrine awaits precision by St. Thomas.
A similar remark must be made on St. Augustine's doctrine
concerning the question of appropriation. Starting from the
philosophically demonstrated unity of God's nature, and not from
the trinity of persons, he easily shows that not the Father alone
is Creator, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit, since creative
power is a characteristic of the divine nature, which is common to
all three persons. This doctrine, through the course of centuries,
becomes more precise by successive pronouncements of the Church.
[509] St. Thomas is ever recurring to it. The three persons are
one and the same principle of external operation. If then, in the
Apostles' Creed, the Father is in particular called the Creator,
He is so called by appropriation, by reason, that is, of the
affinity between paternity and power. Similarly, the works of
wisdom are appropriated to the Word, and those of sanctification
to the Spirit of love. This theory of appropriation, initiated by
St. Augustine, [510] finds final precision in St. Thomas, [511]
and definitive formulation in the Council of Florence. [512].
Other difficulties still remain in St. Augustine's trinitarian
conception, difficulties which St. Thomas removes. [513] Here we
note briefly the chief difficulties.
The generation of the Word is an intellective process. Now, since
the intellective act is common to the three persons, it seems that
generation, even to infinity, belongs to all three persons. St.
Thomas answers. From the essential act of understanding, common to
the three, we must distinguish the personal "act of speaking"
(dictio): which is characteristic of the Father alone. [514].
A similar difficulty attends the second procession, which is the
mode of love. Since all three persons love infinitely, each of
them, it seems, should breathe forth another person, and so to
infinity. But again, from that essential love which is common, we
must distinguish, first, notional love, that is, active spiration,
and secondly personal love, which is the Holy Spirit Himself.
[515].
These distinctions are not to be found explicitly in St.
Augustine. But in St. Thomas they appear as natural developments
of St. Augustine's principles, in contrast to the conception
prevalent in the Greek Fathers Let us note the chief advantages of
this Augustino-Thomistic conception.
a) Starting from De Deo uno, it proceeds methodically, from what
is better known to us to what is less knowable, the supernatural
mystery of three divine persons.
b) It explains, by analogy with our own soul life, of mind and
love, the number and characteristics of the divine processions,
which the Greek Fathers declared to be inscrutable. Thus it gives
the reason why there are two and only two processions, and why the
Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the
Son.
c) It shows more clearly why the three persons are but one single
principle of operations ad extra, since divine activity derives
from omnipotence, which is common to all three persons. Here lies
also the reason why this mystery is naturally unknowable, since
creative power is common to all three. [516].
These positive arguments of appropriateness show how far St.
Augustine had progressed from the Greek conception, attained from
a different viewpoint. The difficulties left unsurmounted by St.
Augustine himself are due, not to deficient method, but to the
sublimity of the mystery, whereas the difficulties in the Greek
conception are due to imperfect method, which, instead of
ascending from natural evidence to the mysterious, descends rather
from the supernatural to the natural.
We will now examine the structure of De Trinitate as it appears in
the Summa, [517] dwelling explicitly on the fundamental questions
which virtually contain all the others. First, then, the divine
processions.
CHAPTER 14: THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS
1. GENERATION
FOLLOWING revelation, particularly as recorded in St. John's
prologue, St. Thomas shows that there is in God an intellectual
procession, "an intellectual emanation of the intelligible Word
from the speaker of that Word. " [518].
This procession is not that of effect from cause (Arianism): nor
that of one subjective mode from another (Modalism). This
procession is immanent in God, but is a real procession, not
merely made by our mind, a procession by which the Word has the
same nature as has the Father. "That which proceeds intellectually
(ad intra) has the very nature of its principle, and the more
perfectly it proceeds therefrom the more perfectly it is united to
its principle. " [519] This is true even of our own created ideas,
which become more perfect by being more perfectly united to our
intellect. Thus the Word, conceived from eternity by the Father,
has no other nature than that of the Father. And the Word is not
like our word, accidental, but substantial, because God's act of
knowledge is not an accident, but self-subsisting substance.
In Contra Gentes St. Thomas devotes long pages to this argument of
appropriateness. The principle is thus formulated: "The higher the
nature, the more intimately is its emanation united with it. "
[520] He illustrates by induction. Plant and animal beget exterior
beings which resemble them, whereas human intelligence conceives a
word interior to it. Yet this word is but a transient accident of
our spirit, where thought follows after thought. In God, the act
of understanding is substantial, and if, as revelation says, that
act is expressed by Word, that Word must itself be substantial. It
must be, not only the idea of God, but God Himself. [521].
Under this form St. Thomas keeps an ancient formula, often
appealed to by the Augustinians, in particular by St. Bonaventure.
It runs thus: Good is essentially self-diffusive. [522] The
greater a good is, the more abundantly and intimately does it
communicate itself. [523] The sun spreads light and heat. The
plant, the animal, beget others of their kind. The sage
communicates wisdom, the saint causes sanctity. Hence God, the
infinite summit of all that is good, communicates Himself with
infinite abundance and intimacy, not merely a participation in
being, life, and intelligence, as when He creates stone, plant,
animal, and man, not even a mere participation of His own nature,
as when He creates sanctifying grace, but His own infinite and
indivisible nature. This infinite self-communication in the
procession of the Word reveals the intimacy and fullness of the
scriptural sentence: "My Son art Thou, this day I beget Thee. "
[524].
Further, [525] this procession of the only-begotten [526] Son is
rightly called generation. The living thing, born of a living
thing, receives a nature like that of its begetter, its generator.
In the Deity, the Son receives that same divine nature, not
caused, but communicated. Common speech says that our intellect
conceives a word. This act of conception is the initial formation
of a living thing. But this conception of ours does not become
generation, because our word is, not a substance, but an accident,
so that, even when a man mentally conceives his own substantial
self, that conception is still but an accidental similitude of
himself, whereas the divine conception, the divine Word, is
substantial, is not merely a similitude of God, but is God. Divine
conception, then, is rightly called generation. Intellectual
conception, purified from all imperfection, is an "intellectual
generation, " just as corporeal conception terminates in corporeal
generation.
In this argument we have the highest application of the method of
analogy. The Word of God, far from being a mere representative
similitude of God the Father, is substantial like the Father, is
living like the Father, is a person as is the Father, but a person
distinct from the Father. [527].
2. SPIRATION
There is in God a second procession, by the road of love, as love
in us proceeds from the knowledge of good. [528] But this second
procession is not a generation, [529] because love, in contrast
with knowledge, does not make itself like its object, but rather
goes out to its object. [530].
These two processions alone are found in God, as in us
intelligence and love are the only two forms of our higher
spiritual activity. [531] And in God, too, the second procession,
spiration, presupposes the first, generation, since love derives
from knowledge.
Further on St. Thomas [532] solves some difficulties inherent in
St. Augustine's teaching on the divine processions. The three
persons, he shows, have in common one and the same essential act
of intellect, but it is the Father only who speaks the Word, a
Word adequate and hence unique. To illustrate: Of three men faced
with a difficult problem, one pronounces the adequate solution,
while all three understand that solution perfectly. Similarly the
three persons love by the same essential love, but only the Father
and the Son breathe (by notional love) the Holy Spirit, who is
personal love. [533] Thus love in God, whether essential or
notional or personal, is always substantial.
CHAPTER 15: THE DIVINE RELATIONS
IF there are real processions in God, then there must also be real
relations. As in the order of nature, temporal generation founds
two relations, of son to father and father to son, so likewise
does the eternal generation of the Word found the two relations of
paternity and filiation. And the procession of love also found two
relations, active spiration and "passive" spiration. [534].
Are these relations really distinct from the divine essence? No.
Since in God there is nothing accidental, these relations,
considered subjectively in their inherence (esse in) are in the
order of substance and are identified with God's substance,
essence and existence. It follows then that the three persons have
one and the same existence. [535] The existence of an accident is
inexistence. [536] Now in God, this inexistence of the relations
is substantial, hence identified with the divine existence, hence
one and unique.
This position, so simple for St. Thomas, was denied by Suarez,
[537] who starts from different principles on being, essence,
existence, and relation. Suarez holds that even in the created
order essence is not really distinct from existence, that
relation, subjectively considered, in its inexistence, in its esse
in, is identified with its objective essence, its esse ad. Hence
the divine relations, he argues, cannot be real, unless each has
its own existence. Thus he is led to deny that in God there is
only one existence. [538] This is an important divergence, similar
to that on the Incarnation, where the proposition of St. Thomas,
that in Christ there is only one existence, [539] is also denied
by Suarez.
Those divine relations which are in mutual opposition are by this
very opposition really distinct one from the other. [540] The
Father is not the Son, for nothing begets itself. And the Holy
Spirit is not the Father nor the Son. Yet the Father is God, the
Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Thus, by increasing precision,
we reach the formula of the Council of Florence: In God everything
is one, except where relations are opposite. [541].
Here enters the saint's response to an objection often heard. The
objection runs thus: Things which are really identified with one
and the same third thing are identified with one another. But the
divine relations and the divine persons are really identified with
the divine essence. [542] Hence the divine relations and the
divine persons are identified with one another.
The solution runs thus: Things which are really identified with
one and the same third thing are identified with one another; yes,
unless their mutual opposition is greater than their sameness with
this third thing. Otherwise I must say No. To illustrate. Look at
the three angles of a triangle. Are they really distinct one from
the other? Most certainly. Yet each of them is identified with one
and the same surface.
Suarez, [543] having a different concept of relation, does not
recognize the validity of this response. Instead of admitting with
St. Thomas, [544] that the three divine persons by their common
inexistence (esse in): have one and the same existence (unum
esse): Suarez, on the contrary, admits three relative existences.
Hence his difficulty in answering the objection just now cited. He
solves it thus: The axiom that things identified with one third
thing are identified with one another -- this axiom, he says, is
true in the created order only, but not universally, not when
applied to God.
Thomists reply. This axiom derives without medium from the
principle of contradiction or identity, and hence, analogically
indeed, but truly, holds good also in God, for it is a law of
being as such, a law of all reality, a law absolutely universal,
outside of which lies complete absurdity.
Thus the doctrine of St. Thomas safeguards perfectly the pre-
eminent simplicity of the Deity. [545] The three persons have but
one existence. Hence the divine relations do not enter into
composition with the divine essence, since the three persons,
constituted by relations mutually opposed, are absolutely equal in
perfection. [546].
A conclusion follows from the foregoing discussion. Real relations
in God are four: paternity, filiation, active spiration, "passive"
spiration. But the third of these four, active spiration, while it
is opposed to passive spiration, is not opposed to, and hence not
really distinct from, either paternity or filiation. [547].
This doctrine, perfectly self-coherent, shows the value of St.
Augustine's conception, which is its foundation and guaranty.
CHAPTER 16: THE DIVINE PERSONS
PERSON in general is a being which has intelligence and freedom.
Its classic definition was given by Boethius: Person is an
individual subject with an intellectual nature. [548] Hence
person, generally, is a hypostasis or a suppositum, and,
specifically, a substance endowed with intelligence. [549]
Further, since person signifies substance in its most perfect
form, it can be found in God, if it be stripped of the imperfect
mode which it has in created persons. Thus made perfect, it can be
used analogically of God, analogically, but still in its proper
sense, in a mode that is transcendent and pre-eminent. Further,
since revelation gives us two personal names, that is, the Father
and the Son, the name of the third person, of the Holy Spirit,
must also be a personal name. Besides, the New Testament, in many
texts, represents the Holy Spirit as a person. [550].
Now, since there are three persons in God, they can be distinct
one from the other only by the three relations which are mutually
opposed (paternity, and filiation, and passive spiration):
because, as has been said, all else in God is identical.
These real relations, since they are subsistent (not accidental):
and are, on the other hand, incommunicable (being opposed): can
constitute the divine persons. In these subsistent relations we
find the two characteristics of person: substantiality and
incommunicability.
A divine person, then, according to St. Thomas and his school, is
a divine relation as subsistent. [551] Elsewhere the saint gives
the following definition: [552] A divine person is nothing else
than a relationally distinct reality, subsistent in the divine
essence.
These definitions explain why there are in God, speaking properly,
not metaphorically, three persons, three intellectual and free
subjects, though these three have the same identical nature,
though they understand by one and the same intellective act,
though they love one another by one and the same essential act,
and though they freely love creatures by one and the same free act
of love.
Hence, while we say: The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy
Spirit is God, we also say: The Father is not the Son, and the
Holy Spirit is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit is not the Son.
In this sentence the verb "is" expresses real identity between
persons and nature, and the negation "is not" expresses the real
distinction of the persons from each other.
These three opposed relations, then, paternity, filiation, and
passive spiration, belong to related and incommunicable
personalities. Thus there cannot be in God many Fathers, but one
only. Paternity makes the divine nature incommunicable as Father,
though that divine nature can still be communicated to two other
persons. To illustrate. When you are constructing a triangle, the
first angle, as first, renders the entire surface incommunicable,
though that same surface will still be communicated to the other
two angles; and the first angle will communicate that surface to
them without communicating itself, while none of the three is
opposed to the surface which they have in common.
Here appears the profundity of Cajetan's [553] remark: the divine
reality, as it is in itself, is not something purely absolute
(signified by the word "nature") nor something purely relative
(signified by the name "person"): but something transcending both,
something which contains formally and eminently [554] that which
corresponds to the concepts of absolute and relative, of absolute
nature and relative person. Further, the distinction between
nature and the persons is not a real distinction, but a mental
distinction (virtual and minor): whereas the distinction between
the persons is real, by reason of opposition. On this last point
theologians generally agree with Thomists.
CHAPTER 17: THE NOTIONAL ACTS
THERE are two notional acts: generation and active spiration. They
are called notional because they enable us to know the divine
persons better. Their explanation serves St. Thomas [555] as a
kind of final synthesis, a recapitulation of trinitarian doctrine.
Here we find the most difficult of the objections raised against
that Augustinian conception which St. Thomas defends. The
objection runs thus: [556] The relation called paternity is
founded on active generation, hence cannot precede generation. But
the personality of the Father must be conceived as preceding
active generation, which is its operation. Hence the personality
of the Father which precedes generation, cannot be constituted by
the subsisting relation of paternity which follows generation.
In other words, we have here a vicious circle.
St. Thomas replies [557] as follows: "The personal characteristic
of the Father must be considered under two aspects: first, as
relation, and as such it presupposes the notional act of
generation. But, secondly, we must consider the personal
characteristic of the Father, not as relation, but as constitutive
of His own person, and thus as preceding the notional act of
generation, as person must be conceived as anterior to the
person's action. ".
Hence it is clear that we have here no contradiction, no vicious
circle, because divine paternity is considered on the one hand as
anterior to the eternal act of generation, and on the other hand
as posterior to that same act. Let us look at illustrations in the
created order.
First, in human generation. At that one and indivisible instant
when the human soul is created and infused into its body, the
ultimate disposition of that body to receive that soul -- does it
precede or does it follow the creation of the soul? It both
precedes and follows. In the order of material causality, it
precedes. In all other orders of causality, formal, efficient, and
final, it follows. For it is the soul which, in the indivisible
moment of its creation, gives to the human body its very last
disposition to receive that soul. Hence, from this point of view,
that disposition is in the human body as a characteristic deriving
from the soul.
Secondly, in human understanding. The sense image precedes the
intellectual idea. Yet that same image, completely suited to
express the new idea, follows that idea. At that indivisible
instant when the thinker seizes an original idea, he
simultaneously finds an appropriate image to express that idea in
the sense order.
Again, in human emotion. The sense emotion both precedes and
follows intellectual love, is both antecedent and consequent.
Again, still more strikingly, in human deliberation. At the
terminus of deliberation, in one and the same indivisible instant,
the last practical judgment precedes the voluntary choice, and
still this voluntary choice, by accepting this practical judgment,
makes that judgment to be the last.
Again, look at the marriage contract. The man's word of acceptance
is not definitively valid before it is accepted by the woman. The
man's consent thus precedes the woman's consent, and hence is not
yet actually related to her consent, which has not yet been given.
Only by her consent does his consent have actual matrimonial
relation to his wife.
Lastly, look again at the triangle. In an equilateral triangle,
the first angle drawn, though it is as yet alone, constitutes,
nevertheless, the geometric figure, but does not as yet have
actual relation to the two angles still undrawn.
In all these illustrations, there is no contradiction, no vicious
circle. Neither is there contradiction when we say that the divine
paternity constitutes the person of the Father anteriorly to the
eternal act of generation, although that same paternity, as actual
relation to the Son, presupposes the act of generation.
To proceed. These notional acts, generation and spiration, belong
to the persons. [558] They are not free acts, but necessary,
though the Father.
wills spontaneously to beget His Son, just as He spontaneously
wills to be God. And active spiration proceeds indeed from the
divine will, but from that will, not as free, but as natural and
necessary, like our own desire of happiness. [559] Generative
power belongs to the divine nature, as that nature is in the
Father. [560] "Spiratory power also belongs to the divine nature,
but as that nature is in both the Father and the Son. Thus the
Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one sole
principle: [561] there is but one Breather (Spirator): though two
are breathing (spirantes). " [562].
If these two powers, generative and spiritave, belonged to the
divine nature as such, as common to the three persons, then each
of the three persons would generate and breathe, just as each of
them knows and loves. Hence the word of the Fourth Lateran
Council: "It is not the essence or nature which generates, but the
Father by that nature. " [563] Hence the formula, [564] common
among Thomists: "The power of generating signifies directly (in
recto) the divine nature, indirectly (in obliquo) the relation of
paternity. ".
What is the immediate principle (principium quo) of the divine
processions? It is, so Thomists generally, the divine nature, as
modified by the relations of paternity and active spiration. To
illustrate. When Socrates begets a son, the principium quo of this
act of generation is indeed human nature, but that nature as it is
in Socrates. Were it otherwise, were human nature the principium
quo, as common to all men, then all men without exception would
generate, as they all desire happiness. Similarly, the surface of
a triangle, as far as it is in the first angle drawn, is
communicated to the second, and by the second to the third; but as
it is in the third it is no longer communicable. If it were, then
we would have a fourth person, and for the same reason a fifth,
and thus on to infinity.
So much on Thomistic doctrine concerning the notional acts. It is
in perfect harmony with the foregoing chapters.
CHAPTER 18: EQUALITY AND UNION
NUMERIC unity of nature and existence makes the three persons
perfectly equal. And unity of existence means unity of wisdom,
love, and power. Thus, to illustrate, the three angles of an
equilateral triangle are rigorously equal. Hence, in God, to
generate is not more perfect than to be generated. The eternal
generation does not cause the divine nature of the Son, but only
communicates it. This divine nature, uncreated in the Father, is
no less uncreated in the Son and in the Spirit. The Father is not
a cause on which the Son and the Spirit would depend. He is rather
a principle, from which, without dependence, the Son and the
Spirit proceed, in the numerical identity of the infinite nature
communicated to them.
Again to illustrate. In the equilateral triangle we have an order,
of origin indeed, but not of causality. The first angle drawn is
not cause, but principle, of the second, and the principle also,
by the second, of the third. Each angle is equally perfect with
the others. The illustration is deficient, since you may start
your triangle with any angle you choose. But illustrations,
however deficient, are useful to the human intellect, which does
not act unless imagination cooperates.
This perfect equality of the divine persons expresses, in supreme
fashion, the life of knowledge and love. Goodness, the higher it
is, the more is it self-diffusive. The Father gives His infinite
goodness to the Son and, by the Son, to the Holy Spirit. Hence of
the three divine persons each comprehends the other with the same
infinite truth and each knows the other with the same essential
act of understanding. Of their love the same must be said. Each
embraces the other with infinite tenderness, since in each the act
of love is identified with infinite good fully possessed and
enjoyed.
The three persons, purely spiritual, are thus open to possession
one by the other, being distinguished only by their mutual
relations. The Father's entire personality consists in His
subsistent and incommunicable relation to the Son, the ego of the
Son is His relation to the Father, the ego of the Holy Spirit in
His relation to the first two persons.
Thus each of the three persons, since He is what He is by His
relationship to the others, is united to the others precisely by
what distinguishes Him from them. An illustration: recall again
the three angles in a triangle. How fertile is that fundamental
principle that in God everything is identically one and the same
except where we find opposition by relation!
The three divine persons, lastly, are the exemplar of the life of
charity. Each of them speaks to the others: All that is mine is
thine, all that is thine is mine. [565] The union of souls in
charity is but a reflection from the union of the divine persons:
"That all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee, that
they also be one in Us. " [566] As Father and Son are one by
nature, so the faithful are one by grace, which is a participation
in the divine nature.
CHAPTER 19: THE TRINITY NATURALLY UNKNOWABLE
THE Trinity is a mystery essentially supernatural. St. Thomas
[567] expounds the reason for this truth much more clearly than
his predecessors did. By natural reason, he says, we know God only
as Creator. Now God creates by His omnipotence, which is common to
all three persons, as is the divine nature of which omnipotence is
an attribute. Hence natural reason cannot know the distinction of
persons in God, but only His one nature. In this argument we have
one of the most explicit expressions of the distinction between
the natural order and the supernatural order.
Hence it follows, as Thomists in general remark, that natural
reason cannot positively demonstrate even the intrinsic
possibility of the mystery. After the mystery is revealed, we can
indeed show that it contains no manifest contradiction, but we
cannot show, apodictically, by reason alone, that it contains no
latent contradiction. Mysteries, says the Vatican Council, [568]
cannot, by natural principles, be either understood or
demonstrated.
Further. If reason alone could demonstrate, positively and
apodictically, the objective possibility of the Trinity, it would
likewise demonstrate the existence of the Trinity. Why? Because,
in things which necessarily exist, we must, from real possibility,
deduce existence. [569] If, for example, infinite wisdom is
possible in God, then it exists in God.
In this matter, the possibility, namely, and the existence of the
Trinity, theology can indeed give reasons of appropriateness,
reasons which are profound and always fruitful, but which are not
demonstrative. Theology can likewise show the falseness, or at
least the inconclusiveness, [570] of objections made against the
mystery. Here is a formula held by theologians generally: The
possibility, and a fortiori the existence, of supernatural
mysteries cannot be proved, and cannot be disproved, but can be
shown to be appropriate, and can be defended against impugners.
[571].
The analogies introduced to clarify the mystery rise in value when
they are pointed out by revelation itself. Thus, when St. John
[572] says that the only-begotten Son proceeds as God's mental
Word, we are led to think that the second procession is one of
love.
CHAPTER 20: PROPER NAMES AND APPROPRIATIONS
PROPER names aid us to understand better the characteristics of
each divine person.
The First Person is called by four proper names: The Father, the
Unbegotten, the Ungenerated, Principle-not-from-principle. [573]
Further, by appropriation, He is called the Creator, because
creative power, though common to all three persons, has a special
affinity with the first, in this sense that He has this creative
power of Himself, that is, has not received it from another
person. [574].
The Second Person has three proper names: Son, Word, Image. [575]
Hence appropriation assigns to him the works of wisdom.
To the Third Person are assigned three proper names: Holy Spirit,
Love, and Uncreated Gift. [576] Love, as proper name, signifies,
not essential love, not notional love, but personal love. By
appropriation, there are assigned to him the works of
sanctification and indwelling in the just soul, since this
indwelling presupposes charity: the charity of God is poured forth
in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to Us. [577] Charity
gives us a greater likeness to the Holy Spirit than faith does to
the Word. Perfect assimilation to the Word is given by the light
of glory.
CHAPTER 21: THE INDWELLING OF THE BLESSED TRINITY
We cannot here treat of the missions of the divine persons. [578]
But we must look briefly at Thomistic doctrine concerning the mode
of the Trinity's indwelling in the souls of the just.
This doctrine derives from the words of our Savior: [579] "If
anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him,
and We will come to him and make Our abode with him. " What will
come? Not merely created effects, sanctifying grace, infused
virtues, the seven gifts, but the divine persons themselves, the
Father and the Son, from whom the Holy Spirit is never separated.
Besides, the Holy Spirit was explicitly promised by our Lord and
was sent visibly on Pentecost. [580] This special presence of the
Trinity in the just differs notably from the presence of God as
preserving cause of all creatures.
We must note three different explanations of this indwelling: that
of Vasquez, that of Suarez, and that of St. Thomas.
Vasquez reduces all real indwelling of God in us to the general
presence of immensity, by which God is present in all things which
He preserves in existence. As known and loved, God is in no way
really present in the just man. He is there only as represented,
like a loved friend who is absent. This view allows very little to
the special presence of God in the just.
Suarez, on the contrary, maintains that God, even if He were not
present by immensity, would still, by the charity which unites men
to Him, be really and substantially present in the just. This
opinion has to face a very grave objection, which runs thus: When
we love the humanity of our Lord and Savior, or the Blessed
Virgin, it does not follow that they are really present in our
souls. Charity certainly is an affective union and creates a
desire for real union, but cannot itself constitute that union.
Here again the thought of St. Thomas [581] dominates two opposed
views, one of Vasquez, the other of Suarez.
According to the Angelic Doctor, [582] the special presence of the
Trinity in the just presupposes the general presence of immensity.
This is against Suarez. But again (and this is what Vasquez did
not see): God, by sanctifying grace, by infused virtues, by the
seven gifts, becomes really present in a new and higher manner, as
object experimentally knowable, which the just soul can enjoy,
which it at times knows actually. God is not like a loved friend
who is absent, but He is really present.
The saint [583] assigns the reason. The soul in the state of
grace, he says, has God as its supernatural object of knowledge
and of love and with that object the power of enjoying God.
To say truly that the divine persons dwell in us, we must be able
to know them, not in abstract fashion, like distant friends, but
in a manner quasi-experimental, with the vibrancy of infused
charity, which gives a connatural intimacy with the inner life of
God. [584] It is the very characteristic of experimental knowledge
that it terminates in an object really present.
But this experimental knowledge need not always be actual. Thus
the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity lasts even during sleep. But
as long as, by grace, virtue, and gifts, this indwelling
continues, this experimental knowledge will, from time to time,
become actual, when God makes Himself known to us as the soul of
our soul, the life of our life. "You have received, " says St.
Paul, "the spirit of adoption wherein we cry Abba, Father. It is
the Spirit Himself who testifies that we are children of God. "
[585].
Commenting on this passage in Romans, St. Thomas speaks thus: The
Holy Spirit gives this testimony, by the filial love He produces
in us. And elsewhere [586] he traces this experimental knowledge
to the gift of wisdom which clarifies living faith. And in another
passage [587] he is still more explicit. Not merely any kind of
knowledge, he says, is in question when we speak of the mission
and indwelling of a divine person. It must be a mode of knowledge
coming from a gift appropriated to that person, a gift by which we
are conjoined to God. That gift, when the Holy Spirit is given, is
love, and therefore the knowledge is quasi-experimental.
Here lies the meaning of our Savior's words: [588] "The Spirit of
truth, whom the Father will send in My name, will be in you, and
will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind
whatsoever I have said to you. ".
If the Blessed Trinity lives in the just soul as in a temple,
[589] a living temple of knowledge and love even while the just
man lives on earth, how wondrously intimate must be this
indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the blessed who form the
temple of heaven! [590].
This doctrine of the indwelling leads from the treatise on the
Trinity to the treatise on grace. Grace is the created gift,
brought forth and preserved in us by the Holy Spirit, who, by
appropriation, is the Uncreated Gift, or by the Blessed Trinity,
wholly present in us. Adoptive filiation, says St. Thomas, [591]
comes to us, by appropriation, from the Father, who is the
principle of natural filiation; but it comes also by the gift of
the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and the Son. The
act of adoption by grace, he says elsewhere, [592] though it is
common to the entire Trinity, is appropriated nevertheless to each
person singly, to the Father as author, to the Son as exemplar, to
the Holy Spirit as imprinting on us the likeness of that exemplar.
Grace, we may recall in conclusion, depends by its very nature on
the divine nature common to all three persons; but, as merited for
all redeemed souls, it depends on Christ the Redeemer.
Fourth Part: Angel and Man
CHAPTER 22: THE SOURCES
IT is sometimes thought that the treatise of St. Thomas on the
angels is an a priori construction, having as its sole foundation
the book of Pseudo-Dionysius, called De coelesti hierarchia. This
is a misconception. Scripture itself is the foundation on which
St. Thomas rests. Scripture gives him the existence of angels,
their knowledge, their number, their differences in good and evil,
their relations to men. Pertinent and numerous texts appear
already in the Old Testament, in Genesis, Job, Tobias, Isaias,
Daniel, the Psalms. Angels appear in the New Testament, at our
Lord's birth, Passion, and Resurrection. St. Paul enumerates them:
thrones, dominations, principalities, powers. [593].
Here lies the foundation of the treatise on the angels. These
testimonies show that the angels are creatures indeed, but higher
than men. Though at times they appear under a sense form, the
common term by which they are called, i. e.: spirits, justifies us
in saying that they are purely spiritual creatures,
notwithstanding the difficulties which several early Fathers found
in conceiving a creature to be real unless it had at least an
ethereal body.
To this spirituality of the angels, St. Thomas gave greater scope
and precision. By distinguishing also in the angels the orders of
nature and grace, by deduction from the interior life of God, from
the character of the beatific vision, which is a supernatural gift
for any intelligence inferior to God, from the doctrine on grace
and the infused virtues, St. Thomas defended and explained the
tradition, summarized thus by St. Augustine: [594] Who gave to the
good angels their good will? No one but He who, at their creation,
founded their nature, and, simultaneously, gave them the gift of
grace.
In this outline of the treatise on the angels we will emphasize
its essential principles, noting opportunely the opposition raised
by Scotus, [595] and in part by Suarez, who, as often elsewhere,
searches here also for a middle ground between St. Thomas and
Scotus. These differences appear chiefly in the doctrines relating
to the nature of angels, their modes of knowing and loving, and to
the manner of their merits under grace. Those who seek detailed
exposition can easily find it in the works cited. Our chief
interest in this treatise on angels is to clarify from on high the
treatise of St. Thomas on man.
CHAPTER 23: ANGELIC NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE
1. NATURE OF ANGELS
ST. THOMAS [596] teaches clearly that the angels are creatures
purely spiritual, subsistent forms without any matter. Scotus says
they are composed of form and incorporeal matter, without
quantity, because, being creatures, they must have an element of
potentiality. The Thomistic reply runs thus: This potential
element is first the angelic essence, really distinct, as in all
creatures, from existence. Secondly, the real distinction between
person and existence, between quod est and existence. Thirdly,
real distinction of substance from faculties, and of faculties
from acts. All these distinctions are explicitly formulated by St.
Thomas himself. [597].
From their pure spirituality St. Thomas concludes that there
cannot be two angels of the same species, because the only
principle by which a substantial form can be individualized is
matter, matter capable of this quantity rather than any other.
Thus, to illustrate, two drops of water, perfectly similar, are by
their matter and quantity two distinct individuals. But angels
have no matter. [598].
Scotus, on the contrary, since he admits a certain kind of matter
in the angels, maintains also that there can be many angels of one
and the same species. Suarez, in his eclecticism, admits this
conclusion of Scotus, although he sides with St. Thomas in
maintaining that the angels are purely spiritual and immaterial
beings. Thomists reply: if the angels are purely spiritual, you
can find in them no principle of individuation, no principle
capable of multiplying within one and the same species.
Form unreceived in matter, they say with St. Thomas, is simply
unique. Whiteness, for example, if conceived as unreceived in this
or that white thing, would be one and unique. If you deny this,
then you simultaneously deny the principle which demonstrates the
unicity of God, the principle, namely, which St. Thomas thus
formulates: [599] Existence unreceived is necessarily subsistent
and unique.
2. ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
There are three orders of knowledge: human, angelic, divine. The
object of knowledge in general is intelligible reality. The proper
object of human intelligence is the intelligible being of sense
objects, because the human intellect has as its proportioned
object the lowest order of intelligible reality, the shadowy
reality of the sense world. By opposition, then, the proper object
of angelic intelligence is the intelligible reality of spiritual
creatures. Hence, the proper intelligible object of each
particular angel is that angel's own essence, just as God's proper
intelligible object is His own divine essence. [600].
This position granted, let us see its consequences. The human
idea, by which man knows, is an abstract and universal idea, drawn
forth, by the intellect agent, from particular sense objects. But
the angelic idea, not being drawn from external sense objects, is
a natural endowment of the angelic intellect, infused into it by
God at the moment of creation. Hence the angelic idea is at once
universal and concrete. The angel's infused idea of the lion, say,
represents not only the nature of the lion, but all individual
lions that either actually exist or have in the past been objects
of the angel's intellect. Angelic ideas are thus participations in
God's own creative ideas. Infused ideas, then, which Plato and
Descartes falsely ascribed to men, are, on the contrary, an
angelic characteristic.
Thus these angelic ideas, at once universal and concrete,
represent whole regions of intelligible reality, and each angel
has his own distinctive suprasensible panorama. The higher the
angel, the stronger is his intelligence and the fewer are his
ideas, since they are more rich and universal. Thus, with ever
fewer ideas, the higher angels command immense regions of reality,
which the lower angels cannot attain with such eminent simplicity.
[601] A human parallel is the sage, who, in a few simple
principles, grasps an entire branch of knowledge. The stronger is
the created intellect, to say it briefly, the more it approaches
the preeminent simplicity of the divine intellect.
A further consequence. The nature of his ideas, at once universal
and concrete, make the angel's knowledge intuitive, not in any way
successive and discursive. He sees at a glance the particular in
the universal, the conclusion in the principle, the means in the
end. [602].
For the same reason his act of judging does not proceed by
comparing and separating different ideas. [603] By his purely
intuitive apprehension of the essence of a thing, he sees at once
all characteristics of that essence, for example, he
simultaneously sees all man's human and created characteristics,
for instance, that man's essence is not man's existence, then
man's existence is necessarily given and preserved by divine
causality. [604].
Why this immense distance between angel and man? Because, seeing
intuitively, the angel sees without medium, as in clearest midday,
an immensely higher object, sees the intelligible world of
spirits, whereas man's intellect, the most feeble of all
intellects, having as object the lowest order of intelligibility,
must be satisfied with twilight glances into the faint mirror of
the sense world.
A further consequence is that the angel's intuitive vision is also
infallible. But while he can make no mistake in his natural
knowledge, he can deceive himself in the supernatural order, on
the question, for example, whether this or that individual man is
in the state of grace. Likewise he may deceive himself in
forecasting the contingent future, above all in attempting to know
the future free acts of men, or the immanent secrets of man's
heart, secrets which are in no way necessarily linked with the
nature of our soul or with external physical realities. The
secrets of the heart are not fragments of the material world, they
do not result from the interplay of physical forces. [605].
Contrary to this view, Scotus holds that the angel, though he has
no sense faculties, can still receive ideas from sense objects.
This view arises from his failure to distinguish intellects
specifically by their proper and proportioned object. Thus he goes
on to say that, had God so willed, the unmediated vision of the
divine essence would be natural to both angels and men. Thus the
distinction between uncreated intelligence and created
intelligence is, for Scotus, a distinction not necessary, but
contingent. A fortiori, then, he denies any necessary distinction
between the proper object of the human intellect and that of the
angelic intellect.
Scotus further denies that the ideas by which higher angels know
are less numerous and more universal than those of lower angels.
Perfection of knowledge, he says, derives less from the
universality of ideas than from their clearness and brightness.
Here Thomists distinguish. In the empiric order, yes, clearness
does not depend on the universality of ideas. But in the order of
perfection, in the order of higher principles, themselves
concatenated with the supreme principle -- in this order doctrinal
clearness most certainly depends on the universality of its ideas.
Scotus holds also that the angel can know discursively, can engage
in reasoning, a view which notably depreciates the perfection of
the pure spirit. On the other hand, he holds that the angel can
know, naturally and with certitude, the secrets of man's heart,
though God, he adds, refuses this knowledge to the demons.
Suarez, again eclectically, admits with St. Thomas that the
angelic ideas are innate, but holds, with Scotus, that the angel
can use reasoning, and can be mistaken regarding the
characteristics of the object he knows.
CHAPTER 24: THE ANGELIC WILL
ST. THOMAS seeks to understand the angelic will by the object to
which that will is specifically proportioned. Scotus insists
rather on the subjective activity of that will.
Studying the object of the angelic will, St. Thomas concludes that
certain acts of that will, though voluntary and spontaneous, are
nevertheless not free, but necessary, by reason of an object in
which the angelic intelligence sees no imperfection, but perfect
happiness. As regards angelic freedom of will, he holds that
angelic choice, like human choice, is always determined by the
last practical act of judgment, but that the act of choice by
accepting that judgment makes it to be the last. Scotus, on the
contrary, holds that freedom belongs essentially to all voluntary
acts, and that free choice is not always determined by the last
practical act of judgment. On this point Suarez follows Scotus.
Against them Thomists invoke the following principle: "If nothing
can be willed unless it be foreknown as good, then nothing can be
here and now preferred unless it be here and now foreknown as
better. " [606] In other words, there can be no will movement,
however free, without intellectual guidance, otherwise we confound
liberty with haphazard, with impulse, which acts necessarily and
without reflection. Here lies the source of the chief doctrinal
divergences concerning the angelic will.
St. Thomas teaches that the objects which the angel loves, not
freely, but necessarily, at least necessarily as regards
specification, are, first, his own happiness, second, himself,
third, God as author of his nature, the reason being that in these
objects he can find nothing repulsive. [607] Hence it is more
probable that the angel cannot, at least not directly and
immediately, sin against the natural law, which he sees
intuitively as written into his own essence. [608] Yet the demons,
in sinning directly against the supernatural law, sin indirectly
against the natural law which prescribes that we obey God in
everything He may command.
Further. If the angel sins, his sin is necessarily mortal,
because, seeing end and means with one and the same intuitive
glance, he cannot be disordered venially, i. e.: in regard to
means, without previous mortal disorder in regard to his last end.
Again, the sin of the angel is irrevocable, and hence
irremissible. In other words, since the angel chooses with perfect
knowledge after consideration, not abstract, discursive,
successive, but intuitive and simultaneous, of all that is
involved in his choice, he can no longer see any reason for
reversal of his choice. Hence arises the demon's fixed obstinacy
in evil. Nothing was unforeseen in his choice. If we were to say
to him: "You did not foresee this, " he would answer, "Surely I
foresaw it. " With fullest knowledge he refused obedience, and
refuses it forever in unending pride. Similarly the choice of the
good angel is irrevocable and participates in the immutability of
God's free act of choice. [609] St. Thomas cites approvingly the
common expression: Before choice the free will of the angel is
flexible, but not after choice. [610].
Scotus admits none of these doctrines. No act of the angelic will
is necessary, not even the angel's natural love of his life or of
the author of life. The will can sin even when there is no error
or lack of consideration in the intellect, because free choice is
not always conformed to the last practical judgment. The first sin
of the demon is not of itself irrevocable and irremissible. The
demons, he says, committed many mortal sins, before they became
obstinate in evil, and could have repented after each of those
sins. And their obstinacy itself he explains extrinsically, as due
to God's decree that, after a certain number of mortal sins, He
would no longer give them the grace of conversion. On these points
Suarez follows Scotus, since he too holds that free choice is not
always conformed to the last practical judgment. But he does not
explain how free choice can arise without intellectual direction.
Thomists repeat: Nothing can be willed unless here and now
foreknown as better.
Contrast shows clearly that St. Thomas has a higher conception of
the specific distinction between angelic intelligence and human
intelligence than have Scotus and Suarez. Faculties, habits, and
acts are proportionally specified by their formal objects. To this
principle, repeatedly invoked in the Summa, Thomism insistently
returns.
This treatise on the pure spirit, on intuitive knowledge, lies on
a very high level. Its conclusions on the angelic will are
faithful to the principle: nothing willed unless foreknown as
good. From the speculative point of view this treatise is a
masterpiece, a proof of the intellectual superiority of the
Angelic Doctor, an immense step forward from the Sentences of
Peter the Lombard. Scotus and Suarez did not maintain this
elevation, did not see the sublimity, intellectual and voluntary,
of the pure spirit as contrasted with the lowly intellect and will
of man.
CHAPTER 25: ANGELIC MERIT AND DEMERIT
ST. THOMAS holds that all the angels were elevated to the state of
grace.
before the moment of their trial, because without sanctifying
grace they could not merit supernatural happiness. With this
doctrine Scotus and Suarez agree. They also agree in saying that
most probably all angels received this gift at the moment of their
creation. All three teachers, following St. Augustine, [611] hold
that the revelation had the obscurity of faith. [612] The three
agree also in saying that after their trial the good angels were
immovably confirmed in grace and received the beatific vision,
while the wicked angels became obstinate in evil. But,
notwithstanding this agreement, there remain three problems
concerning the state of the angels before and during their trial.
On these problems St. Thomas again differs widely from Scotus and
Suarez.
1. NATURAL HAPPINESS
St. Thomas holds that at the very moment of their creation the
angels received all their natural perfection of spirit and their
natural happiness, because their innate knowledge proceeds
instantaneously, without succession, from faculty to act. Hence,
at the very moment of creation, they have perfect intuition of
their own nature, and in that nature as mirror they know God as
author of that nature, on which their own natural law is
inscribed. Simultaneously also in that same moment they know all
other angels, and have instantaneous use of their own infused
ideas.
Here Scotus and Suarez do not follow St. Thomas. They deny, first,
that angels had natural beatitude from the moment of creation.
They hold, secondly, that the angels could, from that first
moment, sin against the natural law directly and immediately. In
reply, Thomists simply insist that pure spirits must from their
first moment of creation, know their own selves perfectly as pure
spirits, and hence know their own nature as mirror of the Author
of that nature, and consequently must love that Author as the
source of their own natural life, which they necessarily desire to
preserve.
2. INSTANTANEOUS CHOICE
At the very moment of creation, so St. Thomas, the angels could
not sin, but neither could they fully merit, because their very
first act must be specially inspired by God, without their own
self-initiated interior deliberation. But at the second instant
came either full merit or full demerit. The good angel after the
first act of charity, by which he merited supernatural beatitude,
was at once among the blessed. [613] Just as immediately the
demons were repudiated.
Hence, with St. Thomas, we must distinguish three instants in the
life of the angel: first, that of creation; second, that of merit
or demerit; third, that of supernatural beatitude [614] or of
reprobation. We must note, however, that an angelic instant, which
is the measure of one angelic thought, may correspond to a more or
less long period of our time, according to the more or less deep
absorption of the angel in one thought. An analogy, in
illustration, is that of the contemplative who may rest for hours
in one and the same truth.
The reason for the instantaneousness of the divine sanction after
the first angelic act, fully meritorious or fully demeritorious,
has been given above. Angelic knowledge is not abstract and
discursive like ours, but purely intuitive and simultaneous. The
angel does not pass successively, as we do, from one angle of
thought to another. He sees at once, simultaneously, all the
advantages and disadvantages. Hence his judgment once made is
irrevocable. There is nothing he has not already considered.
What kind of sin was that of the demons? Pride, says St. Thomas.
[615] They chose as supreme purpose that which they could obtain
by their natural powers, and hence turned away from supernatural
beatitude, which can be reached only by the grace of God. Thus,
instead of humility and obedience, they chose pride and
disobedience, the sin of naturalism.
Scotus and Suarez, as we have seen, since they hold that the
angelic knowledge is discursive and successive, maintain likewise
that the angel's practical judgment and act of choice are
revocable, but that after many mortal sins, God no longer gives
them the grace of conversion.
3. SOURCE OF ANGELIC MERIT
St. Thomas holds that the essential grace and glory of the angels
does not depend on the merits of Christ, because "the Word was
made flesh for men and for our salvation. " Christ merited as
Redeemer. Now the essential grace of the angels was not a
redemptive grace. [616] And their essential glory, he says
elsewhere, [617] was given them by Christ, not as Redeemer, but as
the Word of God. Yet the Word incarnate did merit graces for the
angels, graces not essential but accidental, to enable them to
cooperate in the salvation of men.
Scotus again differs. Since the Word, he says, also in the actual
plan of Providence, would have become man even if man had not
sinned, we should hold that Christ merited for the angels also
their essential grace and glory. And Suarez holds that Adam's sin
was the occasion and condition, not of the Incarnation, but of the
Redemption. Even if man had not sinned, he says, the Word would
still perhaps have become incarnate, but would not have suffered.
Hence, he concludes, Christ merited for the good angels their
essential grace and glory, and is therefore their Savior.
Thomists reply that Christ is the Savior only as Redeemer. But for
the angels He is not Redeemer. Further, they reflect, if the
angels owed to Christ their essential glory, the beatific vision,
they would, like the just of the Old Testament, have had to wait
for that vision until Christ rose from the dead.
Let us summarize this Thomistic treatise on the angels. The main
point of difference from Scotus and Suarez lies in the specific
difference between angelic intelligence and human intelligence, a
difference that depends on their respective formal object, his own
essence for the angel, for the man the essence of the sense world
known by abstraction. Hence angelic knowledge is completely
intuitive. From this position derive all further conclusions of
St. Thomas, on angelic knowledge, will, merit, and demerit. This
Thomistic [618] conception of pure spirit is much higher than that
of Scotus and Suarez. This treatise also throws much light on the
following treatise where St. Thomas, in studying the nature of
man, dwells on the quasi-angelic state of the separated soul.
A last remark. St. Thomas, as he proceeds, corrects the grave
errors of the Latin Averroists, who looked upon all immaterial
substances as eternal and immutable, as having a knowledge
eternally complete, as depending on God, not for creation, but
only for preservation. [619].
CHAPTER 26: THE TREATISE ON MAN
IN his commentary on Aristotle's work, De anima, the method of St.
Thomas had been philosophical, ascending progressively from
vegetative life to sense life, from sense life to intellectual
life, and finally to the principle of intellective acts, the
spiritual and immortal soul. In the Summa, on the contrary, he
follows the theological order, which first studies God, then
creatures in their relation to God. Hence, after treating of God,
then creation in general, then of angels, he now treats of man,
under five headings:
1. The nature of the human soul.
2. The union of soul with body.
3. The faculties of the soul.
4. The acts of intelligence.
5. The production and state of the first man.
Before we follow him, let us recall that St. Thomas pursues a
golden middle way, between the Averroists and the Augustinians.
Averroes [620] maintained that human intelligence, the lowest of
all intelligences, is an immaterial form, eternal, separated from
individual man, and endowed with numeric unity. This intelligence
is both agent intellect and possible intellect. Thus human reason
is impersonal, it is the light which illumines individual souls
and assures to humanity participation in eternal truths. Hence
Averroes denies individual souls, and also personal liberty. Such
was the doctrine taught in the thirteenth century by the Latin
Averroists, Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Against these
St. Thomas wrote a special treatise. [621].
Siger [622] maintained that, beside the vegetativo-sense soul,
there exists indeed an intellective soul, but that this soul is by
its nature separated from the body, and comes temporarily to the
body to accomplish there its act of thought, as, so he
illustrates, the sun illuminates the waters of a lake. Thus the
intellectual soul cannot be the form of the body, for then, being
the form of a material organ, it would itself be material and
therefore be intrinsically dependent on matter. This intellectual
soul is unique, for it excludes from itself even the very
principle of individuation, which is matter. Still it is always
united to human bodies, because, although human individuals die,
humanity itself is immortal, since the series of human generations
is without beginning and will never end. [623].
On the other hand, some pre-Thomistic theologians, notably
Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, admitted a plurality of
substantial forms in man and also a spiritual matter in the human
soul. These theologians were seeking, unsuccessfully, to harmonize
the doctrine of St. Augustine with that of Aristotle. The
multiplicity of substantial forms did indeed emphasize St.
Augustine's view about the soul's independence of the body, but at
the same time compromised the natural unity of the human
composite.
Steering between these two currents, St. Thomas maintains that the
rational soul is indeed purely spiritual, entirely without matter
and hence incorruptible, but that it is nevertheless the form of
the body, rather, the one and only form of the body, although in
its intellectual and voluntary acts it is intrinsically
independent of matter. And if in these acts it is independent,
then it is independent of the body also in its being, and, once
separated from the body which gave it individuation, it still
remains individualized, by its inseparable relation to this body
rather than to any other.
Turning now to special questions, we shall continue to underline
the principles to which St. Thomas continually appeals, and which
Thomists have never ceased to defend, particularly against Scotus
and Suarez, who still preserve something of the theories held by
the older Scholasticism. Thus Scotus admits, first a materia primo
prima in every contingent substance, even in spiritual substances,
and holds, secondly, that there is in man a form of corporeity
distinct from the soul, and that, thirdly, there are in the soul
three formally distinct principles, that of the vegetative life,
that of the sense life, and that of the intellective life.
He likewise holds, against St. Thomas, that prime matter, speaking
absolutely, can exist without any form. This last thesis reappears
in Suarez who, since he rejects the real distinction between
essence and existence, goes on to admit that prime matter has its
own existence. We shall see that the principles of St. Thomas
cannot be harmonized with these positions.
CHAPTER 27: THE NATURE OF THE SOUL
ITS SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY [624]
THE soul of man is not only simple or unextended, as is the soul
of plant and animal, but it is also spiritual, that is,
intrinsically independent of matter, and therefore subsistent, so
that is continues to exist after its separation from the body.
These statements are proved by the soul's intellective activity,
because activity follows being, and the mode of activity reveals
the mode of being. How do we show that intellective activity is
independent of matter? By the universality of the object, which
the intellect abstracts from the particular and limited sense
world. Among the truths thus discovered are universal and
necessary principles, independent of all particular facts,
independent of all space and time. [625].
This necessity and universality, we now note, is manifest on three
levels of abstraction. [626] On the first level, that of the
natural sciences, the intellect, abstracting from individual
matter, studies, not this mineral, plant, or animal perceived by
the senses, but the inner universal nature of mineral, plant, or
animal. [627] On the second level, that of the mathematical
sciences, the intellect, abstracting from all sense matter, from
all sense qualities, considers the nature of triangle, circle,
sphere, or number, in order to deduce their necessary and
universal characteristics. Here it appears clearly that man's idea
of the circle, for example, is not a mere image, a sort of medium
between great and small circles, but a grasp of some nature
intrinsic in each and every circle, great or small.
Again, though the imagination cannot represent clearly to itself a
polygon with a thousand sides, the intellect grasps the idea with
ease. Thus the idea differs absolutely from the image, because it
expresses, not the sense qualities of the thing known, but its
inner nature or essence, the source of all its characteristics,
not as imagined, but as conceived.
Lastly, on the third level of abstraction, the intellect,
abstracting entirely from matter, considers the intelligible being
inaccessible to the senses. This being, this inner reality, is not
a special sense quality, like sound, nor a common sensory quality
like extension, but something grasped by the intellect alone, as
the raison d'etre of reality and all its characteristics.
Intellect alone grasps the meaning of the little word "is, " which
is the soul of every judgment made by the mind, which is
presupposed by every other idea, and which is the goal of all
legitimate reasoning. Being then, that which is, since it does not
involve any sense element, can exist beyond all matter, in
spirits, and in the first cause of spirits and bodies.
On this third level of abstraction, then, the intellect recognizes
the characteristics of being as such: unity and truth and
goodness. From the very nature of being, of inner reality, derive
the principles, absolutely necessary and universal, of
contradiction, causality, and finality, principles which reach out
immeasurably beyond the particular and contingent images pictured
by the imagination, reach even to the existence of a first cause
of all finite things, of a supreme intelligence, regulating the
universe. By its own act, lastly, the intellect recognizes its own
kinship with the immaterial world.
To summarize. Our mode of intelligent activity proves the
immateriality of our soul, and immateriality founds
incorruptibility, [628] since a form which is immaterial is
uncomposed and subsistent, hence incorruptible.
Here lies the meaning of man's desire for immortality. Since the
intellect, says the saint, [629] grasps a reality beyond time,
every intellectual being desires to live forever. Now a natural
desire cannot be void and empty. Hence every intellectual being is
incorruptible.
How does the human soul come into existence? Since it is
immaterial, it cannot come from the potency of matter, i. e.: it
cannot arise by generation, hence it must arise by God's creative
power. That which acts independently of matter, says the saint,
[630] must have this same independence, not only in its existence,
but also in its manner of receiving existence.
Is our universal and necessary knowledge a proof that we can be
elevated to an immediate knowledge of Him who is subsistent being
itself? Not a proof, says the saint, [631] but at least a sign.
[632].
We may insert here two of the twenty-four Thomistic theses.
The fifteenth: The human soul is of itself subsistent. Hence at
the moment when its subject is sufficiently disposed to receive
it, it is created by God. By its own nature it is incorruptible
and immortal. [633].
The eighteenth: Intellectuality is a necessary consequence of
immateriality, and in such wise that levels of intellectuality are
proportioned to their elevation above matter. [634].
Here Suarez [635] differs notably from St. Thomas.
CHAPTER 28: THE UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY [636]
THE rational soul is the substantial form of the human body, gives
that body its own nature, for it is the radical principle by which
man lives, vegetatively, sensitively, and intellectively. These
various vital acts, since they are not accidental to man, but
natural, must come from his nature, from the specific principle
which animates his body.
What makes man to be man? Is it his soul alone? No, because each
man is aware that he uses not only his mind but also his sense
powers. But without body there can be no sense activity. Hence the
body too belongs to man's constitution.
But can we not say, with Averroes, that the soul is an impersonal
intelligence, united with the body, say, of Socrates, in order to
accomplish there that act which we call thinking? No, again,
because such a union, being accidental, not essential, would
prevent the act of thinking from being in truth the action of
Socrates. Socrates would have to say, not: "I think, " but
instead: "It thinks, " somewhat as we say, "It rains. " Nor can we
say, further, that intelligence is united to the body as motor, to
move and guide the body, since thus it would follow that Socrates
would not be a natural unity, would not have one nature only.
[637].
But can then the rational soul be a spiritual thing, if it is the
principle of vegetative and sense life? It can, because, to quote
the saint, [638] "the higher a form is, the less it is immersed in
matter, the more likewise does it dominate matter, and the higher
does its operation rise above materiality. " Even the animal soul
is endowed with sense activity. Much more then can the rational
soul, even as form of the body, dominate that body, and still be
endowed with intellectual knowledge. [639] The spiritual soul
communicates its own substantial existence to corporeal matter,
and this existence is the one and only existence of the human
composite. Hence, also, the human soul, in contrast to the soul of
beasts, preserves its own existence after the destruction of the
body which it vivified. [640] It follows, further, that the
spiritual soul, when separated from its body, preserves its
natural inclination to union with that body, just as naturally as,
to illustrate, a stone thrown into the air still preserves its
inclination to the center of the earth. [641].
Is there possibly only one soul for all human bodies? No, because
it would follow that Socrates and Plato would be simply one
thinking subject, and the one's act of thinking could not be
distinguished from that of the other. [642].
Since each individual human soul has an essential relation to its
own individual body, it follows that, by this essential relation,
the separated soul remains individualized, and hence has a natural
desire for reunion with that body, a reunion which, so revelation
tells us, will become fact by the resurrection of the body. [643].
Is the rational soul the one and only form of the human body? Yes,
because from this one form come both sense life and vegetative
life, and even corporeity itself. If there were more than one
substantial form in man, man would be, not simply one, but
accidentally one. [644] Supposing many substantial forms, the
lowest of these forms, by giving corporeity, already constitutes a
substance, and all subsequent forms would be merely accidental
forms, as is, to illustrate, the form we call quantity when added
to corporeal substance. A form is not substantial unless it gives
substantial being. [645].
Notice how, throughout these articles too, the saint insistently
recurs to the principle of potency and act. "Act united with act
cannot make a thing one in nature. " [646] On the contrary, "only
from act and from potency essentially proportioned to that act can
arise a thing of itself one, as is the case with matter and form.
" [647] This principle of potency and act is the source of the
wonderful unity in the Thomistic synthesis.
Is there not contradiction in saying that a form essentially
spiritual can, nevertheless, be the source of corporeity? No,
because superior forms contain eminently the perfection of
inferior forms, as, to illustrate, the pentagon contains the
quadrilateral. [648] The rational soul contains, eminently and
formally, [649] life sensitive and vegetative, and these qualities
are only virtually distinct from one another. There would be
contradiction if we said that the soul is the immediate principle
of act, intellective, sensitive, and nutritional. But the soul
performs these acts by the medium of specifically distinct
faculties. [650].
If the rational soul has as object the lowest of intelligible
realities, namely, the sense world, what kind of body shall that
soul have? Evidently a body capable of sense activity. [651] Thus
the body is meant by nature to subserve the soul's intellective
knowledge. Only accidentally, particularly as a consequence of
sin, is the body a burden to the soul.
A summary of the principles which dominate the question of the
natural union of the soul to body is found in the sixteenth of the
twenty-four Thomistic theses. It runs thus: [652] This same
rational soul is united to the body in such wise that it is the
one and only substantial form of that body. To this one soul man
owes his existence, as man, as animal, as living thing, as body,
as substance, as being. Thus the soul gives to man all degrees of
essential perfection. Further, the soul communicates to the body
its own act of existence, and by that existence the body, too,
exists.
To Thomists this proposition seems demonstrated by the principle
of real distinction between potency and act, between essence and
existence. Suarez, [653] who has a different understanding of this
principle, holds that the proposition, "the soul is the one and
only form of the body, " is not a demonstrated proposition, but
only a more probable one. Here again we see his eclectic tendency.
What we have said of the soul's spirituality, its personal
immortality, its union with the body, shows clearly the degree of
perfection given by St. Thomas to Aristotle's doctrine, which had
been misinterpreted by Averroes as pantheistic. The precision
Aquinas has given to Aristotle, particularly on the question of
free and non-eternal creation, and on the present question of the
soul, justifies the statement that St. Thomas baptized Aristotle.
The principle of potency and act explains and defends these
important preambles of faith. [654].
CHAPTER 29: THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL [655]
THE principle which dominates all questions on distinction and
subordination of faculties, and which, consequently, dominates all
moral theology, is formulated as follows: Faculties, habits, and
acts are specifically distinguished by their formal object, or
more precisely, by their formal object which (quod) they attain
without medium and their formal object by which (quo) the object
is attained. This principle, which clarifies all psychology, all
ethics, all moral theology, is one of the three fundamental truths
of Thomism. As formulated, in the seventeenth century, by A.
Reginald, [656] it runs thus: [657] A relative thing becomes
specifically distinct by the absolute thing to which it is
essentially proportioned. Thus sight is specifically distinct from
the other senses by its proportion to color, hearing by its
proportion to sound, intellect by proportion to intelligible
reality, will by proportion to the good which it loves and wills.
[658].
From this principle it follows that the soul faculties are really
distinct realities, not identified with the soul itself. In other
words, when the soul knows, it knows, not immediately of itself,
but by its accidental faculty of intellect, and wills by its
faculty of will, and so on. This truth is not a mere habit of
daily speech. It lies in the very nature of things. The essence of
the soul is certainly a real capacity, a real potency, but since
it is not its own existence, it receives from God that substantial
existence to which it is proportioned. This existence is an act
different from the act of understanding or willing, because a
thing must be before it can act. Therefore, just as the soul's
essence is a real capacity for existence, so must the soul have
potencies, faculties, real capacities for knowing the truth, for
loving the good, for imagining, for feeling emotion, for seeing,
hearing, and so on.
In God alone are all these things identified: essence, existence,
intelligence, understanding, willing, loving. In the angel, as in
man, essence is not existence, essence is not faculty, intellect
is not its successive acts, nor will its successive volitions.
[659].
In place of this real distinction Scotus demands a distinction
formal-actual ex natura rei. Here, too, Thomists answer, that a
medium between real distinction and mental distinction is
impossible. If a distinction is anterior to our mental act, it is
real, otherwise it is merely mental.
Suarez, [660] here again, seeks a medium between Aquinas and
Scotus. He thinks the distinction between soul and soul faculties
is not certain, only probable. This position too derives from his
departure from St. Thomas in the doctrine of potency and act.
How do the soul faculties derive from the soul? As characteristics
derive from essence, so all soul faculties, intellective,
sensitive, and vegetative, derive from the one human soul. But the
reason why the intellective faculties so immeasurably transcend
the sense faculties lies in their respective formal object. Sense
faculties, however perfect, since they are limited to here and
now, can never reach the inward raison d'etre of a thing, never
grasp necessary and universal principles, speculative or
practical. In this transcendent power of the intellective faculty
lies the proof for the spirituality of the soul. [661].
Thus also the will, by its formal object, is distinguished from
sense appetite, concupiscible and irascible. [662] The will is a
spiritual power, directed by the intellect, and specifically
distinguished by universal good, which cannot be known by sense
faculties, whereas sense appetite, illuminated only by these sense
faculties, is specifically proportioned to sensible good,
delectable or useful. Hence sense appetite as such can never
desire that rational good which is the object of virtue.
This profound distinction, this immeasurable distance, between
will and sense appetite goes unrecognized by many modern
psychologists, who follow Jean Jacques Rousseau.
Does each faculty have its own special and determinate corporeal
organ? Each sense faculty does, and hence the immediate subject of
all sense faculties is, not the soul, but the human composite,
soul and body united. But intellect and will, being independent of
the organism, which is particular and limited, have as their
subject, not the human composite, but the soul alone. [663].
We cannot here dwell on the intellectual act. [664] Let us merely
note that its adequate object is intelligible being in its fullest
amplitude, by reason of which amplitude man can, in the natural
order, know God, the first cause, and, in the supernatural, can be
elevated to the immediate vision of the divine essence. Since its
proper object, however, is the essence of the sense world, our
intellect can know God and all spiritual beings only by analogy
with the sense world, the lowest of intelligible realities, to
know which it needs the sense faculties as instruments. In this
state of union with body, its manner of knowing the spiritual
world is not immediate like that of the angel. So its very
definition of the spiritual is negative. Spiritual, it says, is
what is immaterial, i. e.: non material. And this negative mode of
knowing the spiritual shows clearly that its proper sphere is in
the world of sense.
This teaching on the nature of human intelligence leads us to the
nature of human freedom. [665] Of this freedom there are two
opposed definitions, one Thomistic, the other, Molinistic. Molina
[666] gives this definition: That agent is free, who, granting all
prerequisites for acting, can either act or not act. Now this
definition, standard among Molinists, however simple and
satisfactory it seems at first sight, is in reality linked
necessarily with Molina's theory of scientia media. [667].
What does Molina mean by the phrase "granting all prerequisites
for acting"? His explanations show that the phrase includes, not
merely what is prerequired by priority of time, but also what is
prerequired by priority of nature and causality. It includes
therefore the actual grace received at the very moment of
performing a salutary act. Hence this definition, Molina explains,
does not mean that the free will, under efficacious grace,
preserves the power of resisting even while, in fact, it never
does resist. What it does mean is this: Grace is not of itself
efficacious, it is efficacious only by our own consent, pre-known
by God (pre-known by God's scientia media of future conditional
things).
Molina's definition, in the eyes of Thomists, is defective because
it leaves out of consideration the object which specifically
distinguishes the free act. It neglects the fundamental principle,
that all faculties, habits, and acts are what they are by their
specific relation to their respective object.
Now if, on the contrary, we consider the specific object of free
will, we will recall the words of St. Thomas: "If we set before
the will an object, which from any point of view is not good, the
will is not drawn to it by necessity. " [668] These words contain,
equivalently, the Thomistic definition of free will which runs
thus: [669] Freedom is the will's dominative indifference in
relation to any object which reason proposes as in any way lacking
in good.
Let us dwell on this definition. Reason proposes an object which,
here and now, is in one way good but in some other way not good.
Faced with such an object the will can choose it or refuse it. The
will, as faculty, has potential indifference; as act, it has
actual indifference. Even when the will actually chooses such an
object, even when it is already determined to will it, it still
goes freely toward it, with its dominating indifference no longer
potential but actual. Indeed, in God, who is supremely free, there
is no potential indifference, but only an actual and active
indifference. Freedom arises from the disproportion which exists
between the will, specifically distinguished and necessitated by
universal good, and this or that limited and particular good, good
in one way, not good in another way.
Against Suarez, Thomists pronounce thus: It is impossible that
God, even by His absolute power, could necessitate the will to
choose an object which reason proposes as indifferent. Why?
Because it is self-contradictory, that the will should necessarily
will an object which reason says is in some way not good, and
which therefore is absolutely disproportioned to the only object
which can necessitate the will. [670].
Here enters the twenty-first of the twenty-four theses. [671] "The
will follows, it does not precede the intellect. And the will
necessarily wills only that object which is presented to it as
good from every angle, leaving nothing to be desired. But the will
chooses freely between good things presented by mutable judgment.
Hence choice follows indeed the last practical judgment, but it is
the will which makes that judgment to be the last. ".
How does the will make the last practical judgment to be the last?
It does this by accepting it as last, instead of turning to a new
consideration which would result in an opposed practical judgment.
Intellect and will are thus reciprocally related, with a kind of
matrimonial relation, since voluntary consent, ending
deliberation, accepts the judgment here and now present as last.
Intellectual direction is indispensable, since the will is of
itself blind: nothing can be willed unless foreknown as good.
Suarez, [672] on the contrary, following Scotus, maintains that
voluntary choice is not necessarily preceded by a practical
judgment immediately directive. The will, when faced with two good
objects, equally or unequally good, can, he says, freely choose
either of them, even though the intellect does not propose that
one as here and now the better. Using their principle as
measuring-stick, Thomists reply: Nothing can be preferred here and
now, unless foreknown as here and now better. That something not
really better can here and now be judged better depends, of
course, on the evil disposition of man's appetites, intellectual
and sensitive. [673].
We have elsewhere examined at great length this problem: [674] the
special antinomies relative to freedom; the reciprocal influence
of the last practical judgment and free choice; comparison of
Thomist doctrine with the psychological determinism of Leibnitz,
on the one hand, and on the other, with the voluntarism of Scotus,
followed partly by Suarez.
In a brief word, the essential thing for St. Thomas is that the
intellect and will are not coordinated, but mutually subordinated.
The last practical judgment is free when its object (good from one
viewpoint, not good from another) does not necessitate it. Freedom
of will, to speak properly, is to be found in the indifference of
judgment.
CHAPTER 30: THE SEPARATED SOUL [675]
WE treat this subject briefly under three headings:
1. Subsistence of the separated soul.
2. Knowledge of the separated soul.
3. The will of the separated soul.
1. SUBSISTENCE
The continued subsistence of the separated soul may be thus
demonstrated. Every form which, in its being, in its specific
activity, and in its production, is intrinsically independent of
matter, can subsist, and in fact, does subsist, independently of
matter. But the human soul is such a form, intrinsically
independent of matter. Hence, after the dissolution of the human
body, the human soul continues to subsist.
The Averroistic question was this: How can the soul, separated
from the matter which gave it individuality, remain
individualized, that is, remain as the soul of Peter rather than
the soul of Paul? It remains individualized, answers St. Thomas,
by its essential, transcendental relation to that human body which
originally gave it individuation, even though that body is now
buried in the dust. Were this relation merely accidental, then it
would disappear with the disappearance of its terminus, as does,
e. g.: the relation of a father's paternity when his son dies. But
the separated soul is individualized by its relation to an
individual body, a relation comparable to that between the soul
and the living body, and this relation remains in the separated
soul, which by that relation remains individualized. Thus St.
Thomas against the Averroists, who, holding that the soul is
individualized only by actual union with matter, went on to say
pantheistically that all men together have but one immortal and
impersonal soul. [676].
We must note that soul and body form a natural composite, which is
one, not per accidens, but per se. Were the human soul united only
accidentally to the body, then it would have only an accidental
relation to its body, which relation could not remain after the
dissolution of the body. Quite otherwise is the case if the human
soul is by nature the form of the body.
Here we may again see how faithful St. Thomas is to the principle
of economy, which he himself thus formulates: [677] When fewer
principles suffice, search not for more. In the present treatise
too he draws all conclusions from principles, very profound but
very few. The saint is thus responsible for great progress in the
unification of theological knowledge.
Let us note briefly a few more of these consequences. First, it is
more perfect for the human soul to be united to the body than to
be separated, because its connatural object lies in the sense
objects to know which it needs the sense faculties. [678] Second,
the separated soul has a natural desire to be reunited to its
body, a conclusion in harmony with the dogma of universal
corporeal resurrection. [679] Third, the separated soul cannot by
its will be reunited to its body, because it informs the body, not
by its voluntary operation, but by its very nature. [680].
2. KNOWLEDGE [681]
Sense operations and sense habits do not remain actually in the
separated soul, but only radically (i. e.: in their root and
principle). What it does actually retain are, first, its
immaterial faculties (intellect and will): second, the habits it
acquired on earth, habits of knowledge, for example, and third,
the actual exercise of these habits, that of reason, for example.
Yet the separated soul finds itself impeded in this exercise,
because it no longer has the actual cooperation of the imagination
and the sense memory. But it receives from God infused ideas
comparable to those of the angels. To illustrate, we may compare
its state to that of a theologian who, unable to keep in touch
with new publications in his science, receives illuminations from
on high.
Sometimes we find an emphasis on this last point, an emphasis
which neglects another truth, very certain and very important,
namely, that the separated soul knows itself directly, without
medium. [682] This truth carries with it many other truths. By
this immediate self-knowledge, it sees with perfect evidence its
own native spirituality, its immortality, its freedom. It sees
also that God is the author of its nature. It thus knows God, no
longer in the sense world as mirror, but as mirrored in its own
spiritual essence. Hence it sees with transcendent evidence the
solution of the great philosophic problems, and the absurdity of
materialism, determinism, and pantheism. Further, separated souls
have knowledge of one another and also of the angels, though their
knowledge of the latter is less perfect, since the angels belong
by nature to a higher order of things.
Does the separated soul know what is happening on earth? Not in
the natural order. But in the supernatural order, God manifests to
the blessed in heaven such events on earth as have a special
relation to their blessed state, as, for instance, the question of
sanctification of living persons for whom the blessed are praying.
[683].
3. THE WILL
Every separated soul, so faith teaches us, has a will immutably
fixed in relation to its last end. For this truth St. Thomas gives
a profound reason. The soul, in whatever state, he says, thinks of
its last end rightly or wrongly according to its interior
disposition. Now as long as the soul is united to the body, this
disposition can change. But when the soul is separated, since it
is no longer tending to its last end, it is no longer on the road
(in via) to its good, but has obtained its goal, unless it has
missed it eternally. Hence its dispositions at the moment of
separation remain immovably fixed either in good or in evil. [684]
Here again we see the harmony between dogma and reason, between
revelation on the immutability of the separated soul and the
doctrine that the soul is the form of the body.
Concluding, St. Thomas, [685] shows that man, first by his
intellectual nature, secondly by grace, thirdly by the light of
glory, is made to the image of God. Is man also an image of the
Trinity? Yes, by his soul, which is the principle from which
proceed both thought and then love.
CHAPTER 31: ORIGINAL SIN
WAS the first man created in the state of grace? Did that original
justice include sanctifying grace?
Peter Lombard and Alexander of Hales, followed by St. Albert the
Great and St. Bonaventure, had answered as follows: Adam was not
created in the state of grace, but only with the full integrity of
human nature. Thereupon, after voluntarily disposing himself
thereunto, he received sanctifying grace. From this point of view
grace seems to be a personal gift to Adam rather than a gift to be
transmitted to his descendants. Still, according to these four
teachers, these descendants too by the dispositions given them in
their transmitted integrity of nature would have received
sanctifying grace.
What is the position of St. Thomas? We find a development in his
thought. When he wrote his commentary on the Sentences, [686]
after expounding the foregoing view, he goes on to speak as
follows: "But others say that man was created in grace. According
to this view the gift of gratuitous justice would seem to be a
gift to human nature itself, and therefore grace would have been
transmitted simultaneously with nature. ".
At this time then, around 1254, he does not as yet give preference
to either of these views. But a little later, farther on in the
same work, [687] he says that it is more probable that Adam
received grace at the moment of his creation.
In his subsequent works, he favors this view ever more strongly.
In a work [688] written between 1263 and 1268, he speaks thus:
"Original justice includes sanctifying grace. I do not accept the
view that man was created in the simple state of nature. " Later
on, in the same work, [689] he again says: "According to some
authors sanctifying grace is not included in the concept of
original justice. This view I hold to be false. My reason is this:
Original justice consists primordially in the subjection of the
human mind to God, and such subjection cannot stand firm except by
grace. Hence original justice must include grace. ".
Finally, in the Summa, [690] he affirms without qualification,
that the first man was created in the state of grace, that grace
guaranteed the supernatural submission of his soul to God, and,
further, that this primordial rectitude brought with it perfect
subordination of passion to reason and of the body to the soul,
with the privileges of impassibility and immortality.
Original justice, then, includes grace. This truth St. Thomas
finds in a word of Scripture: [691] God made man right. Thus this
text was understood by tradition, notably by St. Augustine, who
often says that, as long as reason submitted to God, the passions
submitted to reason. Hence St. Thomas holds that the original
justice received by Adam for himself and for us, included, as
intrinsic and primordial element, sanctifying grace, and that this
grace is the root and source of the other two subordinations, of
passion to reason, of body to soul.
Let us hear the saint's own words: "Since the root of original
justice, which made man right, lies in the supernatural subjection
of reason to God, which subjection, as said above, comes with
sanctifying grace, we must say that children born in original
justice would also have been born in grace. Would grace then be
something natural? No, because grace would not be given by seminal
transfusion of nature, but by God, at the moment when God infused
the rational soul. " [692].
And here is another text: [693] "Original justice belonged
primordially to the essence of the soul. For it was a gift
divinely given to human nature, a gift which is given to the
essence of the soul, before being given to the faculties. " [694].
Original justice, then, includes sanctifying grace, received by
Adam for himself and for us. That this is the position of St.
Thomas is maintained by most of the commentators. [695].
We may add here a word from the saint's teaching on baptism. [696]
If original justice meant merely full integrity of nature, then
original sin would be merely the privation of this integrity, and
hence would not be remitted by baptism, since baptism does not
restore this integrity. But original sin, the death of the soul,
[697] is the privation of grace, and grace is what is restored by
baptism.
This position of St. Thomas, compared to the other view, is much
nearer to the position later defined by the Council of Trent,
[698] which condemned anyone who would assert that Adam's fall
harmed himself only and not his progeny, or that he lost for
himself but not for us that sanctity and justice he had received
from God. The word "sanctity" in that sentence was declared by
many fathers of that Council to mean "sanctifying grace. " And
while the sentence underwent many amendments, the word "sanctity"
was never expunged. [699].
Thus Adam is conceived as head of nature elevated, who, both for
himself and for us, first received and then lost, that original
justice which included sanctifying grace. This truth is thus
expressed in the preparatory schema for the Council of the
Vatican: [700] God raised primordially the whole human race in its
root and head to the supernatural order of grace, but now Adam's
descendants are deprived of that grace.
Original sin, therefore, is a sin of nature, which is voluntary,
not by our will, but only by the will of Adam. Hence original sin
consists formally in the privation of original justice, of which
the primordial element is grace, which is restored by baptism.
Listen to St. Thomas: "The disorder found in this or that man
descended from Adam is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will
of our first parent. " [701].
To say it in a word, the human nature transmitted to us is a
nature deprived of those gifts, supernatural and preternatural,
which, without being gifts of nature, still enriched our nature as
if they were gifts of nature. [702].
Much light is thrown on the transmission of this sin of nature by
the doctrine of the soul as form of the body. The soul, being the
substantial and specific form of the body, constitutes with the
body one and only one natural unity; [703] hence although the
soul, being an immaterial thing, does not arise from matter but
must be created by God from nothing, still that soul enters into a
natural union with a body which is formed by generation. If human
nature is thus transmitted, then, after Adam's sin, it is
transmitted as deprived of original justice. Were the soul, like a
motor, only accidentally united to the body, we would have no way
of explaining the transmission of original sin. Let St. Thomas
speak: "Human nature is transmitted from parent to child by
transmission of a body into which then the soul is infused. The
soul of the child incurs the original stain, because that soul
constitutes with the transmitted body one nature. If the soul were
not thus united to form one nature, but were only united as an
angel is united to an assumed body, then the soul would not incur
this original stain. " [704].
This same doctrine, the soul as form of the body, explains also,
as we saw above, the immutability of the soul, immediately after
death, in regard to its last end. The purpose of the body is to
aid the soul to reach that last end. Hence, when the soul is no
longer united to the body, it is no longer on the road to its last
end, but is settled in its relation to that end by the last act,
meritorious or demeritorious, which it placed during its state of
union with the body. [705].
Thus all questions concerning man from beginning to end, from
conception unto death and thereafter, are explained by one and the
same set of principles. This is a great step in attaining unity of
theological science.
We have now seen, from the viewpoint of principle, the most
important questions regarding God, and the angels, and man, before
his fall and after. Let us summarize and conclude. God alone is
pure act, in whom alone is essence identified with existence, who
alone is not only His own existence, but also His own action.
Every creature is composed of essence and existence, it has its
existence, but it is not its existence. [706] Here appears the
gulf between the verb "to be" and the verb "to have. " Since
activity follows being, every creature is dependent on God for its
activity, just as it is dependent on Him even for its being.
Such is the word of wisdom, which decides all questions in the
light of the supreme cause, God, the source and goal of all
creation.
FIFTH PART: REDEMPTIVE INCARNATION
CHAPTER 32: INTRODUCTION [707]
IN order to show the appropriateness of the Incarnation, St.
Thomas employs this principle: good is self-diffusive, and the
higher the order of good, the more abundantly and intimately does
it communicate itself. The truth of this principle is seen on
every level of being: in the light and heat of the sun, in the
fruitfulness of vegetative life, of sense life, of intellective
knowledge and love. The higher a thing stands in goodness the more
creative it is, both as goal to attract and as agent to effect.
But does a thing that is good necessarily communicate itself? Yes,
if it is an agent limited to one kind of activity, as is the sun
to radiation. But if the agent is free, then its self-
communication is also free. [708] By such free self-communication
a perfect agent gives perfection, but does not itself become
thereby more perfect. Now God is the supremely good thing,
infinitely good. Hence it is appropriate that He communicate
Himself in person to a created nature, and this is what comes to
pass in the incarnation of the Word.
Does this reason prove the possibility of the Incarnation? No,
because reason can simply not prove apodictically even the
possibility of a mystery essentially supernatural. But, as
profound reason of appropriateness, the argument just given is
inexhaustibly fruitful. And on this point we find among
theologians no notable controversy. Real controversy begins when
we put the questions: Why did God become incarnate?
The answer of St. Thomas [709] runs thus: In the actual plan of
providence, [710] if the first man had not sinned, the Word would
not have be come incarnate. He became incarnate to offer God
adequate satisfaction for that first sin and all its consequences.
Let us listen to his argument.
A truth which absolutely surpasses all that is due to human
nature, a truth which depends solely on God's will, can be known
by divine revelation only. But according to revelation, contained
in Scripture and tradition, the reason everywhere assigned for the
Incarnation is drawn from the sin of the first man. [711] Hence it
is reasonable to conclude that, if the first man had not sinned,
the Word would not have become incarnate, and that, after that
sin, He became incarnate in order to offer God adequate
satisfaction, and thus to give us salvation.
This line of reasoning is in harmony with Scripture. [712] Among
the many texts let us quote one: The Son of man came to seek and
to save that which was lost. [713] It is also the voice of
tradition, formulated thus by St. Augustine: [714] Had man not
sinned, the Son of man had not come.
Such is the answer of St. Thomas. Scotus, on the contrary,
maintains that, even if Adam had not sinned, the Word would still
have become incarnate. But, since He would not have come to atone
for sin, He would not have a human nature subject to pain and
death. [715] Suarez, [716] seeking a middle ground, says that the
Word became incarnate equally for the redemption of man and for
the manifestation of God's goodness. By the adverb "equally" he
understands that these two motives are coordinated, as being two
chief purposes, each equal to the other, whereas Thomists hold
that the ultimate purpose of the Incarnation was indeed to
manifest God's goodness, but that the proximate purpose was man's
redemption.
Against the Scotist view Thomists use the following argument.
Divine decrees are of two kinds: one efficacious and absolute, the
other inefficacious and conditional. The latter is concerned with
the thing to be realized taken in itself, abstracting from all
actual circumstance. Thus, for example, God wills the salvation of
all men. But, in fact, God permits final impenitence in a sinner
(e. g.: Judas) as manifestation of infinite justice. Efficacious
decrees on the contrary are concerned with the thing to be
realized taken with all its concrete circumstances of place and
time. Hence these decrees are immutable and infallible. [717] Now
the present efficacious decree extends to the concrete
circumstance of the passibility of our Savior's humanity. And
Scotists themselves concede that the union between divine nature
and human nature subject to passibility presupposes Adam's sin.
This reasoning, which Thomists hold to be irrefutable, supposes
that the last end of the Incarnation is to manifest the divine
goodness by way of redemption, redemption being efficaciously
decreed as subordinated to this manifestation. Thus proposed, the
argument concludes against both Suarez and Scotus. For us men and
for our salvation, says the Council of Nicaea, He came down from
heaven. Had man not sinned, the Son of man had not come, says
tradition. [718] Scotus and Suarez would reword this sentence.
They say: Had man not sinned, the Son of man would still have
come, but not in a "passible" humanity. By such restatement the
assertion of the Fathers, taken simply as it stands, would be
false. To illustrate, it would be false to say that Christ is not
really in heaven and in the Eucharist, though He is not in either
place in a passible humanity.
Scotus brings another difficulty. A wise man, he says, wills first
the end, then the means in proportion to their nearness to that
end. [719] Thus he transfers the subordination in question from
the order of different acts of the divine will to the order of
different objects of those acts. Then he continues: Now Christ,
being more perfect, is nearer the last end of the universe than is
Adam. Hence God, to reveal His goodness, chose first the
incarnation of the Word, before Adam was willed, and hence before
his sin had been committed.
In answer to this objection, many Thomists, [720] following
Cajetan, [721] distinguish the final cause [722] from the material
cause. To illustrate. In the order of final causality God wills,
first the soul, secondly the body for the sake of the soul. But in
the order of material causality He wills first the body, as being
the material cause to be perfected by the soul, and the soul is
created only when the embryo is sufficiently disposed to receive
the soul.
Applying this distinction to the Incarnation, God wills, under
final causality, the redemptive Incarnation before He wills to
permit Adam's sin, conceived as possible. But in the order of
material causality, [723] He permits first the sin of Adam, as
something to be turned into a higher good. Similarly, in the order
of beatitude, beatitude itself is the final cause and man is the
material cause, the subject, [724] which receives beatitude.
This distinction is not idle, verbal, or fictitious. It is founded
on the nature of things. Causes have mutual priority, each in its
own order: [725] form before matter, matter before form. If Adam
had not sinned, if the human race were not there to be redeemed,
the Word would not have become incarnate. That is the order of
material causality. But in the order of finality, God permitted
original sin in view of some higher good, which good we, after the
Incarnation, know to be an incarnation universally redemptive.
On this last point some Thomists hesitate. John of St. Thomas and
Billuart say they have no answer to the question: What higher good
led God to permit original sin? But others [726] give a
satisfactory answer. Before the Annunciation, they say, the
question could not be answered. But, after the Annunciation, we
see that the higher good in question is the universally redemptive
Incarnation, subordinated of course to the revelation of God's
infinite goodness.
That this is the thought of St. Thomas himself appears in the
following words: "Nothing hinders human nature from being led
after sin to a greater good than it had before. God permits evils
only to draw forth from them something better. " [727] Where sin
abounded, says St. Paul, there grace superabounded. And the
deacon, when he blesses the Easter candle, sings: Oh happy guilt,
which merited so great and so beautiful a Redeemer!
Thus God's mercy, goodness, and power find in the Incarnation
their supreme manifestation. How does God manifest His
omnipotence? Chiefly, says the liturgy, [728] by sparing and
showing mercy. [729].
Hence, as the Carmelites of Salamanca so well say, we are not to
multiply divine decrees, and to suppose, as did John of St. Thomas
and Billuart, a whole set of conditional and inefficacious
decrees. It suffices to say that among all possible worlds known
by what we call God's simple intelligence, there were included
these two possible worlds: first, a human race that remains in a
state of innocence and is crowned with a non-redemptive
Incarnation; secondly, a fallen human race restored by a
redemptive Incarnation. Thus, while the fallen race is first [730]
as material subject of the Incarnation, the Incarnation itself is
first in the order of finality. [731] And thus, too, the ultimate
purpose of the universe is the manifestation of God's goodness.
How, then, are we to conceive the succession, not in divine acts
of will, but in the order of objects willed by God? Let us take an
architect as illustration. What the architect aims at first is not
the summit nor the foundation but the building as a whole with all
its parts in mutual subordination. Thus God, as architect, wills
the whole universe as it now stands with its ascending orders,
nature first, then grace (with the permission of sin): then the
hypostatic union as redemptive from sin. The Incarnation, though
it presupposes a sinful human race, is not "subordinated" to our
redemption. Redemptive by its material recipient, it remains in
itself the transcendent cause of redemption, and we, as
recipients, as bodies are to souls, remain ourselves subordinated
to Christ, who is the author of salvation and the exemplar of
holiness. All things belong to you, says St. Paul, [732] but you
belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God.
Let us conclude with a corollary, thus expressed by St. Thomas:
[733]: "God's love for Christ is greater than His love for all
creatures combined. By this love He gave Christ a name that is
above every name, since Christ is truly God. Nor is Christ's pre-
eminent excellence in any way diminished by the death which God
imposed on Him as Savior of the human race. On the contrary, by
this death Jesus gained the most glorious of victories, a victory
which made Him the Prince of peace, whose shoulders bear the
government of the world. " [734] Having humbled Himself, says St.
Paul, [735] having become obedient unto death, even unto death on
the cross, He was exalted and given the name that is above every
name.
This transcendent excellence of the Savior, thus delineated by St.
Thomas, is in fullest accord with Scripture and tradition. The
glory of God's Son was not diminished, was rather pre-eminently
enhanced, when for our salvation He came down from heaven and was
made man.
CHAPTER 33: THE HYPOSTATIC UNION
THE hypostatic union is the union of two natures, one divine, one
human, in the person of the Word made flesh. What is meant by
person, personality?
The classic definition is that of Boethius: [736] Person means an
individual substance having a rational nature. Of this definition
St. Thomas [737] gives the following explanation.
Person signifies an individual subject, which is first
intellectual, secondly free, i. e.: master of his own acts, [738]
one whose acts are self-initiated. Person, he continues, being the
primary subject [739] which bears all predicates attributable in
any way to its being, is itself incommunicable to any other
subject. To each human person, for example, belong and are
attributed, his soul, his body, his existence, his faculties, his
operations, the parts of his body. [740].
This explanation simply makes precise that notion of person
already held by the common sense of mankind. In everyday speech,
when we speak of person, we mean that deep inward self-ownership,
that ontological personality, which is the root, first of the
self-conscious ego, and this we may call psychological
personality, and secondly of that self-controlled use of liberty,
which we may call moral personality.
Person, personality, thus defined, is found in men, in angels,
and, analogically, in God. In God, moreover, according to
revelation, there are three persons, three subjects intellectual
and free, which have each the same intellect and the same liberty,
the same act of understanding and the same free act, by which all
three are one principle of external operation. This same notion of
personality allows us to say that Jesus too is a person, one sole
intellectual and free subject, one sole ego, although he has two
natures, one divine, one human, and hence first two intellects,
and secondly two liberties, His human liberty, however, completely
conformed to His divine liberty. When Jesus says [741] that He is
the way, He is speaking according to His human nature. But when,
in the same text, He adds that He is the truth and the life, He is
speaking primarily according to His divine nature, which makes Him
truth itself and life itself. "All things whatsoever the Father
hath are Mine. " [742].
What is the formal and radical element of ontological personality?
Here the Scholastics divide into opposed camps. Scotus, who denies
real distinction of essence and existence, who denies further real
distinction between suppositum (quod est) and existence (esse):
answers thus: Personality is something negative. In any particular
individual humanity (in Peter or Paul) personality is the denial,
the absence in that person of hypostatic union with a divine
person. [743] Suarez [744] says that personality is a substantial
mode which follows the existence of a particular individual
nature, and makes that nature incommunicable. He cannot admit, as
Thomists do, that personality is presupposed to existence, since,
like Scotus, he denies real distinction of essence and existence.
But even those who admit this real distinction are not all of one
mind in defining personality. One view, that of Cajetan, [745] who
is followed by most Dominican and Carmelite Thomists, [746]
defines personality as follows: [747] Personality is that by which
an individual nature becomes immediately capable of existence. A
second view, less explicit, but almost identical, is that of
Capreolus, who says that personality is the individual nature as
that nature underlies its existence. [748] A third view, that of
Cardinal Billot [749] and his disciples, says that personality is
existence itself, as actualizing the individual nature.
By what criterion are we to arrive at the true definition of
personality? [750] We must start with the nominal definition,
furnished by common usage, a definition which all theologians
intend to preserve. Now, by that common usage, when we use the
word "person" or its equivalent pronouns "I, " "you, " and "he, "
we mean to signify, not a mere negation, not something accidental,
but a distinct, individual and substantial thing, even though its
existence be contingent. Why, then, should the philosopher or
theologian, in his search for a real and distinct definition,
abandon this nominal definition of common sense? Let him rather
follow the method indicated by Aristotle [751] and St. Thomas,
which requires that we proceed, first, negatively, then
positively.
1. Ontological personality, then, that by which a subject is
person, cannot be a negative something. [752] If personality is to
constitute the person, it must itself be something positive.
Further, the personality of Socrates or of Peter must be something
in the natural order, and hence it cannot be defined, as Scotus
wills, by the negation of hypostatic union, which belongs
essentially to the supernatural order; a consequence would be that
personality, the personality, say, of Socrates, would be something
naturally unknowable.
2. Ontological personality is not only something positive, but
also something substantial, not accidental, because "person" means
a substance, a real subject of accident. Hence personality,
speaking properly, ontological personality, is not formally
constituted by self-consciousness, which is rather an act of the
person already constituted, an act which manifests the person
which it presupposes. Similarly, personality is not constituted by
freedom of will, which is a consequence that shows the dignity of
the person who is already constituted. Moreover, in Jesus, we find
two self-conscious intellects and two free wills, though He is one
sole person, one sole ego. Hence personality is something positive
and substantial. Let us now compare it with those elements in the
line of substance which it most resembles.
3. Is personality identified with nature [753] as found concrete
in the individual? No, because person is a whole which has nature
indeed as a part, the essential, formal, and perfective part, but
still only a part. [754] Were nature not a mere part, but the
whole of person, we could say "Peter is his nature. " But since
person contains more than nature, we say "Peter has human nature.
".
4. Is then personality identified with individualized nature which
underlies existence? [755] Again no, because the concrete singular
nature of Peter is not that which exists but is that by which
Peter is man. That which exists is Peter himself, his person.
Hence personality is not the concrete singular nature as preceding
existence. Further, were this view granted, since as in Christ
there are two natures, so there would likewise be two
personalities, two persons.
5. Nor is personality to be identified with existence. Existence
is attributed to created persons as contingent predicate, not as a
formal constitutive predicate. No creature is its own existence.
Creatures have existence, but the distance between "to be" and "to
have" is measureless. Only God is His own existence.
In every creature, St. Thomas [756] repeats, that which exists
(the suppositum, the person) differs from its existence.
Existence, he says elsewhere, [757] follows both nature and
person. But it follows nature as that by which the thing is what
it is, whereas it follows person as that which has existence. The
word "follows" in this passage expresses a sequel that is real and
objective, not a mere logical consequence. And thus, if existence
follows person, it presupposes person, and hence cannot constitute
personality.
Further, if existence formally constituted person, then the
created person would be identical with his existence. Peter would
be his own existence, he would not simply have existence. St.
Thomas [758] would be wrong in repeating: In every creature person
differs from existence.
In other words, the fundamental argument of the Thomistic thesis
runs thus: That which is not its own existence is really distinct
from that existence, really, that is, anteriorly to any mental act
of ours. Now the person of Peter, and much more his personality,
is really distinct from his existence, and existence is in him as
a contingent predicate. God alone is His own existence, a truth of
supremest evidence to those who have received the beatific vision.
6. To recapitulate. Ontological personality is a positive
something, a substantial something, which so determines the
concrete singular nature of a rational substance that it is
capable, without medium, of existing in itself as a separate and
independent entity. [759] More briefly, it is that by which a
rational subject is that which exists (quod est): whereas its
nature is that by which it belongs to its species, and existence
is that by which it exists.
Existence is a contingent predicate of the created person, it is
his ultimate actuality, not in the line of essence but in another
line. Hence, since existence presupposes personality, personality
itself cannot be [760] a substantial mode posterior to existence.
Hence we may say that personality is the point where two distinct
lines intersect: the line of essence and the line of existence.
Personality, speaking properly, is that by which an intellectual
subject is that which is. This ontological personality, which
constitutes the ego, is thus the root, both of the psychologic
personality, that is, of the ego as self-conscious, and of the
moral personality, that is, of self-mastery, of self-initiated
activity. Thus Christ's person, as theologians in general say, is
the personal principle (principium quod) of His theandric actions,
and thus gives to His acts their infinite value.
This objective definition of personality does but make explicit
the content of the nominal definition which common sense accepts.
Personality is that by which the intellectual subject is a person,
as existence is that by which it exists, hence personality differs
both from the essence and the existence which it unites into one
complete whole.
Hence created essence and its contingent existence do not make one
sole nature, [761] but they do belong to one and the same subject
(suppositum): [762] nature as its essential part, and existence as
its contingent predicate. This terminology rests on Aristotle's
doctrine of the four modes ofpredicating per se, i. e.: of saying
that this predicate belongs to this subject. We have the first
mode in a definition, the second mode when we predicate a
characteristic of the essence, the third when we predicate
something of an independent suppositum, and the fourth when we
predicate of an effect its proper and necessary cause. [763]
Following this accepted terminology, we see that created essence
and its contingent existence make one complete whole as belonging
each to one suppositum, in the third mode of predicating per se.
Ontological personality thus conceived, far from preventing union
between essence and existence, is rather that which unites the two
and makes them one complete whole.
Such is the conception of personality defended by Cajetan and the
majority of Thomists. This conception, they maintain, is the
metaphysical foundation of grammatical usage in regard to personal
pronouns, and of the verb "to be": he is a man, for example, or he
exists, or, he is active, he is patient, and so on.
The texts of Capreolus are less explicit. "Nature as
individualized under existence" is his definition of personality.
We have said, with the majority, that personality is that by which
individualized nature becomes immediately capable of existing. Now
that which exists is, precisely speaking, not the nature of Peter,
but Peter himself, Peter's person. Thus Cajetan, though he speaks
more explicitly, does not contradict Capreolus.
In clarification of this doctrine, held by most Thomists, let us
quote a few more texts from St. Thomas. The form signified by this
name person, he says, [764] is not essence or nature, but
personality. The contrast with nature shows that personality is
something substantial. Again he says: [765] The name person rests
on personality, which expresses subsistence in rational nature.
This means, in other terms, that personality is that by which a
rational subject is capable, first of separate existence, second,
of self-initiated activity.
Again, speaking now of Christ directly, he writes thus: [766] Had
not His human nature been assumed by a divine person, that nature
would have its own proper personality. Hence we may say, speaking
inexactly, that the divine person consumed the human personality,
because the divine person, by being united to the human nature
prevented that nature from having its own personality. In other
words, personality, though it is not a part of the essence, is
still something positive and substantial, not identified however
with existence which, in a created person, is something
contingent. Existence, he said above, [767] follows person which
is the subject of existence.
Lastly, speaking now of the Trinity, he says: [768] The three
divine persons have each one and the same existence. This text
shows clearly that personality differs from existence, since in
God there are three personalities but only one existence.
Similarly he says: [769] Existence is not included in the
definition of person (suppositum). Only God is His own existence,
whereas in a created person existence is a predicate, not
essential, but contingent.
Now for some consequences of this position. Person is to be found
in man, in angel, and, analogically, in God. By personality the
intellectual subject becomes the first subject of attribution, the
subject of which all else in him is predicated, the center from
which all else radiates, the ego which possesses his nature, his
existence, his self-conscious act, his freedom. By deviation, this
principle of ownership and possession [770] can become the
principle of egoism and individualism, which prefers itself to
family, society, and God. But while egoism and pride are thus an
abuse of created personality, an enormous abuse, rising even to
the denial of the Creator's supreme right, still the right use of
personality, psychological and moral, grows into truth, self-
devotedness, and sanctity.
In what, then, consists the full development of created
personality? It consists in making ourselves fully independent of
inferior things, but also, and still more closely, dependent on
truth, on goodness, on God.
propriam personalitatem haberet; et pro tanto dicitur persona
(divina) consumpsisse personam, licet improprie, quia persona
divina sua unione impedivit ne humana natura propriam
personalitatem haberet.
Himself. The saints are complete personalities, since they
recognize that human personality grows great only by dying to self
so that God may live in us, may rule us ever more completely. As
God inclines to give Himself ever more and more, so the saint
renounces ever more completely his own judgment and his own will,
to live solely by the thoughts and will of God. He desires that
God be his other self, [771] more intimate than his proper self.
Thus, from afar off, he begins to understand the personality of
Jesus.
But the saint, however high, is still a creature, immeasurably
below the Creator, eternally distinct from God. In Jesus Christ,
the Word of God gave Himself, in the highest conceivable manner,
to humanity, by uniting Himself personally to humanity, in such
wise that the human nature thus united becomes one sole ego with
that Word, which assumed forever that human nature. Thus, there is
in Christ one sole person, one sole intellectual and free subject,
even while there are two natures, two intellects, two freedoms.
Hence Christ alone among men can say: [772] "Before Abraham was, I
am. " "The Father and I are one. " "All that belongs to the Father
belongs to Me. ".
To clarify this hypostatic union, St. Thomas [773] proceeds as
follows: According to Catholic faith, human nature is really and
truly united to the person of the Word, while the two natures
remain distinct. Now that which is united to a person, without a
union in nature, is formally united to it in person, because
person is the complete whole of which nature is the essential
part. Further, since human nature is not an accident, like
whiteness, for example, and is not a transitory act of knowledge
or love, the human nature is united to the Word not accidentally,
but substantially. [774].
Christ, then, is man, though He has no human personality. But His
humanity, far from being lowered by this union with the Word, is
rather thereby elevated and glorified. From that union His
humanity has an innate sanctity substantial and uncreated. To
illustrate. Imagination, the highest of sense faculties, has a
higher nobility in man than in animal, a nobility arising from its
very subordination to the higher faculty of the intellect. A thing
is more noble, says Thomas, when it exists in a higher being than
when it exists in itself. [775].
Whereas individuation proceeds from matter, personality, on the
contrary, is the most perfect thing in nature. [776] Thus in
Jesus, as in us, all individualizing circumstances, of time and
place of birth, of people and country, arise from created matter,
whereas His person is uncreated.
This union of two natures therefore is not an essential union,
since the two are distinct and infinitely distant. Nor is it an
accidental union, like that of the saints with God. It is a union
in the substantial order, in the very person of the Word, since
one real subject, one sole ego, possesses both natures. [777]
Hence this union is called the hypostatic union.
This teaching of St. Thomas, and of the majority of Thomists,
rests, first on the words of Jesus concerning His own person,
secondly on the idea of person accessible to our natural
intelligence. Hence this doctrine can be expounded in a less
abstract form, in formulas that elevate the soul to sure and
fruitful understanding of this mystery. [778].
But a more subtle question arises: Is this hypostatic union of two
natures something created? In answer, it is clear, first, that the
action which unites the two natures is uncreated, because it is an
act of the divine intellect and will, an act which is formally
immanent in God, and only virtually transitive, an act which is
common to the three divine persons. It is clear, secondly, that
the humanity of Jesus has a real and created relation to the Word
which possesses that humanity, and on which that humanity depends,
whereas the Word has only a relation, not real but only of reason,
to the humanity which it possesses, but on which it does not
depend. On these two points there is no discussion.
But there is discussion when the question is posed thus: Is there
a substantial intermediate mode which unites the human nature to
the Word? Scotus, Suarez, and Vasquez answer affirmatively, as do
likewise some Thomists, the Salmanticenses, for example, and
Godoy. Thomists in general answer negatively, appealing with
justice to repeated statements of St. Thomas. Thus he says: [779]
"In the union of the human nature to the divine, nothing mediates
as cause of this union, nothing to which human nature would be
united before being united to the divine person: just as between
matter and form there is no medium. So likewise nothing can be
conceived as medium between nature and person (suppositum). " Thus
the Word terminates and sustains the human nature of Christ, which
human nature thus constituted depends directly, without medium, on
the Word. And creation itself, passive creation, is nothing but a
real direct relation by which the creature depends on the Creator.
Further, St. Thomas holds [780] that the hypostatic union is the
most deep and intimate of all created unions. The human nature, it
is true, is infinitely distant from the divine, but the principle
which unites them, namely, the person of the Word, cannot be more
one and more unitive. The union of our soul to our body, for
example, however immediate it is and intimate, is yet broken by
death, whereas the Word is never separated either from the body or
from the soul which He has assumed. Thus the hypostatic union is
immovable, indissoluble, for all eternity.
This deep inward intimacy of the hypostatic union has as
consequence the truth that there is in Christ one existence for
the two natures. [781] This consequence, since it supposes real
distinction between created essence and existence, is denied by
Scotus and Suarez, who thereby attenuate that union which
constitutes the God-man. St. Thomas thus establishes his
conclusion: [782] There can be, in one and the same person, many
accidental existences, that of whiteness, for example, that of an
acquired science or art: but the substantial existence of the
person itself must be one and one only. Since existence is the
ultimate actuality, the uncreated existence of the Word would not
be the ultimate actuality if it were ulteriorly determinable by a
created existence. Hence we say, on the contrary, that the eternal
Word communicates His own existence to His humanity, somewhat as
the separated soul communicates its own existence to the body at
the moment of resurrection. "It is more noble to exist in a higher
thing than to exist in one's self. " [783] "The eternal existence
of God's Son, an existence identified with divine nature, becomes
the existence of a man, when human nature is assumed by God's Son
into unity with His person. " [784].
Scotus and Suarez, as has been said, since they reject real
distinction between essence and existence, reject likewise the
doctrine of one existence in Christ. They not only attenuate the
hypostatic union but even compromise it, because existence, as
ultimate actuality, presupposes subsistence or personality. Hence,
as Thomists say, if there were two existences in Christ, there
must be likewise two persons. One thing St. Thomas [785] insists
on: one person can have but one sole existence.
This doctrine shows the sublimity of the hypostatic union. Under
this union, just as the soul of Christ has the transcendent gift
of the beatific vision, so the very being of Christ's humanity,
since it exists by the Word's uncreated existence, is on a
transcendent level of being. Here we see in all its fullness the
principle with which St. Thomas begins his treatise on the
Incarnation: Good is self-communicative, and the higher is that
good the more abundantly and intimately does it communicate
itself.
Christ's personality, then, the unity of His ego, is primarily an
ontological unity. He is one sole subject, intellectual and free,
and has one sole substantial existence. But this most profound of
all ontological unities expresses itself by a perfect union of
this human mind and will with His divinity. His human mind, as we
have just said, had even here on earth the beatific vision of
God's essence, and hence of God's knowledge. Hence, even here
below, there was in Jesus a wonderful compenetration of vision
uncreated and vision created, both having the same object, though
only the uncreated vision is infinitely comprehensive. Similarly
there was perfect and indissoluble union of divine freedom and
human freedom, the latter also being absolutely impeccable.
CHAPTER 34: CONSEQUENCES OF THE HYPOSTATIC UNION
1. By the substantial grace of personal union with the Word, the
humanity of Christ is sanctified, with a sanctity that is innate,
substantial, and uncreated. By the grace of union Jesus is united
to God personally and substantially, by that grace He is Son of
God, the well-beloved of the Father, by that grace He is
constituted as the substantial principle [786] of acts, not merely
supernatural but theandrical, and by that grace He is sinless and
impeccable.
2. Nevertheless it is highly appropriate that the soul of the
Savior should have, as consequence of the hypostatic union, the
plenitude also of created grace, of sanctifying grace, with all
the infused virtues and with all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, that
thus his supernatural and meritorious acts be connatural. This
connaturalness requires that also the proximate principles of
these acts, His intellect and will, be of the same supernatural
order as are the acts themselves. [787].
3. This habitual and sanctifying grace, being a consequence of the
hypostatic union, was, from the first moment of His conception, so
perfect that it could not be augmented. By His successive deeds,
says the Second Council of Constantinople, [788] Christ Himself
was not made better.
This initial plentitude of grace expanded at once into the light
of glory and beatific vision. [789] It is highly appropriate that
He who came to lead humanity to its last end should have perfect
knowledge of that end. [790] Were it otherwise, did He have from
His divinity only faith illumined by the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
then, on receiving later the light of glory, He would, contrary to
the Council just cited, have Himself become better.
This expansion of sanctifying grace into the vision of God was
paralleled by a corresponding expansion of zeal for God's glory
and man's salvation, a zeal which led the Savior, at His entrance
into the world, to offer Himself as a perfect holocaust for us.
The same plenitude of grace is the source, on the one hand, of a
supreme beatitude, which did not leave Him even on the cross, and,
on the other hand, of the greatest suffering and humiliations,
arising from His zeal to repair all offenses against God and to
save mankind. This identity of source serves in some manner to
explain the mysterious harmony, in Christ crucified, between
supreme beatitude and supreme suffering, physical, moral, and
spiritual.
4. The priesthood of Christ, which gives to His sacrifice an
infinite value, on what does it rest? It presupposes, not merely
the fullness of created grace, but also the grace of union. The
priestly acts of Christ draw their theandric and infinite value
from His divine personality. Some Thomists, it is true, say that
Christ's priesthood is constituted by His created grace, by His
grace of headship, [791] which of course presupposes the grace of
union. But the majority, more numerous as time goes on, hold that
Christ's priesthood rests directly on the uncreated grace of union
itself. That union it is which makes Jesus the "Anointed one of
the Lord. " That union gives Him His primordial anointing, His
substantial holiness. [792].
Further, the grace of union is also the reason why we owe to
Christ's humanity the homage of adoration. [793] It is likewise
the reason why Christ sits at the right hand of God, as universal
king of all creatures, as judge of the living and the dead. [794]
This is the view which dominates the encyclical on Christ as King.
[795] Jesus is universal judge and universal king, not only as
God, but also as man, and that above all by His grace of union
which makes Him God-man.
This uncreated grace of union, then, is the reason why Christ, as
man, since He possesses substantial holiness, is to be adored with
the adoration due to God alone. And primarily by this same grace
He is first priest, capable of priestly acts which are theandric,
secondly universal king and judge.
Here appears the necessity of contemplating our Savior from three
points of view: first according to His divine nature, by which He
creates and predestines; secondly, according to His human nature,
by which He speaks, reasons, and suffers; thirdly, according to
His unity of person with the Word, by which His acts are theandric
and have a value infinitely meritorious and satisfactory.
Christ was predestinated. In what sense? St. Thomas and his
school, in opposition to Scotus, teach that Jesus as man was
predestined, first to divine filiation, secondly and consequently,
to the highest degree of glory, which is given to Him because He
is God's Son, by nature, not by adoption. [796] They teach,
further, that Christ's own gratuitous predestination is the cause
of our predestination and that Jesus merited for the elect all the
effects of predestination, all the graces which they receive,
including the grace of final perseverance. [797].
5. Christ's meritorious and satisfactory acts have an intrinsic
value which is infinite. On this important question, which touches
the very essence of the mystery of Redemption, Thomists and
Scotists are divided. St. Thomas and his school, as we saw above,
by insisting on the one existence of Christ, emphasize, much more
than Scotus does, the intimacy of the two natures in Jesus, -which
gives to His acts, meritorious and satisfactory, an intrinsically
infinite value. Thomists insist on the substantial principle of
these acts, which is the Word made flesh, the divine suppositum,
the divine person of the Son of God.
Hence, whereas Scotists assign to Christ's acts a value that is
only extrinsically infinite, that is, only so far as God accepts
those acts, Thomists, on the contrary, and with them many other
theologians, hold that the value of these acts is intrinsically
infinite by reason of the divine person of the Word, which is
their substantial and personal principle. That which acts, merits,
satisfies, is not, speaking properly, the humanity of Jesus, but
rather the person of the Word, which acts by His assumed humanity.
But that person, having an infinite elevation, communicates that
elevation to all His acts. He that properly satisfies for an
offense, says St. Thomas, [798] must give to the one offended
something for which his love is at least as great as is his hatred
for the offense. But Christ, by suffering in charity and
obedience, offered God something for which His love is greater
than is His hatred for all offenses committed by the human race.
As offense grows with the dignity of the person offended, so honor
and satisfaction grow with the dignity of the person who makes
amends. [799].
This thesis, admitted by theologians generally, is in accord with
the teaching of Clement VI: [800] One little drop of Christ's
blood, by His union with the Word, would have sufficed to redeem
the whole human race. It is to men an infinite treasure... by
reason of Christ's infinite merits.
CHAPTER 35: FREEDOM AND IMPECCABILITY [801]
CHRIST'S acts of merit and satisfaction presuppose freedom in the
proper sense, [802] not merely spontaneity, [803] which is found
already in the animal. Now it would seem that Christ, if He is to
obey freely, must also be able to disobey. Hence the question: how
is freedom to be harmonized with absolute impeccability?
Impeccability, in Christ, does not mean merely that, in fact, He
never sinned. It means that He simply could not sin. He could not
for three reasons:
a) by reason of His divine personality, which necessarily excludes
sin:
b) by reason of His beatific vision of God's goodness, from which
no blessed soul can ever turn aside:
c) by reason of His plentitude of grace, received inamissibly as
consequence of the grace of union.
How can Jesus be perfectly free if He is bound by obedience to His
Father's will? Dominic Banez [804] was obliged to study this
question profoundly, in answer to certain theologians of his
epoch, who tried to safeguard the freedom of Jesus by saying that
He had not received from His Father a command to die on the cross
for our salvation. This position has defenders even in our own
times. Thomists reply that the position contradicts the explicit
words of Scripture: "I give My life. This is the command I have
received from My Father. That the world may know that I act
according to the commandment My Father has given me. Arise, let us
go. If you keep My commandments, you will abide in My love, even
as I have kept the commandments of My Father, and abide in His
love. " [805] Christ became obedient unto death, even to death on
the cross. [806].
Now obedience, properly speaking, has as formal object a command
to be fulfilled. And if one says, unjustifiably, that the commands
given to Christ were only counsels, how could Christ, being
absolutely impeccable, neglect even the counsels of His Father?
Hence the question inevitably returns: How can impeccability be
harmonized with that real freedom which is presupposed by merit?
The Thomistic reply begins by distinguishing psychological liberty
from moral liberty. A command takes away moral liberty, in the
sense that disobedience is illicit. But the command, far from
taking away psychological liberty, rather builds on this liberty
as foundation. The command is given precisely to ensure free acts.
No one commands fire to burn, or the heart to beat, or any other
necessary act. A command is self-destructive where there is no
liberty.
And precept remains precept, and is freely fulfilled, even when he
who obeys is impeccable, because the thing commanded (death for
our salvation) is good from one viewpoint, and not good, even
painful, from another viewpoint. This object is entirely different
from the divine goodness clearly seen in the beatific vision. The
blessed in heaven are not free to love God whom they see face to
face, though they too remain free in other acts, to pray, for
example, at this time, or for this person.
Further, if the command to die destroys Christ's liberty, we would
have to say the same of all precepts, even of those commanded by
the natural law, and thus Christ would have no freedom to obey any
precept, and hence could have no merit.
But the difficulty seems to remain. If Christ was free to obey,
then He could disobey and thus sin. But faith teaches, not only
that He did not sin, but that He could not sin.
In answer let us weigh the following reflections.
1. Liberty of exercise suffices to safeguard the essence of
liberty. Man is master of his act when he can either place the act
or not place it. Such an act is free, even where there is no
choice between contrary acts, hating, say, and loving, or between
two disparate ways of attaining an end.
2. The power to sin is not included in the idea of freedom, but is
rather the defectibility of our freedom, just as the possibility
of error is the defectibility of our intellect. This power to sin
does not exist in God who is sovereignly free, nor in the blessed
who are confirmed in good. Hence it did not exist in Christ, whose
freedom, even here on earth, was the most perfect image of divine
freedom. Genuine freedom then does not include disobedience, but
rather excludes it. Genuine freedom wills, not evil, but always
good. It chooses between two or many objects, none of which is
bad, but all good. [807].
3. Disobedience is not to be confused with the mere absence of
obedience. In a sleeping child, for example, though he be the most
obedient of children, there is, here and now, the absence of
obedience, but no disobedience. Disobedience is a privation, a
wrong, a fault, whereas mere absence of obedience is a simple
negation. This distinction may seem subtle, but it expresses the
truth. Christ, like the blessed in heaven, could not disobey, even
by omission or neglect. But His human will, incapable of
disobedience, can still see the absence of obedience as good,
[808] as something here and now not necessarily connected with His
beatitude. Death on the cross was good for our salvation, but it
was a good mixed with non-good, with extreme suffering, physical
and moral. Hence it was an object which did not impose necessity
on His will. Nor did the divine will impose necessity, since, as
we have seen, the precept, by making the omission illicit, removes
indeed moral liberty, but, on the contrary, presupposes and
preserves physical and psychological liberty.
When then does Jesus love necessarily? He thus loves His Father
seen face to face, and hence all else that is, here and now,
connected, intrinsically and necessarily, with that supreme
beatitude, just as we necessarily will existence, life, and
knowledge without which we see that we cannot have happiness. But
Jesus willed freely all that was connected, not intrinsically, but
only extrinsically, by a command, with beatitude. Death, at once
salutary for us and terrible in itself, did not attract
necessarily. The command did not change either the nature of the
death, or the freedom of the act commanded. Hence Christ's
response.
Thus Jesus obeyed freely even though He could not disobey. As
distant illustration of this mystery, we may refer to a painful
act of obedience in a good religious. He obeys freely, hardly
reflecting that he could disobey. Even if he were confirmed in
grace, this confirmation would not destroy the freedom of his
obedient act. The will of Christ, says St. Thomas, [809] though it
is confirmed in good, is not necessitated by this or that
particular good. Hence Christ, like the blessed, chooses by a free
will which is confirmed in good. This sentence, in its simplicity,
is more perfect than the long commentaries thereon, but the
commentaries serve to show the truth hidden in that simplicity.
The sinless liberty of Christ is the perfect image of God's
sinless liberty. [810].
CHAPTER 36: CHRIST'S VICTORY AND PASSION
We consider here three important problems.
1. How is Christ's passion in harmony with His beatific vision?
2. How did His passion cause our salvation?
3. Why did He suffer so much, seeing that His least suffering
would suffice to save us?
1. According to St. Thomas [811] our Savior's sufferings were the
greatest that can be conceived. In particular, His moral suffering
surpassed that of all contrite hearts, first because it derived
from a transcendent wisdom, which let Him realize, far beyond our
power, the infinite gravity of sin, and the countless multitude of
men's crimes; secondly because it derived from a measureless love
for God and men; thirdly because He suffered, not merely for the
sins of one man, as does a repentant sinner, but for all sins of
all men taken together. Hence the question: How under such intense
pain, physical and moral, could our Lord simultaneously preserve
the boundless joy of the beatific vision?
This mystery, as theologians generally teach, is the consequence
of another mystery, namely, that Jesus was simultaneously a viator
(on the road to ultimate glory) and a comprehensor (already in
possession of ultimate glory). [812] How is this possible? The
truest answer is that of St. Thomas, an answer that is full of
light, though the mystery remains a mystery.
We must distinguish also in Christ, says the saint, [813] the
higher soul faculties from the lower. Hence, as long as He was
simultaneously viator and comprehensor, He did not allow the glory
and the joy of the superior part to overflow on the inferior part.
Only the summit of His soul, that is, His human mind and will was
beatified, while He freely abandoned to pain all His faculties of
sense. [814] He would not permit His beatific joy in the summit of
His soul to send down the slightest softening ray upon that
physical and moral pain, to which He would fully surrender
Himself, for our salvation. In Illustration, think of a lofty
mountain, the summit Illumined by the sun, while a violent storm
envelops the lower slopes and the foundations, and, as analogy,
think of the contrite penitent, whose higher faculties rejoice in
the affliction of his lower faculties, and rejoice the more, the
more he is thus afflicted.
2. How did Christ's passion cause our salvation? [815] In five
different ways: as merit, as satisfaction, as sacrifice, as
redemption, as efficient cause. Is this series a mere
juxtaposition of scriptural terms? No, we have here an ordered
process, rising from general terms to terms which are specific and
comprehensive. All acts of charity are meritorious, but not all
are satisfactory. An act may be satisfactory without being,
properly speaking, a sacrifice, which presupposes a priest. And
even a true sacrifice, as in the Old Law, may not of itself be
redemptive, but only as prefigurative of a perfect sacrifice. And,
lastly, even a redemptive sacrifice may be only a moral cause of
grace, whereas Christ's redemptive sacrifice is also the efficient
cause of grace.
Christ's passion, then, wrought our salvation under the form of
merit because, as the head of humanity, He could pour out grace on
us from His own fullness, and, as divine person, His merits have
an infinite value. [816].
His passion was, second, a perfect satisfaction, because by
bearing that passion with theandric love, He offered something for
which the Father's love was greater than His displeasure at all
sins of mankind. And the life He offered, the life of the God-man,
had infinite value. Personally then, and objectively, satisfaction
was completely adequate. [817].
His passion, further, was sacrificial cause of our redemption, for
it was an oblation, in the visible order, of His life, of His body
and blood, made by Him as priest [818] Of the New Covenant. [819].
Hence, also as redemption, His passion is cause of our salvation,
because, being an adequate and superabounding satisfaction, it was
the price paid for our deliverance from sin and penalty. [820].
Merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, redemption are forms of moral
causality. But Christ's passion is also an efficient cause of our
salvation, since the suffering humanity of Christ is the
instrument by which the divinity causes in us all graces which we
receive. [821].
Recapitulating, [822] St. Thomas speaks thus: The passion of
Christ's humanity compared to His divinity, has instrumental
efficiency; compared to Christ's human Will, it energizes as
merit; considered in His flesh, it energizes as satisfaction; it
energizes as redemption, in delivering us from the captivity of
guilt; lastly, it energizes as sacrifice, by reconciling, by
making us the friends of God.
We should note here that St. Thomas sees the essence of
satisfaction in our Savior's theandric love rather than in His
great sufferings, since these sufferings draw their value from
that love which pleases God more than all sin displeases Him.
[823] This love makes Christ's satisfaction superabundant, and,
further, as Thomists hold against Scotus, intrinsically, of
itself, superabundant, not merely extrinsically, by God's
acceptance. And this satisfaction, they add, being of itself
superabundant, has the rigorously strict value of justice.
Let us note another conclusion. Jesus is the one sole Redeemer,
[824] the universal Redeemer from whom alone all others, even His
mother, the Virgin Mary, receive their sanctity. [825].
The effects of Christ's passion, to recapitulate, are deliverance
and reconciliation, deliverance from sin, from the domination of
the devil, from the penalties due to sin; and reconciliation with
God, who opens to us the gates of heaven. Here we see, in mutual
order and Illumination, the various terms and truths whereby
Scripture and tradition speak of our Savior's passion. The
conclusions thus presented are not, strictly speaking, theological
conclusions, even when at times they proceed from two premises of
faith. They are rather explanations of the truths contained in the
"doctrine of faith, " truths that precede theology, and of which
theology is itself the explanatory science.
3. Why did Jesus suffer so much, seeing that the least of His
sufferings offered with such love would superabundantly suffice
for our salvation? [826].
In answer, let us look at our Savior's sufferings from three
points of view; our own, His own, and that of God the Father.
a) We need to be Illumined on how to receive the greatest
testimony of love, accompanied by the highest example of heroic
virtue. Now there is no greater love than giving life for those we
love. [827].
b) Christ Himself must fulfil His redemptive mission in the
highest manner. Now, as priest, no victim but Himself was worthy.
And to be a perfect holocaust He must be completely victim, in
body, in heart, in a soul "sorrowful unto death. " Further, having
the fullness of charity, and being both viator and comprehensor,
He necessarily suffered with boundless intensity from mankind's
sins taken on Himself, seeing in these sins both the offense
against God and the cause of the loss of souls.
c) God the Father willed by this road of suffering and humiliation
to give our Savior the grandest of victories, a threefold victory,
over sin, over the devil, over death. The victory over sin was
gained by the greatest of all acts of charity, victory over the
devil's disobedience and pride by the supreme act of obedience and
the loving acceptance of the lowest humiliations, victory over
death, the consequence and punishment of sin, by the glorious
external sign of the two preceding victories, a victory
culminating in His resurrection and ascension. "Christ humbled
Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to death on the cross.
Hence God exalted Him, and gave Him a name above every name, a
name before which all kneel... while every tongue, to the glory of
God the Father, confesses that Jesus Christ is the Lord. " [828].
This treatise on the redemptive Incarnation, like that on God,
shows that Thomism is not a mere sum of haphazard theses, but a
mental attitude of research, a method of expounding truth in the
order of nature and of grace, a unified grasping, a living
synthesis, of the natural order of truth in its essential
subordination to the supernatural order of truth. Such a synthesis
radiates from one mother-idea. In the treatise on God that parent-
idea is this: God is subsistent being, in whom alone essence is
identified with existence. In the treatise on the Incarnation, the
parent idea is the divine personality of our Savior. This unity of
person in two natures implies first, unity of existence, [829]
secondly, substantial sanctity, thirdly, a priesthood supremely
perfect, fourthly, a royal dominion over all creatures. Lastly,
since person is the substantial principle of all acts, the
theandric acts of Christ have a value intrinsically infinite in
the order of merit and satisfaction.
We add one remark. These two treatises, that on God and that on
the Incarnation, are the foundations of the theological edifice.
On their solidity all else depends.
CHAPTER 37: MARIOLOGY [830]
As from the hypostatic union arise all the prerogatives of Christ,
so the divine maternity is the raison d'etre of all Mary's graces,
particularly of her role as our Mother and Mediatrix. We treat
here four questions:
1. Mary's predestination.
2. Her dignity as Mother of God.
3. Her sanctity.
4. Her universal mediation.
Under these headings we give the common Thomistic teaching, and
attempt to make precise the reason why St. Thomas hesitated to
affirm the privilege of the Immaculate Conception.
ARTICLE ONE: MARY'S PREDESTINATION
By one and the same decree God predestined Jesus and Mary, Jesus
unto natural divine filiation, Mary to be the Mother of God,
because Christ's eternal predestination includes all the
circumstances which here and now attend His incarnation. Of these
circumstances the most important is that signalized in the Nicene
Creed: He was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of Mary the Virgin. To
this one and the same decree testimony is borne by Pius IX in the
bull Ineffabilis Deus: [831] This Virgin's privileges are
primordial, given by that one and the same decree which willed
that divine Wisdom be incarnate.
The parallelism is complete. Jesus was predestined, first [832] to
divine filiation, secondly and consequently to the highest degree
of glory and hence to that fullness of grace which belongs to the
holy soul of the Word made flesh. Thus too, by the same decree,
Mary was predestined first to the divine maternity, secondly and
consequently to a very high degree of glory, and hence to that
fullness of grace which belongs to the Mother of God, a fullness
worthy of the grandeur of her mission, a mission which uniquely
associated her with the redemptive work of her Son. [833].
Mary's predestination, further, again like that of Christ,
depends, in the order of material causality, on the permission and
prevision of Adam's fall, because, in the actual plan of
Providence, if the first man had not sinned, were there no
original sin to repair, Mary would not be the Mother of God. But
where sin abounded, grace superabounded. [834] The Fall was
permitted in view of that great good which we see radiating from
the redemptive Incarnation, [835] and Mary, predestined to be
Mother of the Redeemer, is thereby predestined likewise to be the
Mother of mercy.
Mary's predestination, like that of Christ, is absolutely
gratuitous. By no title, either of justice (de condigno) or even
of strict appropriateness (de congruo proprie): could she merit
divine maternity. This is the common teaching, against Gabriel
Biel. The principle underlying this doctrine runs thus: The source
of merit cannot itself be merited. Now, in the actual economy of
salvation, the Incarnation is the source of all grace, and of all
merit, of Mary's graces and of our own.
Further, there is no proportion between merits in the order of
created grace and the hypostatic order of uncreated grace. But
divine maternity, though it terminates in the hypostatic order, in
the person of the Word made flesh, is in itself a created grace.
Hence, when we say that the Blessed Virgin merited to bear the
Lord of all, we do not mean, says St. Thomas, [836] that she
merited the Incarnation itself. What we do mean is this: By the
grace given her she merited that degree of purity and sanctity
which was demanded by her dignity as Mother of God. Can we
therefore say that she merited the Incarnation, not indeed by
justice (dc condigno): nor even by strict appropriateness (de
congruo stricte dicto): but at least by appropriateness in a wider
sense (de congruo late dicto) ? St. Thomas [837] seems to say so,
and is thus understood by many Thomists. The saint's words run
thus: The Blessed Virgin did not merit the Incarnation, but, the
Incarnation supposed, she merited, not de condigno but de congruo,
that the Incarnation should be accomplished through her. This
position is in full accord with two other positions: first that
she merited our graces de congruo proprio, secondly that Christ
merited our graces de condigno.
ARTICLE TWO: THE DIVINE MATERNITY
Mary is truly and properly the Mother of God. This definition of
the Church [838] is to be explained thus: The terminus of the act
of conceiving is not, properly speaking, the nature of the child,
but the person of the child. Now the person in whom Mary's act of
conception terminates is the Word incarnate, a divine person.
The divine maternity, therefore, is a relation, of Mary to Christ
and of Christ to Mary. Since Christ belongs to the hypostatic
order, Mary's maternity is a relation to the hypostatic order.
This relation is, in Mary, a real relation, like that of creature
to Creator, whereas it is only a relation of reason in the
unchangeable Word, like that of Creator to creature.
The sublimity of this divine maternity is thus expressed by St.
Thomas: "The Blessed Virgin, by being Mother of God, has a certain
infinite dignity, by this relation to that infinite good which is
God. And nothing in this line can be conceived greater than this
maternity, just as nothing can be conceived greater than God. "
[839] This conception underlies the saint's words on hyperdulia, a
cult due to Mary alone. He says: [840] "Hyperdulia is the highest
kind of dulia, [841] because the reverence due to any person grows
with that person's affinity to God. " Mary's maternity, then,
since it terminates in God, has an infinite dignity.
By what is Mary sanctified? Is it by the divine maternity,
independently of her plenitude of grace? Some theologians [842]
say Yes, just as the hypostatic union gives to Christ a
substantial sanctity independently of His fullness of sanctifying
grace. But the generality of theologians [843] say No, because the
divine maternity, in contrast to Christ's grace of union, is only
a relation to the Word incarnate, and relation as such does not
seem to be a sanctifying form.
Nevertheless this relation of divine maternity, though it does not
sanctify formally and immediately, does sanctify radically and
exigitively, because it connaturally postulates all the graces
given to Mary to make her the worthy Mother of God. [844].
To understand this distinction, let us note that the divine
maternity, considered materially, consists in the acts of
conceiving, carrying, bearing, and nourishing the Word made flesh.
Now, in themselves, these acts are less perfect than that of
loving God and doing His will according to our Lord's word: "Yea,
rather blessed are they who hear the word of God and keep it. "
[845] But we must consider the divine maternity also formally. To
become Mother of God, Mary had to give her consent to the
realization of the mystery. By this consent, as tradition says,
she conceived her Son, not only in body, but also in spirit, in
body, because He is flesh of her flesh, in spirit, because He
awaited her consent. But her act of consent was given, says St.
Thomas, [846] in the name of the human race. Further, in thus
consenting, she consented likewise to that train of sufferings
predicted by the Messianic prophecies. Considered thus, formally,
the divine maternity demands those high graces which make her, in
God's plan, the worthy Mother of the Redeemer, His most intimate
associate in the work of redemption. [847].
Let us add that maternity, in a rational creature, presupposes the
mother's consent, and that, in the present case, that consent must
be supernatural, since it terminates in the mystery of the
redemptive Incarnation. Thus while the divine maternity, taken
formally, demands grace, the inverse is not true. Fullness of
grace, in idea, does not demand the divine maternity. It may be
said, of course, that, by God's absolute power, divine maternity
could exist without grace. But thus considered, even the soul of
Christ could be annihilated, since there is no intrinsic
contradiction. But, it need hardly be said, we are dealing here
with God's ordinary power, as guided by wisdom which suits all
things to their purpose.
A last question. Divine maternity, taken in itself, without
considering Mary's fullness of grace -- is it higher than
sanctifying grace and the beatific vision? Many theologians [848]
answer No. Among Thomists, Contenson, Gotti, Hugon, [849]
Merkelbach, [850] answer Yes, maintaining that the affirmative
answer is more in conformity with traditional doctrine. They give
three convincing reasons.
1. The divine maternity belongs, terminatively, to the hypostatic
order, it reaches physically the person of the Word made flesh, to
whom it gives His human nature. But the hypostatic order surpasses
by far the orders of grace and glory. Hence the divine maternity
has an infinite dignity. Besides, while grace can be lost, the
divine maternity cannot be lost.
2. The divine maternity is the original reason for Mary's fullness
of grace, and the converse is not true. Hence her maternity, being
the measure and purpose of that fullness, stands simply higher
than its effects.
3. Why do we owe Mary the cult of hyperdulia? Answer: because of
her divine maternity. This cult cannot be given to the saints,
however high in grace and glory. Hyperdulia is due to Mary, not
because she is the greatest of saints, but because she is the
Mother of God. Hence, speaking simply, her divine maternity,
considered purely in itself, [851] is superior to her sanctifying
grace and her glory. Thus we return to our thesis: Mary was
predestined, first to the divine maternity, secondly and
consequently to a surpassing degree of glory, thirdly and again
consequently to her fullness of sanctifying grace.
Since Mary by her divine maternity belongs to the hypostatic
order, she is higher than all angels, and higher than all priests,
who have a priesthood participated from Christ. This maternity
divine is the foundation, the root, the fountainhead, of all her
other graces and privileges, which either precede her maternity as
dispositions, or accompany it, or follow it as consequences.
ARTICLE THREE: MARY'S SANCTITY
Mary's sanctity, considered negatively, includes the privileges of
the Immaculate Conception, and exemption from even the least
personal sin. Considered positively, it means the fullness of
grace.
1. St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception
Was St. Thomas in favor of granting to Mary the privilege of the
Immaculate Conception? Many theologians, including Dominicans
[852] and Jesuits, [853] say Yes. Many others say No. [854] We
hold, as solidly probable, the position that St. Thomas hesitated
on this question. This view, already proposed by many Thomists, is
defended by Mandonnet, [855] and by N. del Prado, E. Hugon, G.
Frietoff, and J. M. Voste. [856] This view we here briefly
expound.
At the beginning of his theological career [857] St. Thomas [858]
explicitly affirms this privilege: The Blessed Virgin, he says,
was immune, both from original sin and from actual sin. But then
he saw that many theologians understood this privilege in a sense
that withdrew the Virgin from redemption by Christ, contrary to
St. Paul's [859] principle that, just as all men are condemned by
the crime of one man (Adam): so all men are justified by the just
deed of one man (Christ, the second Adam): and that therefore,
just as there is but one God, so there is also only one mediator,
Christ, between God and men. Hence St. Thomas showed that Mary,
too, was redeemed by the merits of her Son, and this doctrine is
now part and parcel of the definition of the Immaculate
Conception. But that Mary might be redeemed, St. Thomas thought
that she must have the debt of guilt, [860] incurred by her carnal
descent from Adam. Hence, from this time on, he said that Mary was
not sanctified before her animation, leaving her body, conceived
in the ordinary way, to be the instrumental cause in transmitting
the debitum culpae. We must note that, in his view, [861]
conception, fecundation, precedes, by an interval of time, the
moment of animation, by which the person is constituted. The only
exception he allowed was for Christ, whose conception, virginal
and miraculous, was simultaneous with the moment of animation.
Hence, when we find St. Thomas repeating that the Blessed Virgin
Mary was conceived in original sin, we know that he is thinking of
the conception of her body, which precedes in time her animation.
At what exact moment, then, was Mary sanctified in her mother's
womb? To this question he gives no precise answer, except perhaps
at the end of his life, when he seems to return to his original
view, to a positive affirmation of Mary's Immaculate Conception.
Before this last period, he declares [862] that we do not know the
precise moment, but that it was soon after animation. Hence he
does not pronounce on the question whether the Virgin Mary was
sanctified at the very moment of her animation. St. Bonaventure
had posed that question and like many others had answered in the
negative. St. Thomas preferred to leave the question open and did
not answer it.
To maintain his original position in favor of the privilege, he
might have introduced the distinction, familiar in his works,
between priority of nature and priority of time. He might thus
have explained his phrase "soon after" (cito post) to mean that
the creation of Mary's soul preceded her sanctification only by a
priority of nature. But, as John of St. Thomas [863] remarks, he
was impressed by the reserved attitude of the Roman Church, which
did not celebrate the feast of Mary's Conception, by the silence
of Scripture, and by the negative position of a great number of
theologians. Hence he would not pronounce on this precise point.
Such, in substance, is the interpretation given by N. del Prado
and P. Hugon. [864] The latter notes further the insistence of St.
Thomas on the principle, recognized in the bull Ineffabilis Deus,
that Mary's sanctification is due to the future merits of her Son
as Redeemer of the human race. But did this redemption preserve
her from original sin, or did it remit that sin? On this question
St. Thomas did not pronounce.
In opposition to this interpretation two texts of the saint are
often cited. In the Summa [865] he says: The Blessed Virgin did
indeed incur original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before she
was born. Writing on the Sentences, [866] he says: The Virgin's
sanctification cannot properly be conceived either as preceding
the infusion of her soul, since she was not thus capable of
receiving grace, or as taking place at the very moment of the
soul's infusion, by a grace simultaneously infused to preserve her
from incurring original sin.
How do the theologians cited above explain these texts? They [867]
answer thus: If we recall the saint's original position, and the
peremptoriness of the principle that Mary was redeemed by Christ,
these two texts are to be understood rather as a debitum culpae
originalis than the actual incurring of the sin itself. Thus
animation would precede sanctification by a priority of nature
only, not of time.
Here we must remark, with Merkelbach, [868] that these opportune
distinctions were not yet formulated by St. Thomas. The saint
wrote "she incurred original sin, " and not "she should have
incurred it, " or "she would have incurred it, had she not been
preserved. " Further, the saint wrote: "We believe that the
Blessed Virgin Mary was sanctified soon after her conception and
the infusion of her soul. " [869] And he does not here distinguish
priority of nature from priority of time.
But we must add, with Voste, [870] that St. Thomas, at the end of
his life, seems to return to the original view, which he had
expressed as follows: [871] Mary was immune from all sin, original
and actual. Thus, in December 1272, he writes: [872] Neither in
Christ nor in Mary was there any stain. Again, on the verse [873]
which calls the sun God's tent, he writes: Christ put His tent, i.
e.: His body, in the sun, i. e.: in the Blessed Virgin who was
obscured by no sin and to whom it is said: [874] "Thou art all
beautiful, my friend, and in thee there is no stain. " In a third
text [875] he writes: Not only from actual sin was Mary free, but
she was by a special privilege cleansed from original sin. This
special privilege distinguishes her from Jeremias and John the
Baptist. A fourth text, [876] written in his last year of life,
[877] has the following words: Mary excels the angels in purity,
because she is not only in herself pure, but begets purity in
others. She was herself most pure, because she incurred no sin,
either original or actual, not even any venial sin. And he adds
that she incurred no penalty, and in particular, was immune from
corruption in the grave.
Now it is true that in that same context, some lines earlier, the
saint writes this sentence: The Blessed Virgin though conceived in
original sin, was not born in original sin. But, unless we are
willing to find in his supreme mind an open contradiction in one
and the same context, we must see in the word, "She was conceived
in original sin, " not original sin itself, which is in the soul,
but the debt of original sin which antecedently to animation was
in her body conceived by the ordinary road of generation. [878].
We conclude with Father Voste: [879] "Approaching the end of his
life here below, the Angelic Doctor gradually returned to his
first [880] affirmation: the Blessed Virgin was immune from all
sin, original and actual. ".
2. Mary's Fullness of Grace
The Blessed Virgin's fullness of grace made her of all creatures
the nearest to the Author of grace. Thus St. Thomas. [881] He adds
[882] that her initial fullness was such that it made her worthy
to be mother of Christ. As the divine maternity belongs, by its
terminus, to the hypostatic order, so Mary's initial grace
surpassed even the final grace of the angels and of all other
saints. In other words, God's love for the future Mother of God
was greater than His love for any other creature. Now, grace,
being an effect of God's love for us, is proportioned to the
greatness of that love. Hence it is probable, as weighty Thomists
[883] say, that Mary's initial fullness surpassed the final grace
of all saints and angels taken together, because she was already
then more loved by God than all the saints taken as one. Hence,
according to tradition, Mary's merits and prayer, could, even
without any angel or saint, obtain even here on earth more than
could all saints and angels without her. Further, this initial
plentitude of sanctifying grace was accompanied by a proportional
plentitude of infused virtues and of the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost.
With such initial fullness, could Mary still grow in grace? Most
assuredly. In her we have the perfect exemplification of the
principle which St. Thomas thus formulates: "Natural motion (in a
falling stone) is intensified by approaching its goal. In violent
motion (in a stone thrown upwards) we have the inverse. But grace
grows like nature. Hence those who are in grace grow in proportion
to their approach to their goal. " [884] Hence Mary's progress in
grace, ever more prompt toward God, grew ever more rapid in answer
to God's greater attraction.
But while Mary's grace thus grew greater until her death, there
were two moments when her grace was augmented sacramentally: [885]
the moment of the Incarnation, and that on Calvary when she was
declared the Mother of all men.
ARTICLE FOUR: MARY'S UNIVERSAL MEDIATION
From her divine maternity and her fullness of grace arises Mary's
function of universal mediatrix, a title given to her by
tradition, and now consecrated by a feast of the Church universal.
Two special reasons underlie this title. First, by satisfaction
and merit she cooperated with the sacrifice of the cross, and this
is her ascending mediation. Second, and this is her descending
mediation, by interceding she obtains and distributes all graces
which we receive.
How did she cooperate with the sacrifice of the cross? By giving
to God, with great pain and great love, the life of her adorable
Son, whom she loved more than her life. Could this act of hers
satisfy God in strict justice? No, only our Savior's act could do
that. Yet Mary's satisfaction was a claim, not of strict justice,
but of loving friendship, [886] which has given her the title of
co-redemptrix, in the sense that with, by, and in Christ she
redeemed the human race. [887].
Hence whatever Christ on the cross merited in strict justice, Mary
too merited by the claim of appropriateness, founded on her
friendship with God. This doctrine, now common, is sanctioned by
Pius X: [888] Mary merited by appropriateness (de congruo) what
Christ merited by justice (de condigno). Hence she is the chief
administratrix of all grace that God wills to grant.
What is the difference between meriting de condigno and meriting
de congruo? Merit in these two lines, says St. Thomas, [889] is
used analogically, merit de condigno meaning a claim founded on
justice, and merit de congruo meaning a claim founded on the
friendship of charity. But in Mary's case this merit means
congruousness in the strict sense [890] and hence is still merit
in the proper sense of the word, which presupposes the state of
grace. We do indeed speak of the prayers of a man in mortal sin as
meritorious, but the merit in this case, being founded, not on
divine friendship, but solely on God's mercy, is merit only in an
improper, metaphorical sense. Between merit de condigno (Christ's
merit) and merit proprie de congruo (Mary's merit) there is the
analogy of proper proportionality, and in each case merit in the
proper sense, whereas, in the third case, that of a sinner who
prays, there is merit only by metaphorical analogy.
Mary performs her function as universal mediatrix by intercession.
This doctrine expressed by the prayer commonly addressed to Mary
in the liturgy, [891] is founded on Scripture and tradition. But,
granting Mary's intercessory power, can we hold that she is also a
physical cause, an instrumental cause, and not merely moral cause,
of all graces we receive? Many Thomists say Yes. They reason thus:
If the humanity of Jesus is the physical instrumental cause of all
our graces, His Mother too should be an instrumental cause,
subordinated, of course, to Him who is her Son and her God. We do
not see that this position can be established with true certitude,
but the principles of St. Thomas on the role of Christ's humanity
incline us to accept it. What is certain is that Mary is the
spiritual Mother of all men, that, as coadjutrix in the Savior's
work of redemption, she merits the title "Mother of divine grace,
" and that therefore she pours out graces on all humanity.
Among the authors who have best developed this doctrine we may
signalize Blessed Grignion de Monfort. [892].
SIXTH PART: The Sacraments of the Church
With this sixth part we complete the dogmatic section of this
synthesis. We give, in six chapters, the principal Thomistic
theses on the sacraments.
1. The sacraments in general.
2. Transubstantiation.
3. The Sacrifice of the Mass.
4. Attrition and contrition.
5. The reviviscence of merits.
6. The treatise on the Church.
CHAPTER 38: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL
THE precision given by St. Thomas to sacramental doctrine is best
seen on three important points:
a) the efficacious causality of the sacraments.
b) their matter and form.
c) their raison d'etre.
The sacraments of the New Law are efficacious signs, which produce
grace of themselves (ex opere operato): by a causality that is
physical and instrumental. [893] In the sacraments, he says, [894]
there is an instrumental power which produces the sacramental
effect. Again: [895] The principal efficient cause of grace is God
Himself, who has, as conjoined instrument, [896] the humanity of
Christ, and, as separated instrument, [897] the sacrament itself.
These texts, in themselves and in their context, are entirely
clear, and all Thomists, Melchior Cano excepted, hold that the
sacraments are physical, instrumental causes of grace. The word
itself, "physical, " is not, it is true, in the text of St.
Thomas, but "instrumental" in his mind means real causality which
is distinct from the moral order.
St. Thomas applies to the sacraments analogically the theory of
matter and form, giving precision to the teaching of William of
Auxerre and Alexander of Hales. We see, in fact, an analogy, in
the order of signification, between sacramental words and form. As
form determines matter, so the sacramental words determine the
signification of the sacramental thing, for example, the baptismal
ablution. Thus absolution is the form of penance, which has as
matter the exterior acts of the penitent. As regards matrimony
(the question is subject to discussion) the consent of the two
parties contain both matter and form. [898] In this manner of
speaking, we have an analogy of proportionality which, though it
must not be forced but should remain supple and elastic, is still
a legitimate form of expression, founded on reality.
What is it that specifically distinguishes one sacrament from all
others? Its specific effect. Each sacrament is essentially related
to this effect. And Christ is the author of the sacrament by
manifesting His will for a sensible sign to produce a particular
and special effect. To be author He need not have Himself
determined matter and form.
Why are there seven sacraments? St. Thomas, to show the
appropriateness of this number, appeals to the analogy between
life natural and life supernatural. [899] In the order of natural
life, man must first receive life, then grow, then maintain life,
and, at need, be cured, and re-established. These same needs are
found in the supernatural order. To meet these needs, we have, in
order, the corresponding sacraments: baptism, confirmation, the
Eucharist, penance, and extreme unction. Then, in the social
order, man needs to be prepared, first for the propagation of the
race, to which corresponds the sacrament of matrimony, secondly,
for public office, to which corresponds the sacrament of orders.
The following chapters will emphasize the most important points of
the teaching of St. Thomas, especially on transubstantiation, on
the Sacrifice of the Mass, and the difference between attrition
and contrition.
CHAPTER 39: TRANSUBSTANTIATION
TRANSUBSTANTIATION [900] is the change of the whole substance of
bread into the body of Christ and of the whole substance of wine
into the blood of Christ. This truth is indispensable in
explaining the Real Presence. If the glorious and impassible body
of Christ does not cease to be in heaven, it cannot become present
under the species of the bread and the wine by an adductive action
which would make that body descend from heaven to each host
consecrated. Hence, if the body of Christ Himself is not subject
of the change, He cannot become really present except by the
change into Him of the substances of bread and wine. Briefly, if a
body becomes present there where before it was not, then, by the
principle of identity, this body must undergo a change of place,
or then another body must be changed into it. To illustrate. A
pillar, remaining immovable, which was at my right, cannot be at
my left unless I have changed in my relation to it. Again: If in a
house where there was no fire we now find a fire, that fire either
must have been brought there or produced there. [901].
By this change, then, of the substance of the bread into the body
of Christ, this body, itself remaining unchanged, becomes really
present under the accidents of the bread, because these accidents
lose the real and containing relation they had to the substance of
the bread and they acquire a new, real, and containing relation to
the body of Christ. This new real relation presupposes a real
foundation, which is transubstantiation.
This position granted, St. Thomas draws therefrom all other
Eucharistic truths, particularly in regard to the Real Presence,
and the Eucharistic accidents. He is faithful to the principle of
economy which tells us to explain facts without useless
multiplication of causes.
This doctrine of St. Thomas is not admitted by Scotus, who
explains the Real Presence by annihilation of the substance of the
bread and adduction of the substance of Christ's body. [902] Many
other theologians, [903] following him in part, speak of an
"adductive transubstantiation. " Speaking thus, they no longer
preserve the proper meaning of the words "conversion" and
"transubstantiation, " words used in conciliar decrees. To speak
of transubstantiation as adductive is to deny the conversion of
one substance into another, and to affirm the substitution of one
for the other.
Further, what is the meaning of "adduction, " if Christ's
impassible body remains in heaven? Christ's body, Thomists repeat
St. Thomas, does not become present by any change in itself,
local, quantitative, qualitative, or substantial. Hence the real
presence of that body has no other explanation than the
substantial change of the bread into that body.
But can we, with Suarez, say that transubstantiation is quasi-
reproductive of Christ's body? No, because that body is in heaven
as it was before, neither multiplied nor changed. It is
numerically the same glorified body which is in heaven and in the
Eucharist. Gonet and Billuart, who indulge somewhat in the
terminology of Suarez, nevertheless teach, like other Thomists,
that transubstantiation is a substantial change in the proper
sense of the word. "Thus it comes, " says the Catechism of the
Council of Trent, [904] "that the entire substance of the bread is
by divine power changed into the entire substance of Christ's body
without any mutation in our Lord. ".
Which view is verified in the sacramental formula: This is My
body? This formula most certainly expresses neither annihilation
nor adduction, whereas, by being causatively true, it does express
conversion of the entire substance of the bread into the substance
of Christ's body. Besides, annihilation does not include
adduction, nor the inverse. And the Council of Trent [905] speaks
not of two divine interventions, distinct and independent, but of
one intervention only, by which the entire substance of the bread
is changed into Christ's body, and the entire substance of the
wine is changed into Christ's blood. And this change, the Council
adds, is rightly called transubstantiation.
In what precisely does transubstantiation terminate? Cajetan,
[906] followed by Thomists generally, gives answer by this
formula: That which was bread is now Christ's body, not Christ's
body taken absolutely, as it existed before transubstantiation,
but Christ's body as terminus of this transubstantiated bread.
[907] More explicitly, transubstantiation terminates in this, that
what was the substance of bread is now the body of Christ.
Is transubstantiation an instantaneous process? Yes, one and the
same indivisible instant terminates the existence of the bread
[908] and initiates Christ's existence under the species of bread.
[909].
How is transubstantiation possible? St. Thomas [910] has recourse
to the Creator's immediate power over created being as being. If
God can produce the whole creation from nothing, He can also
change the entity of one thing into that of another. Whereas in a
substantial mutation there is a subject (prime matter) which
remains under the two successive forms, here in transubstantiation
there is no permanent subject, but the whole substance of bread,
matter and form, is changed into that of Christ's body. [911]
These formulas reappear in the Council of Trent. [912].
Let us note some consequences of this doctrine. Christ's body is
in the Eucharist, not as in a place but in the manner of
substance. [913] The quantity of Christ's body is also really
present in the Eucharist, but again, in the manner of substance,
that is, by its relation, not to place, but to its own substance,
since it is present, not by local adduction, but only by a change
exclusively substantial. Thus we see too that it is numerically
the same body which, without division or distance, is
simultaneously in heaven and in the Eucharist, because it is
present in the Eucharist illocally, in the manner of substance, in
an order superior to the order of space.
By this same line of reasoning St. Thomas [914] explains the
Eucharistic accidents, as existing without any subject of
inhesion. All other Eucharistic theses are simply corollaries from
his teaching on transubstantiation. The principle of economy could
not be better exemplified. We cannot say the same of the theories
which have been substituted for that of St. Thomas. They are
complicated, factitious, useless. They proceed by a quasi-
mechanical juxtaposition of arguments, instead of having an
organic unity, which presupposes as source one mother-idea. Here
again we see the wonderful power of the Thomistic synthesis.
CHAPTER 40: THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS [915]
WHAT is the essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass? This question
was posed in one manner in the time of St. Thomas, and in another
manner after the appearance of Protestantism. Yet in his very
first article the saint formulates the objection which will be
developed by Protestantism.
1. In the thirteenth century the question was generally posed in
these terms: Is Christ immolated in this sacrament? And the answer
commonly given is that of Peter Lombard, which is based on these
words of St. Augustine: [916] Christ was immolated once in
Himself, and yet He is daily immolated in the sacrament. The words
"in the sacrament" were explained as meaning: He is immolated
sacramentally, not, as on the cross, physically. Hence in the Mass
there is an immolation, not a physical immolation of Christ's
body, for that body is now glorified and impassible, but a
sacramental immolation. This language had been familiar to the
Church Fathers. [917] It is repeated by Peter Lombard, [918] and
by his commentators, notably by St. Bonaventure and St. Albert the
Great. [919] The explanation of St. Thomas [920] runs as follows:
In two ways this sacrament is the immolation of Christ. First
because, in the words of Augustine, [921] "we are accustomed to
name an image by the name of the thing of which it is the image. "
Now this sacrament, as said above, [922] is an image of the
passion of Christ, which was a true immolation..
Secondly by efficient causality, because this sacrament makes us
participators in the fruits of our Lord's passion.
On the nature of this sacramental immolation the saint [923]
speaks thus: As on the cross Christ's body and blood were
separated physically, thus, in the Mass, by the double
consecration, they are separated sacramentally. Thus, the
substance of the bread having been changed into Christ's body and
that of the wine into His blood, Christ is really present on the
altar in the state of death, His blood being shed, not physically,
but sacramentally, even while, by concomitance, His body is under
the species of wine and His blood under the species of bread.
2. When Protestantism denied that the Mass is a true sacrifice,
Catholic theologians, instead of asking, "Is Christ immolated in
this sacrament? " began to pose the question in this form: "Is the
Mass a true sacrifice, or only a memorial of the sacrifice on the
cross? ".
But we must note here that St. Thomas had anticipated the
Protestant objection. He [924] formulates it thus: Christ's
immolation was made on the cross, whereon He "delivered Himself as
offering and victim, an odor of sweetness unto God. " [925] But in
the mystery of the Mass, Christ is not crucified. Hence neither is
He immolated. To this objection he replies that, although we do
not have in the Mass the bloody immolation of the cross, we do
have, by Christ's real presence, a real immolation, commemorative
of that on the cross.
The objection itself, however, under various forms, is reasserted
as truth by Luther, by Calvin, by Zwingli. The last says: [926]
Christ was slain once only, and once only was His blood shed.
Hence He was offered in sacrifice only once.
Let us notice the assumption which underlies this argument. Any
true sacrifice includes essentially a physical immolation of the
victim, whereas, in the Mass, there can be no physical immolation
of His body which is now glorified and impassible. The Council of
Trent, [927] recalling the doctrine of the Fathers and of the
theologians of the thirteenth century, notably St. Thomas, answers
that the unbloody immolation, the sacramental immolation of the
Mass, is a true sacrifice.
Is real, physical immolation of the victim an essential element of
sacrifice? In a bloody sacrifice, yes. But there can be, and is in
the Mass, an unbloody sacramental immolation, which represents the
bloody immolation of the cross and gives its fruits to us. This
answer of St. Thomas [928] is repeated by the great Thomists. Thus
Cajetan [929] says: This unbloody mode, under the species of bread
and wine, re-presents, sacrificially, Christ who was offered on
the cross. Similarly, John of St. Thomas: [930] The essence of the
Eucharistic sacrifice consists in the consecration, taken, not
absolutely, but as sacramentally and mystically, separative of the
blood from the body. On the cross the sacrifice consisted in the
real and physical separation of Christ's blood from His body. The
action, therefore, which mystically and sacramentally separates
that blood is the same sacrifice as that on the cross, differing
therefrom only in its mode, which there was real and physical and
here is sacramental.
The Carmelites of Salamanca [931] teach the same doctrine. But
they add a modification which is not admitted by all Thomists,
viz.: Reception of the sacrament by the priest belongs to the
essence of this sacrifice. Many other Thomists hold that the
priest's Communion (which destroys, not Christ's body, but only
the Eucharistic species) belongs not to the essence, but only to
the integrity of the sacrifice. But whatever may be the truth on
this last point, the Salmanticenses hold that this double
consecration constitutes a true immolation, not physical, but
sacramental. Bossuet [932] has the same doctrine. And this thesis,
which seems to us the true expression of the thought of St.
Thomas, is reproduced, not only by the majority of living
Thomists, but also by other contemporary theologians. [933].
Some Thomists, [934] however, under the influence, it seems, of
Suarez, wish to find in the double consecration a physical
immolation. Then, since they must recognize that only the
substance of the bread and that of the wine undergo a real
physical change, and that these are not the thing offered in
sacrifice, they are led to admit, with Lessius, a virtual
immolation of Christ's body. This virtual immolation is thus
explained: In virtue of the words of consecration the body of
Christ would be really and physically separated from His blood,
did it not remain united by concomitance, from the fact that
Christ's body is now glorified and impassible. This innovation is
not a happy one, because this virtual immolation is not in fact
real and physical, it remains solely mystic and sacramental.
Besides, what it would virtually renew would be the act by which
Christ was put to death. But this act, says St. Thomas, [935] was
not a sacrifice, but a crime, which therefore is not to be
renewed, either physically or virtually.
The only immolation which we have in the Mass, therefore, is the
sacramental immolation, the sacramental separation, by the double
consecration, of His blood from His body, whereby His blood is
shed sacramentally.
But is this sacramental immolation sufficient to make the Mass a
true sacrifice? Yes, for two reasons: first because exterior
immolation, in sacrifice of any kind, is always in the order of
sign, [936] of signification: secondly because the Eucharist is
simultaneously sacrifice and sacrament.
First then, even where there is no physical immolation, we can
still have a true sacrifice, if we have an equivalent immolation,
above all if we have an immolation which is necessarily the sign,
the signification, the re-presentation of a bloody immolation of
the past. The reason is as we have said, that exterior immolation
is effective only so far as it is a sign, an expression of the
interior immolation, of the "contrite and humbled heart, " and
that without this interior immolation, the exterior is valueless,
is like the sacrifice of Cain, a mere shadow and show. The visible
sacrifice, says St. Augustine, [937] is the sacrament, the sacred
sign, of the invisible sacrifice.
Even in the bloody sacrifice, the exterior immolation is required,
not as physical death (this condition is required to make the
animal fit for eating) but as the sign of oblation, adoration,
contrition, without which the slaughter of the animal has no
religious meaning, no religious value.
This position granted, we see that the Mass is a true sacrifice,
without being bloody in its mode, even if the immolation is only
sacramental, in the order of a sign signifying something that is
now impossible, namely, the physical separation of Christ's blood
from His impassible body. Yet this sacramental immolation is the
sign, is essentially the memorial and re-presentative sign, of the
bloody immolation on Calvary, an effective sign, which makes us
sharers in the fruits of that bloody immolation, since the
Eucharist contains the Christ who has suffered. [938] Again, this
immolation in the Mass of the Word made flesh, though it is only
sacramental, is, as sign, as expression, of reparative adoration,
much more expressive than all the victims of the Old Testament.
St. Augustine and St. Thomas [939] demanded only this sacramental
immolation to make the Mass a true sacrifice.
A second reason for this doctrine, as we said above, lies in the
character of the Eucharist as being simultaneously sacrament and
sacrifice. Hence we are not surprised that the exterior immolation
involved should be, not physical, but sacramental.
But it does not follow that the Mass is a mere oblation. St.
Thomas [940] writes: We have a sacrifice in the proper sense only
when something is done to the thing offered to God, as when
animals were killed and burned, or bread was broken and eaten and
blessed. The very word gives us this meaning, because sacrificium
[941] is used of man doing something sacred. But the word
"oblation" is used directly of a thing which unchanged is offered
to God, as when money or loaves are laid unchanged on the altar,
Hence, though every sacrifice is an oblation, not every oblation
is a sacrifice.
In the Mass, then, we have, not a mere oblation, but a true
sacrifice, because the thing offered undergoes a change; the
double transubstantiation, namely, which is the necessary
prerequisite for the Real Presence and the indispensable
substratum of the sacramental immolation.
3. St. Thomas insists on another capital point of doctrine: The
principal priest who actually offers the Mass is Christ Himself,
of whom the celebrant is but the instrumental minister, a minister
who at the moment of consecration does not speak in his own name,
nor even precisely in the name of the Church, [942] but in the
name of the Savior "always living to intercede for us. " [943].
Let us hear some further texts of St. Thomas. This sacrament is so
elevated that it must be accomplished by Christ in person. [944]
And again: In the prayers of the Mass the priest indeed speaks in
the person of the Church, which is the Eucharistic unity; but in
the sacramental consecration he speaks in the person of Christ,
whom by the power of ordination he represents. [945] When he
baptizes, he says "I baptize thee": when he absolves, he says "I
absolve thee"; but when he consecrates, he says, not "I consecrate
this bread, " but, "This is My body. " [946] And when he says "Hoc
est corpus meum, " he does not say these words as mere historical
statement, but as efficient formula which produces what it
signifies, transubstantiation, namely, and the Real Presence. But
it is Christ Himself who, by the voice and ministry of the
celebrant, performs this substantiating consecration, which is
always valid, however personally unworthy the celebrant may be.
[947].
Is it then sufficient to say [948] that Christ offers each Mass,
not actually, but only virtually, by having instituted the
sacrifice and commanded its renewal to the end of the world? This
doctrine, from the Thomistic viewpoint, depreciates the role of
Christ. Christ Himself it is who offers actually each Mass. Even
if the priest, the instrumental minister, should be distracted and
have at the moment only a virtual intention, Christ, the one high
priest, the principal cause, wills actually, here and now, this
transubstantiating consecration. And further, Christ's humanity,
as conjoined to His divinity, is the physically instrumental cause
of the twofold transubstantiation. [949].
It is in this sense that Thomists, together with the great
majority of theologians, understand the following words of the
Council of Trent: "In the two sacrifices there is one and the same
victim, one and the same priest, who then on the cross offered
Himself, and who now, by the instrumentality of His priests,
offers Himself anew, the two sacrifices differing only in their
mode. " [950].
Substantially, then, the Sacrifice of the Mass does not differ
from the sacrifice of the cross, since in each we have, not only
the same victim, but also the same priest who does the actual
offering, though the mode of the immolation differs, one being
bloody and physical, the other non-bloody and sacramental. Hence
Christ's act of offering the Mass, while it is neither dolorous
nor meritorious (since He is no longer viator): is still an act of
reparative adoration, of intercession, of thanksgiving, is still
the ever-loving action of His heart, is still the soul of the
Sacrifice of the Mass. This view stands out clearly in the saint's
commentaries on St. Paul, [951] particularly in his insistence on
Christ's ever-living intercession. Christ also now, in heaven,
says Gonet, [952] prays in the true and proper sense (by
intercession): begging divine benefits for us. And His special act
of intercession is the act by which, as chief priest of each Mass,
He intercedes for us. Thus the interior oblation, always living in
Christ's heart, is the very soul of the Sacrifice of the Mass; it
arouses and binds to itself the interior oblation of the celebrant
and of the faithful united to the celebrant. Such is, beyond
doubt, the often repeated doctrine of St. Thomas and his school.
[953].
Each Mass, finally, has a value that is simply infinite. This
position is defended by the greatest Thomists against Durandus and
Scotus. [954] This value arises from the sublimity both of the
victim and of the chief priest, since, substantially, the
Sacrifice of the Mass is identified with that on the cross, though
the mode of immolation is no longer bloody but sacramental. The
unworthiness of the human minister, however great, cannot, says
the Council of Trent, reduce this infinite value. Hence one sole
Mass can be as profitable for ten thousand persons well disposed
as it would be for one, just as the sun can as easily give light
and warmth to ten thousand men as to one. Those who object 41 have
lost sight, both of the objective infinity which belongs to the
victim offered, and of the personal infinity which belongs to the
chief priest.
CHAPTER 41: ATTRITION AND CONTRITION [955]
CONTRITION in general, whether perfect or imperfect, is thus
defined by the Council of Trent: "Inward and dolorous detestation
of sin, with proposal not to sin again. " [956] Perfect contrition
proceeds from charity, whereas attrition, imperfect contrition,
exists in a soul which is still in the state of sin. Hence arises
a difficult problem: How can attrition be supernatural, and how is
it related to the love of God?
1. Two extremes are to be avoided: laxism and Jansenism. The
laxists maintained as probable the statement that attrition, if it
is naturally good, united with sacramental absolution, suffices
for justification. [957] The Jansenists, on the contrary, seeing
no medium between cupidity and charity, [958] said that the
attrition which is not accompanied by benevolent love toward God
is not supernatural. [959] In this view, attrition seems to
include an initial act of charity and hence, though it includes
the intention of receiving the sacrament of penance, nevertheless
justifies the penitent before he actually receives absolution.
We are, then, to show that attrition without charity is still
good, that it can be supernatural, and thus suffices for the
fruitful reception of sacramental absolution.
The Thomistic teaching on this point is expounded by Cajetan.
[960] He says [961] that attrition is a contritio informis, which,
by reason of an initial love of God, already detests sin as an
offense against God.
What qualities, then, must attrition have if absolution is to be
fruitful? Is the attrition inspired simply by fear of God's
judgments [962] sufficient? Or must it include also love of God,
and if so, what kind?
First, we must say against the laxists that the attrition which is
only naturally good, [963] but not supernatural, is not
sufficient, even when united with sacramental absolution, because
this act, remaining in the natural order, is neither itself a
salutary act nor even a disposition to supernatural justification.
Much less is it a meritorious act since merit presupposes the
state of grace. Further, it cannot include even the smallest act
of charity, since, if it did, it would justify the penitent even
before he receives absolution.
2. The difficulty lies in finding a middle ground between cupidity
and charity, to use Augustine's terms. Now there is no middle
ground between the state of mortal sin, the state of cupidity, the
unregulated love of self, and the state of grace which is
inseparable from charity. How, then, can we find in a person who
is in the state of mortal sin, an act which is not only naturally
good, ethically good, but also salutary, even though not
meritorious?
All theologians admit and the Church has defined that the state of
mortal sin does not prevent the sinner from having "uninformed"
acts of faith and hope, which acts are personally supernatural and
salutary, although not meritorious. Hence attrition also which
presupposes these acts of faith and hope, [964] may also be
salutary without being meritorious.
3. Must we go a step further? Must we admit that this salutary
attrition, which disposes us for sacramental justification,
implies also an initial benevolent love of God, which nevertheless
is not an act of charity, however small? The Thomists above cited
say Yes. That attrition which suffices as disposition for the
sacrament of penance, thus the Salmanticenses, [965] necessarily
implies some love for God, the fountain of justice. And the
Council of Trent, speaking of adults preparing for baptism, after
mentioning their acts of faith, fear, and hope, continues thus:
"They begin to love God as the source of all justice, and thus are
moved to hate and detest their sins. " [966] Now it is true that
the Council in another text [967] where it treats of the
difference between attrition and contrition, does not mention this
act of love for God as the author of all justice. The reason
probably is that the Council wishes to leave open a question
disputed among theologians, but does not in any way modify the
affirmation cited above. [968].
Further, the Thomists we have cited add the following theological
argument. Attrition, according to the Council, [969] contains
detestation of the sin committed. Now this detestation of sin, of
an offense against God, can simply not exist without an initial
benevolent love for God as the source of justice. Why not? Because
love is the very first of the acts of the will, and hence must
precede hate or detestation. A man can detest injustice only
because he loves justice, hence he can detest an injury done to
God only because he already loves God as the source of justice.
This argument is solid. Only he can detest a lie who already loves
truth. Only he can detest the evil of sin who loves the good
opposed to that evil.
This is surely the thought of St. Thomas, [970] when he says that
penance detests sin as an offense against God supremely lovable.
But, for justification, the sinner must have an act of true
penance. Hence attrition, in the mind of St. Thomas, must include
some initial love of benevolence for God as the author of all
justice.
But then, so runs an objection, this initial benevolent love must
be itself an imperfect act of charity, and hence would justify the
penitent before absolution. The Thomists cited reply thus: No,
this initial love of benevolence is not an act of charity, because
charity includes, not merely mutual benevolence between God and
man, but also a convictus a common life with God which exists only
by man's possession of sanctifying and habitual grace, the root of
infused charity. Charity, says St. Thomas, [971] is a friendship
which presupposes, not merely mutual benevolence, but a habitual
convictus, [972] a communion of life. Between two men who, living
far apart, know each other only by hearsay, there can exist a
reciprocal benevolence, but not as yet friendship. Now this common
life between God and man begins only when man receives that
participation in the divine life which we call habitual grace, the
root of charity, the seedcorn of glory. [973] But attrition, as
distinguished from contrition, does not give man the state of
grace.
Cajetan's description of attrition is based on a profound study of
St. Thomas. It runs thus: "In the line of contrition comes first
an imperfect contrition (not yet informed by charity) which is
displeasure against sin as the most hateful of things, together
with a proposal to avoid and shun sin as of all things most to be
shunned, the displeasure and the proposal arising from a love of
God as of all things the most lovable. " [974] This description
tallies with that initial love of benevolence for God which we
gave above from the Council of Trent. [975] God Himself, by actual
grace, leads us to attrition, to this initial love of Himself,
before He justifies us by sacramental absolution. Sin, as the best
Thomists have ever insisted, is not merely an evil of the soul,
but essentially and primarily an offense against God, and we
cannot detest this offense without an initial love of God as
source of all justice, without that initial love of benevolence
which is the previous disposition for that common life with God
which presupposes charity.
CHAPTER 42: THE REVIVISCENCE OF MERIT
We will dwell here on the chief difference between the doctrine of
St. Thomas and that of many modern theologians, inspired less by
him than by Suarez. On the fact of the reviviscence of merits,
there is no controversy, since the definitions of Trent [976]
imply this truth. The controversy is concerned with the manner and
mode of this reviviscence.
Suarez [977] maintains, and with him many modern theologians, that
all past merits revive in equal degree as soon as the penitent is
justified by absolution, even though his attrition is barely
sufficient to let the sacrament have its effect. If we represent
his merits, for example, by five talents of charity, then under
absolution, even if attrition is just sufficient, he recovers not
only the state of grace, but the same degree of grace, the five
talents which he had lost. The reason given by Suarez is that
these merits remain in God's sight and acceptance, and since their
effect, even as regards essential glory, is only impeded by the
presence of mortal sin, they must revive in the same degree as
soon as that impediment is removed.
St. Thomas, [978] and with him many ancient theologians, expresses
himself in fashion notably different. The principle which he often
invokes in his treatise on grace, and explains also elsewhere,
[979] runs thus: Grace is a perfection, and each perfection is
received in a manner more perfect or less according to the present
disposition of the subject. Hence in proportion to the intensity
of his disposition, attrition or contrition, the penitent receives
grace, and his merits revive, sometimes with a higher degree of
grace, as probably did St. Peter after his denial, sometimes with
an equal degree, and sometimes with a lower degree.
The question is important, and the answer must be sought in what
is true, not in what may seem to be more consoling. It is
particularly important in the spiritual life. If an advanced soul
commits a grave sin, it cannot again begin its ascent at the point
where it fell, unless it has a really fervent contrition which
brings back the same degree of grace as that which it lost, and
must otherwise recommence its climb at a point possibly much
lower. Such at least is the thought of many older theologians,
notably of St. Thomas. We will quote here a passage [980] which
seems to have been in some measure forgotten.
It is clear that forms which can be received in varying degrees
owe their actual degree, as we have said above, [981] to the
varying dispositions of the receiving subject. Hence the penitent
receives grace in a higher degree or in a lower degree,
proportionate to the intensity or to the remissness of his free
will against sin. Now this intensity of the will is sometimes
proportioned to a higher degree of grace than that from which he
fell by sin, sometimes to an equal degree of grace, and sometimes
to a lower degree. And what is thus true of grace is likewise true
of the virtues which follow grace.
This passage, let us note, is not merely a passing remark. It is
the very conclusion of the article. In that same question, a
little farther on, [982] he speaks thus: "He who rises in a lower
degree of charity will receive his essential reward according to
his actual measure of charity. But his accidental reward will be
greater from the works he did under his first measure of grace
than from those he does in his second and lower degree of grace.
".
Banez seems to understand these words in a sense too restricted,
which would exclude reviviscence in regard to the essential
reward. Billot [983] seems to exaggerate in the opposite
direction. Cajetan, in the following passage, keeps well to the
thought of St. Thomas. "When grace revives, all dead merits revive
too, but not always in the same quantity, in their power, that is,
to lead the man to a higher degree of glory as they would have
done had he not fallen. This is the case of a man who, having
risen from sin in a degree of grace lower than was his before his
fall, dies in that state. The reason for this lower degree of
reviviscence is the lower degree of disposition in him who rises.
" [984].
To this explanation of Cajetan, Suarez gives no answer. But the
Salmanticenses [985] and Billuart [986] explain St. Thomas well.
The latter writes as follows:
1. Merits do not always arise in that degree which they had
before, since they revive in proportion to the present
disposition.
2. Also as regards their quantity, merits revive according to the
present disposition. This does not mean, as Banez thinks, that the
same essential glory is now given to the penitent by a twofold
title, first by reason of his present disposition, secondly by
reason of his now revived merits. What it does mean is this: There
is conferred on the penitent, in addition to that degree of
essential glory which corresponds to his present disposition, a
sort of right to additional glory corresponding to his preceding
merits.
To conclude. Merits revive, even as regards their essential
reward, not always in a degree equal to what they formerly had,
but in proportion to the penitent's actual disposition. He who had
five talents and has lost them, can revive on a lower level, and
can die on that level, and hence will have a degree of glory
proportioned, not to the five talents, but to some lower degree of
charity, whereof God alone knows the proportion, as God alone can
measure the fervor of man's repentance.
CHAPTER 43: THE TREATISE ON THE CHURCH
THROUGHOUT the Summa we find the lineaments of a treatise on the
Church, a treatise which became an actuality against Protestant
errors. But this later mode of treatment, being predominantly
exterior and apologetic, led to a disregard for the theological
treatment, properly so called, of the inner constitution of the
Church. Such a treatise has its normal place after the treatise on
Christ the Redeemer and His sacraments. [987] Here lies the road
pointed out by St. Thomas.
In his treatise on Christ's grace of headship [988] he calls the
Church the mystical body, which includes all men in the measure of
their participation in the grace that comes from their Savior.
[989].
In his treatise on faith [990] he finds in the Church a doctrinal
authority that is plenary and infallible, extending even, as in
canonizing her saints, not merely to dogmatic truths, but also to
dogmatic facts. The pope has this power in its fullness, and can
even, against heretics, define the exact meaning of the articles
of faith.
He compares the relation between Church and state to that between
soul and body. [991] The Church has power to annul the authority
of unbelieving or apostate princes, a power extending to
excommunication. [992] This normal pre-eminence of the Church
derives from her superior goal, in virtue of which princes
themselves are bound to obey the sovereign pontiff as vicar of
Jesus Christ.
In the fifteenth century the disciples of St. Thomas clung closely
to the saint's formulas. Special distinction here belongs to
Torquemada, [993] whose work is a careful study of the notes of
the Church, of the union in the mystical body between head and
members, of the Church's indirect power in matters temporal.
[994].
CHAPTER 44: THE SOUL'S IMMUTABILITY AFTER DEATH
WHY does death make the soul immutable, either in good or in evil?
The most explicit answer is found in the Summa contra Gentiles.
[995].
Our will for a definite last end depends on our will's
disposition; as long as this disposition lasts, the desire of this
end cannot change, since it changes only by the desire of
something more desirable as last end.
Now the soul's disposition is variable during its union with the
body, but not after separation from the body. Why? Because changes
in the body bring corresponding changes in the soul's disposition,
since the body has been given to the soul as instrument of the
soul's operations. But the soul, separated from the body, is no
longer in motion toward its end, but rests in the end attained
(unless it has departed in a state of failure toward this end).
Hence the will of the separated soul is immutable in the desire of
its last end, on which desire depends all the will's goodness, or
then all its malice. It is immutable, either in good or in evil,
and cannot pass from one to the other, though in this fixed order,
immutable as regards the last end, it can still choose between
means. [996].
In this line of reasoning we see again the force of the doctrine
on the soul as form of the body. Since the body is united to the
soul, not accidentally, but naturally, to aid the soul in tending
to its goal, it follows that the soul, separated from the body, is
no longer in a state of tendency to its good.
Cajetan proposes on this subject an opinion which seems to
disregard the distance that separates the angel from the human
soul. Having said that the angel's choice of a good or evil end is
irrevocable, he adds these words: "As to the soul, I hold that it
is rendered obstinate by the first act which it elicits in its
state of separation and that its final act of demerit occurs, not
when it is in via, but when it is in termino. " [997].
Thomists in general reject this view. Thus Sylvester de Ferrara,
who says:
The soul in the first moment of its separation has indeed
immutable apprehension, and in that first moment begins its state
of obstinacy. But it does not, as some say, have in that moment a
demeritorious act, because human demerit like human merit
presupposes man. Now the separated soul is not a man, not even in
its first moment of separation. Rather, that moment is the first
moment of its non-existence as man. Therefore its obstinacy is
caused, inchoatively, by its last mutable apprehension of its last
end before death, but irrevocably by that apprehension which
becomes immutable in its first moment of separation. [998].
The Salmanticenses [999] pronounce thus on Cajetan's opinion,
saying: "This mode of speaking does not agree with Scripture,
which states expressly that men can merit or demerit before death,
but not after death. 'We must work while it is day: the night
cometh when no man can work. ' " [1000].
Cajetan conceived the matter too abstractly. He saw correctly that
man's road to God is terminated by the moment when that road
closes. [1001] But he did not notice that merit belongs to the man
who is on the road, not to the separated soul. The last merit, or
demerit, so St. Thomas and nearly all his commentators, is an act
of the soul still in union with the body, and this act of the
united soul becomes immutable by the soul's separation from the
body.
Hence it is wrong to say: The condemned soul, seeing its misery,
can still repent. Of such a soul, as of the fallen angel, we must
rather say: The pride wherein it is immovably fixed closes the
road of humility and obedience whereby alone it could repent.
Could a soul repent after final impenitence, it would no longer be
condemned.
The contrary immutability, that of those who die in the state of
grace, the immutability of their free choice of the Supreme Good,
supremely loved, is a wonderful echo of the immutability of God's
own freedom of choice. God, knowing beforehand all that he has
either willed or permitted to come to pass in time, can have no
reason to change. Thus, when the separated soul of one of the
elect receives the beatific vision, it loves God seen face to face
with a love beyond its freedom, a love that is indeed spontaneous,
but necessary and inamissible. [1002].
We have here, then, in the grace of a good death, a new view of
the grand mystery, namely, the mystery of the inner harmony
between infinite mercy, infinite justice, and sovereign freedom, a
harmony realized in the pre-eminence of the deity, but obscure to
us as long as we have not been raised to the beatific vision.
SEVENTH PART: Moral Theology and Spirituality
The Prima secundae is a general treatise on morality, under the
following headings:
1. Man's ultimate purpose and goal,
2. Human voluntary acts,
3. Passions and habits,
4. Virtues, gifts, and vices,
5. Law, by which God guides us,
6. Grace, by which God aids us.
The Secunda secundae is a detailed treatment, first on each of the
virtues, theological and cardinal, then on the active and
contemplative life, lastly on the state of perfection, episcopal
and religious.
Everywhere throughout these treatises we find the formulas of a
solid spiritual life supported by theological foundations. These
principles appear chiefly, in the Prima secundae, under grace,
virtues, and gifts, in the Secunda secundae, under the theological
virtues, then under prudence, justice, humility, and their
corresponding gifts. Here we can but underline the essentials.
CHAPTER 45: MAN'S ULTIMATE PURPOSE AND GOAL [1003]
In treating man's last end St. Thomas draws inspiration from St.
Augustine, from Aristotle, and from Boethius. [1004].
First of all [1005] man, with a rational nature, must know what he
is working for, that is, must know purpose as purpose, as
something which he thinks will satisfy his desire, something
wherein he can find rest. Without an ultimate purpose, known at
least vaguely, man would never undertake anything. As, in a series
of efficient causes, there must be a first cause, so in a series
of final causes, of things which attract, there must be an
ultimate cause which attracts for its own sake. This ultimate
purpose, reached last in the order of execution, is first in the
order of attention, is the motivating center of all else. In
illustration, it is to each man what defense of his country is to
the commander-in-chief. Thus all men desire some ultimate goal
which they think will give them complete satisfaction and
happiness, even though many do not realize that genuine happiness,
the ultimate goal, is to be found in God alone, the Sovereign
Good.
In the second question St. Thomas shows that no created values,
neither riches nor honors nor glory nor power, neither bodily
advantage nor pleasure, not even knowledge or virtue, can give man
ultimate contentment, because the object of man's will is good as
such, unlimited and universal good, just as unlimited truth is the
object of man's intelligence. The will can find lasting repose
only in the possession of what is in every way good, universally
good. But this universal good can be found, not in creatures,
since they, all and singly, are but limited participations in
good, but only in God. Note that the object to which our will is
proportioned is not this or that particular good, subjective or
objective, but universal good, unlimited good, as known, not by
sense and imagination, but by the intellect, by man's higher
intelligence.
Here lies another proof of God's existence. [1006] This proof
rests on the following principle: a natural desire, founded, not
on imagination nor on error, but on the universal amplitude of
man's will, cannot be vain or chimerical. Now while each man has
this natural desire of complete happiness, both reason and
experience show that this desire cannot be satisfied by any
limited and finite good, because, since our intelligence knows
good as universal and unlimited, the natural amplitude, the
embracing capacity of our will, illumined by our intelligence, T
is itself universal and unlimited.
Further, this desire is not conditional and inefficacious, as is
the desire of the beatific vision, which is founded on this
conditional judgment: this vision would be for me perfect
happiness, if it were possible that I should be raised to it and
if God would raise me to it. But the desire now in question is
natural and innate, since it is founded on a judgment not
conditional but absolute, arising without medium from the
naturally unlimited amplitude of man's will for good. Now since a
natural desire presupposes a naturally desirable good, the object
of man's desire must be as unlimited as that desire itself. Hence
there exists an unlimited good, goodness itself, wherein alone is
found that universal good to which our will is proportioned. And
this unlimited good can be known naturally, in the mirror of
created goodness.
Hence to deny the existence of God is to deny the universal
amplitude of our will, is to deny that will's boundless depth,
which no limited good can fill. This denial is a radical
absurdity, is absolute nonsense. We have here an absolute
impossibility, inscribed in the very nature of our will, whose
natural desire tends, not to the mere idea of good, but to a real
and objective good, because good is not a mental image but
objective reality.
We must note, however, that the specific object of the will must
be distinguished from what is simply man's last end. The will's
specific object is not God, the Sovereign Good, as He is in
Himself, which is the specific object of infused charity. The
naturally specific object of man's will is good taken universally,
as known by man's natural intelligence, an object which is found
participatedly and limitedly in everything that is in any way
good, but which as good, simultaneously real and universal, is
found in God alone. God alone is universal good itself, not indeed
in the order of predication, but in the order of being and
causing. Thus Cajetan, commenting on Aristotle's word: "While
truth is formally in the mind, goodness in the objective thing. "
[1007] Hence we pass legitimately, by the objective realism of the
will, from what is universal as predicate to what is universal in
being.
Had man been created in a state purely natural, without grace, he
would have found natural happiness in the natural knowledge and
love of God, the author of nature. Now our intelligence, far
surpassing sense and imagination, is by nature meant to know even
the supreme truth, as mirrored in the world of creation. For the
same reason, our will, meant by nature to love and will what is
good, tends naturally to love also the supreme good, as far at
least as that good is naturally knowable. [1008].
But revelation, passing beyond nature, tells us that God has
called us to a happiness essentially supernatural, to see Him
without medium and to love Him with a love that is supernatural,
perfect, and indefective. The essence of that supreme beatitude
lies in the act of vision, the act of seeing God without medium,
for by that act we take possession of God. But love, in the form
of desire, precedes that act, and, in the form of joy, follows
that act. Hence love of God, though it is not the essence of
beatitude, is both the necessary presupposition and the equally
necessary consequence of that beatific vision of God. [1009]
Beatitude, therefore, constituted essentially by vision, brings
with it, as necessary complement, love and joy in the supreme
good, in a glorified body, and in the company of the saints.
[1010].
CHAPTER 46: HUMAN ACTS [1011]
ARTICLE ONE: PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN ACTS [1012]
HUMAN acts are the acts of the will directed by reason. They are
either elicited, that is, produced by the will itself, or
commanded, that is, produced by some other faculty under the
influence of the will. Elicited acts are concerned either with the
end or with the means.
Three acts are concerned with the end:
a) simple velleity, [1013] not yet efficacious.
b) efficacious intention of the end; [1014].
c) joy in the end attained. [1015].
Two acts are concerned with means:
a) consent, [1016] which accepts means.
b) choice of a determined set of means. [1017].
Each of these five acts of the will is preceded by a directive act
of-the intellect. Simple velleity, by the knowledge of the good in
question; [1018] intention, by a judgment that this end should be
attained; [1019] consent, by counsel; [1020] choice, by the last
practical judgment which terminates deliberation. [1021].
After voluntary choice there follows, in the intellect, the act
called imperium, which directs the execution of the means chosen,
ascending from lower means to those higher and nearer to the end
to be obtained, in order inverse to that of intention, which
descends from the desired end to the means which come first in
execution. [1022].
After the intellect's imperium there follows in the will the act
called active use, which sets the other faculties to work. These
acts of the other faculties, called passive use, are, properly
speaking, commanded acts of the will. And the will's last act is
that of joy in the possession of the end obtained. The end, which
was first in the order of intention, is the last in the order of
execution. [1023].
The next question is that of morality, which is studied in
general, [1024] in the interior act, [1025] in the exterior act,
[1026] and in its consequences. [1027].
The morality of a human act derives primarily from its specific
object, secondarily from its end and circumstances. [1028] Thus an
act may have a double goodness or a double malice. An act, good in
its object, can be bad by its end, almsgiving, for example, done
for vainglory. Hence, although there are acts which in their
object are indifferent, as for example, walking, there is
nevertheless no deliberate concrete act which is indifferent in
its end, because, unless it is done at least virtually for a good
end, it is morally bad. [1029] All the good acts of a just man,
therefore, are supernaturally meritorious, by reason of their
relation to the last end, which is God.
By the term "interior act" St. Thomas often means an act which
does not arise from a previous act, the first act, for example, of
willing an end. By opposition, then, "exterior act" often means
not only the act of the corporeal members, but also an act of the
will itself, if this act arises from a preceding act, as when, for
example, we will the means because we already will the end.
Here we must remark, further, that a human act, voluntary and
free, is not necessarily preceded, if we speak precisely, by a
discursive deliberation, but may be the fruit of a special
inspiration, superior to human deliberation. But, even here, the
act is free and meritorious, because the will consents to follow
the inspiration. Here lies the difference between the virtue of
prudence, which presupposes discursive deliberation, and the gifts
which make man prompt and docile to the inspirations of the Holy
Ghost. These latter acts, free but not in the proper sense
deliberate, are the fruit, as we shall see later, not of
cooperating grace, but of operating grace. [1030].
ARTICLE TWO: CONSCIENCE AND PROBABILISM
Probabilism is a question which has been often discussed since the
sixteenth century. Solution of the question depends on the
definition of opinion.
"Opinion, " says St. Thomas, "is an act of the intellect which
inclines to one part of a contradiction with the fear that the
other part is true. " [1031] Hence, to have a reasonable opinion,
the inclination to adhere to it must outweigh the fear of error.
Hence, if Yes is certainly more probable, No is probably not true,
but rather probably false, and therefore, as long as Yes seems
more probable, it would be unreasonable to follow No. In other
words, against an opinion probable enough to obtain the consent of
wise men, there can be only an improbable opinion, which we should
not follow.
This position is in accord with the teaching of St. Thomas [1032]
on prudential certitude, which rests on conformity with right
desire. Where we cannot find the truth with evidence, we should
follow that opinion which is nearest the truth, i. e.: is most in
harmony with the inclination of virtue. The virtuous man judges by
his inclinations to virtue, not by the inclination to egoism.
Bartholomew de Medina [1033] proposed a theory quite different
from that just now outlined. It does not seem, he says, that it is
wrong to follow a probable opinion, even when the opposed opinion
is more probable. But, in order to close the door against laxism,
he adds: An opinion does not become probable by the mere support
of apparent reasons and the fact that some maintain it, otherwise
all errors would be probable. An opinion is genuinely probable
only when it is supported by wise men and confirmed by excellent
arguments.
But the position of Medina, even thus safeguarded, is not the less
open to criticism, because he gives to the word "probable" a moral
meaning which is not in harmony with its philosophical meaning,
contained in the definition of opinion as given by St. Thomas.
Medina's theory amounts to saying that, with sufficient
justification, we may uphold both Yes and No on one and the same
object of the moral order.
Nevertheless Medina succeeded in persuading others of the utility
of his theories, and was followed by a certain number of Spanish
Dominicans: Louis Lopez, Dominic Banez, Diego Alvarez, Bartholomew
and Peter of Ledesma. The Jesuits, too, in general adopted this
theory, which became more and more known by the name of
probabilism.
But the descent was slippery. "The facility, " says Mandonnet,
[1034] "with which all opinions became probable since their
contradictories were probable did not delay in leading to great
abuses. Then, in 1656, the Provincial Letters of Pascal threw into
the public arena a controversy confined until then to the schools.
Faced with a great scandal, Alexander VII in that same year
intimated to the Dominican general chapter his will that the order
campaign efficaciously against the probabilist doctrines. " From
that time on probabilist writers disappeared completely among the
Friars Preachers. [1035].
In 1911, a posthumous work of P. R. Beaudouin, O. P. [1036]
proposed an interesting conciliation between the principles of St.
Thomas and the teaching of St. Alphonsus Liguori, namely,
equiprobabilism, considered as a form of probabilism. In matters
where probability is permitted, St. Alphonsus, in fact, invokes
"the principle of possession" in order to pronounce between two
opinions equally probable. This principle seems to have priority
in the system of St. Alphonsus over a second principle that
"doubtful laws do not bind. " Now this principle of possession is
itself derived from a more general reflex principle which has
always been admitted, namely, that in doubt we are to stand by the
view which is presumably true. [1037].
From that time forward, Father Gardeil, following Father
Beaudouin, insisted [1038] on the philosophical sense of the word
"probable, " so well explained by St. Thomas, from which it
follows that, when Yes is certainly more probable, then No is
probably not true, but probably false. In other words, when Yes is
certainly more probable, then the reasonable inclination to accept
that Yes prevails over the fear of error, whereas, if, knowing
this, we maintain the No, the fear of error would outbalance the
inclination to deny. To repeat: When affirmation is certainly more
probable, negation is not probable, that is, is not probably true,
but rather probably false.
St. Thomas, it is true, does cite at times other reflex
principles, useful in forming conscience, for example, that in
doubt we are to stand by the view which is presumably true. But if
he seldom dwells on these reflex principles, it is because he
holds that prudential certitude [1039] is found in that view which
is nearest to evident truth, and most in conformity, not with
egoism, but with the inclination to virtue.
ARTICLE THREE: THE PASSIONS
The passions are acts of the sense appetite, hence are common to
man and animal. But they participate in man's moral life, either
by being ruled, or even aroused, by right reason, or by not being
ruled as they should.
Hence man's will should reduce these passions to the happy medium
where they become instruments of virtue. Thus hope and audacity
become instruments of courage; sense-pity subserves mercy; and
bashfulness subserves chastity. Here again St. Thomas rises above
two opposed extremes: over Stoicism, which condemns passion, and
over Epicureanism, which glorifies passion. God gave us sense
appetite, as He gave us imagination, as He gave us two arms, all
to be employed in the service of true manhood, virtue, moral good.
Passions, then, well employed, become important moral forces.
Antecedent passion, as it is called, since it precedes judgment,
does, it is true, becloud reason, in the fanatic, for example, and
in the sectary. But consequent passion, since it follows reason
clarified by faith, augments merit and strengthens the will.
[1040] But if left unruled, undisciplined, passions become vices.
Thus sense-love becomes gluttony or lust, audacity becomes
temerity, fear becomes cowardice or pusillanimity. In the service
of perversity passion augments the malice of the act.
In classifying the passions, St. Thomas follows Aristotle. Six
passions, in three pairs, hate and love, desire and aversion, joy
and sadness, belong to the concupiscible appetite. To the
irascible appetite belong five passions, two pairs, hope and
despair, audacity and fear, and one single passion, anger (ira,
which gives its name "irascible" to the whole series). First among
all these passions, on which all others depend, is love From love
proceed desire, hope, audacity, joy, and also their contraries,
hate, aversion, despair, fear, anger, and sadness.
St. Thomas scrutinizes in detail each of the eleven passions. The
result is a model, too little known, of psychological analysis.
Deserving of special study is his treatise on love, its causes,
its effects. [1041] Here he formulates general principles which he
later applies, analogically, in his study of charity, that is, the
supernatural love of benevolence, just as his doctrine on the
passion of hope is later applied analogically in his study of the
infused virtue of hope.
CHAPTER 47: VIRTUES AND VICES
AFTER the time of St. Thomas moral theology often followed the
order of the Decalogue, of which many precepts are negative. The
saint himself follows the order of the virtues, theological and
moral, showing their subordination and interconnection. These
virtues he sees as functions of one and the same spiritual
organism, functions supported by the seven gifts which are
inseparable from charity. Thus moral theology is primarily a
science of virtues to be practiced, and only secondarily of vices
to be shunned. It is something much higher than casuistry, which
is mere application to cases of conscience.
Thus charity, which animates and informs all the other virtues and
renders their exercise meritorious, appears very clearly as the
highest of all virtues, and the most universal of all virtues, in
the exercise of which every Christian reaches perfection. [1042]
Thus moral theology is identified with the spiritual life, with
the love of God and docility to the Holy Spirit. Thus asceticism,
which teaches the method of practicing virtue and shunning sin, is
subordinated to mysticism, which teaches docility to the Holy
Spirit, infused contemplation of the mysteries, and intimate union
with God. And the exercise of the gifts, particularly of wisdom
and knowledge, which make faith penetrating and savory, is a
normal element in all Christian life, quite distinct from
extraordinary favors, such as visions and stigmatizations.
ARTICLE ONE: HABITS [1043]
Habits, moral habits, are operative qualities, that is, principles
of activity, either acquired or infused, distinct from sanctifying
grace, which is an entitative habit, infused into the very essence
of the soul, whereas operative habits are received into the
faculties of the soul. This description applies to good habits, to
which are opposed bad habits or vices.
St. Thomas studies habit, in its nature, its subject, and its
cause. To distinguish one habit from all others, his dominating
principle is that each habit is specifically proportioned to its
object, [1044] each under its own special viewpoint. [1045] This
principle is of capital importance, illumining as it does all
questions that follow: on the theological virtues, on the moral
virtues, on the gifts of the Spirit. [1046] Here we give a brief
summary of this Thomistic doctrine. [1047].
1. Habits can be considered as forms which we receive passively.
Then they are specifically distinguished by the active principle
which produces them. Thus infused habits come from God as
participations in His own inner life; acquired habits arise either
from the demonstrative principles which engender them (scientific
habits): or from repeated virtuous acts regulated by reason (moral
habits).
2. Habits considered formally as habits are divided by their
relation, favorable or unfavorable, to the nature in which they
reside. Thus, whereas infused habits are always favorable to
grace, acquired habits may be either favorable to human nature,
and are then called virtues, or unfavorable, in which case we call
them vices.
3. Lastly, habits may be considered in relation to their mode of
operation, and are then distinguished by their formal object,
infused habits by an object essentially supernatural, acquired
habits by an object naturally attainable. "Habits, " says St.
Thomas, "considered as operative dispositions, are specifically
distinguished by objects specifically different. ".
Some theologians, under the influence of Scotism and Nominalism,
say that infused virtues may be specifically distinct from
acquired virtues by their active principles, even while they have
the same formal object. In this view, the formal object of the
infused virtues, even of the theological virtues, would be
attainable by the natural forces of our faculties, supposing that
divine revelation be proposed to us exteriorly in the pages of the
Gospel, and be confirmed by miracles which are naturally knowable.
Thomists, and also Suarez, forcefully reject this interpretation,
saying that it approaches Semi-Pelagianism by compromising the
essentially supernatural character of all infused virtues,
including the theological virtues. If without infused faith the
formal object of faith can still be attained, faith itself either
becomes useless, or is at best useful only as a means to make the
act of faith more easy (Pelagianism): or at least presupposes its
beginning [1048] as coming from our nature without the support of
grace (Semi-Pelagianism). If faith's formal object is attainable
by the natural force of our intelligence, aided by natural good
will, after reading the Gospel confirmed by miracles, then Paul
would be wrong in calling faith "a gift of God. " Why should
infused faith be necessary for salvation, if acquired faith
suffices to attain the revealed mysteries?
Hence the commentators insist that the three distinguishing
viewpoints outlined above are inseparably connected. A virtue,
then, is not infused virtue unless these three qualities are found
in it simultaneously:
1. it is producible by God alone.
2. it is conformed to grace, our participation in the divine
nature.
3. it has an object essentially supernatural, inaccessible to our
natural faculties.
To disregard this third point is to approach Nominalism, which
considers concrete facts, not the inner nature of things.
ARTICLE TWO: CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES
Some virtues are intellectual, some are moral, some are
theological. The intellectual virtues [1049] are five: three in
the speculative order, namely, first principles, science, and
wisdom, and two in the practical order, prudence [1050] and art.
[1051].
Moral virtues are perfections, either of the will or of the sense
appetite. In dividing them St. Thomas is guided by the ancient
moralists, Aristotle, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine. All moral
virtues are reduced to the four cardinal virtues: [1052] prudence,
justice, fortitude, temperance. Prudence, though it is an
intellectual virtue, is likewise a moral virtue, because it guides
both the will and the sense appetite in finding the right means in
attaining an end. Justice inclines the will to give everyone his
due. Fortitude strengthens the irascible appetite against
unreasonable fear. Temperance rules the concupiscible appetite.
The theological virtues [1053] elevate our higher faculties,
intellect and will, proportioning them to our supernatural end,
that is, to God's own inner life. [1054] Faith makes us adhere
supernaturally to what God has revealed. Hope, resting on His
grace, tends to possess Him. Charity makes us love Him, more than
ourselves, more than all else, because His infinite goodness is in
itself lovable, and because He, both as Creator and as Father,
loved us first. The theological virtues, therefore, are
essentially supernatural and infused, by reason of their formal
objects, which without them are simply inaccessible.
By this same rule St. Thomas distinguishes the infused moral
virtues from acquired moral virtues. [1055] This distinction, of
capital importance yet too little known, must be emphasized. The
acquired moral virtues do indeed incline us to what is in itself
good, not merely to what is useful or delectable. They make man
perfect as man. But they do not suffice to make man a God's child,
who, guided by faith and Christian prudence, is to employ
supernatural means for a supernatural end. Thus infused
temperance, say, is specifically distinct from acquired
temperance, as, to illustrate, a higher note on the key board is
specifically distinct from the same note on a lower octave. Thus
we distinguish Christian temperance from philosophic temperance,
and evangelical poverty from the philosophic poverty of Crates.
Acquired temperance, to continue with St. Thomas, [1056] differs
from infused temperance in rule, object, and end. It observes the
just medium in nourishment, so as not to harm health or
occupation. Infused temperance observes a higher medium, so as to
live like a child of God on his march to a life that is eternal
and supernatural. It implies a more severe mortification, which
chastises the body and reduces it to subjection, [1057] not merely
to become a good citizen here below but rather a fellow citizen of
the saints, a child in the family of God. [1058].
This same difference between infused and acquired is found
likewise in prudence, justice, and fortitude. Yet we must note
that acquired virtue facilitates the exercise of infused virtue,
as, to illustrate, finger exercises facilitate the musician's art
which resides in the musician's intellect.
As the acquired virtues in the will and sense appetite, justice,
namely, and fortitude, and temperance, are inseparable from
prudence, so the infused virtues are inseparable from charity.
Faith and hope can indeed continue to exist without charity, but
they no longer exist in a state of virtue, [1059] and their acts
are no longer meritorious. And whereas all moral virtues, infused
or acquired, must preserve a medium between excess and defect, the
theological virtues have no medium properly speaking, because we
can neither believe too much in God, nor hope too much in Him, nor
love Him too much. [1060].
ARTICLE THREE: THE GIFTS
This entire supernatural organism, all the virtues, moral and
theological, spring from sanctifying grace, as the faculties of
the soul spring from the soul. And this supernatural organism has
its complement in the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. These gifts,
too, must be classed as habits, infused habits, which dispose us
to receive with docility and promptitude the inspirations of the
Holy Ghost, as, to illustrate, the sails dispose the ship to
receive impulse from the wind. [1061] Charity, which is "poured
out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who has been given to US, "
[1062] is the inseparable source of these gifts, which, with
charity, grow all together and simultaneously, like the five
fingers of the hand. [1063].
ARTICLE FOUR: THE VICES
Vices are habits that turn us from God and incline us to evil.
[1064] They have four sources: ignorance, more or less voluntary;
passions, if unruled; pure malice, evidently more grave; the
demon, who acts on the sense faculties to suggest evil. God can
never be the cause of sin or moral disorder, though He is the
first cause of the physical entity of the act which is morally
sinful, [1065] and though, by the deserved withdrawal of grace, He
allows the sinner to be blinded and hardened.
From selfishness, the unregulated love of self, from what St. John
called "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and
pride of life, " come the seven capital sins, enumerated by St.
Gregory in this order; vainglory, envy, wrath, avarice, sloth,
gluttony, and lust. [1066] From these capital sins arise others,
often more grave, hatred of God, for example, and despair, because
man does not all at once reach complete perversity.
ARTICLE FIVE: SIN
Sin is a deed, a word, a desire, against the eternal law.
Admitting this definition of sin by St. Augustine, St. Thomas
studies sin, not only in its causes, but in itself as act. As to
be expected, he distinguishes sins specifically by their objects,
[1067] whereas Scotus distinguishes them rather by their
opposition to virtues, and Vasquez by their opposition to
precepts.
What distinguishes mortal sin from venial sin? The answer of St
Thomas is profound. The idea of sin, he says, [1068] as applied to
mortal and venial, IS not a univocal notion, is not a genus
divided into species, but is found analogically in both. Mortal
sin is a turning away from our last end, is simply against the
law, and is in itself irreparable, whereas venial sin is not a
turning away from our last end, but a disorder in the use of
means, and is rather beside the law than against it, halting us on
our road to God. It is therefore reparable.
Mortal sin [1069] deprives the soul of sanctifying grace, reduces
our natural inclination to virtue, and deserves eternal
punishment, because without repentance it lasts forever as
habitual sin, and hence draws on a punishment which also lasts
forever. Yet not all mortal sins are equal in malice, the worst
being sins directly against God: apostasy, despair, hatred of God.
Venial sin tarnishes that brightness given to the soul by acts of
virtue, but not that of sanctifying grace. [1070] But it can lead
imperceptibly to mortal sin [1071] and merits temporal punishment.
[1072] A feeble act of virtue contains an imperfection, which is
not, like venial sin, a privation, but only a negation of
desirable perfection, a lack of promptitude in the service of God.
[1073].
Original sin [1074] is specifically distinct from actual sin which
we have been speaking of. It is the sin of nature, transmitted
with nature. It is voluntary in its cause, the sin of the first
man. It consists formally in the privation of original justice, by
which our will was subject to God. [1075] Materially, it consists
in concupiscence. It resides, as privation of grace, in the
essence of the soul, before it infects the will and man's other
powers. [1076].
CHAPTER 48: LAW
VIRTUES and vices are intrinsic principles of human acts. St.
Thomas now turns to the extrinsic principle, to God who causes
human acts by His law and His grace.
Law is "a regulation of reason in favor of the common good,
promulgated by the ruler of the community. " [1077] Its violation
deserves punishment, to re-establish the law. [1078] There are
many kinds of law. The highest kind, whence all others are
derived, is the eternal law, "the plan by which divine wisdom
rules all creatures. " [1079] Natural law, a direct derivation
from the eternal law, is imprinted on our rational faculties,
inclining them to the end willed by the author of nature. It is
immutable, like nature itself. Its first precept is: Do good, shun
evil. From this principle follow other natural precepts, relative
to the individual, to the family, to social life, and to the
worship of God. [1080].
Positive laws, human or divine, presuppose the eternal law and the
natural law. Divine positive law is either the Old Law or the New.
The New Law is inscribed in our souls before it is inscribed on
parchment. It is identified with grace and infused virtue. [1081]
It brings the Old Law to perfection. It is the law of love, since
it continually recalls the pre-eminence of charity, with its two
grand precepts of love for God and neighbor. [1082].
Human laws, coming from human authority, must conform to natural
law and to divine positive law. [1083] They must be morally good,
just, suited to people and time. They bind in conscience, as
derivations from the eternal law. Unjust laws do not bind in
conscience, unless their observance is necessary to avoid a
greater evil. In such cases we may yield on our rights, but not on
our duties. But we may not obey a law which is manifestly against
a higher law, especially if the higher law is a divine law.
[1084].
On the immutability of the natural law Scotus maintains that the
only necessary precepts are those relating to the service of God,
whereas God could revoke the precept "Thou shalt not kill, " and
then murder would no longer be sin. Thus all relations of man to
man would depend, not on God's natural law, but on His positive
law. Occam goes still further, saying that God, being infinitely
free, could have commanded us to hate Him. God might thus be,
comments Leibnitz, [1085] the evil principle of the Manichaeans
rather than the good principle of Christians. This nominalistic
doctrine brings forth complete juridical positivism, since it
leaves no act intrinsically either good or evil. Gerson [1086]
approaches this position, saying there is only one act
intrinsically good, namely, the love of God. St. Thomas, on the
contrary, holding the natural law to be as immutable as human
nature itself, establishes on high a luminary to guide all
legislation worthy of the name.
CHAPTER 49: A TREATISE ON GRACE
FOLLOWING the order of St. Thomas, we dwell here, first, on the
necessity of grace, second, on its essence, third, on its
divisions, fourth, on its causes, fifth, on its effects, which are
justification and merit.
ARTICLE ONE: THE NECESSITY OF GRACE [1087]
Man, even in his fallen state, can without grace, by God's
concurrence in the natural order, know certain natural truths,
though this concurrence of God is gratuitous in this sense, that
it is accorded to men in varying degree. Yet, even within the
natural order, fallen man cannot without supernatural grace attain
all truths, in particular not the more difficult truths. To reach
these latter truths man must have long years of study, an ardent
love of truth, a persevering will, and subservient passions, and
these qualities man in his actual state cannot have without grace
added to his nature. [1088].
Even supposing revelation as an exterior fact, man cannot without
interior grace give a supernatural assent to divine revelation.
This point of doctrine is strenuously upheld by Thomists against
those who approach more or less nearly to Pelagianism or Semi-
Pelagianism. The act of faith, by which we adhere to supernatural
truths as revealed, is essentially supernatural, [1089] by reason
of its specific object and motive The mysteries of faith are more
supernatural than miracles. A miracle is supernatural, not by the
essence of its effect, but only by the mode of production, as when
resurrection, for example, restores to a corpse the natural life
it once had. Whereas, then, the miraculous fact is naturally
knowable, the life of grace, on the contrary, and the mysteries of
the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Redemption, are in their very
essence supernatural, inaccessible to all natural knowledge, human
or angelic. [1090].
Here Thomists part company with Scotus, the Nominalists, and
Molina, who maintain that the assent of faith to revelation is
natural in substance and only supernatural by superadded modality.
This "supernatural veneer" is contrary to the principle: Acts and
habits are specifically proportioned to their formal object, that
is, a supernatural object can be attained as supernatural only by
an act which is itself essentially supernatural. Further, if you
hold that the act of faith is substantially natural, you must
likewise say the same of the acts of hope and charity, and you
must further say that charity here below is not identified with
charity above, because charity is, like the beatific vision,
essentially supernatural.
What Thomists do concede is this: After revelation has been
preached, fallen man can, without grace, by God's natural
concurrence, know and admit the supernatural truths materially, by
an imperfect consent given for a human motive. Thus heretics, by
their own judgment, retain dogmas that please them, and reject
dogmas that displease them. Such faith is not infused; it is a
human faith, similar to the acquired faith of the demons, who, by
reason of confirmatory miracles, admit supernatural mysteries. But
while such faith, founded on the evidence of miraculous signs, is
possible without grace, true faith, founded formally on the
veracity of God, the author of supernatural life, is impossible
without grace. But this necessary grace can be lacking in an adult
only by his own fault, because if he does not resist the voice of
conscience and prevenient grace, he will be led to the grace of
faith. [1091].
A man in mortal sin, deprived of grace and charity, can still
perform acts, morally good in the natural order, and, if he
preserves infused faith and hope, can, with actual grace, elicit
supernatural acts in those virtues.
Fallen man, without the grace of faith, can perform natural acts
that are morally good, honor his parents, for example, pay his
debts, and so on. The acts of infidels are not all sins. They
retain, however enfeebled, the natural inclination to moral good.
The natural concurrence of God in these acts, ethically good, is
gratuitous only in this sense that it is given in varying degree.
[1092].
Fallen man, without medicinal grace, cannot love God more than
himself, more than all else, not even as the author of nature,
much less as the author of grace. [1093].
Whereas Scotus, Biel, and Molina grant that man cannot, without
grace, though he may have the firm purpose, carry out that purpose
by fulfilling the whole natural law, Thomists hold that medicinal
grace is necessary even for that firm purpose which precedes
execution. To love God naturallyabove all things, says St. Thomas,
fallen man needs the aid of medicinal grace. The reason is that
fallen man, until healed by grace, prefers his own good to that of
God.
The injured faculties of fallen man cannot, it is clear, perform
the most elevated of those acts which they would have performed
when still sound. The feebleness of will in fallen man, while it
consists directly in aversion from his supernatural end, includes
at least indirectly aversion from his natural end. Every sin
against the supernatural end is indirectly against the natural
law, which binds us to obey all God's commands, be they in the
natural order or in a higher order.
Hence Thomists in general, against Molina and his school, hold
that man, in his fallen state, is less able to keep the natural
law than he would have been in the state of pure nature. In a
purely natural state his will would not, initiatively, be turned
away even indirectly from his natural end, but would be capable of
choosing this end, or of turning away from it. [1094] Hence we
understand [1095] that fallen man, without medicinal grace, cannot
observe the whole natural law. Could he do so, he could even keep
that firm purpose we spoke of above.
Hence, further, fallen man, in the state of mortal sin, cannot,
without special grace, avoid all grievous sin against the natural
law or conquer all temptations thereto. [1096] But the just man
can, under the ordinary concurrence of grace and without special
privilege, avoid each venial sin, because sin, if it were
inevitable, would no longer be sin. Yet in the long run he cannot
escape all venial sin, since reason cannot be always vigilant
enough to suppress even the first movements of disorder.
Can fallen man, without the concurrence of actual grace, prepare
himself for sanctifying grace? To this question the Semi-Pelagians
answered Yes, saying the beginning of salvation comes from our
nature and that grace comes with this initial natural movement of
good will. They were condemned by the Second Council of Orange,
which affirmed the necessity of actual, prevenient grace in our
preparation for conversion. Insisting on this point, St. Thomas
[1097] recalls the words of our Savior, "No one can come to Me
unless My Father draws him, " [1098] and the words of Jeremias,
"Convert us, O Lord, and we will be converted. " [1099] The reason
lies in the principle of finality. Disposition to grace must be
supernatural, as is grace itself. Hence this disposition must come
from the Author of grace. Natural acts have no proportion to the
supernatural gift of grace, which lies in an order immeasurably
higher.
But is there not a common axiom: To him who does what lies in his
power God does not refuse grace? Thomists explain thus: To him
who, under the concurrence of actual grace, does what in him lies,
God does not refuse sanctifying grace. But that God confers this
actual grace because man of himself makes a good use of his
natural will -- this interpretation cannot be admitted. [1100] Why
God draws this man and not that man, says St. Augustine, judge not
unless you would misjudge. [1101] The divine judgment, which gives
a special mercy to one and not to another, is inscrutable. But it
would not be inscrutable if grace were given by reason of a good
natural disposition, since we could answer: God gave grace to this
man and not to this other, because the first did, and the second
did not, prepare himself thereto by his natural powers. But such
explanation would destroy the mystery, would lose from sight the
immeasurable distance between the two orders, one of nature, the
other of grace.
Molinists give the axiom a different interpretation. They say that
God, by reason of Christ's merits, gives to the man who does what
he naturally can an actual grace, and then if the man makes good
use of this actual grace, God gives also sanctifying grace. This
divergence rests on scientia media, by which God depends on the
foreseen choice of the creature. Thomists, denying scientia media,
since it posits in God dependent passivity, deny also the above
interpretation. Man cannot, then, without the concurrence of
grace, even begin to escape from the state of sin. [1102].
Even the justified man, however high be his degree of habitual
grace, has need of actual grace for each and every meritorious
act. Sanctifying grace, and the infused virtues arising therefrom,
are indeed supernatural faculties, supernatural potencies, but
still depend for their acts on the divine motion, just as
necessarily as do faculties in the natural order.
Does man need a special grace of perseverance until death? The
Semi-Pelagians said No. They were opposed by St. Augustine in a
special work, [1103] and were condemned by the Second Council of
Orange (can. 10). The Church teaches this special grace when she
prays: Thy kingdom come. This grace of final perseverance is the
union of the state of grace with the moment of death, whether that
state has endured for years or has been attained only a moment
before death. This union of grace and death is manifestly a
special effect of providence, and even of predestination, since it
is given only to the predestinate.
In what does it consist? For the infant who dies after baptism it
is the state of grace until death, death being permitted by
providence at a determined moment before the infant can lose
grace. In the case of adults, the grace of perseverance includes,
not merely sufficient grace which gives the power to persevere,
but also efficacious grace by which the predestinated adult does
in fact persevere, even amid great temptations, by a last
meritorious act. According to Thomists this grace is of itself
efficacious, whereas, according to Molinists, it becomes
efficacious by the human consent foreseen by scientia media.
Such is the Thomistic doctrine: Grace is necessary for knowing
supernatural truth, for doing good, for avoiding sin, for
disposing man unto justification, for performing each meritorious
act, for persevering unto the end.
ARTICLE TWO: THE ESSENCE OF GRACE
Grace here means above all sanctifying grace which makes us
children and heirs of God. Actual grace is either the disposition
for sanctifying grace, or the divine concurrence which makes us
act supernaturally.
Sanctifying grace, which makes us pleasing to God, is not a mere
extrinsic denomination, as when we say that we are seen or loved
by human persons, or that a poor infant is adopted by a rich man.
Grace is something real and intrinsic in our soul: "He hath given
us most great and precious promises that by them you may be made
partakers of the divine nature. " [1104] Whereas human love, as
that of the rich man adopting a child, is given to what already
exists, divine love creates something to be loved. Divine love is
not sterile, and not merely affective, but effective and
efficacious, creating, not presupposing, the good it loves. God
cannot love a man without producing in that man a good, be it in
the natural order, as when he gives him existence, life, and
intelligence, or in the supernatural order, as when He makes man
His adopted child, His friend, to prepare him for a blessedness
wholly supernatural, wherein He gives Himself to man eternally.
God's love, says St. Thomas, [1105] creates goodness in creatures.
Uncreated love does not presuppose, but creates, our lovableness
in His eyes.
Thus St. Thomas excludes in advance the error of Luther, who says
that man is justified solely by the extrinsic imputation to him of
Christ's merits, without grace and charity being poured into his
heart. This view is manifestly contrary to Scripture, which
teaches that grace and charity were given to us by the Holy Ghost.
[1106].
Sanctifying grace, to proceed, is a permanent quality of the soul.
It is the living water, springing up into eternal life. [1107] It
is "the seed of God, " [1108] which tradition calls "the seed of
glory. " [1109] St. Thomas [1110] formulates a precise doctrine,
which found ever wider acceptance and final approval in the
Council of Trent. [1111] We cannot hold, he says, that God
provides less generously in the supernatural order than He does in
the natural order. Since in the natural order He gives nature as
radical, principle and the faculties as proximate principles of
our natural operations, we may expect that He will give us grace
as radical principle of our supernatural operations. Thus
sanctifying graces becomes "a second nature, " which enables us to
connaturally know and love God in a higher order than that of our
natural faculties.
This participation in the divine nature is indeed formal and
physical, but only analogical. [1112] Human words, even inspired
words, far from being exaggerations, can express supernatural
truths only by understatement. As the divine nature is the
principle by which God knows and loves Himself, without medium or
interruption, so sanctifying grace is the radical principle which
disposes us to see God without medium, to love Him eternally
without interruption, to do all things for His sake. That is the
meaning of "participation in the divine nature. " This
participation is not a mere moral quality, a mere imitation of
God's goodness. It is a real and physical participation, spiritual
and supernatural, because it is the root principle of acts which
are themselves really, physically, essentially supernatural. Human
adoption gives to the child the moral right to an inheritance.
Divine adoption creates in the soul a real and physical claim to
divine inheritance.
Sanctifying grace, then, is a participation, not, like actual
grace, virtual and transient, but formal and permanent. Still this
participation is, not univocal, but analogical, because the divine
nature is independent and infinite, whereas grace is essentially
finite and dependent on God. Further, grace is an accident, not a
substance, and the utmost knowledge it can give us of God is only
intuitive, never absolutely comprehensive. Nevertheless this
participation, though it is analogical, is still a participation
in the deity as deity, since it is the source of the light of
glory which enables us to see God as He is in Himself, the deity
as deity. Now the deity as deity, though it precontains formally
all perfections, being, life, intelligence, which it can
communicate to creatures, still transcends infinitely all these
perfections. [1113] The stone, by participating in being, has an
analogical resemblance to God as being. The plant, participating
in life, has an analogical resemblance to God as living. Our soul,
participating in intelligence, has an analogical resemblance to
God as intelligent. But sanctifying grace alone is a participation
in the deity as deity, a participation which is naturally
impossible and hence naturally unknowable. Only the obscure light
of infused faith here below, and only the light of glory there
above, can let us see the deity as deity, God as He is in Himself.
We are here in a world of truth far beyond the reach of reason.
Hence, first, the adversaries of the faith can never prove that
sanctifying grace is impossible. But, secondly, neither can its
possibility be rigorously demonstrated by reason. What, then, of
the arguments we have just been proposing? They are arguments of
appropriateness, profound indeed and inexhaustible, but since they
move in an order beyond reason and philosophy, they can never be
apodictically demonstrative. Both the intrinsic possibility of
grace and its existence are affirmed with certitude, not by
reason, but by faith alone. [1114].
Grace, we must insist, is by its very nature absolutely
supernatural. Angelic nature, since it far transcends human
nature, is relatively supernatural, not essentially. Miracles are
indeed absolutely supernatural, but only in the mode of their
production, not in the effect they produce. The life restored
miraculously to a corpse is in itself a natural life, not a
supernatural life. But grace is absolutely supernatural, not in
the mode of production merely, but in its very essence. Hence the
remark of St. Thomas: [1115] The grace even of one man is a
greater good then the whole universe of nature. Only those who
enjoy the beatific vision can fully know the value of grace, the
source and root of their glory. [1116] Hence God loves one soul in
grace more than He loves all creatures with merely natural life,
as, to illustrate, a father loves his children more than he loves
his houses, and fields, his herds, flocks and droves. God, says
St. Paul, guides the universe in favor of the elect.
Scotus greatly reduces this transcendent distance between the
order of grace and the order of nature. His distinction between
them is not essential but contingent, since God, he says, could
have given us the light of glory as a characteristic property of
our nature. This grace and glory would indeed be supernatural in
fact, but not by intrinsic essence. This intrinsic supernaturality
of grace is denied also by the Nominalists who admit in grace only
a moral right to eternal life, a right which may be compared to
paper money, which, though it is only paper, gives us a right to
this or that sum of silver or gold. This Nominalistic thesis
prepared the way for that of Luther, which makes grace a mere
extrinsic imputation to us of Christ's merits. How profoundly, by
contrast with human adoption, does St. Thomas set in relief the
creative adoption by God, which gives to the soul an intrinsic
root of eternal.
How does sanctifying grace differ from charity? Charity is an
infused virtue, an operative potency, residing in the will. But
just as acquired virtue presupposes human nature, so infused
virtue presupposes a nature raised to supernatural life, and this
supernatural life is given to the soul by sanctifying grace.
Activity presupposes being, in every order, and God cannot provide
in the supernatural order less generously then He provides in the
natural order. [1117] Hence grace is received into the essence of
the soul, whereas charity is received into the soul faculty which
we call the will. [1118] Grace, when consummated, is called glory,
the root principle whence the light of glory arises in the
intellect, and inalienable charity in the will.
ARTICLE THREE: DIVISION OF GRACE [1119]
Sanctifying grace must be distinguished from charismatic graces,
[1120] like prophecy and the grace of miracles, which are signs of
divine intervention. These charismatic graces, far from being a
new life uniting us to God, can be received even by men who are in
the state of mortal sin. Hence infused contemplation, since it
proceeds from faith illumined by the gifts, does not belong to the
order of charismatic grace, but to the order of sanctifying grace,
of which such contemplation is the connatural development, as
normal prelude to the life of heaven.
Sanctifying grace, being permanent, must be distinguished also
from actual grace, which is transient, just as being, which is
permanent, is the presupposition of activity, which is transient.
Actual grace itself is either operative or cooperative. Under
cooperative grace, the will, under the influence of a previous
act, posits a new act, as when, to illustrate, noticing that our
daily hour has come, we give ourselves to prayer. But under
operative grace, the will is not moved by a previous act, but by a
special inspiration, as when, for example, absorbed in our work,
we receive and follow an unforeseen inspiration to pray. Such acts
are indeed free, but are not the fruit of discursive deliberation.
But they are nevertheless infused acts, arising, not from
cooperating grace, but from operative grace.
Actual grace, further, is either sufficient or efficacious. How is
the one distinguished from the other? The following article gives
the classic Thomistic answer to this much discussed question.
ARTICLE FOUR: GRACE, SUFFICIENT AND EFFICACIOUS
Efficacious grace, in contrast with sufficient grace which can
remain sterile, is infallibly followed by a meritorious act. This
efficacious grace, so Thomists maintain, is intrinsically
efficacious because God wills it; not merely extrinsically
efficacious, that is, by the consent of our will.
We shall consider first the texts of St. Thomas which express this
doctrine, then the Scriptural texts on which it reposes. The main
distinction here is that between God's antecedent will and God's
consequent will, a distinction fully in harmony with that between
potency and act.
Commenting on St. Paul, [1121] St. Thomas writes: "Christ is the
propitiation for our sins, for some efficaciously, for all
sufficiently, because the price, which is His blood, is sufficient
for universal salvation, but, by reason of impediment, is
efficacious only in the elect. " God removes this impediment, but
not always. There lies the mystery. God, he says again, [1122]
withholds from no one his due. Again: [1123] the New Law gives of
itself sufficient aid to shun sin. Then, commenting on the
Ephesians, [1124] he becomes more precise: God's aid is twofold.
One is the faculty of doing, the other is the act itself. God
gives the faculty by infusing power and grace to make man able and
apt for the act. God gives further the act by inner movement to
good, working in us both to will and to do. [1125].
All men receive concurrence of grace which makes them able to
fulfill the divine precepts, because God never commands the
impossible. As regards efficacious grace, by which a man actually
observes God's commands, if it is given to one, it is given by
mercy, if it is refused to another, it is refused by justice.
[1126] If man resists the grace which makes him able to do good,
he merits deprival of that grace which gives him the actual doing
of good. By His own judgment, says St. Thomas, [1127] God does not
give the light of grace to those in whom he finds an obstacle.
Here follow the chief Scripture texts on which this doctrine
rests:
a) "I called, and you refused. " [1128].
b) "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and
stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have
gathered thy children as the hen doth gather her chickens under
her wings, and thou wouldst not. " [1129].
c) "You always resist the Holy Ghost. " [1130].
Such texts most certainly speak of graces which remain sterile by
man's resistance. Yet they are surely sufficient, whatever
Jansenists say, because God could not blame those for whom
fulfillment of divine commands is impossible. God wills that all
men be saved, says St. Paul, [1131] because Jesus gave Himself as
ransom for all. Hence the Council of Trent, [1132] quoting St.
Augustine, says: "God does not command the impossible, but gives
His command as admonition to do what you can and to pray when you
cannot. " [1133] The grace which the sinner resists, which he
makes sterile, was really sufficient, in this sense, that
fulfillment was really in his power.
Further, Scripture often speaks of efficacious grace. Here are the
chief texts:
a) "I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you. I
will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and will give you
a heart of flesh. And I will put My spirit in the midst of you,
and I will cause you to walk in My commandments and to keep My
judgments. " [1134].
b) "As the potter's clay is in his hand... so man is in the hand
of Him that made him. " [1135].
c) "My sheep... shall not perish forever. And no man shall pluck
them out of My hand. " [1136].
d) "It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.
" [1137].
"Whenever we do good, " says the Second Council of Orange, "God in
us and with us works our work. " [1138].
These words surely indicate a grace that is of itself efficacious,
efficacious intrinsically, because God wills it to be efficacious,
not efficacious merely because He has foreseen that we will
consent without resistance.
Further, as we have said, the distinction between grace sufficient
and grace intrinsically efficacious is an immediate consequence of
the distinction between God's antecedent will and His consequent
will. [1139] Antecedent will deals with an object absolutely,
abstracting from concrete circumstances. God thus wills the
salvation of all men, as, to illustrate, a merchant at sea wills
to preserve all his goods. But consequent will deals with a good
to be realized here and now. Thus the merchant, willing
antecedently and conditionally to save his goods, wills, in fact,
during a tempest, to throw his goods into the sea. Thus God,
proportionally, analogically, though he antecedently and
conditionally wills salvation for all men, permits nevertheless,
to manifest His justice, the final impenitence of a sinner, Judas
say; while with consequent and efficacious will He gives final
perseverance here and now to other men, to manifest His mercy.
"In heaven and on earth, whatever God willed He has done. " This
verse of the psalm [1140] surely means that God's consequent will
is always fulfilled. In this sense it was understood by the
Council of Tuzey: "Nothing happens in heaven or on earth, unless
God either propitiously does it or justly permits it. " [1141]
Hence it follows clearly, first, that no good comes to pass here
and now, in this man rather than in that other, unless God has
from all eternity efficaciously willed it; secondly, that no evil
comes to pass, here and now, in this man rather than in that
other, unless God has permitted it. The sinner, at the very
instant when he sins, can avoid the sin, and God from all eternity
has by sufficient grace made him genuinely able to avoid it. But
God has not willed efficaciously the actual avoidance here and
now, say of the sin of Judas. Did God will this efficaciously, the
sinner would have had not merely the great benefit of being able
to shun sin, but the far greater benefit of its actual avoidance.
On these sure principles, generally received, rests the Thomistic
teaching on the difference between sufficient grace, which makes
man able to do good, and grace self-efficacious, which, far from
forcing our freedom, actualizes that freedom, leading us, strongly
and sweetly, to give freely our salutary consent. [1142].
"What hast thou that thou hast not received? " [1143] This word of
St. Paul carries our entire doctrine. That which is best in the
hearts of the just, their free choice of salutary acts, was
received from God. This free choice, without which there is no
merit, is clearly a good beyond that of precept, beyond pious
thought, and that velleity which inclines to consent, because
these can be found even in him who does not give good consent.
Manifestly, he who fulfills the precept in fact has more, has a
greater good, then he who, though genuinely able to do so, does
not in fact fulfill it. And he who has this greater good has
received it from the source of all good.
"Since God's love, " says St. Thomas, "is the cause of all created
good, no created thing would be better than another, did it not
receive from God that good which makes it better. " [1144]
Besides, if the free and meritorious choice did not come from God,
God could not foreknow it by His own causality. His foreknowledge
of the future, of His free act, would be dependent and passive.
Here lies the reason why Thomists have never been able to admit
the doctrine called scientia media, thus expressed in two
propositions by Molina: [1145].
a) "With equal aid of grace it can come to pass that one is
converted and the other not. ".
b) "Even with a smaller aid of grace one can arise while another
with greater aid of grace does not rise. ".
Against this view Thomists, Augustinians, and Scotists are in
accord. Their formula is thus expressed by Bossuet: "We must admit
two kinds of grace, one of which leaves our will without excuse
before God, while the other allows our will no self-glorification.
".
For better understanding of this doctrine, we add five remarks.
1. Sufficient grace acts on a very wide field. Exteriorly, it
includes preaching and miracles. Interiorly, it includes the
infused virtues, the seven gifts, and all good thoughts, and
invitations which precede meritorious consent. But all these,
while in varying degree they perfect the power, still differ
notably and intrinsically from self-efficacious grace. The power
to act may be ever so proximate and ready to act, [1146] power to
act is never the act itself. But power to act is still a reality,
a great good. To say that sufficient grace which gives this
reality is insufficient in its own order is equivalent to saying
that a sleeping man is blind, because, forsooth, since he is not
now exercising the act of vision, he cannot even have the power of
vision. [1147].
2. Sufficient grace, sufficient as regards a perfect act like
contrition, may be efficacious as regards, say, attrition.
Sufficient grace is not sterile, it produces a good thought, a
good movement of will, some disposition to consent. It is called
sufficient, says Alvarez, [1148] as counter-distinguished from
"simply efficacious. " But each sufficient grace is in a sense
efficacious, i. e.: in its own order.
But each meritorious act, however small, requires a grace simply
efficacious. It is good here and now realized, hence presupposes
an eternal decree of God's consequent will. Nothing comes to pass
hic et nunc, unless God has efficaciously willed it (if it is
good) or permitted it (if it is evil). [1149] We cannot, says
Bossuet, [1150] refuse to God the power of actualizing our free
and salutary choice, without which no merit can exist.
3. Resistance to sufficient grace is an evil, arising from us,
from our defectibility and our actual deficience, whereas our non-
resistance is, on the contrary, a good, arising from ourselves as
second causes, but from God as first cause.
Billuart sums up the matter: "Efficacious grace is required for
consent to sufficient grace. But for resistance to sufficient
grace the man's own defective will is sufficient cause. And since
that resistance precedes the privation of efficacious grace, it is
true to say that man is deprived of efficacious grace because he
resists sufficient grace, whereas it is not true to say that he
sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace. " [1151].
4. Efficacious grace is offered to us in sufficient grace, as
fruit is offered in the blossom, as act is offered in the power.
But by resistance to sufficient grace we merit deprival of
efficacious grace. Resistance falls on sufficient grace as hail
falls on a tree in blossom, destroying its promise of fruit.
[1152].
5. Mystery remains mystery. How can God have both a universal will
of salvation and a divine predilection for the elect? How can God
be simultaneously infinitely just, infinitely merciful, and
supremely free? We must leave the mystery where it belongs: in the
transcendent pre-eminence of the deity, in the inner life of God,
to be unveiled to us only in the beatific vision. There we shall
see what now we believe: That some are saved is the Savior's gift,
that some are lost is their own fault. [1153] But even here below
simple everyday Christian speech grasps the reality of the
mystery. What a special act of God's mercy, it says, when of two
sinners equal in evil disposition one alone is converted. All that
is good comes from God, evil alone cannot come from Him.
Such are the principles which rule Thomistic doctrine on the
efficaciousness of grace, a doctrine which claims as sponsors St.
Augustine and St. Paul.
ARTICLE FIVE: THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF GRACE
The principal cause of grace is God Himself, since grace is a
participation in the divine nature. As only fire ignites, so the
Deity alone can deify. [1154].
Grace, since it is not a subsistent reality, is not, properly
speaking, created, nor concreated. It presupposes a subject in
which it begins and continues, the soul, namely, of which it is an
accident. But since it is an accident essentially supernatural,
not natural and acquired, it is drawn forth from the obediential
potency of the soul. This obediential potency of the soul is its
aptitude to receive all that God can will to give it, and God can
give it anything that is not self-contradictory. Thus the soul has
obediential potency to receive not only grace and glory, and the
hypostatic union, but also an ever higher degree of grace and
glory, since obediential potency can never be so completely
actualized as not to be still more actualizable. It is formally a
passive potency, yet, if it resides in an active faculty, it is
materially active, as when the will receives infused charity.
Thomists cannot agree with the Scotist and Suaresian view that
obediential potency is formally active.
In the ordinary course of providence, the production of grace
presupposes, in the adult, some movement of the free will as
disposition. "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord, " says Samuel.
[1155] God moves all things according to their nature. But though
a repeated good act engenders an acquired habit, the disposition
we treat of here cannot engender grace, which is an infused habit.
Yet to the man who, under actual grace, does what is in his power
to prepare for justification, habitual grace is indeed given
infallibly, not because this preparation proceeds from our free
will, but because it comes from God who moves efficaciously and
infallibly. "If God who moves, " says St. Thomas, "intends that
man attain grace, he attains it infallibly. " [1156].
In proportion to his disposition man receives a higher or a lower
degree of grace. But God, who is the first cause of each degree of
disposition, distributes His gifts more or less abundantly, so
that the Church, the mystical body, may be adorned with different
levels of grace and charity. [1157].
Can man be certain that he is in the state of grace? Only special
revelation can give absolute certitude. The only ordinary
certitude man can have is a relative certitude, a moral and
conjectural certitude. "Neither do I judge my own self, " says St.
Paul. [1158] "I am not conscious to myself of anything, " he
continues. "Yet am I not hereby justified; but He that judgeth me
is the Lord. ".
We can always fear some hidden fault, or some lack of contrition,
some confusion of charity with a natural love which resembles
charity. Further, the Author of grace transcends our natural
knowledge. Hence, without special revelation, we cannot know with
genuine certitude whether He dwells in us or not. Yet there are
signs whereby we may conjecture our state of grace: to have no
conscience of mortal sin, to have no esteem for terrestrial
things, to find our joy in the Lord.
ARTICLE SIX: JUSTIFICATION [1159]
1. By justification sins are truly remitted, deleted, taken away,
not merely externally covered. Were it otherwise, man would be
simultaneously just and unjust, God's love for sinners would be
the same as His love for His friends and children, and sinners
remaining in a state of sin would be worthy to receive eternal
life, and Jesus Christ would not have taken away the sins of the
world. [1160].
For this remissive justification, infusion of sanctifying grace is
absolutely necessary. [1161] Against Scotists and Nominalists,
Thomists insist on this doctrine, because justification is an
effect of God's love, and God's love, since it is not merely
affective, but effective, produces something real in the soul, the
grace, namely, which justifies and sanctifies. God's act of
adoption is not a mere human adoption.
Inversely, the state of sin implies that the sinner's will is
habitually, if not actually, turned away from his last end. This
habitual estrangement can be changed only by a voluntary turning
of his will to God, which requires infusion of grace by God.
Hence, says the Council of Trent, [1162] sanctifying grace is the
formal cause of justification.
Thomists, consequently, against Scotists and Suarez, maintain that
God, even by His absolute power, cannot bring it to pass that
mortal sin, habitual or actual, can coexist, in one and the same
subject, with sanctifying grace. Grace is essentially justice,
rectitude, sanctity, whereas sin is essentially iniquity,
defilement, disorder. Hence the two are absolutely incompatible.
One and the same man, at one and the same moment, cannot be to God
both pleasing and displeasing, spiritually both dead and alive.
2. What are the acts prerequired in the justification of an adult?
Six acts are enumerated by the Council of Trent: faith, fear,
hope, love, contrition, firm proposal. St. Thomas [1163] insists
chiefly on faith and contrition, but notes also filial fear,
humility, hope, and love of God. Firm proposal is included in
contrition.
In order these acts begin with faith, both in God's justice and
His mercy. From this faith arise fear of justice and hope of
pardon. Hope leads to love of God, the source of both justice and
all benevolent mercy. Love of God leads to hatred of sin, as
harmful to the sinner and offensive to God. This hatred of sin is
contrition, perfect contrition if sin is hated chiefly as
offensive to God, imperfect contrition if sin is hated chiefly as
harmful to the sinner. And genuine contrition, perfect or
imperfect, includes the firm proposal to begin a new life.
Must all these acts be explicitly present? Two of them must
certainly be so present: faith, which is in the intellect, and
love, which is in the will. These two acts cannot be contained
virtually in other acts. Contrition, too, must be ordinarily
present, though it can be contained virtually in the act of love
if the man is not at the time thinking of his sins. Hope can
likewise be virtually contained in charity.
A TREATISE ON GRACE.
3. These acts of contrition and love, which are thus the ultimate
disposition for sanctifying grace, proceed from what effective
principle? Here Thomists divide. John of St. Thomas and Contenson
hold that these acts proceed from actual grace, whereas many
others [1164] maintain that they arise from sanctifying grace at
the very moment of its infusion, since the divine motion which
infuses grace infuses simultaneously the virtues from which the
acts in question proceed.
St. Thomas [1165] favors this second interpretation. The subject's
disposition, he says, precedes the form, not in time but in
nature, and in the order of material causality. But in the order
of formal and efficient causality, this disposition does not
precede, but follows, the action of the agent which disposes the
subject. Thus the act of the free will, though it precedes
materially the infusion of grace, follows that infusion, formally
and effectively.
In illustration, the saint offers the sun and the air in regard to
dispelling darkness. By priority of material causality the air
loses darkness before it is illuminated. But by priority of the
efficient causality the sun illuminates the air before dispelling
darkness. Thus God, at one and the same moment, but by priority of
nature, infuses grace before dispelling sin, whereas man, by
another priority, ceases to be sinner before receiving grace.
The saint, we see, is faithful to his general principle. In its
own order, each of the four causes is first. [1166] The ultimate
disposition precedes, materially, the form, but follows it,
formally, as characteristic of that form. In the human embryo, the
ultimate disposition both precedes and follows the infusion of the
soul. The air does not enter if the window is not opened, and the
window would not be opened if the air were not to enter. We have
here no contradiction, no vicious circle, because each priority
has its own order, its own circle of causality.
Opposed to this Thomistic teaching is the Nominalistic position
which prepared the Lutheran doctrine of justification without
infusion of grace, by merely external attribution of the merits of
Christ. Thomists have always affirmed, even before the Council of
Trent, the doctrine defined by that Council, [1167] that the
formal cause of justification is sanctifying grace.
The depth and reach of this doctrine appears in the unvaried
Thomistic thesis of the absolute incompatibility, in one and the
same man, of mortal sin and sanctifying grace. A consequence of
this thesis runs thus: In the actual plan of providence, under
which a state of pure nature has never existed, each and every man
is either in the state of sin, or then in the state of grace. "He
who is not with Me is against Me, " i. e.: he who does not love
God as his last end is turned away from God. But the other word of
our Lord [1168] is also true: "He who is not against you is for
you, " i. e.: he who, by actual grace, is disposing himself for
conversion will, if he continues, reach that ultimate disposition
which is realized at the moment when sanctifying grace is infused.
ARTICLE SEVEN: THE MERITS OF THE JUST [1169]
Merit follows as a consequence of sanctifying grace, as activity
follows being.
1. Definition and Division
Taken concretely, merit is a good work which confers right to a
reward. Hence, in the abstract, merit is the right to a reward,
opposed to demerit, i. e.: to guilt which deserves punishment.
[1170].
On this definition of merit are founded its division. [1171] The
idea of merit, we must note, is not univocal, but analogical,
because it is found, in meanings proportionally similar and
subordinated, first, in the merits of Christ, second, in the
merits of the just, third, in the sinner's dispositive
preparations for sanctifying grace. We have already seen many
exemplifications of analogy: sin, mortal and venial, knowledge,
sensitive and intellectual, love, sensible and spiritual. Many
errors arise from treating as univocal an idea which is really
analogical.
The merits of Christ, then, are founded on absolute justice,
because Christ's person is divine. The merits of the just are also
founded on justice, not absolute, but dependent on Christ's
merits. To this merit we give the name of "condignness, " [1172]
which expresses a value, not equal to the reward, but proportioned
to it. Condign merit rests on God's ordination and promise,
without which it could not give a right in the proper sense of the
word.
But the just have also a second kind of merit, founded, not on
justice, but on friendship, which presupposes grace and charity.
To this kind of merit we give the name "merit of proper congruity.
" [1173] The word "proper" is added to distinguish this merit,
based on friendship, from the sinner's dispositive merits, which
are based, not on friendship with God, but on God's liberality to
His enemies. These merits too are called "merits of congruity, "
but in a wider sense of the word. [1174].
Merit, then, has four different levels. On the three higher
levels, which presuppose sanctifying grace, we have merit by
proper proportion, whereas on the lowest level we have improper
proportion, almost metaphorical proportion.
Here Thomists are separated by a wide distance from Scotus.
Against him they maintain, first, that the merits of Christ have a
value intrinsically infinite, not merely extrinsically infinite by
divine acceptation. This value is intrinsically equal by absolute
justice to the eternal life of all the elect, intrinsically
sufficient for universal salvation. Secondly, they hold, against
Scotus and the Nominalists, that the condign merits of the just
are properly and intrinsically meritorious of eternal life, not
merely extrinsically by God's ordination and acceptation. Thirdly,
they hold that God cannot accept merely naturally good works as
meritorious of eternal life. The order of grace, they repeat, is
supernatural, by its very essence, not merely by the mode of its
production, as is life miraculously restored to a dead man. The
act of charity is, therefore, meritorious, properly,
intrinsically, condignly, of eternal life, though such merit
presupposes the divine ordination of grace to glory, and the
divine promise of salvation to those who merit that salvation.
[1175].
The merit of "proper congruity" is found in acts of charity,
elicited or commanded, in favor of our neighbor. Thus the just man
merits the conversion of a sinner. Thus Monica merited the
conversion of Augustine. Thus Mary, universal Mediatrix, merited,
de congruo proprie, all graces merited de condigno by Christ.
[1176].
The merit of "improper congruity, " arising not from grace but
from some disposition thereto, a prayer, say, while it is not
merit in the proper sense, can still be called merit in so far as
God's mercy directs it to the sinner's conversion. [1177].
2. Principle and Qualities of Merit
A meritorious act, in the proper sense, whether condign or
congruous, has six qualities. [1178] It must be free and good,
addressed to the rewarder, and be done in the present life,
proceed from charity, and be under God's promise of reward.
Why must it come under God's promise? Because our good works are
already due to God, as Creator, Ruler, and Last End. For lack of
this quality the good works done by those in purgatory and heaven
are not meritorious. Scotus and the Nominalists, exaggerating this
requirement of God's promise, say that merit is not intrinsically
meritorious, but only extrinsically, i. e.: because God has
promised. The precise doctrine of St. Thomas [1179] is that the
act is intrinsically meritorious, but must still be supported by
divine promise which makes its reward a duty which God owes to
Himself. "Rejoice and be glad, " says our Savior, "because your
reward is great in heaven. " [1180] God's creative ordinance gives
our good acts a title of justice, intrinsically proportioned to
eternal life. [1181] But if the man falls into sin and dies in
that state, he loses all his merits. Hence the necessity of the
grace of final perseverance, either to preserve or to recover
merit.
It is above all by charity that sanctifying grace is the principle
of merit, since it is by charity, either actual or virtual, that
we tend to our last end. [1182] Merit is therefore greater as
charity is higher and its influence greater. Thus an act
objectively easy, if it comes from great charity, is more
meritorious than a difficult act arising from a lower degree of
charity. Mary, the mother of God, merited more by easier acts than
the martyrs by their torments.
3. What can we merit? We can merit whatever our acts have been
ordained by God to merit. This truth includes implicitly a second
truth: We cannot merit the principle of grace.
The just man, then, so faith teaches, can condignly merit growth
of grace and charity, and a corresponding degree of glory. [1183]
Further, he can merit, not indeed condignly, but congruously and
properly, the graces of conversion and spiritual advancement for
his neighbor. Temporal favors, as far as they are conducive to
salvation, also fall under merit.
But the first grace, actual or habitual, being the presupposed
principle of merit, cannot itself be merited, either condignly or
congruously. This truth of faith rests on the disproportion
between naturally good works and the supernatural order. [1184]
Neither can man merit in advance a grace of contrition to be given
after a fall into mortal sin. [1185] This position is not admitted
by all theologians. St. Thomas defends it, by pointing out that,
since all merits are lost by mortal sin, the sinner must begin a
new road of merit, on which contrition is the first step, the
presupposition of merit, which cannot itself be merited, either
condignly or congruously. Further, if men could merit this act of
contrition in advance, they would obtain it infallibly, and thus
persevere unto death. Thus all men now in grace would belong to
the predestinate. Nevertheless the man in sin can, by the merit of
improper congruity, by prayer to the divine mercy, obtain the
grace of contrition.
Lastly, the just man cannot merit the grace of perseverance, i.
e.: the grace of a good death. Since the Council of Trent, [1186]
this point of doctrine is admitted by all as theologically
certain, at least if merit is understood as condign merit. The
Council quotes this word of Augustine: "This gift can come from
one source only, from Him who is able first to so establish man
that man will stand perseveringly, and, second, to raise up the
man who has fallen. " [1187].
St. Thomas [1188] supports this commonly received truth by the
axiom: The principle of merit cannot be itself merited. Now the
gift of perseverance is nothing but the state of grace itself, the
principle of all merit, preserved by God up to the moment of
death. Hence it cannot be merited, certainly not by condign merit,
and only certainly not by merit of proper congruity, which also
has its source and principle in grace and charity. God has not
promised that each man who has performed meritorious acts for a
period of time more or less long has thereby a right to final
perseverance. A man may now be just without being among the elect.
Hence man cannot merit either condignly or congruously that
efficacious concurrence of grace which alone can preserve him from
mortal sin. If he could merit it, he would infallibly obtain it;
he could then likewise merit a second and a third efficacious
concurrence, and thus infallibly obtain the grace of perseverance.
Still we can obtain this grace of final perseverance. How? By
humble, confident, persevering prayer. In this sense, by the merit
of improper congruity, we may say that man merits perseverance.
This kind of merit addresses itself, not to divine justice, but to
divine mercy. In this sense we understand the promise of the
Sacred Heart to Margaret Mary, that He will give the grace of a
good death to those who receive Holy Communion on nine successive
first Fridays.
Here emerges an objection: If we can merit eternal life, which is
something higher than final perseverance, why can we not merit
perseverance itself? The answer runs thus: Eternal life, as the
goal of perseverance, is higher than perseverance. But God, while
He has ordained that eternal life shall be merited, has not
ordained that the state of grace, the presupposed source of merit,
can itself be merited, though He has ordained that the grace of
perseverance, though unmerited, can be obtained by prayer.
But how, the questioner continues, can man merit eternal life if
he cannot merit perseverance, which is a prerequired condition of
obtaining eternal life? You cannot merit eternal life, so runs the
answer, unless you preserve your merits to the end, and that
preservation, being the principle of your merits to eternal life,
cannot itself be merited. You merit eternal life, and, if you die
in grace, the actual attainment of that eternal life. [1189].
Such are the operative principles in the treatise on grace. St.
Thomas, here again, is a summit, rising above two radically
opposed heresies, above Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism on the
one hand, and, on the other, above Predestinarianism. Against
Pelagianism, which denies elevation to grace, the saint insists on
the immeasurable distance between the two orders, one of nature,
one of grace, the latter being a formal participation in the deity
as deity. "Without Me, " says our Lord, "you can do nothing. "
Hence the absolute necessity of grace in the order of grace. "What
hast thou that thou hast not received? " Hence the absolute
gratuity of grace. If one man is better than another, let him
thank God who has loved him more. God alone, the Author of grace,
can move man to a supernatural end, and only God's self-
efficacious grace can, by actualizing our freedom, carry us on
effectively to acts that are meritorious and salutary.
Against Predestinarianism, to reappear later in Protestantism and
Jansenism, the saint insists that God cannot command the
impossible, and that God's sufficient grace makes universal
salvation genuinely possible. But, if man resists, he merits
deprivation of efficacious grace. Lastly, man can merit everything
to which the meritorious act is by God's ordination proportioned,
but he cannot merit the very principle of merit.
Between these opposed heresies lies the mystery, descending from
the transcendental deity which binds in one God's infinite mercy,
His infinite justice, and His sovereign freedom.
CHAPTER 50: THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
ARTICLE ONE: FAITH [1190]
THE theological virtues and their acts, like faculties, virtues,
and acts in general, are specifically proportioned to their formal
object. The profound import of this principle went unrecognized by
Scotus and by the Nominalists and their successors, as is clear
from the controversies which, from the fourteenth century onwards,
have never ceased.
Faith, says St. Thomas, [1191] has as its material object all
truths revealed by God, but chiefly the supernatural mysteries not
accessible to any natural intelligence human or angelic. But the
formal object of faith, its formal motive of adherence, is God's
veracity, [1192] which presupposes God's infallibility. [1193] The
veracity here in question is that of God as author, not merely of
nature, but of grace and glory, since the revealed mysteries, the
Trinity, for example, and the redemptive Incarnation, are
essentially supernatural. Let us quote the saint's own words:
"Faith, considered in its formal object, is nothing else than God,
the first truth. For faith assents to no truth except in so far as
that truth is revealed. Hence the medium by which faith believes
is divine truth itself. [1194] Again: "The formal object of faith
is the first truth, adherence to which is man's reason for
assenting to any particular truth. " [1195] Once more: "In faith
we must distinguish the formal element, i. e.: the first truth,
far surpassing all the natural knowledge of any creature; and
second, the material element, i. e.: the particular truth, to
which we adhere only because we adhere to the first truth. "
[1196] Lastly: "The first truth, as not seen but believed, is the
object of faith, by which object we assent to truths only as
proposed by that first truth. " [1197].
Thomists, explaining these words, note that the formal object of
any theological virtue must be something uncreated, must be God
Himself. Neither the infallible pronouncements of the Church nor
the miracles which confirm those pronouncements are the formal
object of faith, though they are indispensable conditions. Faith,
therefore, being specifically proportioned to a formal object
which is essentially supernatural, must itself be essentially
supernatural. Again we listen to Thomas.
"Since the act by which man assents to the truths of faith is an
act beyond man's nature, he must have within, from God, the
supernatural mover, a principle by which he elicits that act. "
[1198] And again: "The believer holds the articles of faith by his
adherence to the first truth, for which act he is made capable by
the virtue of faith. " [1199].
In other words the believer, by the infused virtue of faith and by
actual grace, adheres supernaturally to the formal motive of this
theological virtue, in an order which transcends all apologetic
arguments, based on evident miracles and other signs of
revelation. His act of adherence is not discursive, but simple,
since all through it is one and the same act. That act can be
expressed in three ways: [1200] I believe God who reveals, [1201]
I believe what has been revealed concerning God, [1202] I believe
unto God. [1203] But by these three expressions, says St. Thomas,
[1204] we designate, not different acts of faith, but one and the
same act in different relations to one and the same object, as, we
may add in illustration, the eye, by one and the same act of
vision, sees both light and color.
Faith, therefore, has a certitude essentially supernatural,
surpassing even the most evident natural certitude, whether that
of wisdom, of science, or of first principles. [1205] God's
authority claims our infallible adherence in an order far higher
than apologetic reasoning, which is prerequired for credibility,
i. e.: that the mysteries proposed by the Church are guaranteed by
signs manifestly divine, and are therefore evidently credible.
Even for the willingness to believe, [1206] actual grace is
prerequired.
This essential supernaturalness of faith is not admitted by
Scotus, nor the Nominalists, nor their successors. Scotus says
that the distinction of grace from nature is not necessary, but
contingent, dependent on the free choice of God, who might have
given us the light of glory as a characteristic of our nature,
[1207] since a natural act and a supernatural act can each have
the same formal object. [1208] Neither is infused faith necessary
by reason of a supernatural object, because the formal object of
theological faith is not higher than acquired faith. [1209]
Lastly, the certitude of infused faith is based on acquired faith
in the veracity of the Church, which veracity is itself founded on
miracles or other signs of revelation. Otherwise, so he claims, we
would regress to infinity. This same doctrine is upheld by the
Nominalists. [1210] Thence it passes to Molina, [1211] to Ripalda,
[1212] and with slight modification to de Lugo [1213] and to
Franzelin. [1214] Vacant [1215] shows clearly wherein this theory
differs from Thomistic teaching.
Thomists reply as follows: The formal motive of infused faith is
the veracity of God, the author of grace, and this motive,
inaccessible to any natural knowledge whatsoever, must be attained
by an infused virtue. If acquired faith, which even demons have,
were sufficient, then infused faith would not be absolutely
necessary, but would be, as the Pelagians said, a means for
believing more easily. Against the Pelagians the Second Council of
Orange defined the statement that grace is necessary even for the
beginning of faith, for the pious willingness to believe.
Resting on the principle that habits are specifically
differentiated by their formal objects, Thomists, since the days
of Capreolus, have never ceased to defend the essential
supernaturalness of faith, and its superiority to all natural
certitude. On this point Suarez [1216] is in accord with Thomists,
but with one exception. To believe God who reveals, and to believe
the truths revealed concerning God, are for him two distinct acts,
whereas for Thomists they are but one.
Thomists are one in recognizing that the act of infused faith is
founded [1217] on the authority of God who reveals, and hence that
God is both that by which and that which we believe, [1218] as
light, to illustrate, is both that by which we see, and that which
is seen, when we see colors. [1219] But this authority of God can
be formal motive only so far as it is infallibly known by infused
faith itself. Were this motive known only naturally, it could not
found a certitude essentially supernatural.
We may follow this doctrine down a long line of Thomists.
Capreolus [1220] writes: "With one and the same act I assent, both
that God is triune and one, and that God revealed both truths. By
one and the same act I believe that God cannot lie, [1221] and
that what God says of Himself is true. " [1222] Cajetan [1223]
writes: "Divine revelation is both that by which (quo) and that
which (quod) I believe. Just as unity is of itself one without
further appeal, so divine revelation, by which all else is
revealed, is accepted for its own sake and not by a second
revelation. One and the same act accepts the truth spoken about
God and the truthfulness of God who speaks. " [1224] "This
acceptance of the first truth as revealing, and not that acquired
faith by which I believe John the Apostle, or Paul the Apostle, or
the one Church, is the ultimate court of appeal. The infused habit
of faith makes us adhere to God as the reason for believing each
and every revealed truth. 'He that believeth in the Son of God
hath the testimony of God in himself. ' " [1225] This same truth
you will find in Sylvester de Ferraris, [1226] in John of St.
Thomas, [1227] in Gonet, [1228] in the Salmanticenses, [1229] and
in Billuart. [1230].
All Thomists, as is clear from these testimonies, rest on the
principle so often invoked by St. Thomas: Habits and acts, since
they are specifically differentiated by their formal objects, are
in the same order as are those objects. This principle is the
highest expression of the traditional doctrine on the essential
supernaturalness of faith, and of faith's consequent superiority
over all natural certitude. Let us repeat the doctrine in a formal
syllogism, whereof both major and minor are admitted by all
theologians.
We believe infallibly all that is revealed by God, because of the
authority of divine revelation, and according to the infallible
pronouncements of the Church. But revelation and the Church
affirm, not only that the revealed mysteries are truths, but also
that it is God Himself who has revealed those mysteries. Hence we
must believe infallibly that it is God Himself who has revealed
these mysteries.
Note, as corollary, that the least doubt on the existence of
revelation would entail doubt on the truth of the mysteries
themselves. Note further that infallible faith in a mystery as
revealed presupposes, by the very fact of its existence, [1231]
that we believe infallibly in the existence of divine revelation,
even though we do not explicitly reflect on that fact. [1232].
An objection arises. St. Thomas teaches that one and the same
truth cannot be simultaneously both known and believed. But, by
the miracles which confirm revelation, we know the fact of
revelation. Hence we cannot simultaneously believe them
supernaturally. In answer, Thomists point out that revelation is
indeed known naturally as miraculous intervention of the God of
nature, and hence is supernatural in the mode of its production,
like the miracle which confirms it. But revelation, since it is
supernatural in its essence, and not merely in the mode of its
production, can never be naturally known, but must be accepted by
supernatural faith. By one and the same act, to repeat St. Thomas,
[1233] we believe the God who reveals and the truth which He
reveals.
"Faith, " says the Vatican Council, [1234] "is a supernatural
virtue by which we believe that all that God reveals is true, not
because we see its truth by reason, but because of the authority
of God who reveals. " By the authority of God, as the phrase is
here used, we are to understand, so Thomists maintain, the
authority of God, not merely as author of nature and of miracles,
which are naturally known, but the authority of God as author of
grace, since revelation deals principally with mysteries that are
essentially supernatural.
Is this distinction, between God the author of nature and God the
author of grace, an artificial distinction? By no means. It runs
through all theology, particularly the treatise on grace. Without
grace, without infused faith, we cannot adhere to the formal
motive of faith, a motive far higher than the evidence of
credibility furnished by miracles. The believer holds the articles
of faith, says St. Thomas, [1235] simply because he believes and
clings to the first truth, which act is made possible by the habit
of faith. Thus the believer's act, essentially supernatural and
infallible, rises immeasurably above acquired faith as found in
the demon, whose faith is founded on the evidence of miracles, or
in the heretic who holds certain dogmas, not on the authority of
God which he has rejected, but on his own judgment and will.
The consequences of this doctrine for the spiritual life are very
pronounced. We see them in the teaching of St. John of the Cross
on passive purification of the spirit. Faith is purged of all
human alloy in proportion to its unmixed adherence to its formal
motive, at a height far above the motives of credibility,
including all accessory motives, life in a believing community,
say, which facilitates the act of faith. [1236].
The gifts which correspond to the virtue of faith are, first,
understanding, which enables us to penetrate the revealed
mysteries, [1237] second, knowledge, which illumines our mind on
the deficiency of second causes, on the gravity of mortal sin, on
the emptiness of a worldly life, on the inefficacy of human
concurrence in attaining a supernatural end. [1238] This gift thus
also facilitates a life of hope for divine gifts and eternal life.
ARTICLE TWO: HOPE [1239]
We dwell here, first on the formal motive of hope, secondly on its
certitude.
1. Hope tends to eternal life, i. e.: God possessed eternally
The formal motive of hope is not our own effort, is not a created
thing, but is God Himself, in His mercy, omnipotence, and
fidelity. All these divine perfections are summed up in the word:
God the Helper. [1240] Only the supreme agent can lead to the
supreme end. Since an uncreated motive is the characteristic of
each theological virtue, hope's uncreated motive is God as source
of unfailing succor, transmitted to us by our Savior's humanity
and Mary auxiliatrix. [1241].
Thus the infused virtue of hope, preserving us equally from
presumption and from despair, is something immeasurably higher
than the natural desire, conditional and inefficacious, to see
God, or the confidence born from the natural knowledge of God's
goodness.
Infused hope necessarily presupposes infused faith, by which we
know, first the supernatural end to which God has called us,
secondly the supernatural aid in attaining that end which He has
promised to those who pray for it.
Is hope inferior to charity? Certainly; but this inferiority, as
Thomists hold against the Quietists, does not mean that hope
contains a disorder, and that consequently we must sacrifice hope
in order to arrive at disinterested love. By infused hope, says
Cajetan, [1242] I do indeed desire God for myself, yet not for my
own sake, but for His sake. By hope we desire God as our supreme
Good, not subordinating Him to ourselves, but subordinating
ourselves to Him, whereas in the case of a good inferior to
ourselves, we wish it not only to ourselves, but as subordinated
to ourselves. [1243] Here the Quietists did not see clear. The
last end of hope is God Himself. To that end we subordinate
ourselves. Thus also God the Father, giving us His only Son as
Redeemer, subordinated us to that Son. "All things are yours, "
says St. Paul, "but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. ".
But when we say that hope desires God for His own sake, are we not
confounding hope with charity? No, because this phrase, "for God's
sake, " means, when used of hope, that God is the final cause,
whereas when used of charity it means the formal cause. Charity
loves God, primarily as He is in Himself, infinitely good,
secondarily as desirable to ourselves and to our neighbors. But
hope, though inferior to charity, still has God as its last end,
even when, in the state of mortal sin, it is separated from
charity. In the state of grace hope has God efficaciously loved
for His own sake as final motive. But when this love is
inefficacious by disordered self-love, it can still be good and
salutary, though not meritorious of life eternal. The sinner's
hope, though it remains a virtue, is still not in a state of
virtue, because its act is not efficaciously related to man's last
end.
But when, on the contrary, hope is vivified by charity, it grows
with charity, and is a great virtue though not the greatest of
virtues. To understand this truth better, we may note that
acquired magnanimity, and still more infused magnanimity, which
are closely related to hope, make us strive for great objectives,
to which we dedicate ourselves, a truth which we see exemplified
in the labors and struggles of founders of religious orders. Now
the infused virtue of hope stands still higher, because it aims,
not at great deeds merely, but at God Himself, to whom we dedicate
ourselves. Hope desires, not merely a precise degree of beatitude,
but eternal life itself. Hope carries us ever onwards toward God
as our supreme goal.
Consequently, whatever Quietists may say, we are not to sacrifice
hope and desire of salvation when we are undergoing that passive
purification of the spirit described particularly by St. John of
the Cross. Far from it. As St. Paul says, we are to "hope against
hope. " Passive purification, in truth, outlines in powerful
relief the supreme formal motive of this theological virtue. While
all secondary motives all but disappear, the supreme motive, "God
is my support, " remains always. God abandons not those who hope
in Him.
Further, in these passive purifications, confidence in God is ever
more animated and ennobled by charity. In adversity, in seeming
abandonment by God, hope is purified from all dross and
selfishness, and the soul desires God ever more keenly, not only
to possess Him but to glorify Him eternally.
2. The Certitude of Hope [1244]
St. Thomas has already noted four kinds of certitude: (a) the
certitude of science, founded on evidence; (b) the certitude of
faith, founded on revelation; (c) the certitude of the gift of
wisdom, founded on the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; (d) the
certitude of prudence in the practical order. It remains to show
precisely in what the certitude of hope consists. Hope resides,
not in the intellect, but in the will, under the infallible
guidance of faith. Hope, then, has a participated certitude. It
has, to speak formally and precisely, a certitude of tendency to
our last end, notwithstanding the uncertainty of salvation. Thus,
to illustrate, the swallow, following animal instinct under the
guidance of providence, tends unerringly to the region which is
its goal. Just as moral virtues, under the guidance of prudence,
tend to their goal, viz.: to the right medium of their respective
fields, so does hope tend with certainty to the last end.
It is true that we cannot, without a special revelation of our
predestination, be certain of our individual salvation. But,
notwithstanding this incertitude, we tend certainly to salvation,
resting on faith in the promises of God, who never commands the
impossible, but wills that we do what we can and pray when we
cannot. The passenger from Paris to Rome, to illustrate, even
while he knows of accidents which make his arrival uncertain,
still has a certitude of final arrival, a certitude which grows
with nearness to his goal.
Infused hope, like infused faith, can be lost only by a sin
contrary to itself, i. e.: by a mortal sin either of despair or of
presumption. But though it remains in the soul under mortal sin,
it does not remain in a state of virtue, because the soul deprived
of grace is not a connatural subject of virtue.
The gift which corresponds to the virtue of hope is the gift of
filial fear, which turns us away from sin and preserves us from
presumption. [1245].
ARTICLE THREE: CHARITY [1246]
St. Thomas devotes to this subject twenty-five questions. We
single out two points: first, the formal object of charity;
second, its characteristics. [1247].
1. Charity is that infused theological virtue by which, first, I
love God the author of grace, for His own sake, more than I love
myself, more than His gifts, more than all else; by which,
secondly, I love myself, and then my neighbor because he like
myself is loved by God and is called to glorify God both here and
in eternity. Charity is not indeed identified, as the Lombard
thought, with the Holy Spirit, but it is a gift created in the
will by that uncreated charity, which loved us first, and which
constantly preserves, vivifies, and re-creates our love.
Charity is, properly speaking, supernatural friendship, [1248]
friendship between God's children and God Himself, mutual
friendship among all the children and that one Father in heaven.
Friendship is a love of mutual benevolence, founded on life in
common, a life which is a participation in God's own inner life, a
life which enables us to see Him without medium, to love Him
without end. [1249].
The formal motive of charity is, therefore, the divine goodness,
supernaturally known and loved for its own sake. We must, it is
true, love God by reason of His gifts to us. But this love of
gratitude, though it is a disposition toward loving God for His
own sake, is not as such an act of charity, [1250] since the
goodness of the divine benefactor far surpasses all His gifts.
Hence charity desires eternal life in order to glorify God's
incommunicable goodness.
Charity, further, attains God without medium. Whereas in our
natural knowledge sense creatures are the medium, and whereas, in
the knowledge of faith, the ideas abstracted from the sense world
are the medium, in charity, on the contrary, our love of God has
no medium, and we love creatures only because we first love God.
"Charity, " says St. Thomas, "tends to God first, and from God
goes out to all else. Hence charity loves God without medium, and
all else with God as mediator. " [1251].
This unmediated love of God above all else must be objectively
universal and efficacious, but we should aim also at affective
intensity, at that conscious enthusiasm of the heart possessed by
God which in its full perfection is realized in heaven. [1252].
By one and the same act of charity we love God, and in God our
neighbor. [1253].
2. The first characteristic of charity is universality. No one can
be excluded from our love, though we love those who are nearer to
God with a greater love of esteem, and those who are nearer to us
with a greater intensity of feeling. [1254] And this love for
charity's secondary object, i. e.: myself and my neighbor, is a
love essentially supernatural and theological, far above that
affection which is merely natural.
Further, charity on earth is specifically identified with charity
in heaven, because the object, God's goodness, is the same when
not seen as when seen, the intellectual grasp of that object being
the condition indeed but not the cause of our love. Hence charity,
even here on earth, is, as St. John and St. Paul never cease to
proclaim, the most excellent of all virtues. Hence too, whereas in
heaven knowledge of God is higher than charity, here on earth
charity is higher than knowledge, since the latter is somehow
limited by its medium, i. e.: our finite ideas of God. [1255].
Being the highest of virtues, charity inspires and commands the
acts of all other virtues, making them meritorious of eternal
life. In this sense, charity is the form, the extrinsic form, of
all other virtues. Without charity the other virtues may still
exist, but they cannot exist in a state of virtue. Mortal sin
brings with it an enfeeblement of all virtues, hinders their
living connection, and allows none of them to be in a state of
virtue, i. e.: a state which can be changed only with difficulty.
[1256].
Charity grows by its own acts. [1257] An imperfect act of charity,
an act inferior in intensity to the virtue it proceeds from, still
merits condignly an augmentation of charity, but will not receive
that augmentation until its intensity disposes it thereto. [1258].
The gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds to the virtue of
charity is wisdom, which gives a connatural sympathy for and
appreciation of things divine. [1259] Faith, illumined by the
gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, is the source of
infused contemplation.
The formal motive, which is the guiding star of St. Thomas in
studying each of the three theological virtues, has important
consequences in the spiritual life, notably in the passive
purification of the spirit. It is in this process that these
virtues are purified from human dross, that their formal motives
are thrown into powerful relief far beyond all inferior and
accessory motives. First truth, supporting omnipotence, infinite
goodness, shine in the spirit's awful night like three stars of
the first magnitude. [1260].
CHAPTER 51: THE MORAL VIRTUES
ARTICLE ONE: PRUDENCE
THE charioteer among the virtues, the name given to prudence by
the ancients, shows that prudence is an intellectual virtue which
guides the moral virtues. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, says
that prudence is right reason as directing human acts. [1261] This
definition is found, proportionally, in acquired prudence which
educates and disciplines the will and the sense faculties, and in
infused prudence which pours divine light into these faculties.
[1262].
Prudence, acquired or infused, determines the golden middle way
between extremes, between cowardice, say, and temerity, in the
virtue of fortitude. But the medium way of acquired prudence is
subordinated to that of infused prudence; as, for example, in the
musician finger dexterity is subordinated to the art of music
which is in the practical intellect.
Prudence has three acts: first counsel, which scrutinizes the
means proposed for an end; second, practical judgment, which
immediately directs choice; third, imperium, which directs
execution. [1263].
In determining the relation between prudence and the moral
virtues, St. Thomas is guided by Aristotle's principle: "As are a
man's dispositions, so are his judgments. " [1264] If we are
ambitious, that is good which flatters our pride. If we are
humble, that is good which agrees with humility. No one, then, can
give prudent judgments unless he is disposed thereto by justice,
temperance, fortitude, loyalty, and modesty, just as, to
illustrate, the coachman cannot guide the vehicle well unless he
has well-trained horses. This is what St. Thomas means when he
says that the truth of the judgment passed by prudence depends on
its conformity to well-trained appetites, rational and sensitive.
[1265].
Here, as always, we see St. Thomas passing progressively from the
common sense of natural reason to philosophic reasoning, all in
the service of theology. Thus, even when the judgment of prudence
is speculatively false, in consequence of ignorance, say, or of
involuntary terror, that judgment is still true in the practical
order. To illustrate. When we simply cannot know nor even suspect
that the drink offered to us is poisoned, our act of drinking is
not imprudent. In the speculative objective order our judgment is
not true, but in the practical order it is true, because conformed
to right disposition and intention.
This virtuous disposition and intention, necessary for counsel, is
more necessary for the imperium. Prudence cannot command unless
the will and the sense appetites are seasoned in obedience. Here
lies what is called the interconnection of virtues, the union of
all virtues in one spiritual organism. Prudence, acquired and
infused, is the charioteer whose first task is continual training
of his steeds. For the education and formation of a good
conscience, the doctrines just explained are excellent guides,
more sure, profound, and useful than the shifting balance of
conflicting probabilities.
The gift which corresponds to prudence is that of counsel, which
gives us divine inspirations in eases where even infused prudence
hesitates, in answering, for instance, an indiscreet question, so
as neither to lie nor to betray a secret. [1266].
ARTICLE TWO: JUSTICE [1267]
Justice, either acquired or infused, is a virtue residing in man's
will, a virtue which destroys selfishness, and enables him to give
to each neighbor that neighbor's due. Justice is found on four
ascending levels: commutative justice, distributive justice,
social justice, equity.
Commutative justice rules everyday commercial life. It commands
honesty in buying, selling, and exchanging. It forbids theft,
fraud, calumny, and obliges to restitution.
Distributive justice is concerned with the right distribution of
public duties and awards, which are not to be given
indiscriminately, but in proportion to merit, need, and
importance. [1268].
Social justice, also called legal justice, establishes and
maintains the laws required for the common good and advancement of
society. Its source lies in political prudence, which belongs
principally to the rulers of the state, but also to the subjects
of the state, since without it the subject cannot be interested in
the common good which he shares with his fellow citizens, nor in
the observance of the laws which uphold that common welfare.
[1269].
Equity, also called epikeia, is the highest form of justice. It is
concerned, not merely with the letter of the law, but with the
spirit of the law, i. e.: with the intention of the legislator,
particularly in difficult and afflicting circumstances, where
rigid application of the law's mere letter would work injustice
[1270] and thus defeat the intention of the legislator. Equity,
resting on great good sense and wisdom, sees the spirit behind the
law and emulates charity, which is still higher than itself.
All these divisions reappear in higher form in infused justice,
which increases tenfold the energies of the will, imprinting upon
it a full Christian character which dominates even man's physical
temperament. If acquired virtue pours natural rectitude down into
our will and sense appetites, infused virtue, from an immeasurably
higher source, pours into those same faculties the supernatural
rectitude of faith and grace.
Justice, further, though it is the instrument of charity, differs
from it notably. Justice gives to each fellow man his right and
due. Charity gives each not only his rights, but the privileges of
a child of God and a brother of Jesus Christ. Justice, says St.
Thomas, [1271] looks on our neighbor as another person with his
own personal rights, whereas charity looks on him as another self.
When our neighbor sins, justice will not punish him beyond
measure, whereas charity will even forgive his sin. And, while
peace depends, first on justice, secondly on charity, justice
produces peace indirectly by removing wrongs, whereas charity, by
making men's hearts one in Christ, produces peace directly.
A specific question under justice is the right of ownership.
"Ownership, " says St. Thomas, [1272] "includes two rights: first,
the right to acquire and administer property as my own, second,
the right to use the revenues arising from this property. " "But
from this second right, " he adds, "there arises the duty of
aiding others in their necessities. " [1273] The rich man, far
from being a selfish monopolist, should rather be God's
administrator in favor of the needy. Only thus can human society
escape the domination of covetousness and jealousy, and live in
God's kingdom of justice and charity. [1274].
Lastly, let us notice the auxiliary virtues of justice, i. e.:
virtues which can only imperfectly render to others their due.
Here we find, first religion which, aided by the gift of piety,
gives to God that worship to which He has transcendent right.
Secondly penance, which repairs injuries to God. Thirdly filial
piety, toward parents and fatherland. Fourthly obedience to
superiors. Fifthly gratitude for benefits. Sixthly vigilance, to
be just, but also mild, in inflicting just punishment. Seventhly
truthfulness, both in word and deed. Eighthly, ninthly, and
tenthly are friendship, amiability, and generosity. [1275].
ARTICLE THREE: FORTITUDE [1276]
Fortitude keeps fear from shrinking and audacity from rushing.
Thus it holds the golden middle way between cowardice and
foolhardiness.
This definition holds good, proportionally, both of acquired
fortitude,
as in the soldier who faces death for his country, and of infused
fortitude, as in the martyr who, guided by faith and Christian
prudence, faces torments and death for Christ.
The principal act of fortitude is endurance, and its secondary act
is aggression. Endurance, says St. Thomas, [1277] is more
difficult than aggression and more meritorious. Greater moral
strength is shown in daily and long-continued self-control than in
the momentary enthusiasm which attacks a deadly adversary. Three
reflections show this truth:
a) He who endures is already in continual warfare against a self-
confident adversary.
b) He is accustomed to suffering, whereas he who waits for the
far-off struggle does not in the meantime exercise himself in
suffering and even hopes to escape it.
c) Endurance presupposes long training in fortitude, whereas
attack depends on a moment of temperamental enthusiasm.
Endurance at its best is exemplified in martyrdom, the supreme act
of fortitude, which gives even life to God. [1278] Whereas
counterfeit martyrdom, supported by pride and obstinacy, may also
be inflexible against pain, the genuine martyr is supported by
virtues seemingly opposed to fortitude, namely, charity and
prudence and humility, and loving prayer for his tormentor.
Fortitude is also the name of the gift which corresponds to the
virtue. He who is faithful to the Holy Ghost in the details of
daily life is prepared to be heroically faithful in the supreme
trial. [1279].
The auxiliary virtues of fortitude are magnanimity, constancy,
patience, perseverance.
ARTICLE FOUR: TEMPERANCE
Temperance rules the concupiscible appetite, particularly in the
domain of the sense of touch. It holds the golden mean between
intemperance and insensibility. Acquired temperance is ruled by
right reason, infused temperance by faith and grace. [1280].
The kinds of temperance are chiefly three: abstinence, the right
medium in food; sobriety, the right medium in drink; chastity, the
right medium in sex. [1281] Chastity, the virtue, must be clearly
distinguished from the instinct of shame, which naturally inclines
man to the virtue, just as sense pity inclines him to the virtue
of mercy. [1282].
Virginity is a virtue distinct from chastity, say, of the widow,
because virginity offers to God perfect and lifelong integrity of
the flesh. Virginity, then, is related to chastity as munificence
is related to liberality. [1283] It is a more perfect state than
that of matrimony, since it is a disposition for contemplation,
which is a higher good than propagation of the race. [1284].
Among the auxiliary virtues of temperance we must emphasize
humility and meekness. [1285] Humility, which, in Jesus and Mary,
found no pride to repress, consists in self-abasement first,
before the infinite Creator, secondly before each creature's share
in God's goodness. The humble man, rccognizing that of himself he
is nothingness and emptiness, sees in all other creatures what
they have from God, and hence is persuaded, and acts according to
his persuasion, that he is the lowest of all. [1286] This simple
and profound formula, the key to the life of the saints, ascends
by successive levels to perfection: [1287].
a) I recognize that I am contemptible.
b) I accept the consequent suffering.
c) I acknowledge my contemptibleness;
d) I wish my neighbor to believe me contemptible;
e) I hear patiently his expression of that belief.
f) I accept corresponding treatment.
g) I love this kind of treatment.
Humility is thus a fundamental virtue, which eradicates all pride,
the root of all sin, and leaves us completely docile to divine
grace. [1288] The sin of the first man, we note further, [1289]
was, like that of the angels, a sin of pride. But angelic pride
arose from a perfect knowledge which pre-existed, whereas human
pride came from a desire of knowledge which man had not, but
wished to have, in order to live independently of God, without
being bound by obedience. [1290].
Finally, [1291] we note the auxiliary virtue of studiousness,
which is again the golden middle road, between uncontrolled
curiosity and intellectual laziness, the latter being often a
consequence of the former, curiosity being spasmodic and short-
lived.
All in all, St. Thomas examines about forty virtues, all arranged
under the four cardinal virtues. Justice excepted, each virtue is
flanked by two opposite vices, one by excess, the other by defect.
Hence it comes that a virtue may have an external resemblance to a
vice. Magnanimity, for example, thus resembles pride. Acquired
virtue is often defective in this way, until it is perfected by
gifts of the Holy Ghost. Hence, if man's virtuous organism be
compared to an organ, defective virtue can easily strike false
notes, and thus we need the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost to
attain perfection in virtue. And thus we are brought to the study
of perfection, contemplative and active.
CHAPTER 52: CHRISTIAN PERFECTION
PERFECTION, SO we are taught by the Gospel and St. Paul, means
perfection in charity. "Every being, " says St. Thomas, [1292] "is
perfect when it attains its final goal. But charity unites us to
God, the goal of all human life, a truth expressed by St. John's
word on him who abides in God and God in him. Hence charity
constitutes the life of Christian perfection. " Faith and hope,
since they can coexist with mortal sin, cannot constitute
perfection. Nor can infused moral perfections, since they are
concerned with the roads that lead to God, and hence are
meritorious only so far as they are vivified by charity, which is
their animating principle.
"Perfection, " St. Thomas [1293] continues, "lies principally in
love of God, secondarily in love of neighbor, and only
accidentally in the evangelical counsels, " obedience, chastity,
and poverty, which are unprescribed instruments of perfection.
Hence perfection can be attained without literal observance of the
counsels, in the state, say, of matrimony, though the spirit of
the counsels, i. e.: detachment from worldliness, is necessary for
perfection in any state. The advantage of literal observance of
the counsels lies in this: they are the most sure and rapid road
whereby to reach sanctity.
Love of neighbor, though secondary in value when compared to love
of God, is nevertheless first in the order of time, because love
of our neighbor, who is the visible image of God, is the
indispensable first proof of our love for God. Our Lord says: "By
this shall all men know that you are My disciples, if you have
love one for another. " [1294].
Which is higher in value, love of God, or knowledge of God? In
this life, so runs the answer of St. Thomas, [1295] love of God
stands higher than knowledge of God. Why? Because, although in
general the intellect is higher than the will which it guides, our
intellect, until it obtains the beatific vision, draws God down
within its own limited and finite ideas, whereas when we love God
we ourselves are drawn upward to God's own unlimited and infinite
perfection. Hence it comes that when a saint, the Cure of Ars, for
example, teaches catechism, his act of love his higher value than
the wisest meditation of a theologian with a lower degree of love.
[1296] In this sense we can love God more than we know Him, and we
love Him the more, the more His mysteries surpass our knowledge.
Charity is the bond of perfection, since it draws all virtues into
one unit which is anchored in God.
But love of God and neighbor, in matrimony, priesthood, or
religion, is subject to the law of unlimited growth. It is an
error, says St. Thomas, [1297] to imagine that the commandment of
charity is limited to a degree beyond which it becomes a simple
counsel. The commandment itself has no limits. We must love God
with our whole heart, soul, mind, and strength. Charity is in no
way a mere counsel, but the purpose and goal of all commandments.
[1298] Means may be loved with measure, but not the end itself. No
one, says Aristotle, [1299] wills a goal by half. Does the
physician will to restore merely half of health? No. What he does
limit and measure is the medicine, the means whereby to restore,
if he can, unlimited health. Now the counsels are means, the
precept, the love of God, is the end. But why does God command,
not merely counsel, to love Him completely, with heart, soul,
mind, and strength, seeing that our love here below can never be
perfect? Because, as St. Augustine [1300] answers his own
question, love of God and neighbor is not a thing to be finished
here and now, but a goal to be ceaselessly aimed at by all men
each according to his own state of life. [1301] This ancient
doctrine, from which in part Suarez [1302] departs, is well
preserved by St. Francis de Sales, [1303] and reappears in two
encyclicals of Pius XI. [1304].
In relation to this perfection which consists in charity we
distinguish three forms of human life: the contemplative life, the
active life, and the apostolic life. [1305] Contemplation studies
divine truth, action serves our neighbor, preaching and teaching
gives to our neighbor the fruits of our own contemplation. [1306].
The active life is the disposition for the contemplative life,
because it subordinates passion to advancement in justice and
mercy. Its end is contemplation, the better part, which leads us
to rest eternally in the inner life of God. The apostolic life is
the completion of the contemplative life, because it is more
perfect to illumine others than to be merely illumined ourselves.
Hence the perfect apostolic life, as exemplified in the apostles
and their successors, presupposes plenitude of contemplation,
which itself advances by the gifts of knowledge, understanding,
and wisdom, which make faith penetrating and attractive. [1307].
Bishops must be perfect both in the active life and in the
contemplative. And whereas religious are tending to the perfection
of charity, [1308] bishops are already in the state of perfection
to which they are to lead others. [1309] Hence a bishop who would
enter religion would make a step backward, as long as he is useful
to the souls for whom he has accepted responsibility. [1310].
CHAPTER 53: CHARISMATIC GRACES
CHARISMATIC graces [1311] are given chiefly for the good of
others, to instruct them in revelation (by the word of knowledge,
by the word of wisdom): or to confirm that revelation (by
miracles, prophecies, discernment of spirits, etc. ). Here we
restrict ourselves to underlining the Thomistic doctrine regarding
prophecy, revelation, and biblical inspiration.
1. PROPHETIC REVELATION
Prophecy has degrees. [1312] On the lower level the prophet
(Caiphas, for example) may not know that he is prophesying. On the
higher level, in perfect prophecy, the prophet needs first the
supernatural proposition of a truth so far hidden, secondly a
supernatural knowledge that that proposition is divine in its
origin, thirdly an infused light by which he judges infallibly
regarding the truth itself and its divine origin. In giving the
prophet this revelation, God may use as intermediary the prophet's
external sense power, or his internal sense power, or his
intellect. [1313] As to his physical state, the prophet can be
either awake or in ecstasy or in dream. [1314] The object revealed
may be either a truth in itself essentially supernatural, or a
future contingent event, which, when it comes to pass, can be
naturally known. In either of these cases the prophecy thus
becomes, like miracles, a supernatural proof of divine revelation.
[1315].
2. BIBLICAL INSPIRATION [1316]
Under the name "prophecy, " St. Thomas includes all charismatic
intellectual graces. Hence biblical inspiration is a special kind
of prophecy, which, in the words of St. Augustine, he defines
thus: "a hidden and divine inspiration which human minds receive
unknowingly. " [1317] Thus inspiration differs from revelation. In
receiving revelation the mind receives new ideas, whereas in
simple inspiration, unaccompanied by revelation, no new ideas are
infused, but only a divine judgment on the ideas which the
inspired writer has already acquired, from experience, say, or
from human testimony, as the Evangelists, for example, knew before
inspiration the facts of our Lord's life which they report. And
since it is in judgment that truth or falsity resides, the infused
judgment of the inspired writer is divinely and infallibly
certain. [1318].
Biblical inspiration, then, is a divine light which makes the
judgment of the inspired writer divine, and consequently
infallible. Yet this scriptural inspiration, which has as its
object a written book, is not only a divine light for the writer's
spirit, but also a divine motion, which energizes the writer's
will, and through his will all his other faculties which cooperate
in producing the inspired book. But his charismatic grace of
inspiration is not a permanent and habitual grace, but is
transient and intermittent. [1319].
Thus Scripture has two authors, one divine and principal, the
other human and instrumental. [1320] This doctrine, generally held
both in medieval times and in our own, is clearly expounded in the
Providentissimus of Leo XIII. As instrumental cause, the inspired
writer attains the goal intended by the principal cause, and yet
retains his own character and style, and adopts any literary genus
he finds suited to his purpose.
Inspiration, then, to repeat, is a divine causality, physical and
supernatural, which elevates and moves the human writer in such
fashion that he writes, for the benefit of the Church, all that
God wills and in the way God wills. [1321] Hence God's causality
enters not only into the truth conceived by the human writer, but
into the very words employed by the human writer to express those
truths, as is seen by the very terms Holy Scripture, the Holy
Books, the Holy Bible, which faith, according to Jewish and to
Christian tradition, employs to express the results of
inspiration. These terms imply that the human author's decision to
use this set of words rather than another is also an effect of
inspiration.
Hence we are not to conceive inspiration as a mere material
dictation, whereby the human author would have no freedom in the
choice of words. Verbal inspiration, as here defended, leaves the
inspired authors even more free and personal than authors who are
not inspired, since God moves all second causes in conformity with
their individual natures. Hence, although verbal inspiration is
necessarily implied if the book is to be God's book, we must, if
we are to understand the literal meaning of that book, be fully
aware of the personal characteristics of the human writer, in
whom, as in every writer, style is subordinated to thought.
[1322].
Lastly, let us notice that statements may be infallible without
being inspired. Thus the definitions of the Church, although they
express divine truth infallibly, are not spoken of as inspired.
Infallibility is indeed the work of the Holy Ghost, but not in the
form of biblical inspiration. [1323].
CHAPTER 54: CONCLUSION
IN the first six parts of this work we studied what may be called
the dogmatic portion of the Summa. In the seventh part we
expounded the moral portions. Our exposition has shown how
faithful the saint has remained to his initial announcement [1324]
that dogmatic theology and moral theology are not two distinct
branches of knowledge, but only two parts of one and the same
branch of knowledge. Like God's knowledge from which it descends,
theology is, pre-eminently and simultaneously, both speculative
and practical, having throughout but one sole object: God revealed
in His own inner life, God as source and goal of all creation.
This conception of theology is at war with what we may call
Christian eclecticism. Hence we add here two articles, one, an
exposition of the evils of eclecticism, the other devoted to the
power of Thomism in remedying these evils.
ARTICLE ONE: THOMISM AND ECLECTICISM
This article reproduces substantially the important discourse of
his eminence, J. M. R. Villeneuve, archbishop of Quebec, delivered
May 24, 936, at the close of the Thomistic Convention in Ottawa,
Canada. [1325].
Thomism is concerned primarily with principles and doctrinal
order, wherein lie its unity and its power. Eclecticism, led by a
false idea of fraternal charity, seeks to harmonize all systems of
philosophy and theology. Especially after Pope Leo XIII the Church
has repeatedly declared that she holds to Thomism; but eclecticism
says equivalently: Very well, let us accept Thomism, but not be
too explicit in contradicting doctrines opposed to Thomism. Let us
cultivate harmony as much as possible.
This is to seek peace where there can be no peace. The fundamental
principles of the doctrine of St. Thomas, they would say, are
those accepted by all the philosophers in the Church. Those points
on which the Angelic Doctor is not in accord with other masters,
with Scotus, say, or with Suarez, are of secondary importance, or
even at times useless subtleties, which it is wise to ignore, or
at least to treat as mere matters of history. The Cardinal says:
In fact, the points of doctrine on which all Catholic
philosophers, or nearly all, are in accord, are those defined by
the Church as the preambles of faith. But all other points of
Thomistic doctrine, viz.: real distinction of potency from act, of
matter from form, of created essence from its existence, of
substance from accidents, of person from nature -- these,
according to eclecticism, are not fundamental principles of the
doctrine of St. Thomas. And they say the same of his doctrine that
habits and acts are specifically proportioned to their formal
objects. All these assertions, they say, are disputed among
Catholic teachers, and hence are unimportant.
These points of doctrine, which eclecticism considers unimportant,
are, on the contrary, says the Cardinal, the major pronouncements
of Thomism as codified in the Twenty-four Theses. [1326] Without
these principles thus codified, says the Cardinal of Quebec,
Thomism would be a corpse. [1327] The importance of these
Thomistic fundamentals is set in relief by a series of Suaresian
countertheses, published by the Ciencia Tomista. [1328].
In the following two paragraphs Cardinal Villeneuve signalizes the
consequences of contemporary eclecticism.
Since the days of Leo XIII many authors have tried, not to agree
with St. Thomas, but to get him to agree with themselves.
Consequences the most opposite have been drawn from his writings.
Hence incredible confusion about what he really taught. Hence a
race of students to whom his doctrine is a heap of
contradictories. What ignoble treatment for a man in whom, as Leo
XIII wrote, human reason reached unsurpassable heights! Thence
arose the opinion that all points of doctrine not unanimously
accepted by Catholic philosophers are doubtful. The final
conclusion was that, in order to give St. Thomas uncontradicted
praise, he was allowed to have as his own only what all Catholics
agree on, that is, the definitions of faith and the nearest
safeguards of that faith. Now this process, which reduces
Thomistic doctrine to a spineless mass of banalities, of
unanalyzed and unorganized postulates, results in a traditionalism
without substance or life, in a practical fideism, a lack of
interest in questions of faith. Hence the lack of vigilant
reaction against the most improbable novelties.
If we once grant that the criterion of truth, which ought to be
intrinsic evidence deriving from first principles, lies instead in
external acceptance by a majority, then we condemn reason to
atrophy, to dullness, to self-abdication. Man learns to get along
without mental exertion. He lives on a plane of neutral
persuasion, led by public rumor. Reason is looked upon as
incapable of finding the truth. We might be inclined to trace this
abdication to a laudable humility. But, judged by its fruits, it
engenders philosophic skepticism, conscious or unconscious, in an
atmosphere ruled by mystic sentimentalism and hollow faith.
Eclecticism, we may add, entertains doubts about the classic
proofs of God's existence, hardly allowing any argument to stand
as proposed by St. Thomas.
"If we must leave out of philosophy, " the Cardinal continues,
"all questions not admitted unanimously by Catholics, then we must
omit the deepest and most important questions, we must leave out
metaphysics itself, and with that we will have removed from St.
Thomas the very marrow of his system, that wherein he outstrips
common sense, that which his genius has discovered. ".
Further, we may add, with such a decapitated Thomism, we could no
longer defend common sense itself. With Thomas Reid's Scotch
School we would, after renouncing philosophy in favor of common
sense, find ourselves unable to analyze that common sense, to
anchor it in self-evident, necessary, and universal principles.
Does charity oblige us to sacrifice depth and exactness of thought
to unity of spirit? No, replies the Cardinal; that which wounds
charity is not truth nor the love of truth, but selfishness,
individual and corporate. Genuine doctrinal harmony lies along the
road to which the Church points when she says: Go to Thomas.
Loyalty to Thomas, far from curtailing intellectual freedom,
widens and deepens that freedom, gives it an unfailing
springboard, firm and elastic, to soar ever higher out of error
into truth. "You shall know the truth; and the truth shall make
you free. " [1329].
ARTICLE TWO: THE ASSIMILATIVE POWER OF THOMISM
A doctrine's assimilative power is in proportion to the elevation
and universality of its principles. Here, then, we wish to show
that Thomism can assimilate all the elements of truth to be found
in the three principal tendencies which characterize contemporary
philosophy. Let us begin with an outline of these three
tendencies.
The first of these is agnosticism, either empiric agnosticism, in
the wake of positivism, or idealist agnosticism, an offshoot of
Kantianism. Here belongs the neo-positivism of Carnap,
Wittgenstein, Rougier, and of the group called the Vienna Circle.
[1330] In all these we find the re-edited Nominalism of Hume and
Comte. Here belongs also the phenomenology of Husserl, which holds
that the object of philosophy is the immediate datum of
experience. All these philosophies are concerned, not with being,
but with phenomena, to use the terms of Parmenides in pointing out
the two roads which the human spirit can follow.
The second tendency is evolutionist in character. Like
agnosticism, it appears in two forms: one idealist, in the wake of
Hegel, represented by Gentile in Italy, by Leon Brunschvicg in
France; the other empiric, in the creative evolution of Bergson,
who, however, toward the end of life, turned again, like Blondel,
in the direction of traditional philosophy, led by the power of an
intellectual and spiritual life devoted to the search for the
Absolute.
The third tendency is the metaphysical trend of the modern German
school. It appears under three chief forms: voluntarism in Max
Scheler; natural philosophy in Driesch, who leans on Aristotle;
and ontology in Hartmann of Heidelberg, who gives a Platonic
interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics. The great problems of
old, we see, compel attention still: the constitution of bodies,
the essence of life, sensation, knowledge, freedom, and morality,
the distinction between God and the world. And as the ancient
problems reappear, so reappear the ancient antinomies, mechanism
or dynamism, empiricism or intellectualism, monism or theism. Let
us now see how Thomism assimilates, in transcendent unity, all
that is true in these opposed theories.
1. The Generative Principle
In Thomism, which is simply a deepened form of perennial
philosophy, we find again what is best in the thought of
Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine. This philosophy, says Bergson, is
nothing but the natural development of ordinary human
intelligence. This philosophy, therefore, is open to all genuine
progress in science. It is not, like Hegelianism, the huge a
priori construction of one bewitching genius, but a temple that
rests on a broad inductive base, centuries-old, but perpetually
repaired by the most attentive study of all attainable fact, a
study strikingly exemplified in the work of Albert the Great, the
teacher of St. Thomas.
This inductive basis presupposed, Thomistic metaphysics continues
through the ages to scrutinize the relations between intelligible
being and becoming, the passage from potency to act, the various
kinds of causes. By these two characteristics, one positive, the
other intellectual, Thomism is deeply opposed to Kantianism and
its offshoots. Thomism, because it remains in continual contact
with facts, and because it simultaneously studies the laws of
being, becoming, and causality, accepts all the genuine elements
found in systems otherwise mutually contradictory. This power of
absorption and assimilation is a criterion of its validity, both
for thought and for life.
Here we introduce a profound remark of Leibnitz, though he himself
only glimpsed its consequences. Speaking of the philosophia
perennis, he says that philosophic systems are generally true in
what they affirm, but false in what they deny. This remark, which
has its roots in Aristotle and Aquinas, must be understood of
genuine and constituent affirmations, not of negations disguised
as affirmations. Thus materialism is true in its affirmation of
matter, false in its denial of spirit. The reverse is true of
idealism. Similarly, though Leibnitz did not see it fully,
psychological determination is true in affirming that the
intellect guides the free choice of the will, but false in denying
genuine freedom of will. And the reverse is true of "Libertism, "
which dreams of a freedom unfettered by intellectual guidance.
But this remark, applied eclectically by Leibnitz, holds good
likewise from the higher viewpoint of Aristotle and Aquinas. Each
successive system affirms some element of reality even while it
often denies another element of reality. This denial, then, as
Hegel said, provokes a counterdenial, before the mind has reached
a higher synthesis.
We hold, then, that Aristotelian-Thomistic thought, far from being
an immature a priori construction, remains always on the alert for
every aspect of reality, eager not to limit that reality which
dominates our ever-growing sense experience, external and
internal, but eager also not to limit our intelligence, intuitive
in its principles, discursive in its conclusions. Thus, while it
rests on common sense, it rises far above common sense, by its
discovery of the natural subordination in which sense knowledge
stands to intellect. The common sense of Thomas Reid does not
build a foundation for Thomas Aquinas.
This traditional philosophy differs further from eclecticism
because, not content to limit itself to choosing, without a
directive principle, what seems most plausible in various systems,
it begins rather with a superior principle that illumines from on
high the great problems of all times. This principle, itself
derived from that of contradiction and causality, is the
distinction of potency from act, a distinction without which, as
Aristotle says and Thomas reaffirms, it is impossible to answer
both Heraclitus, who defends universal evolution, and Parmenides,
who defends a changeless monism.
Potency distinct from act explains the process of becoming, the
passage from one form to another, the passage from seed to plant,
from potentiality to actuality. This process presupposes an agent
that prepossesses the perfection in question, and a directing
intelligence toward the perfection to be realized. The process of
becoming is essentially subordinated to the being which is its
goal. Becoming is not, as Descartes would have it, a mere local
movement defined by its points of rest, but a function of being in
its passage from potency to act.
The process of becoming therefore presupposes four sources: matter
as passive potency, as capacity proportioned to the perfection it
is to receive; act in three fashions, first in the actualizing
agent, secondly in the form which terminates becoming, thirdly in
the purpose toward which the form tends.
Finite beings are conceived as composed of potency and act, of
matter and form, and, more generally, of real essence and
existence, essence limiting the existence which actualizes it, as
matter limits its actualizing form. Then, preceding all beings
composed and limited, must be pure act, if it is true that
actuality is more perfect than potentiality, that actual
perfection is something higher than mere capacity to receive
perfection, that what is something more than what as yet is not.
This is a most fundamental tenet of Thomism. At the summit of all
reality we must find, not the endless evolutionary process of
Heraclitus or Hegel, but pure actuality, being itself, truth
itself, goodness itself, unlimited by matter, or essence, or any
receiving capacity whatever. This doctrine on the supreme reality,
called by Aristotle the self-existing and self-comprehending act
of understanding, [1331] contained also in Plato's thought, is
fortified and elevated by the revealed truth of the freedom of
God's creative act, revealed, it is true, but still attainable by
reason, hence not a mystery essentially supernatural like the
Trinity.
Let us now see the assimilative power of this generative principle
on ascending philosophical levels: in cosmology, in anthropology,
in criteriology, in ethics, in natural theology. By way of general
remark, let us note that Thomistic assimilation is due to the
Thomistic method of research. In meeting any great problem Thomism
begins by recalling extreme solutions that are mutually
contradictory. Next it notes eclectic solutions which fluctuate
between those extremes. Lastly, it rises to a higher synthesis
which incorporates all the elements of reality found in its
successive surveys of positions which remain extreme. This
ultimate metaphysical synthesis it is which Thomism offers as
substructure of the faith.
1. Cosmology
Mechanism affirms the existence of local motion, of extension in
three dimensions, often of atoms, but denies sense qualities,
natural activity and finality. Hence it cannot well explain
weight, resistance, heat, electricity, affinity, cohesion, and so
on. Dynamism, on the contrary, affirming sense qualities, natural
activity, and finality, reduces everything to mere force, denying
any extension properly so called, and denying also the principle
that activity presupposes being. Now the doctrine of matter and
form accepts all that is positive in these two extreme
conceptions. By two principles, distinct but intimately united, it
explains both extension and force. Extension has its source in
matter, which is common to all bodies, capable of receiving the
specific form, the essential structure, of iron, say, or gold, or
hydrogen, or oxygen. And the doctrine of specific form explains,
far better than does Plato's idea or the monad of Leibnitz, all
the natural qualities, characteristics, and specific activities of
bodies, in full harmony with the principle that specific activity
presupposes specific being.
Matter, being a purely receptive capacity, while it is not yet
substance, is still a substantial element, meant to blend with
form into a natural unity, not accidental but essential.
This doctrine explains too how extension can be mathematically,
not actually, divisible into infinity. Extension cannot be
composed of indivisible points, which would be all identical if
they were in contact, and if not in contact would be
discontinuous. Hence the parts of extension must be themselves
extended, capable indeed of mathematical division but not of
physical.
Mechanism tries in vain to reduce plant life to physico-chemical
developments of a vegetative germ, which produces, here a grain of
corn, and there an oak, or from an egg brings forth a bird, a
fish, or a snake. Must there not be, asks Claude Bernard, some
force that guides evolution? In the germ, in the embryo, if it is
to evolve into definite and determined structure, there must be a
vital and specifying principle, which Aristotle called the
vegetative soul of the plant and the sense soul of the animal.
This doctrine assimilates, without eclecticism, all that is
positive in mechanism and dynamism even while it rejects their
negations.
2. Anthropology
Man is by nature a unified whole, one, not accidentally but per se
and essentially. He is not two complete substances accidentally
juxtaposed. Matter in the human composite is actualized by one
sole specific and substantial form, which is the radical principle
of life, vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual. This would be
impossible if one and the same soul were the proximate principle
of all man's actions, but it is possible if the soul has a
hierarchy of faculties. Here, again, we have an application, not
eclectic, but spontaneous and daring, of the distinction between
potency and act. The essence of the soul is proportioned to the
existence which actualizes it, and each faculty is proportioned to
its own act. The soul, therefore, cannot act without its
faculties, can understand only by its intellect, and will only by
its will.
Here Leibnitz and Descartes represent extremes. Leibnitz,
misunderstanding the Aristotelian term dynamis, which may be
either passive or active, puts the principle of mere force and
power in the place of potency and act. Descartes, at the opposite
extreme, sees in the mental activity of thought the sole principle
of philosophizing about man. Leibnitz neglects to reduce force,
and Descartes neglects to reduce thought, to functions of being.
Man's intellect, to go further, since it attains universal and
necessary truth, is not limited by material conditions and
material organs. Hence man's soul, the source of his intellect, is
independent of matter, and hence survives the corruption of the
human organism.
3. Criteriology
The extremes here are empiricism and intellectualism. Thomism
accepts both the inductive method of empiricism and the deductive
method of intellectualism. But Thomism insists further that the
first principles from which deduction proceeds are not mere
subjective laws of the mind but objective laws of reality.
Without, say, the principle of contradiction, the principle of
Descartes ("I think, therefore I am") may be a mere subjective
illusion. Perhaps, since one contradictory (I think) does not
objectively exclude its opposite (I do not think): perhaps
thinking is not essentially distinct from non-thinking. Perhaps,
further, thought is buried in the subconscious, its beginning
unknown and its end. Perhaps, again, "I am" and "I am not" are
both true. Perhaps, finally, the word "I" stands for a mere
transient process, unsupported by any individual permanent and
thinking subject.
But if, on the contrary, the objective reality of the sense world
is the first object of the human intellect, then, by reflection on
the source of its act, the intellect grasps its own existence with
absolute certitude, knows itself in an objectively existing
faculty, capable of penetrating through sense phenomena into the
nature and characteristics of the objective world. It sees then
its own immeasurable heights above, say the imagination, which
however rich it may be and fertile, can never grasp the "why" of
any motion, of a clock, for example.
By this same line of thought we distinguish further the will,
illumined by intellect, from sense appetite, guided by sense
knowledge. As the object of the intellect is objective and
universal truth, so the object of the will is objective and
universal good.
4. Freedom and morality
By normal development of the distinction between potency and act
Thomism rises above the psychological determinism of Leibnitz and
the freedom of equilibrium conceived by Scotus, Suarez, Descartes,
and certain moderns, Secretan, for example, and J. Lequier. Thomas
admits the positive point of psychological determinism, namely,
that intelligence guides man's act of choice, but he goes on to
show that it depends on the will itself whether the intellect's
practical judgment shall or shall not terminate deliberation.
[1332] Why? Because, granted that the intellect has to propose its
object to the will, it is the will which moves the intellect to
deliberate, and this deliberation can end only when the will
freely accepts what the intellect proposes. Intellect and will are
inseparably related.
What then is free will? Free will, in God, in angel, and in man,
is indifference, both of judgment and of choice, in the presence
of any object which, however good otherwise, is in some way
unattractive. God, when seen face to face, is in every way
attractive, and draws our love infallibly and invincibly. But even
God is in some way unattractive as long as we must know Him
abstractly, as long as we feel His commandments to be a burden.
Why is the will thus free and indifferent in the presence of an
object in any way unattractive? Because the will's adequate object
is unlimited and universal good. Hence even the moral law does not
necessitate the will. I see the better road, I approve it
speculatively, but I follow, in fact and by choice, the worse
road.
Thomism, further, admits fully the morality governed by duty and
the longing for happiness. Why? Because the object of the will, as
opposed to sense appetite, is the good proposed by reason. Hence
the will, being essentially proportioned to rational good, is
under obligation to will that good, since otherwise it acts
against its own constitution, created by the author of its nature
as preparation for possessing Himself, the Sovereign Good. Always,
we see, the same principle: potency is naturally proportioned to
the act for which the creature was created.
5. Natural theology
That which is, is more than that which can be, more than that
which is on the road to be. This principle led Aristotle and
Aquinas to find, at the summit of all reality, pure act,
understanding of understanding, sovereign good. But Aquinas rises
above Aristotle and Leibnitz, for whom the world is a necessary
consequence of God. St. Thomas shows, on the contrary, the reason
why we must say with revelation that God is sovereignly free, to
create or not to create, to create in time rather than from
eternity. The reason lies in God's infinite plentitude of being,
truth, and goodness, which creatures can do nothing to increase.
After creation, there are more beings, it is true, but not more
being, not more perfection, wisdom, or love. "God is none the
greater for having created the universe. " God alone, He who is,
can say, not merely "I have being, truth, and life, " but rather
"I am being itself, truth itself, life itself. ".
Hence the supreme truth of Christian philosophy is this: In God
alone is essence identified with existence. The creature is only a
capability to exist, it is created and preserved by Him who is.
Further, the creature, not being its own existence, is not its own
action, and cannot pass from potency to act, either in the order
of nature or in that of grace, except by divine causality.
We have thus shown how Thomism is an elevated synthesis, which,
while it rejects unfounded denials, assimilates the positive
tendencies of current philosophical and theological conceptions.
This synthesis recognizes that reality itself is incomparably more
rich than our ideas of that reality. In a word, Thomism is
characterized by a sense of mystery, [1333] which is the source of
contemplation. God's truth, beauty, and holiness are continually
recognized as transcending all philosophy, theology, and
mysticism, as uncreated richness to be attained only by the
beatific vision, and even under that vision, however clearly
understood, as something which only God Himself can comprehend in
all its infinite fullness. Thomism thus keeps ever awake our
natural, conditional, and inefficacious desire to see God as He
is. Thus we grow in appreciation of the gifts of grace and
charity, which move us, efficaciously, to desire and to merit the
divine vision.
This power of assimilation is therefore a genuine criterion
whereby to appraise the validity and scope of Thomism, from the
lowest material elements up to God's own inner life. Economy
demands that any system have one mother-idea, as radiating center.
The mother-idea of Thomism is that of God as pure act, in whom
alone is essence identified with existence. This principle, the
keystone of Christian philosophy, enables us to explain, as far as
can be done here below, what revelation teaches of the mysteries
of the Trinity and the Incarnation, the unity of existence in the
three divine persons, the unity of existence in Christ. [1334] It
explains likewise the mystery of grace. All that is good in our
free acts comes from God as first cause, just as it comes from us
as second causes. And when we freely obey, when we accept rather
than resist grace, all that is good in that act comes from the
source of all good. Nothing escapes that divine and universal
cause, who without violence actualizes human freedom, just as
connaturally as He actualizes the tree to bloom and bear fruit.
Let Thomism then be judged by its principles, necessary and
universal, all subordinated to one keystone principle, not a
restricted principle as is that of human freedom, but by the
uncreated principle of Him who is, on whom everything depends, in
the order of being and activity, in the order of grace and of
nature. This is the system which, in the judgment of the Church,
most nearly approaches the ideal of theology, the supreme branch
of knowledge.
EIGHTH PART: Developments and Confirmations
To develop and confirm the synthesis so far expounded, we add five
supplementary chapters:
1. The Twenty-four Thomistic Theses.
2. The Principle of Contradiction.
3. Truth and Pragmatism.
4. Ontological Personality.
5. Grace, Efficacious and Sufficient.
The first chapter is a summary of the Thomistic synthesis. The
second and third chapters deal with the objective foundations of
this synthesis. The fourth treats a question, much controverted
and very important, in the treatise on the Trinity and in that on
the Incarnation. The fifth deals with the opposition between
Thomism and Molinism.
CHAPTER 55: THE TWENTY-FOUR THOMISTIC THESES
BY the Motu Proprio of June 29, 1914, Pius X prescribed that all
courses in philosophy should teach "the principles and the major
doctrines of St. Thomas, " and that in the centers of theological
studies the Summa theologiae should be the textbook.
ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-FOUR THESES
The state of things which Pius X intended to remedy has been well
described above (p. 343 ff. ) by Cardinal Villeneuve. We repeat
here briefly the Cardinal's contentions:
a) Authors try to make St. Thomas the mouthpiece of their own pet
theories.
b) Hence contradictory presentations by teachers and writers,
confusion and disgust among students.
c) Hence, Thomism reduced to the minimum on which all Catholic
thinkers can agree, hence to a blunted traditionalism and an
implicit fideism.
d) Hence, carelessness in the presence of extremely improbable new
doctrines, abdication of thought in the domain of piety, practical
skepticism in philosophy, mysticism based on emotion.
Against this withered and confused Thomism, Pius X prescribes
return to the major doctrines of St. Thomas. What are these major
doctrines? The Congregation of Sacred Studies, having examined the
twenty-four fundamental theses presented by Thomistic professors
of various institutions, replied, with the approval of the Holy
Father, that these same twenty-four theses contain the principles
and major doctrines of St. Thomas. [1335]
What shall be the binding force of these theses? They are safe
norms of intellectual guidance. [1336] This decision of the
Congregation, confirmed by Benedict XV, was published March 7,
1916.
The next year, 1917, saw the promulgation of the New Code, which
[1337] makes the method, the principles, and the teaching of St.
Thomas binding on the professors and students both in philosophy
and in theology. Among the sources of this canon the Code cites
the decree of March 7, 1916.
Pope Benedict XV, on various occasions, expressed his mind on this
point. He approved, for instance, in a special audience, the
intention of P. E. Hugon, O. P.: to write a book [1338] on the
twenty-four theses. The author of the book [1339] reports that the
Pontiff said that he did not intend to impose the twenty-four
theses as compelling internal assent, but as the doctrine
preferred by the Church. [1340]
It gradually became known that these twenty-four theses had been
formulated by two Thomists of great competence who, throughout
their long teaching career, had been teaching these theses in
juxtaposition with their respective countertheses.
Is the real distinction of potency from act a mere hypothesis?
Some historians of great name, who in special works have expounded
the teaching of St. Thomas, saw in the real distinction of potency
from act a mere postulate. And an excellent review has, for forty
years, carried a series of learned articles which culminate in
this conclusion: the doctrine of real distinction between potency
and act is an admirable hypothesis, most fertile in results.
Now if this distinction were but a postulate or a hypothesis,
then, however strongly suggested it might be by the facts, it
would still not compel the mind's assent. What becomes then of the
proofs for God's existence, which are based on that distinction?
Those who formulated these theses, on the contrary, saw in the
distinction of potency from act not a mere postulate or
hypothesis, but the very first principle, the necessary foundation
for all the other theses. In truth, if we study the commentaries
of St. Thomas on the first two books of Aristotle's Physica and
books three and four of his Metaphysica, we see that real
distinction of potency from act imposes itself necessarily on the
mind which attempts to harmonize the principle of contradiction or
identity [1341] with that of becoming or multiplicity. [1342]
"That which is, is, and that which is not, is not. That's a
sentence we cannot escape from. " This is the formula of
Parmenides, which makes of the principle of identity not merely a
necessary and universal law of reality, but a law which governs
all processes of becoming. A thing supposed to be in process of
becoming cannot arise either from being or from non-being. Not
from being, which already is: the statue cannot come from a statue
which already is. Not from non-being: out of nothing comes
nothing. Hence all becoming is an impossibility, an illusion. If
you set yourself to walking, to disprove Parmenides, he retorts:
Walking is a mere appearance, a sense phenomenon, whereas the
principle of identity is a primordial law both of the mind and of
reality.
For the same reason Parmenides concludes the impossibility of more
than one being. Being cannot be diversified by itself, nor by
something different from itself, which could only be non-being, i.
e.: nothing. Hence being is one and immutable. Parmenides here,
like Spinoza later, confounds being in general with divine being.
With Parmenides, Aristotle too, against Heraclitus, defends the
principle of contradiction, which is the negative form of the
principle of identity: being is being, non-being is non-being, we
cannot confound the two.
But Aristotle shows too that the process of becoming, which is an
evident fact of experience, is to be harmonized with the principle
of identity and contradiction by the real distinction between
potency and act. This distinction, accepted, however confusedly,
by natural reason, by the common sense of mankind, is
indispensable in solving the arguments of Parmenides against the
reality of generation and multiplicity.
That which is generated, which comes into existence, cannot come
from an actually existing thing: a statue does not arise from
something which is already a statue. Nor can it come from that
which is simply nothing. [1343] But that which comes into
existence comes from indeterminate potential being, which is
nothing but a real capacity to receive an actual perfection. The
statue comes from the wood, yes, yet not from wood as wood, but
from wood as capable of being carved. Movement supposes a subject
really capable of undergoing motion. The plant, the animal, comes
from a germ capable of definite evolution. Knowledge comes from
the infant's intelligence capable of grasping principle and
consequences.
That there are many statues, say, of Apollo, supposes that the
form of Apollo can be received in diverse portions of matter, each
capable of receiving that form. That there are many animals of one
specific kind supposes that their specific form can be received in
diverse parts of matter, each capable of being thus determined and
actualized.
Potency, then, is not act, not even the most imperfect act
conceivable. Potency is not yet initial movement. Potency,
therefore, since it cannot be act, is really distinct from act,
and hence remains under the act it has received, as a containing
capacity of that act which it receives and limits. Matter is not
the form which it receives but remains distinct under that form.
If potency were imperfect act, [1344] it would not be really
distinct even from the perfect act which it receives.
In the eyes of Aristotle, and of Aquinas who deepened Aristotle,
real potency, as receiving capacity, is a necessary medium between
actual being and mere nothing. Without real potency there is no
answer to Parmenides, no possible way to harmonize becoming and
multiplicity with the principle of identity, the primordial law of
thought and of reality. Becoming and multiplicity involve a
certain absence of identity, an absence which can be explained
only by something other than act, and this other something can
only be a real capacity, either to receive the act if the capacity
is passive potency, or to produce the act, if the potency is
active. But active potency is still potency, and hence presupposes
an actual mover to actualize that potency. Hence arise the four
causes, matter, form, agent, and end, with their correlative
principles, in particular that of efficient causality, of
finality, of mutation. Thus, in his first proof of God's
existence, St. Thomas writes: [1345] "Nothing can be moved except
it be in potency. The thing which moves it from potency to act
must be actual, not potential. Nothing can be reduced from potency
to act except by being which is not potential, but actual. " This
proof, it is evident, rests on the real distinction of potency
from act. If that principle is not necessarily true, the proof
loses its demonstrative power. The same holds good for his
following proofs.
This truth was clearly seen by those who formulated the twenty-
four theses.
DERIVATIVE PROPOSITIONS
In the Thomistic Congress, held in Rome (1925): we illustrated the
inner unity of the twenty-four theses by showing the far-reaching
consequences of the distinction between potency and act. The
points made in that paper we here summarize.
In the order of being we note ten consequences of the principle
that potency is really and objectively distinct from act.
I. Matter is not form, but really distinct from form. Prime matter
is pure potency, mere receiving capacity. Without form, it can
simply not exist.
2. Finite essence is not its own existence, but really distinct
from that existence.
3. God alone, pure act, is His own existence. He is existence
itself, unreceived and irreceivable. "Sum qui sum. "
4. In all created person, personality is really distinct from
existence. [1346]
5. God alone, existence itself, can have no accidents. Hence, by
opposition, no created substance is immediately operative; it
needs, in order to act, a superadded operative potency.
6. Form can be multiplied only by being received into matter. The
principle of individuation is matter as preordained to this
particular quantity.
7. The human soul is the sole form of the human body, since
otherwise it would be, not substantial form, but accidental, and
would not make the body one natural unity.
8. Matter, of itself, has neither existence nor cognoscibility. It
becomes intelligible only by its relation to form.
9. The specific form of sense objects, since it is not matter, is
potentially intelligible.
10. Immateriality is the root both of intelligibility and of
intellectuality. [1347] The objectivity of our intellectual
knowledge implies that there is in sense objects an intelligible
element, distinct from matter, and the immateriality of the spirit
is the source of intellectuality, the level of intellectuality
corresponding to the level of immateriality.
In the order of operation, we note six consequences.
I. The operative potencies, the faculties, are distinguished
specifically by the formal object and act to which each is
proportioned.
2. Hence each faculty is really distinct, first, from the soul
itself, second, from all other faculties.
3. Each cognoscitive faculty becomes, intentionaliter, i. e.: in a
supramaterial order, the object known, whereas matter cannot
become form.
4. Whatever is in motion has that motion from something higher
than itself. Now, in a series of actually and necessarily
subordinated causes regression to infinity is impossible: the sea
is upheld by the earth, the earth by the sun, the sun by some
higher source, but somewhere there must be a first upholding
source. Any cause, which is not its own activity, can have that
activity ultimately only from a first and supreme cause which is
its own activity, and hence its own existence, because mode of
activity follows mode of being. Hence the objective necessity of
admitting God's existence.
5. Since every created faculty is specifically constituted by its
own proper object, it follows evidently that no created intellect
can be specifically proportioned to the proper object of divine
intelligence. Hence the divinity as it is in itself, being
inaccessible to created intelligence, constitutes an order
essentially supernatural, an order of truth and life which
transcends even the order of miracles, which are indeed divine
deeds, but can be known naturally.
6. The obediential potency, by which the creature is capable of
elevation to the supernatural order, is passive, not active. Were
it otherwise, this potency would be both essentially natural, as a
property of nature, and simultaneously supernatural, as
specifically constituted by a supernatural object, to which it
would be essentially proportioned. The word "obediential" relates
this potency to the agent which alone can raise it to a
supernatural object, to which, without that elevation, it can
never be related and proportioned. Here lies the distinction
between the two orders. The theological virtues are per se infused
only because they are specifically constituted by a supernatural
object which, without grace, is inaccessible.
Revelation admitted, the real distinction of potency from act, of
finite essence from existence, leads us to admit, further, that in
Christ, just as there is one person for the two natures, so there
is likewise one existence for those two natures. The Word
communicates His own existence to his human nature, as, to
illustrate, the separated soul, when it resumes its body, gives to
that body its own existence. Similarly, in the Trinity, there is
for the three persons one sole uncreated existence, namely,
existence itself, identified with the divine nature. [1348]
Such are the consequences of the distinction between potency and
act, first in the natural order, then in the supernatural order.
The brief analysis just given shows what the Congregation of
Studies had in mind when it declared that the twenty-four theses
are safe norms of intellectual direction. The supreme authority
[1349] does not intend these theses to be definitions of faith,
but declarations of the doctrine preferred by the Church.
FORGETTING THE TWENTY-FOUR THESES
We have noted above the state of things that led to the formation
of the twenty-four theses. Now, thirty years later, the same
conditions seem to have returned. Lip-service to St. Thomas is
universal, but the theses defended under his name are often worlds
apart, and even contradict the holy doctor. Can a man be called
Thomist by the mere fact that he admits the dogmas defined by the
Church, even while he follows Descartes in his teachings on the
spiritual life, or denies the evident principle of causality, and
hence the validity of proof for the existence of God.
A small error in principle is a great error in conclusion. This is
the word of St. Thomas, repeated by Pius X. To reject the first of
the twenty-four theses is to reject them all. This reflection led
the Church to approve the twenty-four.
But are not the truths of common sense a sufficient foundation for
Catholic philosophers and theologians? They are, but not when they
are distorted by individualistic interpretations. If these truths
are to be defended today, against phenomenalists, idealists, and
absolute evolutionists, we must penetrate to their philosophic
depths. Without this penetration we lose all consistency, even in
fundamentals, and fall prey to a skepticism, if not in thought, at
least in life and action, to a fideism which is the dethronement
of reason and of all serious intellectual life. And if it be said
that sincerity in the search for truth remains, then we must
retort that a sincerity which refuses to recognize the value of
the greatest doctors whom God gave to His Church is surely a
doubtful sincerity, destined never to reach its goal. Common sense
is a term to conjure with. But let it be genuine common sense,
fortified by deep analysis of man's first notions and man's first
principles. Otherwise, deserting Thomas of Aquin, we may find
ourselves in the poor encampment of Thomas Reid.
Here we may well listen to Pierre Charles, S. J.: "In favor of the
history of dogma, and in discredit of metaphysics, an extremely
virulent relativism had been, almost without notice, introduced
into the teaching of doctrine. Psychology replaced ontology.
Subjectivism was substituted for revelation. History inherited the
place of dogma. The difference between Catholics and Protestants
seemed reduced to a mere practical attitude in regard to the
papacy. To arrest and correct this baneful and slippery attitude,
Pius X had the proper gesture, brusk and definitive. Anglican
modernism today shows all too well the frightening consequences to
which, without the intervention of the Holy See, doctrinal
relativism might have led us.
"Papal condemnation has brought to light, in many Catholic
theologians, a gaping void: the lack of philosophy. They shared
the positivistic disdain for metaphysical speculation. Sometimes
they proclaimed a highly questionable fideism. Fashion led them to
ridicule philosophy, to jeer at its vocabulary, to contrast its
infatuated audacity with the modesty of scientific hypotheses. The
pope, by describing and synthesizing the modernistic error,
compelled theology to re-examine, not so much particular problems,
but rather fundamental religious notions, so skillfully distorted
by the school of innovators. The philosophic bone-structure began
to reappear ever more clearly as indispensable for the entire
theological organism. " [1350]
We admonish professors, Pius X [1351] had said, to bear well in
mind, that the smallest departure from Aquinas, especially in
metaphysics, brings in its wake great harm.
An historian of medieval philosophy has recently said that
Cajetan, instead of limiting himself to an excellent commentary of
the Summa, was rather bound to follow the intellectual movement of
his time. The truth is that Cajetan did not feel himself thus
called by Him who guides the intellectual life of the Church on a
higher level than that of petty combinations, presumptions, and
other deviations of our limited intelligences. Cajetan's glory
lies in his recognition of the true grandeur of St. Thomas, of
whom he willed to be the faithful commentator. This recognition
was lacking in Suarez, who deserted the master lines of Thomistic
metaphysics to follow his own personal thought.
Many a theologian, on reaching the next world, will realize that
here below he failed to appreciate the grace which God bestowed on
His Church when He gave her the Doctor Communis.
In these late years one such theologian has said that speculative
theology, after giving beautiful systems to the Middle Ages, does
not today know what it wants, or whither it is going, and that
there is no longer serious work except in positive theology. He is
but repeating what was said during the epoch of modernism. In
point of truth, theology, if it disregarded the principles of the
Thomistic synthesis, would resemble a geometry which, disregarding
Euclidean principles, would not know whither it is going.
Another theologian of our own time proposes to change the order
among the chief dogmatic treatises, to put the treatise on the
Trinity before that of De Deo uno, which he would notably reduce.
Further, on the fundamental problems relative to nature and grace,
he invites us to return to what he holds to be the true position
of many Greek Fathers anterior to St. Augustine. The labors of
Aquinas, the labors of seven centuries of Thomists, are either of
no value or of very little value.
Alongside these extreme and idle views, we find an eclectic
opportunism, which strives to reach a higher level between
positions which it regards as extreme. But it is destined to
perpetual oscillation between two sides, since it can not
recognize, or then cannot appreciate, that higher truth, which,
amid fruitless tentatives, the Church unswervingly upholds and
opportunely repeats, as she has done in our own time by approving
the twenty-four theses.
We must grant that the problems of the present hour grow
continually graver. But this situation is an added reason for
returning to the doctrine of St. Thomas on being, truth, and
goodness, on the objective validity of first principles, which
alone can lead to certitude on God's existence, which is the
foundation of all duty, and to attentive examination of those
prime notions which are involved in the very enunciation of the
fundamental dogmas. This necessity has been recently reinculcated
by the Right Reverend St. M. Gillet, general of the Dominicans in
a letter to all professors in the order. Msgr. Olgiati urges the
same necessity in a forthcoming book on "Law according to St.
Thomas. " By this road alone can we reach the goal, thus indicated
by the Vatican Council:
"Reason, illumined by faith, if it seeks sedulously, piously, and
soberly, can attain a most fruitful understanding of revealed
mysteries, both by analogy with natural knowledge and by the
interwoven union of these mysteries with one another and with
man's last end. "
Who more surely than St. Thomas can lead us to this goal? Let us
not forget the word of Leo XIII, on the certainty, profundity, and
sublimity of the saint's teaching.
In the life of the priest, above all in the life of a professor,
whether of philosophy or not, it is a great grace to have been
fashioned by the principles of St. Thomas. How much floundering
and fluctuation does he thereby escape: on the validity of reason,
on God one and triune, on the redemptive Incarnation, the
sacraments, on the last end, on human acts, on sin, grace,
virtues, and gifts! These directing principles of thought and life
become ever more necessary as the conditions of existence grow
ever more difficult, demanding a certitude more firm, a faith more
immovable, a love of God more pure and strong.
CHAPTER 56: REALISM AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
THE problem we treat here, that of the fundamental objective
foundation of the Thomistic synthesis, merits greatest attention.
The depth of thought in the Middle Ages stands revealed in the
importance they gave to the problem of universals. Does the
universal idea correspond to reality, or is it a mere concept, or
is it, lastly, just a name with a mere conventional meaning? Do
our ideas agree with the objective reality of things, or are they
mere subjective necessities of human thought and language?
This fundamental problem, which certain superficial minds look on
as antiquated, has reappeared, under a new form, in the
discussions relative to the question of fixed species, and still
more notably in the discussion on absolute evolutionism. The
primary reality, the universal principle -- is it something
absolutely immutable, or is it on the contrary, something
identified with universal change, with creative evolution, with a
God who evolves in humanity and the world? On this problem
traditional realism is radically opposed to subjective
conceptualism and to nominalism.
The importance of this problem of the universal stands out most
clearly in its relation to the principle of contradiction.
Aristotle sees in this principle the primordial law of being and
of thought, Locke sees in it nothing but a solemn futility, and
Descartes thinks that God could have created a world where this
principle would not be true. These different conceptions arise, it
is clear, from different forms of solving the problem of
universals. This radical discord at the very roots of human
thought vividly illumines the meaning and importance of
traditional realism.
Hence we proceed here to recall the essentials of this problem in
relation:
a) to the absolute realism of Parmenides.
b) to the absolute nominalism of Heraclitus.
c) to the limited realism of Aristotle and St. Thomas. [1352].
CONTRADICTION AND EXAGGERATED REALISM
The first man on record as having seen the primordial importance
of the principle of contradiction is Parmenides. But, in
enthusiastic intuition, he gave to the principle a realist
formula, so absolute as to deny all facts of change and
multiplicity. "Being exists, non-being does not exist: from this
thought there is no escape. " Thus, for him, the principle
affirms, not merely the objective impossibility of simultaneous
contradiction, but also the exclusion from reality of all changing
existence. Being, reality, is one, unique, and immutable, ever
identified with itself. It could be changed, diversified,
multiplied, only by something other than itself, and something
other than being is non-being, and non-being simply is not. Nor
can being commence to exist, because it would have to arise either
from being or from non-being. Now it cannot come from being which
already is. Nor can it come from non-being which is not, which is
nothing. Beginning, becoming, is an illusion. Thus does absolute
realism of the intellect lead to the mere phenomenalism of sense
knowledge.
Aristotle, we recall, solved these arguments of Parmenides by
distinguishing potency from act. The actual statue comes from the
wood which is potentially the statue, the plant from the seed
which potentially is the plant. Being is an analogous notion, not
univocal, and is found only proportionally in potency and act, in
pure act and in beings composed of potency and act. Parmenides
could not distinguish being in general from the divine being. Of
the divine being only is it true to say that it is unique and
immutable, that it can neither lose nor gain, that it can have no
accidents, no additions, no new perfections.
What led Parmenides to this confusion? It was the supposition, at
least implicit, that the universal as such, as it exists in the
mind, must likewise be formally universal in the mind's object.
The conditions of thought must be likewise the conditions of
reality.
What Parmenides said of being Spinoza says of substance. Being
exists, said Parmenides, non-being does not exist. Substance
exists, says Spinoza, because in substance existence is an
essential predicate. Hence, instead of saying: If God exists, He
exists of Himself, Spinoza affirms a priori the existence of God,
the one and only substance.
But all absolute realism, including Spinoza's restriction to
substance, leads by reaction to nominalism. Plurality of
substance, plurality of attributes and faculties, are mere sounds.
There is but one unique and eternal substance, says Spinoza, even
while the finite modes of that substance follow one another
eternally. Were Spinoza consequent, he would agree with
Parmenides. He would deny all reality to these modes, and admit as
real only the one unique and substantial being, which can lose
nothing and gain nothing.
In attenuated form, absolute realism reappears in the ontologists
who admit the a priori proof of God's existence, because they
claim to have intuition of God, and see in Him the truth of first
principles. They say: "Immediate knowledge of God, at least
habitual, is so essential to the human intellect, that without
that knowledge it can know nothing. For that knowledge is itself
man's intellectual light. " "That reality which is in all things,
and without which we know nothing, is the divine reality. " "Our
universal ideas, considered objectively, are not really
distinguished from God. " [1353].
Exaggerated realism, to conclude, tends to confound being in
general with the divine being. Hence it turns the principle of
contradiction into a judgment, not essential but existential, or
even confounds that principle with the affirmation of God's
existence. "Being exists" becomes equivalent to: "There exists one
sole Being, which cannot not exist. ".
CONTRADICTION AND NOMINALISM
Heraclitus, according to Aristotle, denied the objective validity
of the principle of contradiction or identity, because of the
perpetual mobility of the sense world, where everything changes
and nothing remains absolutely identical with itself. The
arguments of Parmenides who, invoking the principle of identity,
denies multiplicity and change, become from Heraclitus' point of
view, a mere play of abstract concepts, without objective
foundation, and the principle of contradiction a mere law of
language and of inferior discursive reason, which employs these
more or less conventional abstractions. Superior reason, intuitive
intelligence, rises above these artificial abstractions, and
reaches intuition of the fundamental reality, which is a perpetual
becoming, wherein being and non-being are identified, since that
which is in the process of becoming is not as yet, but still is
not mere nothing.
This radical nominalism of Heraclitus reappeared among the Greek
Sophists, Protagoras in particular and Cratylus. It emerges again
among the radical nominalists of the fourteenth century, and in
our own day among absolute evolutionists, under an idealistic form
in Hegel, under an empiric form in many positivists. Hegel's
universal becoming leads him to nominalism as regards the notions
of being and substance, leads him to deny all reality in
substance, divine or created.
In the Middle Ages, Nicholas of Autrecourt had expressed the first
principle thus: If something exists, something exists. [1354]
Nicholas and Parmenides are antipodes. The principle of
contradiction has become a mere hypothesis. Beneath the words, "If
something exists, something exists, " lies a mental reservation,
running somewhat as follows: "But perhaps nothing exists, perhaps
our very notion of being, of reality, is without validity, even in
the possible order, perhaps that which to us seems impossible, a
squared circle, for example, or an uncaused beginning, is not
really impossible in extra-mental reality, perhaps uncaused
beginning, creative evolution, is the one fundamental reality. ".
The principle of contradiction thus forfeited, the principle of
causality, having no longer ontological value, becomes a mere law
of succession. Every phenomenon presupposes an antecedent
phenomenon. Proof for the existence of God becomes impossible. Let
us listen to Nicholas: [1355].
"Natural appearances can give us hardly any certitude. " "Nothing
can be evidently concluded from another thing. " "The two
propositions, God is and God is not, signify, only in a different
manner, the same thing. " "These two conclusions are not evident.
If there is an act of understanding, then there must be an
intellect; if there is an act of will, then there must be a
faculty of will. ".
Absolute nominalism, we see, has led to complete skepticism. Many
scholars, who wished to harmonize St. Augustine with Descartes,
failed to see that Descartes is profoundly nominalist when he
declares that the principle of contradiction depends on God's free
will, that God could have made a world wherein two contradictories
would be simultaneously true. Imagine Augustine admitting this!
Descartes' idea of divine liberty is an idea gone mad.
Further, if the principle of contradiction is not absolute, then
the formula of Descartes himself loses all real validity and
becomes a mere mental phenomenon. [1356] If I can deny this
principle, then I may say: Perhaps I think and do not think
simultaneously, perhaps I exist and do not exist, perhaps I am I
and not I, perhaps "I think" is impersonal like "it rains. "
Without absoluteness of the principle of contradiction I cannot
know the objective existence of my own individual person.
Some years ago Edward Le Roy wrote as follows: "The principle of
contradiction, being only a law of speech and not of thought in
general, applies only in what is static, particular, and immobile,
in things endowed with identity. But just as there is identity in
the world, so is there also contradiction. Fleeting mobilities,
beginnings, duration, life, which, though not in themselves
discursive, are transformed by discourse into contradictory
categories" (Le Roy, Rev. de Met. et de morale, 1905, pp. 200 ff.
).
Now by this road, as by that of radical nominalism, we arrive at
absolute evolutionism, or then at complete agnosticism. "If
something exists, then something exists. " Then we must continue:
But perhaps nothing exists, perhaps everything is in flux, perhaps
the fundamental reality is uncaused becoming, perhaps God is not
eternal, but only arriving in humanity and the world.
CONTRADICTION AND LIMITED REALISM
According to traditional realism, as formulated by Aristotle and
Aquinas, the universal idea exists in the sense world, not
formally, but fundamentally, and of all ideas the most universal
is that of being, on which is founded the principle of
contradiction. This principle is not a mere existential judgment,
but neither is it, as nominalists would have it, a mere
hypothetical judgment, nor, as the conceptualists maintain, a mere
subjective law of thought. It is simultaneously a law both of
thought and of being. It excludes not only what is subjectively
inconceivable, but also what is objectively impossible.
This limited realism does not, like Parmenides, stop short with
saying: Being is, non-being is not. Neither does it say with
nominalism: If something exists, then of course it exists, but
perhaps our notion of being does not allow us to know the
fundamental law of extramental reality. No, limited realism claims
to have intellectual intuition of the objective extramental
impossibility of a thing which, remaining the same, could
simultaneously be and not be, the impossibility, say, of a square
circle, or of an uncaused beginning. Its positive formula is:
Being is being, non-being is non-being. Its negative formula is:
Being is not non-being. Positively expressed, it is the principle
of contradiction. Both formulas express the same truth. [1357].
"No one can ever conceive, " says Aristotle, "that one and the
same thing can both be and not be. Heraclitus, according to some,
differs on this point. But it is not necessary that what a man
says be also what he thinks. To think thus would be to affirm and
deny in the same breath. It would destroy language, it would be to
deny all substance, all truth, even all probability and all
degrees of probability. It would be the suppression of all desire,
all action. Even becoming and beginning would disappear, because
if contradictories and contraries are identified, then the point
of departure in motion is identified with the terminus and the
thing supposed to be in motion would have arrived before it
departed. " [1358].
Hence we must hold absolutely this fundamental law of thought and
of reality, a law founded on the very notion of being. That which
is, is, and cannot simultaneously not be.
Granting, then, the principle of contradiction, we must likewise
grant that there is more reality in that which is than in that
which is in the process of becoming and which as yet is not; more
in the plant than in the seed, more in the adult animal than in
the embryo, more in being than in becoming. Hence the process of
becoming is not self-explanatory, it presupposes a cause.
Evolution, becoming, is not identified with the primary and
fundamental reality, as A is identified with A. Becoming is not
identical with being. That which is in the process of becoming as
yet is not.
Hence in man's order of discovering truth, the principle of
contradiction is both his first and his last step. As first step,
it says: "That which is, is, and cannot simultaneously not be. "
As last step, on the highest level of discovery, it says: "I am He
who is. ".
This is no a priori proof of God's existence, nor even of God's
objective possibility, because we must first know sense realities,
from which alone, by the road of causality, we can rise from this
lower analogue of being to the supreme analogue of uncreated
reality. But the first step in discovery: "That which is, is, "
corresponds to the last step: "I am He who is. " [1359].
But if we follow Descartes in doubting the absolute necessity, the
objective validity, independent of God's decrees, of the principle
of contradiction, if we maintain that the Creator could perhaps
make a squared circle, then we cannot possibly maintain even "I
think, therefore I am" as an objective judgment, nor can we find
any valid a posteriori proof of God's existence. If, on the
contrary, we maintain the absolute necessity of this principle, we
find that the supreme reality is identified with being as A is
identified with A. The supreme reality then, is not becoming, is
not creative evolution, but is Being itself, ever identical with
itself, in whom alone is essence identified with existence. This
profound view of the initial truth, of the principle of identity
founded on the notion of being, leads necessarily, first, to the
primacy of being over becoming, second, by the road of causality,
to the supreme truth: I am He who is, who cannot but be, who can
lose nothing, who can gain nothing.
Parmenides confounded the initial truth with the ultimate and
supreme truth. Heraclitus, denying the initial truth, closed all
approach to that supreme truth. Limited realism, penetrating the
meaning and the range of the initial truth, its inner union with
the primacy of being and hence with the principle of causality,
leads us naturally and necessarily to the supreme truth. [1360]
Any true philosopher, it has been said, has at bottom one sole
thought, a root thought whence all his ideas branch forth. The
root thought of traditional philosophy is the principle of
identity and contradiction, of the primacy of being over becoming.
This primacy, expressed initially and implicitly by the principle
of identity, reaches complete and definitive expression in
affirming the existence of God, being itself, wherein alone
essence is identical with existence: I am He who is.
REALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY
Unlimited realism, as conceived by Parmenides, and in attenuated
forms by Spinoza, starts from pseudo-intuition of the Supreme
Being and arrives at the negation of causality and creation, God
being all reality. Absolute nominalism reduces the principle of
causality to a law of the phenomenal order. Every phenomenon
presupposes an antecedent phenomenon, conventionally called its
cause. Hence there can be no first cause, nor any miracle, because
the so-called miraculous phenomenon would have to have a
phenomenal antecedent, since there can be no supraphenomenal
intervention of a divine cause.
Against the pseudo-intuition of the unlimited realists, including
Malebranche, nominalism holds that the first object of human
intelligence is the brute fact of existence of phenomena. To this
it adds: If anything really exists, then it is, but perhaps,
properly speaking, nothing is, everything is in a state of
uncaused becoming, a mere series of brute facts, all
unintelligible.
In limited and traditional realism, the first object of human
intelligence is not God, who is its highest object, is not merely
the brute fact of existence, but the intelligible being of sense
objects, wherein, as in a mirror, we can discover a posteriori, by
the road of causality, the existence of God.
Thus we explain the ontological validity, not merely of the
principle of contradiction, but also that of causality. It is just
as impossible that the contingent being be contingent and not
contingent as it is that the triangle be not a triangle. And just
as we cannot deny that characteristic of the triangle which makes
its three angles equal to two right angles, so we cannot deny that
characteristic of the contingent being which presupposes a cause.
[1361] In other words, existence is incompatible with an uncaused
contingent being. [1362] Such a being would be absurd.
Our sense of sight knows the brute fact, the phenomenon of color,
but our intellect knows the intelligible reality of that fact.
Man's intelligence, the lowest of all intelligences, has as object
the lowest level of intelligible reality, the intelligibility of
the sense world, wherein, as in a mirror, it knows the existence
of a first cause, of God. [1363].
In the ascending order of discovery, we thus formulate the
principle of causality: All that begins, all that is contingent,
has a cause, and in last analysis a supreme cause, an uncaused
cause. In the descending order, thus: All beings by participation
depend on the Being by essence as on their supreme cause. That
which is being by participation is not its own existence, since we
must distinguish the subject which participates from the existence
which it receives and participates. Peter is not his existence,
but has his existence, received from Him who alone can say: I am
He who is, I am existence itself. " [1364].
CHAPTER 57: REALISM AND PRAGMATISM
THE eternal notion of truth, conformity of thought with reality,
impels us to say: This displeases me and annoys me, but it is none
the less true. Still, human interests are so strong that Pilate's
question often reappears: What is truth? One answer which we must
here examine is that of pragmatism.
1. PRAGMATISM AND ITS VARIATIONS
There are two kinds of pragmatism, one historical, [1365] the
other theoretical. In England, at the end of the last century,
Charles S. Peirce, aiming at unburdening philosophy of parrotism
and logomachy, sought for a precise criterion whereby to
distinguish empty formulas from formulas that have meaning. He
proposed to take as criterion "the practical effects we can
imagine as resulting from opposed views. " A starting-point is
found in a remark of Descartes: [1366] "We find much more truth in
a man's individual reasoning on his own personal affairs, where
loss follows error, than in those of the literary man in his
study, where no practical result is anticipated. " Equivalent
remarks were often made by the ancients.
This form of pragmatism, which still grants much objectivity to
knowledge, is also that of Vailati and Calderoni. Subsequently,
however, with William James, pragmatism becomes a form of
subjectivism, thus defined in the work cited: "A doctrine
according to which truth is a relation, entirely immanent to human
experience, whereby knowledge is subordinated to activity, and the
truth of a proposition consists in its utility and
satisfactoriness. " [1367] That is true which succeeds.
Hence arise many variations. We find a pragmatic skepticism,
similar to that of the ancient sophists, where success means
pleasure to him who defends the proposition. Truth and virtue give
way to individual interest. A profitable lie becomes truth. What
is an error for one man is truth for his neighbor. "Justice
limited by a river, " says Pascal. "How convenient! Truth here is
error beyond the Pyrenees!".
An opposite extreme understands success to mean spontaneous
harmony among minds engaged in verifying facts held in common. At
the end of his life, James approached this view, which endeavors
to uphold the eternal and objective notion of truth.
Between these two extremes we find many nuances, reasons of state,
for example, or of family, where interests, national or private,
defy objective truth and even common sense. Or again, opportunism,
for which truth means merely the best way to profit by the present
situation. Seeing these inferior connotations of pragmatism, as in
course of acceptance by public usage, Maurice Blondel [1368]
resolved to renounce the word which he had previously employed.
Edouard Le Roy writes as follows: "When I use the word
'pragmatism, ' I give it a meaning quite different from that of
the Anglo-Americans who have made the word fashionable. My
employment of the word does not at all mean to sacrifice truth to
utility, nor to allow, in the search for particular truths, even
the least intervention of considerations extraneous to the love of
truth itself. But I do hold that, in the search for truth, both
scientific and moral, one of the signs of a true idea is the
fecundity of that idea, its aptitude for practical results.
Verification, I hold, should be a work, not merely a discourse. "
[1369].
Yet Le Roy [1370] proceeded to this pragmatist conception of
dogma: In your relations to God, act as you do in your relations
with men. Dogma, accordingly, is before all else a practical
prescription. Dogma, speaking precisely, would not be true by its
conformity with divine reality, but by its relation to the
religious act to be performed, and the practical truth of the act
would appear in the superior success of that religious experience
in surmounting life's difficulties. Hence the following
proposition was condemned by the Church: "The dogmas of faith are
to be retained only in the practical sense, i. e.: as preceptive
norms of action, but not as norms of belief. " [1371] Thus the
dogma of the Incarnation would not affirm that Jesus is God, but
that we must act towards Jesus as we do towards God. The dogma of
the Eucharist would not affirm, precisely, His Real Presence, but
that practically we ought to act as if that Presence were
objectively certain. Thus we see that the elevated variations of
pragmatism are not without danger, both in maintaining truth in
general, and in particular dogmatic truths, defined by the Church
as immutable and as conformed to the extramental reality which
they express.
In opposition to all forms of pragmatism, let us recall the
traditional notion of truth, in all its manifestations, from
highest to lowest, including the truth in prudential arguments,
which are always practically true, even when at times they involve
a speculative error absolutely involuntary.
II. THE TWO NOTIONS COMPARED
Adequation of intellect and object: that is the definition of
truth given by St. Thomas. [1372] He quotes that of St. Augustine:
Truth is that by which reality is manifested, and that of St.
Hilary: Truth declares and manifests reality. The first relation
of reality to intellect, St. Thomas continues, is that reality
correspond to intellect. This correspondence is called adequation
of object and intellect, wherein the conception of truth is
formally completed. And this conformity, this adequation, of
intellect to reality, to being, is what the idea of truth adds to
the idea of being.
Truth, then, is the intellect's conformity with reality. Change in
this universal notion of truth brings with it total change in the
domain of knowledge. The modernists, says Pius X, overturn the
eternal notion of truth. [1373].
Without going to this extreme, Maurice Blondel, [1374] in 1906,
one year before the encyclical Pascendi, wrote a sentence that
would lead to unmeasured consequences in science, in philosophy,
and in faith and religion. In place of the abstract and chimerical
definition of truth as the adequation of intellect and reality,
thus he wrote, we must substitute methodical research, and define
truth as follows: the adequation of intellect and life. How well
this sentence expressed the opposition between the two
definitions, ancient and modern! But what great responsibility
does he assume who brands as chimerical a definition maintained in
the Church for centuries. [1375].
Life, as employed in the new definition, means human life. How,
then, does the definition escape the condemnation [1376] inflicted
on the following modernist proposition: Truth is not more
unchangeable than is man himself, since it evolves with, in, and
through man. [1377].
Change in definition entails immense consequences. He who dares it
should be sure beforehand that he clearly understands the
traditional definition, particularly in its analogous quality,
which, without becoming metaphorical, is still proportional.
Ontological truth, for example, is the conformity of creatures
with the intellect of the Creator. Logical truth is the conformity
of man's intellect to the world around him, which he has not made
but only discovered. Logical truth is found both in existential
judgments, e. g.: Mont Blanc exists, this horse is blind, I am
thinking, and in essential judgments, e. g.: man is a rational
animal, blindness is a privation, the laws of the syllogism are
valid.
Truth, then, like being, unity, the good, and the beautiful, is
not a univocal notion, but an analogical notion. Thus truth in God
is adequation in the form of identity, God's intellect being
identified with God's being eternally known. Truth in possible
creatures is their correspondence with God's intellect. Truth in
actual creatures is their conformity with the decrees of God's
will. Nothing that is not God, not even created free acts, can
exist except as causally dependent on God.
Truth, then, is coextensive with all reality. A change in defining
truth, then, brings corresponding changes, not only in the domain
of knowledge, but in that of willing and acting, since as we know,
so do we will.
III. PRAGMATIC CONSEQUENCES
In sciences, physical and physico-mathematical, those facts which
exist independently of our mind are considered certain, as laws
which express constant relations among phenomena. Postulates,
hypotheses, are defined by their relation to the truth to be
attained, not as yet accessible or certain. To illustrate. On the
principle of inertia, many scientists hold that inertia in repose
is certain, meaning that a body not acted upon by an exterior
cause remains in repose. But others, H. Poincare, for example, or
P. Duhem, see in this view a mere postulate suggested by our
experience with inertia in movement, which means that "a body
already in motion, if no exterior cause acts upon it, retains
indefinitely its motion, rectilinear and uniform. " Experience
suggests this view, because as obstacles diminish, the more is
motion prolonged, and because "a constant force, acting on a
material point entirely free, impresses on it a motion uniformly
accelerated, " as is the motion of a falling body. But the second
formula of inertia, as applied to a body in repose, is not
certain, because, as Poincare [1378] says: "No one has ever
experimented on a body screened from the influence of every force,
or, if he has, how could he know that the body was thus screened?
" The influence of a force may remain imperceptible.
Inertia in repose, then, remains a postulate, a proposition, that
is, which is not self-evident, which cannot be proved either a
priori or a posteriori, but which the scientist accepts in default
of any other principle. The scientist, says P. Duhem, [1379] has
no right to say that the principle is true, but neither has he the
right to say it is false, since no phenomenon has so far
constrained us to construct a physical theory which would exclude
this principle. It is retained, so far, as guide in classifying
phenomena. This line of argument renders homage to the objective
notion of truth. We could not reason thus under truth's pragmatic
definition.
Let us look now at metaphysical principles: The principle of
contradiction or identity, [1380] that of sufficient reason,
[1381] that of efficient causality, [1382] and that of finality.
[1383] These principles, we say, are true, because it is evident
that they are primary laws, not only of our mind but of all
reality. They are not merely existential judgments, but express
objective and universal impossibilities. Never and nowhere can a
thing simultaneously exist and not exist, can a thing be without
its raison d'etre, can a non-necessary thing exist without cause,
can a thing act without any purpose. Metaphysical principles admit
no exception. But they all disappear under the pragmatic
definition of truth.
The truth in the formulas of faith is their conformity with the
realities which they express; the Trinity, the Incarnation,
eternal life, eternal pain, the Real Presence, the value of Mass.
Although the concepts which express subject and predicate in these
formulas are generally analogous, the verb "is" (or its
equivalent) expresses immutable conformity to the reality in
question. I am the truth and the life, says Jesus Though "truth"
and "life" are analogous notions, Jesus added: "My words shall not
pass away. " The same holds good of all dogmatic formulas. They
are not mere "norms of action. " They do not express mere
"conformity of our minds with our lives. " They express primarily,
not our religious experience, but divine reality, a reality which
often transcends experience, as, for instance, when we believe in
heaven or n hell. Who can claim to experience the hypostatic
union? Or the infinite values of Christ's death? We may experience
indeed, not these mysteries themselves, but their effects in us.
The Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the
sons of God. [1384] The Spirit, says St. Thomas, commenting on
that sentence, evokes in us a filial affection which we can
experience. But even this experience we cannot absolutely
distinguish from a mere sentimental affection.
Faith, therefore, both by its divine object and by its infallible
certitude, transcends our experience. This is true even when
faith, under the special inspirations of the gifts of knowledge
and wisdom, becomes ever more savorous and penetrating. [1385]
These gifts, far from constituting faith, presuppose faith. The
same holds good of all religious experience. It holds good
likewise of the certitude of faith and of the ardor of charity.
Hope and charity presuppose faith and the act of faith itself
presupposes credibility in the truths to be believed.
Dogmatic propositions, too, derive certainty from their conformity
to the reality which they express. When God's revelation employs
the natural notions of our intelligence, the natural certainty we
have on all truths deriving from these notions is supplemented by
a supernatural certainty, deriving from that revelation. Thus,
when God says: I am He who is, our philosophical certainty of the
attributes that belong to self-existent being is supplemented by
theological certitude. When Jesus is revealed as truly God and
truly man, theology deduces, with a certitude which transcends our
experience, that Jesus has two wills, one belonging to His divine
nature, and the other to His human nature.
Under the pragmatist definition of truth, on the contrary, we
would have to say, and it has been recently said, that theology is
at bottom merely a system of spirituality which has found rational
instruments adequated to its religious experience. [1386] Thus
Thomism would be the expression of Dominican spirituality, Scotism
that of Franciscan spirituality, Molinism that of Ignatian
spirituality. Hence, since these three systems of spirituality are
approved by the Church, also the theological systems, which are
their expression, would all be simultaneously true, as being each
in conformity with the particular religious experience which is
their respective originating principle. This position, if we
recall that at times these systems contradict one another, is
itself a painful illumination of the contrast between the
traditional and pragmatist definitions of truth.
The question arises: Can a system of spirituality be true if it is
not objectively founded on true doctrine? We, like many others,
look on these ingenious theories as false spiritualizations of
theology, reduced to a religious experience, wherein we look in
vain for an objective foundation. Spiritual pragmatism may lead at
best to prudential certitude which arises, not directly from
objective conformity with reality, but from subjective conformity
with a right intention. But it would then have to descend still
lower, because prudential truth and certitude presuppose a higher
certitude, an objective certitude, without which even prudential
certitude would vanish.
The certitude of prudence, as explained by Aquinas, [1387]
following Aristotle, contains that which is true in limited
pragmatism. Prudence is a virtue, even an intellectual virtue, in
the moral order, a virtue which transcends opinion, and reaches a
practical certitude on the goodness of the act in question. The
truth of the practical intellect, Aristotle [1388] has said,
differs from that of the speculative intellect. Speculative truth
means conformity with objective reality. But since the intellect
is limited to the necessary truths of reality, it cannot attain
infallible conformity with the contingent and variable elements of
reality. The contingent, as such, cannot be the subject matter of
a speculative science. Truth in the practical intellect, on the
contrary, means conformity with good will, with good intention.
When for instance, presented with an unsuspected poisoned drink, a
man proceeds to partake, his speculative error does not prevent
his having a true prudential judgment based on his intention to
obey charity and politeness. Practical truth can coexist with
speculative error. Pragmatism can claim this partial truth.
Pragmatism Must Return to Tradition
One chief difficulty, proposed by the philosophy of action,
appears in St. Thomas [1389] in the form of an objection. The
thesis is: Goodness in the will depends on reason. The objection
runs thus: The reverse is true, because as the Philosopher [1390]
says, truth conformed to right appetite is the goodness of the
practical intellect, and right appetite means good will In other
words, each man's judgment follows his fundamental inclination,
bad or good. If this fundamental inclination is bad, the judgment
will be wrong. But if the inclination is good, the judgment too
will be right and true, just as spiritual pragmatism maintains.
The saint's answer runs thus: The Philosopher is speaking here of
the practical intellect, as engaged in the order of means, to find
the best road to a presupposed goal, for this is the work of
prudence. Now it is true that in the order of means the goodness
of the reason consists in its conformity with the will's
inclination to the right end and goal. But, he adds, this very
inclination of the will presupposes the right knowledge of the
end, and this knowledge comes from reason. [1391].
Prudential certitude, then, does presuppose right intention in the
will, but this right intention itself derives its rectitude from
those higher principles of reason which are true by their
conformity with objective reality, with our nature and our last
end. To reduce all truth to prudential certitude means to destroy
prudential certitude itself.
To this extreme we seem to be led by those who, abandoning the
eternal notion of truth as conformity with objective reality,
propose rather to define truth as conformity of spirit with the
exigencies of human life, a conformity known by a constantly
developing experience, moral and religious. Here we are surely
near the following modernistic proposition: Truth is not more
immutable than is man himself, since it evolves with him, in him,
and through him. [1392].
The pragmatism we are here dealing with is not, we must
acknowledge, the grovelling pragmatism of social climbers or
politicians, who utilize mendacity as practical truth, as sure
road to success. It is rather the pragmatism of good and honest
men who claim to have a high level of religious experience. But
they forget that man's will, man's intention, can be right and
good only by dependence on the objective and self-supporting
principles of man's nature and man's destination, as known by
reason and revelation, principles which impose on him the duty of
loving God, above all things, man himself included. This truth,
the source of man's good will and intention, rests on its
conformity with the highest levels of reality, on the nature of
our soul and our will, on the nature of God and God's sovereign
goodness, on the nature of infused grace and charity, which are
proportioned to God's own inner and objective life.
The consequences, then, even of this higher pragmatism, are
ruinous, though unforeseen by those who meddle with the
traditional definition of truth. We noted above [1393] the remark
of M. Maurice Blondel that the abstract and chimerical definition
of truth as "conformity of intellect to reality" should be
abandoned in favor of "conformity of mind with life. " That was in
1906. Though he later attempted to draw near to St. Thomas, he
still wrote: [1394] "No intellectual evidence, even that of ah
solute and ontologically valid principles, is imposed on us with a
certitude that is spontaneous and infallibly compelling; not more
than our objective idea of the absolute Good acts on our will as
it would if we already had the intuitive vision of perfect
goodness. ".
To admit parity here would be a grave error, because our adherence
to first principles is necessary, [1395] whereas our choice to
prefer God to all else is, in this life, free. Here below God is
not known as a good which draws us invincibly, whereas the truth
of the principle, say of contradiction, can simply not be denied.
He who knows the meaning of the two words "circle" and "square"
has necessary and compelling evidence of the objective
impossibility of a square circle.
The higher pragmatism does not, it is true, sacrifice truth to
utility. But to abandon the traditional definition of truth is to
unsettle all foundations, in science, in metaphysics, in faith, in
theology. Prudential truth rests on an order higher than itself.
The enthusiasm of hope and charity, if it is not to remain a
beautiful dream of religious emotion, must rest on a faith which
is in conformity with reality, not merely with the exigencies of
our inner life, or even with our best intentions Nothing can be
intended except as known. Unless the intellect is right in its
judgment on the end to be attained, there can be no rectitude in
the will. The good, says St. Thomas, [1396] belongs first to
reason under the form of truth, before it can belong to the will
as desirable, because the will cannot desire good unless that good
is first apprehended by the reason.
Our view is supported by Emile Boutroux. [1397] He writes as
follows:
"Is it the special action of the will which is in question? But
the will demands an end, a purpose. Can you say that you offer an
intelligible formula when you speak of a will which takes itself
as purpose, that it has its own self as proper principle? That
which these men search for by these ingenious theories is action,
self-sufficient action independent of all concepts which would
explain or justify action.
"Is not this to return willy-nilly to pragmatism? Human
pragmatism, if the action is human, divine pragmatism, if the
action is divine: action, conceived as independent of intellectual
determination, which ought to be the source (and supreme rule) of
human activity. Action for action's sake, action arising from
action, simon-pure praxis, which perhaps brings forth concepts,
but is itself independent of all concepts -- does this abstract
pragmatism still merit the name of religion?
"... And do you not enter on an endless road if you search in a
praxis isolated from thought for the essence, for the true
principle of a life according to religion? ".
Let us, then, return to the traditional definition of truth.
Action can never be the first criterion. The first criterion must
be ontological, must be that objective reality from which reason
draws first principles. The first act of the intellect is to know,
not its own action, not the ego, not phenomena, but objective and
intelligible being. [1398] The exigencies of life, far from making
our thoughts true, derive their own truth from the thoughts that
conform to reality and to divine reality. [1399].
Difficulties
But surely we know our life, our will, our activity, better than
we know the external world.
The question is not what we know best, but what we know first, and
what we know first is not individual differences, not even
specific differences, but external intelligible reality as being,
as giving us first principles, without which we could not even
say: "I think, therefore I am. " Further, the intellect knows what
is within it better than it knows what is in the will, since we
can always have some doubt on the purity of our intentions, which
may be inspired by secret selfishness or pride. Man knows first
principles with an incomparable certainty. But he cannot know with
certainty that he is in the state of grace, in the state of
charity.
As regards E. Le Roy, we hear it said that what is false is not
his notion of truth in general, but his notion of the truth of
dogma.
We reply, first, that this defense is itself an admission that
pragmatism in its proper sense leads to heresy. Secondly, Le Roy
maintains pragmatism, not only in the field of dogma, but also in
that of philosophy. "All ontological realism is ruinous and
absurd: anything beyond thought is by definition unthinkable.
Hence, with all modern philosophy, we must admit some kind of
idealism. " [1400].
Thirdly, the phrase "anything beyond thought is unthinkable" holds
good indeed of divine thought, but not of human thought, which
distinguishes between things as yet undiscovered and things which
we know, the extramental reality, e. g.: of this table on which I
write. Common sense knows evidently the objective validity of the
sense knowledge here exemplified. And even idealists, forgetting
that they are idealists, often speak the language of common sense.
[1401].
As regards Blondel's philosophy of action, we find that he still
maintains in his latest work, these two positions: first, concepts
are always provisional, second, free will governs the intellect,
not only in the act of attention, but also in the act of admitting
the validity of first principles. [1402] Thus, though he has
turned back to some traditional positions, he is still far off. He
gives, as P. Boyer says, [1403] too much imperfection to universal
concepts. This is the least one can say. But Blondel rises at
times above his own philosophy and affirms the absolute truth
concerning God, truth which is conformity of our intellect to
extramental reality, to Supreme Reality. [1404].
In the 1945 volume of Acta. Acad. S. Thomae (no. 226) the
statement is made that I was obliged to retract what I had said
concerning Blondel. That statement is false. My position is still
what it was in 1935 [1405] and 1944. [1406] The propositions there
quoted, [1407] I held and still hold, are untenable. The
philosophy of action must return to the philosophy of being, must
change its theories of concept and judgment, must renounce its
nominalism, if it is to defend the ontological, extramental
validity of first principles and dogmatic formulas.
But did not Blondel [1408] retract the last chapter of l'Action?
He did. But he still holds [1409] that concepts have their
stability only from the artifice of language, not only in physics
and biology, but also in mathematics and logic. He still maintains
that the free will intervenes in every judgment, not only as
regards attention, but also as regards mental assent, even in
first principles. [1410] Hence first principles are not necessary
only probable. [1411].
The immutable judgments of faith, then, cannot be preserved
inviolate unless we cling to the immutable concepts of being,
unity, truth, goodness, nature, and person. And how shall these
concepts remain immutable if "they have their stability only from
the artifice of language"?
The philosophy of action is true in what it affirms, false in what
it denies. It affirms the value of the action by which the human
will raises itself to the love of God. [1412] But in denying the
validity proper to the intellect, It compromises the validity of
voluntary action. [1413] Depreciating intellective truth, we
cannot defend our love of God.
CHAPTER 58: ONTOLOGICAL PERSONALITY
FATHER CARLO GIACON, S. J.: recently published an important work,
La seconda scolastica (Milan, 1943): which deals with the great
Thomistic commentators of the sixteenth century: Cajetan,
Ferrariensis, Victoria. The author maintains that the twenty-four
theses are the "major pronouncements" of the philosophy of St.
Thomas. He has excellent remarks on this doctrine, and on its
opposition to Scotism, and to nominalism. Having recognized the
great merits of Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and John of St.
Thomas, he continues: "After these two great men (Cajetan and
Ferrariensis): the Thomistic synthesis, with unimportant
deviations, remained intact among the Dominicans. But it became
ever wider among the Jesuits, and wider still among the disciples
of Suarez than in Suarez himself. There was no return to
nominalism, but there was some yielding to nominalistic
influences. Scotism, too, which lived on, came to have views
somewhat loosely connected with traditional speculation. ".
While we are in general accord with this author and must commend
[1414] his penetrating and disinterested love of truth, we feel
bound to differ from him when he maintains that, on the question
of ontological personality, Cajetan departed from St. Thomas. It
seems well to dwell on this point, since the doctrine of
personality is so closely united with that on essence and
existence and hence of special importance in treating the
Incarnation and the Trinity.
Person (human, angelic, or divine) means a subject, a suppositum
which can say "I, " which exists apart, which is sui juris. The
question is: What is it that formally constitutes that ontological
personality, which is the root of the intellectual personality and
the moral personality?
Ontological personality, says Cajetan, [1415] is that which
constitutes the person as universal subject of all its attributes:
essence, existence, accidents, operations. In this view, says
Father Giacon, [1416] Cajetan departs from St. Thomas. We, on the
contrary, hold that Giacon, who says that existence is the formal
constitutive element of personality, has himself departed from St.
Thomas. [1417].
Many texts are available in St. Thomas. [1418] Throughout he
affirms that the suppositum, that which exists, the subject
formally constituted as subject, is really distinct from its
existence, and that existence, far from being the formal
constituent, is only a contingent predicate. [1419].
Existence is not id quo subjectum est quod est, id quo persona est
persona, but id quo subjectum seu persona existit. Natura est id
quo subjectum est in tali specie.
To say that the subject, Peter, is formally constituted by a
contingent predicate is to suppress all that constitutes him as
subject, is to suppress id quo aliquid est quod. Then, there being
no longer a real subject, there cannot be longer any real
predicate: essence, existence, operation, all disappear with the
suppositum.
"That which exists" is not the essence of Peter, it is Peter
himself, and Peter, a creature, is not his own existence. [1420].
Peter of himself is Peter, of himself he is a person, but he is
not of himself existent, not his own existence; Peter is really
distinct from his nature, as whole is distinct from essential
part, [1421] and he is really distinct from his contingent
existence. [1422] Peter is not his existence, but has existence.
[1423].
But then, if person is not formally constituted by existence, nor
by individualized nature (since this in Christ exists without a
human personality): what is it that does constitute personality?
The name "person, " says St. Thomas, [1424] is derived from the
form which we call "personality, " and "personality" expresses
subsistence in a rational nature. Again: [1425] The form signified
by this noun "personality" is not essence or nature, but
personality. Again, speaking of suppositum, i. e.: first
substance, he says: [1426] Substance signifies an essence to which
it belongs to exist per se, though this existence is not that
essence itself.
These texts say, equivalently, that personality is not that by
which the person exists, but that by which it is suited to exist,
is that by reason of which the person is made capable of existing
per se. And this is the teaching of Cajetan.
Further, personality thus conceived is something real, distinct
from nature and from existence. In Christ, says the saint, [1427]
if the human nature had not been assumed by a divine person that
human nature would have its own personality. The divine person,
uniting with human nature, hindered that human nature from having
its own personality.
But then, one may say, you must admit that personality is a
substantial mode. Now St. Thomas never spoke of this substantial
mode which later came into vogue among the Scholastics.
The answer is that St. Thomas not only speaks of accidental modes
(e. g.: the speed of movement): and of transcendental and special
modes of being, but he also freely uses the term "substantial
mode. " Thus he writes: [1428] By the name "substance" we express
that special mode of being, which belongs to independent being.
Again, speaking precisely of person, he says: [1429] Person is
contained in the genus of substance, not as species, but as
determining a special mode of existing. This means, in other
words, that personality, just as Cajetan says, is that by which
person is immediately capable of independent and separate
existence. [1430] Capreolus is less explicit, but is in essential
agreement. Suppositum, he writes, [1431] is identified with
individual substantial being which has existence per se. He does
not say that personality is formally constituted by existence. We
can without difficulty admit his enunciations.
Cajetan's doctrine is not merely the only doctrine that agrees
with that of St. Thomas, it is also the only doctrine that agrees
with that which common sense and natural reason employ when we use
the personal pronouns (I, you, he) of the subject which is
intelligent and free. There must be something real to constitute
this subject as subject. [1432].
Rightly, therefore, does Cajetan say to his opponents: "If we all
admit the common notion of person as point of departure, why do we
turn away from that common notion when we come to scrutinize the
reality signified by that common notion? " [1433] His opponents
pass from the nominal definition to a pseudo-philosophic notion,
which forgets the point of departure which they originally
intended to explain.
Let us summarize.
1. To deny this doctrine is gravely to jeopardize the real
distinction of essence from existence.
;2. To deny it is to destroy the truth of affirmative propositions
relative to a real subject. In propositions like the following:
Peter is existent,. Peter is wise, the verb "is" expresses real
identity between subject and predicate. Now this identity thus
affirmed is precisely that of the suppositum, the person,
notwithstanding the real distinction of essence from existence, of
substance from accidents. If these propositions are to be true,
there must be a reality which formally constitutes Peter as
subject. Now this cannot be his individual essence, which is
attributed to him as essential part, nor his existence which is a
contingent predicate.
Similarly, this proposition spoken of Jesus: This man is God, can
be true only by identity of His person, notwithstanding the
distinction between the two natures. [1434].
3. To reject this doctrine, to say that personality is existence
itself, is to overturn the order of the treatise on the
Incarnation. The seventeenth question on the one existence in
Christ would have to be incorporated in the second question where
St. Thomas discusses the hypostatic union. Further, a common point
of doctrine in this treatise is that the person is the principium
quod of theandric acts. Now existence, which is common to the
three persons, cannot be principium quod of theandric actions
which belong solely to the Second Person. [1435].
We regret our disagreement on this point with Father Giacon, who
has often penetrated deeply into the merits of Cajetan and
Ferrariensis. [1436] He recognizes that they have correctly
interpreted and vigorously defended the great metaphysical
doctrines of the Thomistic synthesis. Hence we hope that a serene
and objective study of our differences on ontological personality
will not be without result.
CHAPTER 59: EFFICACIOUS GRACE
TREATING the questions of God's foreknowledge, of predestination
and of grace, many Molinists, in order to denote themselves as
Thomists, refer to classic Thomism under the name of
"Bannesianism. " Informed theologians see in this practice an
element of pleasantry, even of comedy.
Our purpose here is to insist on a principle admitted by all
theologians, a principle wherein Thomists see the deepest
foundation of the distinction between grace sufficient and grace
efficacious.
THE PROBLEM
Revelation makes it certain that many graces given by God do not
produce the effect (at least the entire effect) toward which they
are given, while other graces do produce this effect. Graces of
the first kind are called sufficient graces. They give the power
to do good, without bringing the good act itself to pass, since
man resists their attraction. The existence of such graces is
absolutely certain, whatever Jansenists say. Without these graces,
God, contrary to His mercy and His justice, would command the
impossible. Further, since without these graces sin would be
inevitable, sin would no longer be sin, and could not justly be
punished. Judas could have really here and now avoided his crime,
as could the impenitent robber who died near our Savior.
Graces of the second kind are called efficacious. They not only
give us real power to observe the precepts, but carry us on to
actual observance, as in the case of the penitent robber. The
existence of actual efficacious grace is affirmed, equivalently,
in numerous passages of Scripture. Ezechiel [1437] says, for
example: I will give you a new heart and put in you a new spirit,
I will take away your heart of stone, and give you a heart of
flesh. I will put My spirit in you and bring it about that you
follow My commands and observe and practice My laws. Again, the
Psalmist says: [1438] All that God wills, He does. The word
"wills" must here be understood as meaning all that God wills, not
conditionally, but absolutely. Thus He wills a man's free
conversion, that of Assuerus, e. g.: at the prayer of Esther:
[1439] Then God changed the wrath of the King into mildness. God's
omnipotence is, in these texts, assigned as reason for the
infallible efficacy of God's decree. [1440].
The Second Council of Orange, against the Semi-Pelagians, after
citing many of these texts, says of the efficaciousness of grace:
[1441] Whenever we do good, God, in us and with us, brings our
work to pass. Hence there is a grace which not only gives real
power to act right (a power which exists also in him who sins):
but which produces the good act, even while, far from excluding
our own free cooperation, it arouses rather this cooperation,
carries us on to consent.
St. Augustine [1442] thus explains these same texts: God, by His
power, most hidden and most efficacious, turns the king's heart
from wrath to mildness.
The great majority of older theologians, Augustinians, Thomists,
Scotists, hold that the grace called efficacious is efficacious of
itself, because God wills it to be so, not because we will it to
be so, by an act of consent foreseen by God. God is, not a mere
spectator, but the Author of salvation. How is grace self-
efficacious? Here these older authors differ. Some recur to the
divine motion called premotion, some to what they call "victorious
delectation, " some to a kind of attraction. But, amid all
differences, they agree that grace is of itself efficacious.
Molina, on the contrary, maintains that grace is efficacious
extrinsically, by our consent, foreseen by scientia media. This
scientia media has always been rejected by Thomists, who say that
it implies a passivity in God relative to our free determinations
(futuribilia, and future): and that it leads to "determination by
circumstances" (since it is by knowledge of these circumstances
that God would foresee what man would choose). Thus the very being
and goodness of the will and salutary choice would come from man
and not from God. Granted equal grace to each, says Molina, [1443]
it can come to pass that one is converted, the other not. Even
with a smaller aid of grace one can rise, while another with
greater grace does not rise, and remains hardened.
Molina's opponents answer thus: Here we have a good, the good of a
salutary act, which does not come from God, Source of all good.
How then maintain the word of Jesus: [1444] Without Me you can do
nothing? Or that of St. Paul: [1445] What hast thou that thou hast
not received? If, with equal grace, and amid equal circumstances,
one is converted and the other not, then the convert has a good
which he has not received.
Molinists object: If, in order to do good, you demand, besides
sufficient grace, also self-efficacious grace, does sufficient
grace really and truly give you a real power to act?
It does, so Thomists reply, if it is true that real power to act
is distinct from the act itself; if it is true [1446] that the
architect, before he actually builds, has a real power to build,
that he who is seated has a real power to rise; that he who is
sleeping is not blind, but has a real power to see. Further, if
the sinner would not resist sufficient grace, he would receive the
efficacious grace, which is offered in the preceding sufficient
grace, as fruit is offered in the blossom. If he resists he merits
privation of new aid.
But does St. Thomas explicitly distinguish self-efficacious grace
from that grace which gives only the power to act?
He does, and often. God's aid, he says, [1447] is twofold. God
gives the power, by infusing strength and grace, by which man
becomes able and apt to act. But He gives further the good act
itself, by interiorly moving and urging us to good... since His
power, by His great good will, operates in us to will and to do.
Again: [1448] Christ is the propitiation for our sins, for some
efficaciously, for all sufficiently, because His blood is
sufficient price for the salvation of all, but does not have
efficacy except in the elect, because of impediment. Does God
remedy this impediment? He does, often, but not always. And here
lies the mystery. God, he says, [1449] withholds nothing that is
due. And he adds: [1450] God gives to all sufficient aid to keep
from sin. Again, speaking of efficacious grace: [1451] If it is
given to this sinner, it is by mercy; if it is refused to another,
it is by justice.
Thomists add, [1452] in explanation: Every actual grace which is
self-efficacious for an imperfect act, say attrition, is
sufficient for a more perfect salutary act, say contrition. This
is manifestly the doctrine of St. Thomas. [1453] If man resists
the grace which gives him the power to do good, he merits
privation of the grace which would carry him on to actual good
deed. But the saint has not merely distinguished the two graces,
he has pointed out the deepest foundation for this distinction.
THE DIVINE WILL, ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT
"The will, " says St. Thomas, [1454] "is related to things as they
are in themselves, with all their particular circumstances. Hence
we will a thing simply (simpliciter) when we will it with all its
concrete circumstances. This will we call the consequent will.
Thus it is clear that everything which God wills simpliciter comes
to pass. ".
If, on the contrary, we will a thing in itself good, but
independently of its circumstances, this will is called the
antecedent will, or conditional will, since the good in question
is not realized here and now. That man should live, says St.
Thomas, [1455] is good. But if the man is a murderer, it is good
that he be executed. Antecedently, God wills that harvests come to
maturity, but He allows for some higher good, that not all
harvests do in fact mature. Similarly, He wills antecedently the
salvation of all men, though for some higher good, of which He
alone is judge, He permits some to sin and perish.
But, since God never commands the impossible, His will and love
make the observance of His commandments possible to all men, to
each according to his measure. He gives to each, says St. Thomas,
[1456] more than strict justice requires. It is thus that St.
Thomas harmonizes God's antecedent will, of which St. John
Damascene speaks, with God's omnipotence.
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES
Nothing comes to pass, either in heaven or on earth, unless God
either brings it to pass in mercy, or then in justice permits it.
This principle, taught in the universal Church, shows that there
is in God a conditional and antecedent will, relative to a good
which does not come to pass, the privation of which He permits in
view of some higher good.
To this principle we must add another: [1457] God does not command
the impossible. From these two revealed principles derives the
distinction between God's efficacious consequent will and His
antecedent will, which is the source of sufficient grace.
All that God wills, He does. This principle has no exception. All
that God wills (purely, simply, unconditionally) comes to pass
without our freedom being thereby in any way forced, because God
moves that freedom sweetly and strongly, actualizing it, not
destroying. He wills efficaciously that we freely consent and we
do freely consent. The supreme efficacy of divine causality, says
St. Thomas, [1458] extends to the free mode of our acts.
Many repeat these principles, but do not see that they contain the
foundation of the distinction between the two kinds of grace, one
that is self-efficacious, the other simply sufficient which man
may resist, but not without divine permission.
Hence we find that in the ninth century, to terminate the long
controversy with Gottschalk, the Council of Thuzey (860): at the
instance of the Augustinian bishops, harmonized God's will of
universal salvation with the sinner's responsibility. That
Council's synodal letter [1459] contains this sentence: Whatever
He has willed in heaven or on earth, God has done. For nothing
comes to pass in heaven or on earth that He does not in mercy
bring to pass or permits to come to pass in justice.
Since God's love is the cause of created goodness, says St.
Thomas, [1460] no created thing would be better than another, if
God did not give one a great good than He gives to another. This
is equivalent to St. Paul's word: [1461] What hast thou that thou
hast not received?
CONSEQUENCES.
Christian humility rests on two dogmas, that of creation from
nothing, and that of the necessity of grace for each and every
salutary act. Now this same principle of God's predilection
contains virtually the doctrine of gratuitous predestination,
because the merits of the elect, since they are the effects of
their predestination, cannot be the cause of that predestination.
[1462].
Even all there is of being and action in sin must come from God,
Source of all being and of all activity. [1463] As the divine will
cannot indeed, either directly or indirectly, will the disorder
which is in sin, so neither can divine causality produce that
disorder. Disorder is outside the adequate object of God's
omnipotence, more than sound is outside the object of sight. As we
cannot see sound, so God cannot cause the disorder of sin. Nothing
is more precise and precisive, if we may use the word, than the
formal object of a power. [1464] The good and the true are not
really distinct in the object, yet the intellect attains in that
object only the truth, and the will only the good. In our
organism, it is impossible to confuse the effects of weight with
the effects of electricity, say, or of heat. Each cause produces
only its own proper effect. And thus God is the cause, not of the
moral disorder in sin, but only what there is in sin of being and
action. No reality comes to pass, to repeat the principle, unless
God has willed it, and nothing of evil unless God has permitted
it. How necessary, then, it is that the theologian, after drawing
conclusion from principles, should remount from conclusions to
principles, thus clarifying his conclusions for those who do not
see the bond that binds all consequences to the primal verities.
If, then, one of two sinners is converted, that conversion is the
effect of a special mercy. And if a just man never sins mortally
after his baptism, this perseverance is the effect of a still
greater mercy. These simple remarks are enough to show the
gratuity of predestination.
Molina, refusing to admit that grace is intrinsically self-
efficacious, maintains that it is efficacious only by our consent,
foreseen from eternity by scientia media. Thus we have a good
which comes to pass without God having efficaciously willed it,
contrary to the principle we have just laid down.
Molina does indeed attempt to defend that principle. God, having
seen by scientia media that Peter, placed in such and such
circumstances, would with sufficient grace be in fact converted,
wills to place him in those favorable circumstances rather than in
others where he would be lost. But this explanation surely reduces
the absolute principle of predilection to a relative, indirect,
and extrinsic principle. Grace is efficacious, not of itself and
intrinsically, but only by circumstances which are extrinsic to
the salutary act. With equal aid, yea with less aid, says Molina,
one rises, the other perseveres in obstinacy. One who thus rises,
St. Paul would say, has something he has not received.
THE MYSTERY
Who can resist God's will? St. Paul [1465] answers this question
with a hymn on the mysterious depths of God's wisdom. Why God
draws this man and not that man, says St. Augustine, [1466] judge
not unless you would misjudge. Predestination, says St. Thomas,
[1467] cannot have the merits of the elect as cause, because these
merits are the effects of predestination, which is consequently
gratuitous, dependent on the divine good pleasure.
Not infrequently we meet authors who, in explaining this mystery,
wish to speak more clearly than St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St.
Thomas. Superficially, they may be more clear. But is not this
superficial clarity incompatible with the sense of mystery? Willy-
nilly, these authors return to Molina. One of them recently wrote
as follows: "Here is the mystery of predestination. Since God knew
from all eternity that Judas would not profit by the sufficient
grace accorded to him, why did God not give to Judas, as He did to
the good robber, those graces to which He knew that Judas would
correspond? ".
This explanation is Molinistic, since it rests on scientia media,
since it implies in God's foreknowledge a passivity, depending on
the course man would take, were he put in such and such
circumstances, and which he will take if in fact he is placed
there. The dilemma remains: Is God's knowledge causal and
determining? Or is it rather caused and determined? There is no
medium.
If we follow the principle commonly received that all good comes
from God's efficacious will and all evil from God's permission,
then it is not sufficient to say with the author just quoted: God
knew what would happen if, etc. We must rather say: God permitted
the final impenitence of Judas. Had God not permitted it, it would
not have come to pass and God could not have infallibly foreseen
it. And God would not have permitted it, had He willed
efficaciously to save Judas. But God did efficaciously will the
conversion of the penitent robber, because He willed efficaciously
his salvation (gratuitous predestination to glory). [1468].
The free will moved and aroused by God, says the Council of Trent,
can dissent if it will. This declaration, which was prepared by
Dominic Soto, a Thomist, and by many Augustinians, is not a
condemnation of self-efficacious grace. Grace actualizes our
liberty, but leaves intact the freedom to resist. [1469] As he who
is seated retains real power to rise, so he who chooses a
particular road has real power to refuse it freely. Real power to
resist is one thing, actual resistance is something else. [1470].
No one, then, can be better than another unless he be loved more
by God. Divine predilection is the foundation of predestination.
[1471] Bannez says nothing more than does St. Thomas. [1472]
Molina, more frank than some of his followers, recognized that his
own doctrine is not that of St. Thomas. [1473].
As regards reprobation, it consists precisely, says St. Thomas,
[1474] in God's will to permit sin (negative reprobation) and of
inflicting punishment of damnation for sin (positive reprobation).
Hence it is wrong to say, as has been recently said, that
permission of sin is found in the same way among the elect as it
is among the reprobate. Final impenitence is never found among the
elect.
CONCLUSION
Nothing comes to pass unless God wills it efficaciously, if it is
good, or permits it if it is evil. God never commands the
impossible. From these two most fundamental principles arises the
distinction between efficacious grace, which is the effect of the
intrinsically efficacious will of God, and sufficient grace, which
is the effect of God's antecedent will, accompanied by permission
of sin. The first grace gives the actual doing of salutary acts,
the second gives real power for salutary acts. But -- we cannot
repeat it too often -- sufficient grace is a blossom wherein
efficacious grace is offered, yet so that, if man resists, he
merits privation of the efficacious grace which, without this
resistance, he would have received.
A very great mystery, certainly. God cannot be unjust, cries St.
Paul. [1475] What creature can claim to have first given anything
to God, so as to claim a reward? But this much is manifest in this
chiaro oscuro: we are dealing here with the transcendent pre-
eminence of the deity, wherein are harmonized infinite justice,
infinite mercy, and supreme freedom. Final perseverance comes from
infinite mercy. Final impenitence is a just punishment. The
infinity of all God's attributes will be manifest only in the
immediate vision of God as he is in Himself.
Let us learn, says Bossuet, [1476] to make our intelligence
captive, to confess these two graces (sufficient and efficacious):
one of which leaves our will without excuse before God, while the
other forbids all self-glorification. Resistance to grace is an
evil which comes only from ourselves. Non-resistance to grace is a
good, which would not come to pass here and now, had not God from
all eternity efficaciously willed it so.
Let us notice some common errors, especially in the minds of those
who are just being introduced into this doctrine. It is an error
to think that some receive only efficacious graces and others only
those which are sufficient. All of us receive both kinds of
graces. Even those in mortal sin receive from time to time
efficacious graces, to make, say, an act of faith, or of hope. But
often too they resist the sufficient grace which inclines them to
conversion, whereas good servants of God often receive sufficient
graces which they do not resist and which are followed by
efficacious graces.
We should note too that there are various kinds of sufficient
grace. There are first exterior graces, as, e. g.: a sermon, a
good example, a proper guidance. Then interior graces, as, e. g.:
that of baptism, the infused virtues and graces, which give us the
proximate power to act supernaturally. Thirdly, there are actual
graces, graces of illumination, which give us good thoughts,
graces of attraction which incline us to salutary consent, even
though consent does not follow. [1477] A grace which efficaciously
produces attrition is, as regards contrition, a sufficient grace.
[1478].
Sufficient grace often urges us insistently not to resist God's
will, manifested to us by our superior, say, or by our director.
For a year, it may be, or two years, or many years, circumstances
strengthen what is demanded of us in God's name, and still we
remain deceived by our selfishness, though prayers are said for
us, and Masses celebrated for our intention. Notwithstanding all
light and attraction that comes from these graces, we may still
reach a state of hardening in sin. Behold I stand at the gate and
knock.
Resistance comes from the soul alone. If resistance ceases, the
warmth of grace begins, strongly and sweetly, to penetrate our
coldness. The soul begins to realize that resistance is her own
work, that non-resistance is itself a good that comes from the
Author of all good, that it must pray for this good, as the priest
prays just before his Communion at Mass: "Grant, O Lord, that I
may ever cling to Thy precepts, and let me never be separated from
Thee. ".
One who keeps the commandments sincerely is certainly better than
he who, though fully able, does not keep them. He is therefore
bound to special gratitude to God who has made him better. Hence
our present distinction, between grace sufficient and grace
efficacious, is the foundation of a gratitude intended to be
eternal. The elect, as St. Augustine [1479] so often says, will
sing forever the mercy of God, and will clearly see how this
infinite mercy harmonizes perfectly with infinite justice and
supreme freedom. [1480].
The Thomistic synthesis sets all these principles in bold relief,
thereby preserving the spirit of theological science which judges
all things, not precisely and primarily by their relation to man
and man's freedom, but by their relation to God, the proper object
of theology, to God, the source and goal of all life, natural and
supernatural. Truth concerning God is the sun which illumines our
minds and wills on the road that rises to eternal life, to the
unmediated vision of the divine reality.
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1 Luther even doubted the salvation of the Angelic Doctor
2 See Archivio di filosofia, July, 1933, p. 10, a posthumous
article by Laberthonniere
3 See Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, art. "Leibniz"
(conclusion).
4 See Ia, q. 1; q. 32. Also Cont. Gent.: I, 3
5 Cf. Ia, q. 1
6 Cf. IIa, IIae, q. 2, a. 2, ad. 1
7 Ibid.: q. 188, a. 6
8 The Vatican Council
9 Chap. 31
10 Chaps. 32, 35
11 Ibid.
12 In the Third Part of the Summa.
13 Media vita in morte sumus
14 Ibid.: chap. 48
15 Ex plenitudine contemplationis
16 S. Thomas d'Aquin (French trans.: 1920, p. 58)
17 Giles of Rome, Henry de Bate
18 J Cf. Jourdain, Fr. Brentano, G. von Hertling, and others
19 In the years 1269-71
20 In 1268 or later
21 Peri hermenias, I, 14
22 Chap. 1
23 In the second book of the Physica
24 Books three to six of the Physica
25 Books seven and eight
26 Written in the year 1272-73
27 Written 1269-71
28 Written 1272-73
29 Bk. 1, chap. 8 (lect. 17, in St. Thomas)
30 Terra (vel corpus grave) velocius movetur quanto magis
descendit
31 S. Thomas d'Aquin, 1920, p. 36
32 The historian of the Copernican system
33 Summa, Ia q. 32, a. 1, ad 2, and De coelo et mundo, Bk. II,
lect. 17
34 See also P Duhem, Essai sur la notion De theorie physique De
Platon a Galilee, Paris, 1908, pp. 46 ff
35 Written about 1266
36 Written in 1266
37 Written in 1266
38 In the first book
39 Bk. II lect. 1-5
40 Ibid.: lect. 6
41 Ibid.: lect. 13
42 Bk. III, lect. 2
43 Sonatio et auditio sunt in subjecto sentiente, sonatio ut ab
agente, auditio ut in patiente
44 Bk. II, lect. 24
45 Fit quodammodo omnia
46 Bk. III, lect. 4, 5, 7
47 Intellectus agens
48 Bk. III, lect. 10
49 Ibid.: lect. 11
50 Ibid.: lect. 8
51 Ibid.: lect. 14
52 Bk. II, chap. 2; Bk. III, chap. 5
53 Bk. I, chap. 4; Bk. III, chaps. 4, 5
54 Bk. 10, chap. 7
55 Bk. IV, lect. 5
56 In, the author's text I find chrinein and chrisis a slip on the
part of proofreader or printer's devil
57 Bks VII, VIII
58 Bk. IX
59 Cf. Bk. XII, lect. 7-12
60 Et hoc est quod concludit (Philosophus): quod est unus princeps
totius universi, scilicet primum movens et primum intelligibile et
primum bonum
61 The saint, in 1266, commented on all ten books
62 The saint, in 1268, commented on Bks. I and II, and of III,
chaps. 1-6. He did not explain the Moralia magna, nor the Moralia
ad Eudemum
63 Bk. I
64 Bk. II
65 Bk. III
66 Bk. IV
67 Bk. V
68 Bk. VI
69 Bk. VII
70 Bk. IX
71 Bk. X
72 Nous
73 Ibid
74 Cf. A. Mansion, "L'eudemonisme aristotelicien et la morale
thomiste" in Xenia thomistica I, 429-49
75 Cf. Msgr. Grabmann, Phil. Jahrbuch, 1915 pp. 373-78
76 IIae, q. 94, a. 5, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 10; q. 104, a. 5
77 see the first chapter of that work
78 see the Summa, Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 1
79 De regimine principum I, 6
80 Si paulatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragium,
et regimen flagitiosis, sceleratisque committat, recte adimitur
populo talis potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit
arbitrium
81 In 1269
82 In 1257
83 Ad eruditionem incipientium
84 Secundum ordinem disciplinae
85 Ia, q. 1, a. 6
86 Ia, q. 11, prologue
87 IIa IIae, q. 180, a. 6
88 Can. 1366, pars 2: Philosophiae rationalis ac theologiae
studia, et alumnorum in his disciplinis institutionem, professores
omnino pertractent ad Angelici Doctoris rationem doctrinam et
principia, eaque sancte teneant
89 Died 1444
90 Latest edition, Tours, 1900-1908
91 Died 1481
92 Died 1523
93 Written 1507-22
94 On the Ia IIae, Cologne, 1512
95 On the Cont. Gent.: Venice, 1534
96 On the IIa IIae. He died in 1546
97 At Salamanca, 1932-35
98 At Madrid. 1933-35
99 Sess. VI, chap. 6.
100 IIIa, q. 85, a. 5
101 Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 4; IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 3.
102 Et liquido nuper in sacris concilii Tridentini decretis
apparuit
103 Bull. ord. praed.: V, 155
104 On the Ia IIae, Salamanca, 1577, and on the IIIa, Salamanca,
1578
105 On the la, Salamanca, 1584-88 (recently reprinted, Valencia,
1934) ; on the IIa IIae, Salamanca, 1584-94; and on the IIIa
(still in manuscript).
106 Published 1640-42
107 Published 1631, 1637, 1641 (new ed.: Paris, 1871).
108 Defensiones (latest edition, Tours, 1900-1908).
109 Bk. III, chap. 51.
110 Ibid.: chap. 94
111 Bk IV, chap. 95. Note here some differences between him and
Cajetan
112 De entia et essentia; De analogia nominum. Noteworthy too are
his opuscula on the sacrifice of the Mass.
113 Rome, 1888-1906
114 De divinis nominibus, chap. 5, lect. 3. Quodl. XII, a. 3, 4:
Commentary on St. John's Gospel (2: 4; 7: 30; 13: 1; 17: 1)
115 Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Banez
116 Re-edited at Paris, 1883; and recently again, by Beatus
Reiser, O. S. B.: Turin, 1930-37
117 Re-edited at Paris, 1883-86. The Benedictines of Solesmes are
now again re-editing the work.
118 Fribourg, 1911
119 Fribourg, three volumes, 1907
120 1908 and 1912
121 1910
122 Two volumes, 1927
123 Primo in conceptione intellectus cadit ens; quia secundum hoc
unumquodque cognoscibile est in quantum est actu; unde ens est
proprium objectum intellectus et sic est primum intelligibile,
sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ia, q. 5, a. 2. Cf. also Ia, q.
85, a3; Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2; Cont. Gent.: II, 83; De veritate, q.
1, a. I.
124 Id cujus actus est esse
125 Quod statim ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu.
De anima, II, 6, lect. 13 (de sensibili per accidens).
126 Ia, q. 76, a. 5.
127 Per intellectum ens dulce ut ens, et per gustum ut dulce
128 Naturaliter intellectus noster cognoscit ens et ea quae sunt
per se entis, in quantum hujusmodi, in qua congnitione fundatur
primorum pincipiorum notitia, ut non esse simul affirmare et
negare (vel oppositio inter ens et non ens) et alia hujusmodi.
Cont. Gent.: II, 83. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
129 Ia, q. 86, a. 1; De veritate, q. 10, a. 5.
130 See St. Thomas, In Met.: IV, lect. 5-15.
131 Here we see too the distance that separates idea from image. A
polygon with 10,000 sides is not easily imaginable, but is easily
conceivable, and also realizable
132 In Phys.: II, lect. 10: Hoc quod dico propter quid quaerit de
causa; sed ad propter quid non respondetur nisi aliqua dictarum
(quattuor) causarum.
133 See also In Met.: V, 2, lect. 2
134 Id quod est.
135 Id quo aliquid est, v. g.: alburn, calidum
136 In Met.: V, lect. 10 and 11.
137 Ab aeterno
138 Ia, q. 2, a. 2
139 Sub ratione finis
140 In Phys.: II, 3, lect. 5, 12-14; Ia, q. 44, a. 4; Ia IIae, q.
1, a. 2; Cont. Gent.: III, 2
141 Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
142 For more extended treatment of these foundations of Thomistic
realism, see our two works: Le sens commun, la philosophie De
l'etre et les formules dogmatiques, 1909, 4th ed.: 1936, and Dieu,
son existence et sa nature, 1915 (6th ed.: 1936, pp. 108-226). See
also J Maritain, Elements De philosophie (6th ed.: 1921): I, 87-
94; Sept lecons sur l'etre (s. d. ).
143 Realisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance, 1939, pp.
213-39
144 Illud quod primo intellectus concipit, quasi notissimum et in
quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens. De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
145 Cogito ergo sum
146 Cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus
communis. Ia, q. 85, a. 3
147 See art. "Acte et puissance, Aristotelisme" in Dict. theol.
cath
148 Operari sequitur esse, et modus operandi modum essendi.
149 Phys.: I and II; Met.: I, V (IV): IX (VIII).
150 Phys.: I, 6 and 8; Met.: I, 5; IV (III): per totum; IX (VIII):
per totum
151 Ex ente non fit ens, quia jam est ens, et ex nihilo nihil fit,
ergo ipsum fieri est impossibile
152 Met.: IV (III): from chap. 4 to the end
153 Le Sophiste, 241d, 257a, 259e
154 Phys.: loc. cit. ; Met.: loc. cit.
155 Ex nihilo nihil fit
156 Ia, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2
157 Ex ente in actu non fit ens
158 Ex nulla presupposita potentia reali
159 Ia, q. 45, a. 1, 2, 5; IIIa, q. 75, a. 8.
160 De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 8.
161 Ia, q. 50, a. 4.
162 From this doctrine Suarez differs. Disp. met.: XXX, sect. 2,
no. 18; XXXI, sect. 13, nos. 14 f. De angelis, I, XII, XV
163 Non est quid, nec quale, nec quantum, nec aliquid hujusmodi In
Met.: VII (VI) ; lect. 2, 6.
164 Corruptio unius est generatio alterius
165 Ia, 15. a. 3, ad 3. Suarez differs from this doctrine; Disp.
met.: XIII, sect. 5; XXXIII, sect. I; XV, sect. 6, no. 3 and sect.
9.
166 Cf. St. Thomas, Ia, q. 7, a. 1.
167 Ibid
168 Illud quod est maxime formale omnium est ipsum esse (ibid. ).
169 Ia, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium;
comparatur enim adomnia ut actus; nihil enim habet actualitatem,
nisi in quantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum
et etiam ipsarum formarum; unde non comparatur ad alia sicut
recipiens ad receptum sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens, cum
enim dico esse hominis vel equi, vel cujuscumque alterius, ipsum
esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui
competit esse.
170 Ia, q. 7, a. 1.
171 Ibid.: ad 3.
172 Approved, 1914, by the Sacra Congregatio Studiorum
173 Disp. met.: XV, sect. 9; XXXI per totum
174 Cf. Disp. met. XXX, sect. 2, no. 18; XXXI, sect. 13, no. 14
175 Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit. De
potentia, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17.
176 Hoc est contra rationem facti quod essentia rei sit ipsum esse
ejus, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum. Ia, q. 7, a. 2,
ad 1.
177 Praeter esse est capacitas realis ad esse et limitans esse
178 Ia, q. 13, a. 12
179 Dist. met.: XV, sect. 9; XXX and XXXI
180 See p. 45 and note 26
181 Revue De philosophie, 1938, p. 412; cf. pp. 410 f.: 429
182 Art. cit.: pp. 410 ff
183 De veritate q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
184 Sententiae Bk. 1, dist. 19, q. 2, a. 2
185 De hebdomadibus
186 Quodlibet. III, a. 20 (written 1270).
187 Saltem ex esse et quod est
188 Suppositum, id quod est
189 Bk. II, chap. 53: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis
est actus et potentia
190 Solus Deus est suum esse, non solum habet esse, sed est suum
esse.
191 Ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens, non receptum
in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis
et alia removentur ab eo; sicut si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc
ipso quod non esset in alio differret ab omni albedine existente
in subjecto. Ia, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3.
192 De ver. fund. phil. christianae, Fribourg, 1911, pp. 23 ff.
Cf. also p. Cornelio Fabro, C. P. S.: "Neotomismo e Suarezismo, "
Divus Thomas (Placentiae, 1941): fasc. 2-3, 5-6.
193 Cf. F. X. Maquart, Elementa philosophiae, 1938, Vol. IIIb,
Ontologia, pp. 54-60
194 Ens non est univocum, sed analogum, alioquin diversificari non
posset
195 In Metaph.: Bk. 1, chap. 5, lect. 9. See the fourth of the
twenty-four Thomistic theses
196 OpusOxon.: Bk. 1, dist 3, q. 2, nos. 5 ff. ;dist. V, q.
1;dist. 8, q. 3; IV Met.: q. 1.
197 Disp. met.: II, sect. 2, no. 34; XV, sect. 9; XXX and XXXI
198 Doctrinae D. Thomae tria principia: a) Ens est transcendens et
analogum, non univocum. b) Deus est actus purus, solus Deus est
suurn esse. c) Absoluta specificantur a se, relativa ab alio
199 Cf. N. del Prado, O. P.: De veritate fundamentali philosophiae
christianae, 1911, pp. xliv ff. ; also Dict. theol. cath.: s. v.
Essence et existence
200 Ipsum esse subsistens et irreceptum. Ia, q. 7, a. 1
201 Ia, q. 3, a. 6.
202 Ipsum intelligere subsistens. Ia, q. 14, a. 1.
203 1a, q. 19, a. l; q. 20, a. I
204 Ia, q. 50, a. 4
205 Unum per se, una natura.
206 Ex actu et actu non fit unum per se, sed solum ex propria
potentia et proprio actu. Ia, q. 76, a. 4.
207 Id quo aliquid est materiale et id quo aliquod corpus est in
tali specie
208 See the ninth of the twenty-four theses
209 Ia, q. 66, a. 1.
210 Id quo forma recepta limitatur et multiplicatur.
211 Ia, q. 15, a, 3, ad. 3
212 Ia, q. 85, a. 1
213 Ia, q. 14, a. 1; q. 78, a. 3. See the eighteenth of the
twenty-four theses.
214 Operari sequitur esse, et modus operandi modum essendi
215 Ia, q. 77, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2; IIa IIae, q. 5, a. 3
216 Ia, q. 77, a. 1, 2, 3, 4
217 Ia, q. 79, a. 7.
218 Omne quod movetur movetur ab alio.
219 Ia, q. a, a. 3
220 Multa sunt quae per actum virtualem videntur sese movere et
reducere ad actum formalem, ut in appetitu seu voluntate videre
licet. Disp. met.: XXIX, I.
221 Ia, q. 105, a. 4, 5
222 Quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis pnatur
perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere, nisi moveatur a Deo.
Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 1
223 Si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus non erit
prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec
causae efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ia, q. 2, a. 3,
2a via
224 See the twenty-second of the twenty-four theses
225 In causis per se subordinatis non repugnat infinitas causas,
si sint, simul operari. Disp. met.: XXIX 1, 2; XXI, 2
226 Ibid
227 Concursus simultaneus
228 Partialitate causae, si non effectus
229 Cf. Disp. met.: XX, 2, 3; XXII, 2, no. 51.
230 Quando causae subordinatae sunt inter se, necesse non est, ut
superior in eo ordine semper moveat inferiorem, etiamsi
essentialiter subordinatae sint inter se et a se mutuo pendeant in
producendo aliquo effectu; sed satis est si imrnediate influant in
effectum. Concordia, disp. XXVI, in fine
231 Ia, q. 2, a. 3; q. 105, a. 5. Deus in omni operante operatur
232 Cf. St. Thomas, Compend. theol.: 104; IIIa, q. 11, ad I; De
verit.: q. 14, a. 2; De potentia, q. 16, ad I, ad 18.
233 De gratia, VI, 5
234 Cf. John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 12, a. 1, 4 (disp. XIV, a.
2, nos. 17ff. ).
235 Ia, a. 17, a. 1.
236 Potentia dicitur ad actum
237 Cf. Ia, q. 105, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 4.
238 Deus sub ratione deitatis
239 On this subject, see Acta secundi congressus thomistici
internationalis Rome, 1936, pp. 379-408; Garrigou-Lagrange, De
relationibus inter philosophiam et religionem, ac De natura
philosophiac christianae
240 l'Evolution homogene du dogme catholique, Paris, 2nd ed.:
French trans.: 1924, II, 333.
241 Introductio in historiam dogmatum, Paris, 1922, pp. 128, 115-
49, 170-73, 185, 192-210.
242 De revelatione, Rome, 1918, I, 18, 20, 189 ff. ; De Deo uno,
Paris, 1938, pp. 43-49
243 Essai sur le probleme theologique (Bibliotheque Orientations):
Belgium, 1938, pp. 66, 121, 123, 135.
244 Ibid.: pp. 137-41
245 See note 3. Cf. Gagnebet, in Rev. thom.: 1939, pp. 108-47
246 This paragraph summarizes the first question in the Summa. See
Ia, q. 1, a. 6.
247 Clare visa
248 Obscure per fidem cognita
249 Ego sum qui sum
250 Deus solus est ipsum esse subsistens
251 Bk. 1, lect. 4; Scire est cognoscere causam propter quam res
est et non potest aliter se habere
252 Cf. R. Gagnebet, O. P.: "La nature de la theologie
speculative" in Rev. thom.: 1938, nos. 1 and 2, p. 78; 1939, pp.
108-47
253 Radix ejus est ipsa fides infusa
254 Ia, q. 1, a. 6, 8, 9.
255 Sufficit defendere non esse impossibile quod praedicat fides.
Ia, q. 32, a. 1
256 IIIa, q. 1, a. 1.
257 Ia, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2
258 Haec non possunt nec probari nec improbari, sed cum
probabilitate suadentur et sola fide cum certitudine tenentur
259 Matt. 16: 18
260 Doctrina fidei
261 Matt. 26: 39.
262 Fides quaerens intellectum
263 Cf. Gagnebet, O. P.: "La nature de la theologie speculative, "
Rev. thom.: 1938, nos. 1 and 2.
264 Cf. Salmanticenses, Cursus theol.: de tide, disp. 1, dub. 4,
no. 127
265 See Salmanticenses (loc. cit.: no. 124): who rightly cite as
defenders of their thesisa series of Thomists, Capreolus, Cajetan,
Banez, John of St. Thomas, and others, against Vega, Vasquez,
Suarez, and Lugo. Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Explicite et
Implicite and s. v. Dogme
266 Ad aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam, eamque
fructuosissimam Denz.: no. 1796
267 Bk. II, lect. 3-17
268 Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: 1933, Part I; De
Deo uno, 1st ed.: 1938
269 Ia, q. 2, a. 1
270 Existentiam non solum signatam aut conceptam, sed exercitam in
re extra animam
271 Nescimus de Deo quid est
272 Ia, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; a. 2, ad 2.
273 Ia, q. 104, a. 1.
274 Ia, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7
275 Cf. Cont. Gent.: II, 38
276 Cf. Ia, q. 104, a. 1
277 Ia, q. 2, a. 2
278 Ia, q. 104, a. 1.
279 See above, on Concursus simultaneus
280 Quae secundum se diversa sunt non conveniunt in aliquod unum
nisi per aliquam causam, adunantem ipsa. Ia, q. 3, a. 7
281 Quod causam non habet primum et immediatum est. Cont. Gent.:
II, 15, § 2.
282 Ens per essentiam et non per participationem
283 See note 13
284 Causa unionis est unitas
285 For more detailed defense of the principle of causality, see
Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: 1933, pp. 83 ff.: 98
ff.: 170-81
286 Secumdum viam ascendentem inventionis
287 Secundum viam judicii
288 Ia, q. 44, a. 1.
289 Cf. C. Fabro, "La difesa critica del principio di causa" in
Rivista di filosofia neoscholastica, 1936, pp. 102-41; also La
nozione metafisica di participazione sec. s. Tommaso, 1939
290 Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1
291 In primo modi dicendi per se
292 In secundo modi dicendi per se. We have here the terminology
of Aristotle: Post. Analyt.: 1, 4, lect. 10 of St. Thomas
293 Cf. Ia, q. 2, a. 1: Incorporalia non esse in loco est
propositio per se nota apud sapientes tantum
294 See Ia, q. 3, a. 4
295 Via inventionis
296 Via judicii
297 Cf. Ia, q. 79, a. 9.
298 Cf. N. del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae
christianae, 1911
299 Ego sum qui sum. Exod. 3: 14
300 Divina essentia per hoc quod exercitae actualitati ipsius Esse
identificatur, seu per hoc quod est ipsum Esse subsistens, in sua
veluti metaphysica ratione bene nobis constituta proponitur, et
per hoc idem rationem nobis exhibet suae infinitatis in
perfectione.
301 See Index of his works in Tabula aurea, s. v. Deus, no. 27
302 This proposition must, of course, be irresistibly evident to
the created intellect which sees God immediately, and contrasts
itself with the self-subsistent existence
303 See Garrigou-Lagrange, "La distinction reelle et la refutation
du pantheisme" in Rev. thom.: October, 1938
304 Intelligere subsistens
305 Ipsum esse subsistens
306 Ia, q. 3, a. 1, 2
307 Ia, q. 12.
308 Sub ratione communi et analogica entis
309 Deum sub ratione deitatis
310 Deum nemo vidit umquam. John 1: 18
311 Lucem habitat inaccessibilcm. I Tim. 6: 16.
312 In speculo rerum spiritualium
313 In speculo sensibilium
314 Ia, q. 77, a. 3
315 Ia, q. 12, a. 4
316 Creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei, virtutem causae non
adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei
virtus cognosci, et per conscquens nec ejus essentia videri. Cf.
Ia, q. 12, a. 12
317 See also Cont. Gent.: I, 3.
318 Cf. Scotus, In Iam Sent.: dist. III, q. 3, nos. 24, 25
319 Prolog. Sent. ; q. 1 and In IV Sent.: dist. XLIX, q. 10
320 De gratia, VI, 5
321 Ia, q. 12, a. 1
322 Cf. Denz.: no. 1021
323 Primum velle
324 Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 6
325 Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1
326 Cf. Salmanticenses, In Iam, q. 12, a. 1, nos. 75, 77.
327 Ad modum ponderis naturae.
328 The Vatican Council condemns the proposition: Mysteria proprie
dicta possunt per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis
intelligi et demonstrari. Denz.: nos. 1795, 1816.
329 Possibilitas et a fortiori existentia mysteriorum
essentialiter supernaturalium non potest naturaliter probari, nec
improbari, sed suadetur argumentis convenientiae et sola fide
firmiter tenetur. Cf. Salmanticenses, In Iam, Disp. 1, dub. 3. Cf.
also GarrigouLagrange, De Deo uno, 1938, pp.: 264-69
330 Ia, q. 12, a. 5
331 Vita nova
332 8 Cf. John of Saint Thomas, In Iam, q. 12, disp. XIV, a. 2,
nos. 17, 18, 23
333 De gratia, VI, 5
334 See also the Salmanticenses, In Iam, q. 12, disp. IV, dub. 4,
335 Omnem speciem creatam
336 Ia, q. 12, a. 2
337 Finito modo
338 Ia, q. 12, a. 7.
339 Ia, q. 13. For a thorough study of analogy, see The Bond of
Being, an Essay on Analogy and Being, by James F. Anderson. [Tr. ]
340 Op. Oxon.: I, d. III, q. 2, nos. 5 f. ; d. V, q. 1; d. VIII,
q. 3.
341 Disp. met.: II, sect. 2, no. 34; XV, sect. 9; XXX and XXXI.
342 Ia, q. 13.
343 Perfectiones simpliciter simplices
344 Substantialiter
345 Perfectiones mixtae
346 In suo significato formali
347 Ia, q. 13, a. 5. Omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae
recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed
deficienter; ita quod id quod divisim et multipliciter est in
effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo. Omnes rerum
perfectiones quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter,
praeexistunt in Deo unite et simpliciter.
348 Analoga sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio vero per nomen
significata est simpliciter eadem, et secundum quid diversa
349 Analoga sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio vero per somen
significata est simpliciter quidem diversa in analogatis, et
secundum quid eadem, id est similis secundum quandam proportionem,
seu proportionaliter eadem
350 Cf. Cajetan, De analogia nomimum, c. 5, 6; also N. del Prado,
De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, 1911, pp. 196
ff
351 Ia, q. 13, a. 5. Non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen
sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur
352 De veritate, q. 2, a. 11
353 Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta simulitudo
notari, quin sit semper major dissimilitudo notanda. Denz.: no.
432
354 Cum hoc nomen sapiens de homme dicitur, quodammodo describit
et comprehendit rem significatam (distinctam ab essentia hominis,
ab ejus esse, ab ejus potentia, etc. ): non autem cum dicitur de
Deo; sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, excedentem
nominis significationem. Ia, q. 13, a. 5.
355 Formaliter eminenter
356 Distinctio formalis actualis ex natura rei
357 In ipsa re, extra animam
358 Council of Florence: In Deo omnia sunt unum et idem, ubi non
obviat relationis oppositio. Denz.: no. 703.
359 In Iam, q. 13, a. 5s, no. 7. "Sicut res quae est sapientia, et
res quae est justitia in creaturis, elevantur in unam rem
superioris ordinis, scilicet Deitatem et ideo sunt una res in Deo:
ita ratio formalis sapientiae et ratio formalis justitiae
elevantur in unam rationem formalem superioris ordinis, scilicet
rationem propriam Deitatis, et sunt una numero ratio formalis,
eminenter utramque rationern continens, non tantum virtualiter ut
ratio lucis continet rationem coloris, sed formaliter.. Unde
subtilissime divinum sancti Thomae ingenium, ex hoc... intulit:
Ergo alia est ratio sapientiae in Deo et alia sapientiae in
creaturis. "
360 Ibid.: no. 15; De analogia nominum, chap.. 6: Non est una
ratio simpliciter, sed proportionaliter una
361 See note 52
362 Hae quidem perfectiones in Deo pracexistunt unite et
simpliciter, in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et
multipliciter.. Ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus
intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum
hujusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Ia, q. 13, a. 4.
Again: Rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et vanae,
quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia hujusmodi
multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum. Ibid.: ad 2. It3m, a.
5 in corpore.
363 As mathematical illustration, think of a multitude of radii
converging to the center of a circle. Each radius is distinct from
all others and still, by its central point of convergence,
identified with all other radii. [Tr. ]
364 Blessed Angela de Foligno, for instance
365 Secundum se, non quoad nos loquendo, est in Deo unica ratio
formalis, non pure absoluta, nec pure respectiva, non pure
communicabilis, nec pure incommunicabilis, sed eminentissime ac
formaliter continens et quidquid absolutae perfectionis est et
quidquid Trinitas respectiva exigit.. Quoniam res divina prior est
ente et omnibus differentiis ejus; est enim super ens et super
unum, etc. In Iam, q. 39, a. 1, no. 7.
366 Cont. Gent.: I, 3, no. 3
367 For more detailed exposition, see Garrigou-Lagrange, De
revelatione, 1, chap. 11, pp. 347-54
368 I Tim. 6: 16
369 Ia, q. 14.
370 Ibid.: a. 1.
371 Ibid.: a. 2, 3.
372 Non solum intelligibilis in actu sed intellecta in actu.
373 Ia, q. 14, a. 4
374 Ibid.: a. 5.
375 Ibid.: a. 6
376 Ibid.: a. 7
377 Ibid.: a. 8.
378 Ibid.: a. 10
379 Futuribilia
380 Aeternitas ambit totum tempus
381 Ia, q. 14, a. 13
382 Fortiter et suaviter.
383 Ia, q. 19, a. 1; q. 20, a. 1
384 Theod.: chap. 7
385 Ia, q. 19, a. 3.
386 Yet Plato and Aristotle are themselves immeasurably above
those moderns who trace the world back to a universal radiation
which, seemingly, is self-existent. [Tr. ]
387 Agens naturale secundum quod est tale agit, unde quamdiu est
tale non facit nisi tale; omne enim agens per naturam habet esse
determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum (seu
limitatum): sed contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi non
potest esse quod agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte
causaret aliquid indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo, quod est
impossibile. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae, sed
effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Ia, q.
7, a. 2, 4.
388 Vult hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc. Ia,
q. 7, a. 5
389 Ps. 134: 6: Omnia quaecumque voluit Deus fecit
390 Ia, q. 19, a. 6
391 Ibid.: ad 1.
392 Dives in hell knew that the acts which brought him there were
his own free choice. Hence his warning to his brothers. [Tr. ]
393 Ia, q. 19, a. 8. This article has special importance on this
point. The commentators dwell on it at great length
394 For more extended exposition, see our work, De Deo uno, 1938,
pp. 410-34; also Rev. thom.: May, 1937, "Le fondement supreme de
la distinction des deux graces, suffisante et efficace. "
395 See Molina, Concordia, Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 230, 356, 459,
565.
396 For an extended exposition of this Thomistic viewpoint, see
our article in Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Premotion physique,
cols. 31-77; also s. v. Predestination, cols. 294058, 2983-89
397 Cf. Molina, Concordia, Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 565
398 Cum amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, non esset aliquid alio
melius, si Deus non vellet uni majus bonum quam alteri. Ia, q. 20,
a. 1.
399 From Proverbs and St. Paul. See note 19
400 See Origen, in the third book of Peri Archon.
401 Cont. Gent.: I, 89. The saint is commenting on two Scripture
texts. Prov. 21: 1: The king's heart is in God's hand. God turns
that heart whithersoever He wills. Phil. 2: 13: It is God who
works in us by His own good will, both to will and to fulfill. The
saint's own words run thus: "Quidam non intelligentes qualiter
motum voluntatis Deus in nobis causare possit absque praejudicio
libertatis voluntatis, conati sunt has auctoritates male exponere,
ut scilicet dicerent quod Deus causat in nobis velle et perficere
in quantum dat nobis virtutem volendi, non autem sic quod faciat
nos velle hoc vel illud, sicut Origenes exponit in tertio
Periarchon. Quibus quidem auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae
resistitur evidenter. Dicitur enim apud Is. 36: 12: 'Omnia opera
nostra operatus es in nobis, Domine. ' Unde non solum virtutem
volendi a Deo habemus, sed etiam operationem. "
402 Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor ad
universale objectum voluntatis quod est bonum, et sine hac
universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle: sed homo per
rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere
bonum vel apparens bonum. Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3
403 See preceding note
404 Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid
determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per
gratiam ut infra dicetur. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 111, a. 2
405 Quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum,
sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet quod
non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet ejus motus
contingens et non necessarius nisi in his ad quae naturaliter
movetur. Ibid.: q. 10, a. 4.
406 Ia IIae, q. 10o, a. 4
407 Ibid.: a. 4, ad 3.
408 Si voluntas hominis immobiliter (seu infallibiliter) movetur a
Deo sequitur quod homo non habeat liberam electionem suorum
actuum. De malo, q. 6, a. l, ad 3.
409 Deus movet quidem voluntatem immutabiliter propter efficaciam
virtutis moventis quae deficere non potest; sed propter naturam
voluntatis motae, quae indifferenter se habet ad diversa, non
inducitur necessitas, sed manet libertas. Ibid.
410 You may note that he does not say: By reason of His divine
prevision of our consent
411 Si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo, cujus cor movet,
gratiam (sanctificantem) consequatur, infallibiliter ipsam
consequitur. Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 3.
412 John 2: 4
413 Intelligitur hora passionis sibi, non ex necessitate, sed
secundum divinam providentiam determinata
414 On John 7: 30
415 Cf. also on John 13: 1 and 17: 1
416 Ps. 134: 6
417 Quidquid perfectionis est
418 Motio divina perfecte praescindit a malitia actus mali
419 Nihil est magis praecisivum quam objectum formale alicujus
potentiae
420 Ia, q. 20, a. 3, 4; q. 21, a. 4
421 For more extended treatment, see our articles in Dict. de
theol. cath.: s. v. Providence, cols. 998-1023; Predestination,
cols. 2940-59, 2984-3022.
422 Ia, q. 2, a. 3
423 Ia, q. 22, a. 1.
424 Ibid.: ad 1
425 Matt. 10: 29 ff
426 Ia, q. 22, a. 2
427 Ia, q. 14, a. 11
428 Ia, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2.
429 Ia, q. 19, a. 8;q. 22, a. 4
430 Rom. 8: 28
431 Extended treatment will be found in Dict. de theol. cath.: s.
v. Predestination, cols. 2940-59, 2984-3022
432 John 17: 12
433 John 10: 27-29
434 Matt. 22: 14.
435 I Cor. 4: 7.
436 Phil. 2: 13
437 Eph 1: 4-6
438 Rom. 8: 28-30
439 Cf. Eph. 1: 14; I Cor. 4: 7; Rom. 9: 15 f.
440 Chaps. 9-11
441 Rom. 9: 14-16
442 Rom. 11: 33-36
443 Praedestinatio est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum
Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur. De dono
perseverantiae chap. 14
444 De praedestinatione sanctorum, chap. 10
445 Rom. 9: 22 f.
446 John 6: 44
447 In Jo.: tr. 26. Quare hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli
velle dijudicare si non vis errare
448 If thou hast received, why glory? I Cor. 4: 7. God worketh in
you, both to will and to accomplish. Phil. 2: 13.
449 John 15: 5. Without Me you can do nothing.
450 Ia, q. 23, a. 5. Quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in
salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam
ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam
451 Ia, q. 20, a. 3
452 Ia, q. 23, a. 4
453 Non praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi
praeexistente voluntate finis
454 Ia, q. 23, a. 5
455 Ibid.: ad 3
456 Ia, q. 23, a. 5. ad 3
457 In his quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo
dare cui vult plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum
absque praejudicio justitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias:
Tolle quod tuum est, et vade; an non licet mihi quod volo facere?
458 Matt. 20: 14f
459 Deus auxilians
460 Cf. IIa IIae, q. 18, a. 4
461 Ia, q. 25, a. 1.
462 Ia, q. 46, a. 2.
463 Ex nihilo sui et subjecti
464 Ia, q. 46, a. 1, 2, 5.
465 Ibid.: a. 5
466 Disp. met.: XX, 1, 2, 3.
467 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 2.
468 Met.: V (IV): 2
469 Ia, q. 44, a. 5, ad 3
470 Cf. the twenty-fourth Thomistic thesis
471 Elevations sur les mysteres, IIIe sernaine, le elev.: against
Leibnitz, Theod.: §8
472 Cont. Gent.: II, 22-24, 26-30; III, 98 f. ; De potentia, q. 6;
Ia, q. 105, a. 6
473 Theod.: §8.
474 Ia, q. 25, a. 5.
475 Dum Deus calculat fit mundus
476 Ia, q. 25, a. 6, ad 1
477 Qualibet re a se facta potest facere aliam meliorem.
478 Ia, q. 46, a. 2.
479 Cf. Cont. Gent.: II, 34, and especially 38.
480 Ibid.: 31-37
481 Novitas divini effectus absque novitate actionius divinae. Cf.
ibid.: Bk. II, 35; Ia, q. 46, a. 1, ad 9
482 Ia q. 104
483 Cf. N. del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae
christianae, 1911, pp. 404-15.
484 Ia, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4.
485 Ia, q. 8, a. 1
486 Isa. 26: 12
487 Acts 17: 28.
488 I Cor. 12: 6.
489 Ia, q. 105, a. 5
490 Ibid
491 Cf. Cont. Gent.: III, 67.
492 Sic ergo Deus est causa actionis cujuslibet in quantum dat
virtutem agendi, et in quantum conservat eam, et in quantum
applicat actioni, et in quantum ejus virtute omnia alia virtus
agit. De potentia, q. 3, a. 7.
493 Ibid.: ad 7: Rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur
absque operatione divina.
494 Cf. the twenty-fourth Thomistic thesis
495 Concordia, ed. Paris, 1876, p. 152: Duo sunt quae mihi
difficultatem pariunt circa doctrinam hanc D. Thomae. Primum est,
quod non videam quidnam sit motus ille et applicatio in causis
secundis qua Deus illas ad agendum moveat et applicet
496 Ibid.: p. 158: non secus ac cum duo trahunt navim
497 Disp. met.: XXII, sect. 2, no. 51; sect. 3, no. 12; sect. 4.
498 For extended treatment, see our article in Dict. de theol.
cath.: s. v. Premotion, cols. 31-77.
499 Cont. Arianos, I, 14, 16, 25, 27; III, 6; II, 24
500 St. Athanasius, Epist. ad Serapionem, I, 23 ff. ; III, 1-5.
501 Omnia per ipsum (Verbum) facta sunt. St. John's prologue. Thus
similarly in St. Paul's epistles
502 De Trinitate
503 Ibid.: Bks. IX and X
504 Ibid.: V, 5, 16, 17
505 See especially ibid.: XV, 10-16
506 Ibid.: Bks. IX and X; XV, 17-28
507 Ibid.: Bk. V (in toto) and XV, chaps. 4, 5, where he speaks
thus: Demonstratur non omne quod de Deo dicitur secundum
substantiam dici, sed dici etiam relative, id est, non ad se, sed
ad aliquid, quod ipse non est.
508 Ad Filium, ad Patrem. Ad Patrem et Filium. Ibid.: V, 16, 17.
Cf. J. Tixeront, Hist. des dogmes, II, 364-66
509 See Denz.: nos. 19, 77, 254, 281, 284, 421, 428
510 De Trin.: VI 2
511 Ia, q. 39, a. 7, 8; q. 46, a. 3; q. 4s, a. 6, ad 2
512 In Deo omnia sunt unum et idem ubi non obviat relationis
oppositio. Denz.: no. 703
513 Cf. T. de Regnon, Etudes positive sur le mystere de la
Trinite, 1892-98 I, 303 ff.
514 Ia, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3
515 Ia, q. 37. a. 1
516 Ia, q. 32, a. 1.
517 Ia, q. 26-43
518 Secundum emanationem intelligibilem Verbi intelligibilis a
dicente. Ia, q. 27, a. 1
519 Ibid.: ad 2.
520 IV, II. Quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea
emanat est magis intimum
521 Deus verus de Deo vero
522 Bonum est esssentialiter diffusivum sui.
523 Ia, q. 28, a. 5, ad 2; IIIa, q. 1, a. 1.
524 Ps. 2: 7; Heb. 1: 5
525 Ia, q. 27, a. 2.
526 John 1: 18.
527 Cf. Cont. Gent.: IV; also John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 27,
a. 2
528 Ia, q. 27, a. 3
529 Ibid.: a. 4
530 Amor meus, pondus meum (Augustine).
531 Ia, q. 27, a. 5.
532 Ia, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3
533 Ia, q. 37, a. 1
534 Ia q. 28, a. 1
535 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3
536 Esse accidentis est inesse
537 De mysterio SS. Trinitatis III, 5. See N. del Prado, De verit.
fund.: phil. christianae, 1911, pp. 537-44
538 In divinis est unum esse tantum
539 Est unum esse in Christo. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2
540 Ia, q. 28, a. 3
541 In Deo omnia sunt idem, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.
Denz.: no. 703
542 Ia, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1
543 De myst. SS. Trin.: IV, 3.
544 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.
545 See N. del Prado, op. oit.: pp. 529-44
546 See also I. Billot, De Trinitate, epilogue; regarding the
difference between St. Thomas and Scotus, see Cajetan, In Iam, q.
28, a. 2.
547 Ia, q. 28, a. 4
548 St. Thomas analyzes this definition. Ia, q. 29, a. 1
549 Ibid.: a. 2
550 Ibid.: a. 3.
551 Ibid.: a. 4
552 De potentia, q. 9, a. 4: Persona nihil aliud est quam
distinctum relatione subsistens in essentia divina. Cf. Ia, q. 40,
a. 1
553 In Iam, q. 39, a. 1, no. 7
554 Formaliter eminenter
555 Ia, q. 40, a. 4; q. 41
556 Ia, q. 40, a. 4, ad 2; and sed contra
557 Ibid.: corpus in fine
558 Ia, q. 41, a. 1.
559 Ibid.: a. 2
560 Ut est in Patre
561 Per unicam spirationem
562 Ia, q. 41, a. 5; q. 36, a. 4
563 Denz.: no. 432: Non est essentia vel natura quae generat, sed
Pater per naturam
564 Potentia generandi significat in recto naturam divinam et in
obliquo relationem paternitaus. Cf. Ia, q. 41, a. 5
565 John 17: 10
566 John 17: 21
567 Ia, q. 32, a. 1
568 Denz.: no. 1861
569 In necessariis ex reali possibilitate sequitur existentia
570 Aut falsae aut non necessariae. St. Thomas, In Boetium de
Trinitate, a. 3
571 Possibilitas et a fortiori existentia mysteriorum
supernaturalium non probatur, nec improbatur, sed suadetur et
defenditur contra negantes
572 In the prologue of his Gospel
573 Principium non de principio. Ia, q. 33
574 Ia, a. 4s, a. 6, ad 2
575 Ia, q. 34, 35
576 Ia, q. 36, 37, 38.
577 Rom 5: 5
578 See Ia, q. 43
579 John 14: 23.
580 Cf. John 14: 16, 26; I John 4: 9-16; Rom. 5: 5; I Cor. 3: 16;
6: 19
581 See John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 43, a. 3, disp. XVII, nos.
8-10; also p. A. Gardeil, La structure de l'ame et l'experience
mystique, 1927, II, 7-60
582 Ia, q. 43, a. 3
583 Ibid
584 IIa IIae q. 45, a. 2.
585 Rom. 8: 14
586 IIa IIae, q. 45, a. 2: Rectum judicium habere de rebus divinis
secundum quamdarn connaturalitatem ad ipsas pertinet ad
sapientiam, quae est donum spiritus sancti
587 Non qualiscumque cognitio sulficit ad rationem missionis (et
habitationis) divinae personae, sed solum illa quae accipitur ex
aliquo dono appropriato personae, per quod efficetur in nobis
conjunctis ad Deum, secundum modum proprium illius personae,
scilicet per amorem quando Spiritus Sanctus datur, unde cognitio
ista est quasi experimentalis. In I Sent.: dist. XIV, q. 2, a. 2,
ad a, ad 3
588 John 14: 26
589 I Cor. 3: 16
590 On this Thomistic doctrine concerning the indwelling of the
Trinity, we commend especially John of St. Thomas, Ia, q. 43, a. 3
591 Filiatio adoptiva est quaedam participata similitudo
filiationis naturalis; sed fit in nobis appropriate a Patre, qui
est principium naturalis filiationis, et per donum Spiritua
Sancti, qui est amor Patris et Filii. IIIa, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2
592 Adoptatio licet sit communis toti Trinitati, appropriatur
tamen Patre ut auctori, Filio ut exemplari, Spiritui Sancto ut
imprimenti in nobis similitudinem hujus exemplaris. IIIa, q. a3,
a. 2, ad 3
593 Col. 1: 116; 2: 10; Rom. 8: 38.
594 De civ. Dei, VII, 9: Bonam voluntatem quis fecit in angelis,
nisi ille qui eos... creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et
largiens gratiam
595 Scotus, De rerum principio, q. 7, 8; Opus Oxon.: dist. III, q.
5, 6, 7, etc. Cf. Suarez, De angelis
596 Ia, q. 50, a. 1, 2
597 Ia, q 54, a. 1, 2, 3
598 Ia, q. 50. a. 4.
599 Ipsum esse irreceptum est subsistens et unicum. Ia, q. 7, a1;
q. 11, a. 3
600 Ia, q. 12, a. 4
601 Ia, q. 55, a. 3
602 Ia, q. 58, a. 3
603 Componendo et dividendo
604 Ia, q. 58, a. 4.
605 Ia, q. 57, a. 3, 4, 5
606 Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum ut conveniens, et nihil
praevolitum nisi praecognitum ut convenientius hic et nunc
607 Ia, q. 60, a. 5.
608 Ia, q. 63, a. 1, ad 3;De malo, q. 16, a. 3
609 Ia, q. 62, a. 4, 5; q. 63, a. 5, 6
610 Ia, q. 64, a. 2.
611 De civ. Dei, XII, 9. Cf. Ia, q. 62, a. 3.
612 Ia, q. 64, a. 1, ad 4
613 Angelus post primum actum caritatis quo beatitudinem
(supernaturalem) meruit, statim beatus fuit. Ia, q. 62, a. 5.
614 This instant is already the one unique instant of eternity
615 Ia, q. 63, a. 3
616 Cf. De ver..: q. 29, a. 7, ad 5
617 IIIa, q. 59, a. 6
618 See Cajetan, Banez, John of St. Thomas, the Carmelites of
Salamanca, Gonet, and Billuart
619 Cf. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averoisme latin au XIIIe
siecle, and ed.: Louvain, 1908-10. Introd. and chap. 6; also
Denifle, Chartularium univ. parisien.: I, 543
620 De anima, III, Venice, 1550, p. 165.
621 De unitate intellectus contra averroistas
622 In De anima intellectiva
623 Mandonnet, op. cit.: pp. 112 ff
624 Ia, q. 75.
625 Ibid.: a. 5
626 See the saint's commentaries on Aristotle, Met.: 1, lect. 10;
III, lect. 7; VI, lect. I; VIII, lect. I; XII, lect. 2.
627 Ia, q. 75, a. 2
628 Ibid.: a. 6
629 Ibid. Intellectus apprehendit esse absolute et secundum omne
tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum desiderat esse semper.
Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur
intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis
630 Id quod operatur independenter a materia, paritcr est et fit
seu potius producitur independenter a materia. Ia, q. 118, a. 2.
631 Ia, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3
632 See Ia, q. 85, a. 7, for proof that the soul of man is
specifically distinct from the angels
633 Per se subsistit anima humana quae, cum subjecto sufficienter
disposito potest infundi, a Deo creatur, et sua natura
incorruptibilis est atque immortalis.
634 Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas, et ita
quidem ut secundum gradus elongationis a materia, sint quoque
gradus intellectualitatis
635 Disp. met.: V, 5; XXX, 14, 15
636 Ia, q. 76
637 Sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter nec ens
simpliciter
638 Ia, q. 76, a. 1
639 Ibid
640 Ibid.: ad 5
641 Ibid.: ad 6
642 Ibid.: a. 2
643 Ibid.: a. 2, ad 1, 2
644 Like a company of soldiers. [Tr. ] Ibid.: a. 3, 4
645 Ibid.: a. 4: Forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter
646 Ex actu et actu non fit unum per se in natura
647 Ex potentia essentialiter ordinata ad actum et ex actu potest
fieri aliquid per seunum, ut ex materia et forma. Cf. Cajetan, In
Iam, q. 76, a. 3
648 Ibid
649 We hear at times the expression: The human soul is only
virtually sensitive and vegetative. The expression would be
correct if used of God who causes these qualities. But God, since
He cannot be the form of our body, cannot be, like the soul,
formally vegetative and sensitive
650 Ia, q. 77, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
651 Ia, q. 76, a. 5
652 Eadem anima rationalis ita unitur corpori, ut sit ejusdem
forma substantialis unica, et per ipsam habet homo ut sit homo ut
anirnal et vivens et corpus et substantia et ens. Tribuit igitur
anima homini omnem gradum perfectionis essentialem; insuper
cornmuni. cat corpori actum essendi, quo ipsa est
653 Disp. met.: XIII. 13, 14.
654 See especially Cajetan, In Iam, q. 75, 76, where with great
penetration he defends the doctrine of St. Thomas against Scotus.
All conclusions of St. Thomas follow from the principles of
Aristotle
655 Ia, q. 77 ff
656 De tribus principiis doctrinae sancti Thomae. The first
fundamental truth he formuLates thus: Ens est transcendens seu
analogum. The second thus: Deus est actus purus
657 Relativum spccificatur ab absoluto ad quod essentialiter
ordinatur.
658 A. Reginald did not get to write this third part of his work
659 Ia, q. 54, a. 1, 2, 3; q. 77, A. 1, 2, 3.
660 Disp. met.: XIV, 5
661 Ia, q. 77, a. 4, 5; q. 79
662 Ia, q. 80, a. 2
663 Ia, q 77, A. 5.
664 IA, q. 84-88.
665 Ia, q. 83; Ia IIae, q. 10 a. 1, 2, 3, 4.
666 Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. II, init.: Paris, 1876, p. 10.
Illud agens liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad
agendum potest agere et non agere
667 Op.: cit.: pp. 318, 356, 459, 550, etc.
668 Si proponatur voluntati aliquod objectum, quod non secundum
quamlibet considerationem sit bonum non ex necessitate voluntas
fertur in illud. Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2
669 Libertas est indifferentia dominatrix voluntatis erga objectum
a ratione propositum ut non ex omni parte bonum
670 De ver.: q. 22, a. 5
671 Intellectum sequitur, non praecedit, voluntas, quae necessario
appetit id quod sibi praesentatur tamquam bonum ex omni parte
explens appetitum; sed inter plura bona, quae judicio mutabili
appetenda proponuntur, libere eligit. Sequitur proinde electio
judicium practicum ultimum at quod sit ultimum voluntas efficit.
672 Disp. met.: XIX. 6
673 Qualis unusquisque est talis finis videtur ei conveniens
674 Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: pp. 590-657
675 Ia, q. 89
676 Cf. Ia, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2; q. 118, a. 3; Cont. Gent.: II, 75,
80, 81, 83
677 Quod potest compleri et explicari per pauciora principia, non
fit per plura
678 Ia, q. 51, a. 1; q. 55, a. 2; q. 76, a. 5
679 Suppl q. 75
680 De potentia, q. 6, a. 7, ad 4
681 Ia, q. 89
682 Ibid.: a. 2
683 Ibid.: a. 8.
684 Cf. Cont. Gent.: IV, 95.
685 Ia, q. 93
686 Bk. II, dist. XX, q. 2, a. 3. Alii vero dicunt quod homo in
gratia creatus est, et secundum hoc videtur quod donum gratuitae
justitiae ipsi humanae naturae collatum sit; unde cum transfusione
naturae etiam infusa fuisset gratia
687 In II Sent.: dist. XXIX, q. 1, a. 2.
688 De malo, q. 4, a. 2, ad 17: Originalis justitia includit
gratiam gratum facientem, nec credo verum esse quod homo sit
creatus in naturalibus puris
689 q. 5, a. 1, ad 13: (Juxta quosdam) gratia gratum faciens non
includitur in ratione originalis justitiae, quod tamen credo esse
falsum, quia cum originalis justitia primordialiter consistat in
subjectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest
nisi per gratiam, justitia originalis sine gratia esse non potuit
690 Ia, q. 95, a. 1
691 Deus fecit hominem rectum. Eccles. 7: 30
692 Cum radix originalis justitiae, in cujus rectitudine factus
est homo, consistat in subjectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum,
quod est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est,
necesse est dicere, quod si pueri nati fuissent in originali
justitia etiam nati fuissent cum gratia. Non tamen fuisset per hoc
gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis,
sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem.
Ia, q. 100, a. 1, ad 2
693 Originalis justitia pertinebat primordialiter ad essentiam
animae. Erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae naturae, quod per
prius respicit essentiam animae quam potentias. Ia IIae, q. 83, a.
2, ad 2
694 Sanctifying grace is the only infused habit in the soul's
essence.
695 See Capreolus, In II Sent.: dist. XXXI, a. 3; Cajetan, In Iam
IIae q. 83, a. 2, ad 2; Ferrariensis, In Cont. Gent.: IV, 52;
Soto, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, etc
696 IIIa, q. 59, q. 1. 2, 3.
697 Mors animae. Denz.: no. 175
698 Sess. V, can. 2 (Denz.: no. 789).
699 Cf. Acta Conc. Trid.: ed. Ehses, p. 208. See also the
preparatory schema for the Vatican Council: Collectio Lacensis pp.
517, 549. Likewise Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Justice originelle
700 Totum genus hurnanum in sua radice et in suo capite (Deus)
primitus elevavit ad supernaturalem ordinem gratiae... nunc vero
Adae posteri ea privati sunt. Coll. Lac.: p. 549
701 Ia IIae, q. 80, a. 1: Sic igitur inordinatio, quae est in isto
homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed
voluntate primi parentis
702 Ut dotes naturae. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 3; also Billot, S.
J.: De personali et originali peccato, 4th ed.: 1910, pp. 139-81;
Hugon, O. P.: Tract. dogm.: I, 795, I, 795; De hom. prod. et
elev.: II, 1-42
703 Aliquid unum per se in natura
704 Humana natura traducitur a parente in filium per traductionem
carnis cui postmodum anima infunditur; et ex hoc infectionem
incurrit quod fit cum carne traducta una natura. Si enim uniretur
ci non ad constituendam naturam, sicut angelus unitur corpori
assumpto, infectionem non reciperet. De potentia, q. 3, a. 9, ad
3; cf. De malo, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2.
705 Cf. Cont. Gent.: IV, 95
706 Nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet esse
707 IIIa, q. 1.
708 Cajetan, In IIIam, q. 1, a. 1
709 IIIa, q. 1, a. 3
710 Vi praesentis decreti
711 Ubique ratio incarnationis ex peccato primi hominis assignatur
712 For example, Matt. 18: 11; I Tim. 1: 15; John 3: 17.
713 Luke 19: 10.
714 Si homo non periisset, Filius hominis non venisset. Serm. 174,
no. 2. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Contr. haer.: V, xiv, 1; St. John
Chrysostom, In Ep. ad Hebraeos, hom. 5, no. 1
715 In carne passibili
716 De incarn.: disp. V, sect. 2, no. 13; sect. 4, no. 17
717 Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1
718 See note 8 supra
719 Ordinate volens prius vult finem et propinquiora fini, quam
alia
720 Gonet, Godoi, the Salmanticenses, I. Billot, Hugon, etc.
721 In IIIam, q. 1, a. 3.
722 Finis cujus gratia
723 Finis cui (proficua est incarnatio).
724 Finis cui
725 Causae ad invicem sunt causae, sed in diverso genere
726 Godoi, Gonet, the Salmanticenses. See Capreolus, In IIIam
Sent.: dist. T, q. 1, a. 3; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 22, a. 2, no. 7.
727 Nihil prohibet ad aliquid majus humanam naturam perductam esse
post peccatum. Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut inde aliquid
melius eliciat. Unde dicitur (Rom. 5: 20): Ubi abundavit delictum,
superabundavit et gratia. Unde et in benedictione cerei paschalis
dicitur: O felix culpa, quac talem ac tantum meruit habere
redemptorem. IIIa, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3
728 Deus qui maxime parcendo et miserando omnipotentiam tuam
manifestas
729 cf. IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 4.
730 Finis cui
731 Finis cujus gratia
732 Omnia enim vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei.
I Cor. 3: 23
733 Ia, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1
734 See Isa. 9: 5 ff
735 Phil. 2: 8-10
736 Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia
737 Ia, q. 29, a. 1
738 Sui juris
739 Suppositum, substantia prima
740 Ia, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2.
741 John 14: 6
742 John 16: 15.
743 In IIIam Sent.: dist. 1, q. 1, no. 5
744 Disp. met.: disp. XXXIV, sect. 1, 2, 4; De incarn.: disp. XI,
sect. 3.
745 In IIIam, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8
746 Sylvester de Ferraris, Victoria, Banez, John of St. Thomas,
the Salmanticenses, the Complutenses Abbreviati, Goudin, Gonet,
Billuart, Zigliara, del Prado, Sanseverino, the three cardinals
Mercier, Lorenzelli, and Lepicier; Gardeil, Hugon, Gredt, etc
747 In quo natura singularis fit immediate capax existentiae, seu
id quo aliquid est quod est
748 Ut est sub uno esse.
749 De Verbo incarnato, 5th ed.: pp. 75, 84, 137, 140.
750 See note 1
751 Post analyt.: II, 12, 13, 14
752 Scotus. See note 8
753 Natura haec
754 See IIIa, q. 2, ad. 2.
755 Sub suo esse
756 Cf Cont. Gent.: II, 52
757 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1: Esse consequitur naturam non sicut
habentem esse, sed qua aliquid est; personam autem sequitur
tamquam habentem esse
758 Cont. Gent.: II, 52: In omni creatura differt quod est
(suppositum, persona) et esse
759 Ut sit immediate capax existendi in se et separatim
760 As Suarez holds
761 Aliquid unum per se ut natura
762 Ad aliquid unum per se ut suppositum
763 Post. analyt.: I, 4; comment.: lect. 10
764 Ia, q. 39, a. 3. ad 4
765 I Sent.: dist. XXIII, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4: Nomen personae
imponitur a forma personalitatis quae dicit rationem subsistendi
naturae tali. Cf. I Sent.: dist. IV, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.
766 IIIa, a. 4, a. 2, ad 3: Si natura non esset assumpta a divina
persona, natura humana
767 See note 22
768 Ibid.: ad 3.
769 Esse non est de ratione suppositi (creati): Quodl. II, q. 2,
a. 4, ad 2.
770 Principium quod existit et operatur
771 Alter ego
772 John 8: 58; 10: 30; 16: 15
773 IIIa, q. 2. a. 2.
774 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 2
775 Ibid.: a. 2, ad 2, 3
776 Cf. Ia, q. 29, a. 3.
777 IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, 6
778 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le Sauveur, Paris, 1933, pp. 92-129
779 In III Sent.: dist. II, q. 2, a. 2; q. 3: Sciendum est quod in
unione humanae naturae ad divinarn nihil potest cadere medium
unionem causans, cui per prius humana natura conjungatur quam
divinae personae; sicut enim inter materiam et formam nihil cadit
medium... ita etiam inter naturam et suppositum non potest aliquid
dicto modo medium cadere.
780 Ibid.: q. 2, a. 9.
781 See IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, and the commentators
782 Ibid.: Impossibile est quod unius rei not sit unum esse
783 Cf. q. 2. a. 2, ad 2
784 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2.
785 See note 47
786 Principium quod
787 IIIa, q. 7, a. 1.
788 Denz.: no. 224. IIIa, q. 7, a. 10-12
789 See St. John's Gospel: 1: 18; 3: 11, 13; 8: 55; 17: 22
790 IIIa, q. 9, a. 2
791 Gratia capitis
792 Cf. Gonet, Clypeus, De incarn.: disp. XXII, a. 3; Hugon, O.
P.: De Verbo incarn.: 5th ed.: 1927, p. 631. See also IIIa, q. 22,
a. 2, ad 3; Bossuet, Elevations XIIIe sem.: 1st and 6th elevation
793 Latria: the adoration due to God alone. IIIa, q. 25, a2
794 IIIa, q. 58, a. 3; q. 59, a. 1, 2, 6.
795 Pius XI, Quas primas, December 11, 1925 Cf. Denz.: no. 2194
796 IIIa, q. 24
797 Ibid.: a. 4; De ver.: q. 29, a. 7, ad 8; in joan.: 17: 24
798 IIIa, q. 48, a. 2: IIIe proprie satisfacit pro offensa, qui
exhibet offenso id quod aeque vel magis diligit quam oderit
offensam. Christus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo,
majus aliquid Deo exhibuit, quam exigeret recompensatio totius
offensae humani generis
799 Cf. Salmanticenses, De incarn.: disp. XXVIII, de merito
Christi, 2; John of St. Thomas, disp. XVII, a. 2; Gonet, De
incarn.: disp. XXI, a. 4; Billuart, etc
800 Gutta Christi sanguinis modica, propter unionem ad Verbum, pro
redemptione totius humani generis suffecisset. sic est infinitus
thesaurus hominibus... propter infinita Christi merita. Denz. nos.
550ff. ; IIIa, q. 46, a. 5, ad 3
801 IIIa, q. 18, a. 4; John of St. Thomas, De incarn.: XVI, a. 1;
the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, etc.
802 Libertas a necessitate
803 Libertas a coactione
804 Vol. II, cols. 142 ff.
805 John 10: 17 ff. ; 14: 31; 15: 10.
806 Phil. 2: 8; cf. Rom. 5: 19
807 IIIa, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3
808 As when He prayed: Father, let this chalice pass from Me. [Tr.
] to that object was free, even while He responded sinlessly,
without any deviation
809 IIIa, q 18, a. 4, ad 3: Voluntas Christi, licet sit
determinata ad bonum, non tamen est determmata ad hoc vel illud
bonum. Et ideo pertinet ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium
confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos
810 For detailed exposition, see our work Le Sauveur et son amour
pour nous, 1933, pop. 204-18
811 IIIa, q. 46, a. 6, 7, 8.
812 Cf. Salmanticenses, De incarn.: disp. XVII, dub. 4, no. 47
813 IIIa, q. 46, a. 8 corp. and ad 1
814 Cf. Compend. theol. chap. 232
815 IIIa q. 48
816 Ibid.: a. 1
817 Ibid.: a. 2
818 Sacerdos et hostia
819 IIIa, q. 48, a. 3
820 Empti enim estis pretio magno: I Cor. 6: 20. Ibid.: a. 4
821 Ibid.: a. 5.
822 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 3
823 Ibid.: a. 2
824 Ibid.: a. 5
825 IIIa, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2
826 IIIa, q. 46, a. 3, 4; q. 47, a. 2, 3
827 John 15: 13
828 Phil. 2: 8.
829 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2
830 IIIa q. 27-30; Commentaries of Cajetan, Nazarius, J. M. Voste
(1940). Cf. Contenson, Theol. mentis et cordis, Bk. X, diss. 6; N.
del Prado, S. Thomas et bulla ineffabilis, 1919; E. Hugon,
Tractatus theol.: II, 716-95, sth ed.: 1927; G. Friethoff, De alma
socia Christi mediatoris, 1936; B. H. Merkelbach, Mariologia,
1939; Garrigou-Lagrange, La Mere du Sauveur et notrc vie
inte'rieure, 1941
831 IIIius Virginis primordia quae uno eodemque decreto cum
divinae Sapientiae incarnatione fuerunt praestituta
832 In signo priori
833 Cf. Contenson, Hugon, Merkelbach, loc. cit. 5 Rom. 5: 20
834 Rom. 5: 20
835 IIIa, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3
836 IIIa, q. 2, a. 11, ad 3
837 In III Sent.: d. IV, q. 3, a. 1, ad 6. B. Virgo non muerit
incarnationem, sed suppositaincarnatione meruit quod per eam
fieret, non quidem merito condigni, sed merito congrui. Cf.
Sylvius, BIIIuart, and Contenson, loc. cit
838 Second and Third Councils of Constantinople
839 Ia, q. 25, a. 6, ad 4: Beata Virgo, ex hoc quod est mater Dei
habet quamdam dignitatem ex bono infinito quod est Deus; et ex hac
parte non potest aliquid fieri melius sicut Lon potest aliquid
esse melius Deo
840 IIa IIae, q. 103, a. 4, ad 2.
841 Dulia: the cult due to any saint
842 Ripalda and Vega
843 With the Salmanticenses and Contenson
844 See Contenson, loc. cit.: IIa praerogativa; also Hugon and
Merkelbach, loc. cit
845 Luke 11: 28
846 IIIa q. 30, a. 1
847 Cf. Hugon, loc. cit.: p. 734; M. J. Nicolas, "Le concept
integral de la maternite divine" in Rev. thom.: 1937; Merkelbach,
op. cit.: pp. 74-92, 297 ff
848 Suarez, Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Mannens, Pesch,
Van Noort, Terrien
849 p. cit.: pp. 736 ff
850 Op. Cit.: pp. 64 ff.
851 Nude spectata
852 S, Capponi a Porrecta (died 1614): John of St. Thomas (died
1644): Curs. theol.: Spada, Rouart de Card, Berthier; in our days
N. del Prado, Divus Thomas et bulla init. ; De approbatione
doctrinae S. Thomae, d. II, a. 2; Noel Alexander; more recently,
Ineffabilis Deus, 1919; Th. Pegues, Rev. thom.: 1909, pp. 83-87;
E. Hugon, op. cit.: p. 748, p. Lumbreras, Saint Thomas and the
Immaculate Conception, 1923; C. Frietoff, "Quomodo caro B. M. V.
in peccato originali concepta fuerit" in Angelicum, 1933, pp.
32144; J. M. Voste, Comment. in III p. Summae theol. s. Thomae; De
mysteriis vitae Christi, 2nd ed.: 1940, pp. 13-20
853 Perrone, Palmieri, Hurter, Cornoldi
854 Among them we note: Suarez, Chr. Pesch.: I. BIIIot, I.
Jannsens, Al. Lepicier, B. H. Merkelbach, op. cit.: pp. 127-30
855 Dict.. de theol. cath.: s. v. Freres Precheurs
856 See note 23.
857 1253-54
858 In Iam Sens.: dist. XLIV, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
859 Rom. 5: 18
860 Debitum culpae
861 IIIa, q. 33, a. 2.: ad 3.
862 cito post: Quodl. VI, q. 5, a. 1
863 See note 23.
864 See note 23
865 IIIa, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2.
866 In IIIum, dist. III, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.
867 In particular, Del Prado and Hugon.
868 Op. Cit.: pp. 129 ff
869 Quodl. VI q. 5, a. 1.
870 Op. cit.: 2nd ed.: 1940, p. 18
871 See note 29.
872 On Ps. 14: 2
873 Ps 18: 6.
874 Cant 4: 7.
875 Comp. theol.: chap. 224
876 Exposition Salutationis Angelicae, Piacenza, 1931 (a critical
edition, by F. Rossi, C. M. )
877 April, 1273
878 Cf. C. Frietoff, loc. Cit.: p. 329; Mandonnet in Bulletin
thomiste, January-March, Notes and communications, pp. 164-67
879 op. cit.: 2nd ed.: 1940, p. 19.
880 In 1254, twenty years before his death. See note 29
881 IIIa, q. 27, a. 5
882 Ibid.: ad 2.
883 Cf. Contenson, Monsabre, Hugon, Merkelbach
884 Heb. 10: 25 See the saint's commentary
885 Ex opere operato
886 In jure amicabili
887 Benedict XV (Denz.: no. 3034, no. 4): Filium immolavit, ut
dici merito queat, ipsam cum Christo humanum genus redemisse.
888 Denz.: no. 3034: B. Maria Virgo de congruo, ut aiunt,
promeruit nobis quae Christus de condigno promeruit, estque
princeps largiendarum gratiarum ministra
889 Ia IIae, q 114, a. 6
890 Proprie de congruo
891 Lex orandi, lex credendi
892 Traite de la vraie dcvotion a la sainte Vierge
893 IIIa, q. 62, a. 1-5
894 Ibid.: a. 4.
895 Ibid.: a. 5.
896 Instrumentum conjunctum
897 Instrumentum separatum
898 In IV Sent.: dist. XXVI, q. 2.
899 IIIa, q. 65, a. 1
900 IIIa, q. 75 a. 2.
901 Ibid.
902 In IV, Dist. X, q. 1; dist. XI, q. 3.
903 Bellarmine, De Lugo, Vasquez.
904 Part II, chap. 4, nos. 37-39. This catechism was edited by
Dominican theologians.
905 Denz.: no. 834. Cf. Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the
Salmanticenses, N. del Prado, Billot, Hugon, etc.
906 In IIIam, q. 75, a. 3, no. 8.
907 Ut est ex pane.
908 Primum non esse panis.
909 Primum esse corporis Christi sub specibus panis. Ibid.: a. 7.
910 Summa, IIIa, q. 75, a. 4, corp. and ad. 3. Cf. Cajetan.
911 Ibid.: a. 8.
912 Denz. nos. 877, 884.
913 Non sicut in loco, sed per modum substantiae. q. 76, a. 1, 2,
3, 5.
914 IIIa, q. 77, a. 1, 2, 3.
915 IIIa, q. 83, a. 1.
916 Epist. ad Bonifacium.
917 Cf. M. Lepin, L'idee du sacrificc de la messe, 2nd ed.: 1926,
pp. 38, 51, 84-87, 103, 152.
918 IV Sent.: dist. VIII, no. 2.
919 Cf. Lepin, op. cit.: pp. 158 ff.: 164 ff.
920 See note 1.
921 Ad Simplicianum, Bk. II, q. 3.
922 IIIa, q. 79, a. 1.
923 IIIa, q. 74, a. 1; q. 76, a. 2, ad. 1.
924 Loc. cit.: a. l, 2nd obj.
925 Eph. 5: 2.
926 Opera, II, 183. Cf. Lepin, op. cit.: p. 248.
927 Sess. XXII, chap. 1.
928 IIIa, q. 83, a. 1.
929 De missae sacrificio et ritu advcrsus Luthcranos, 1531, chap.
6.
930 Cursus theol.: De sacramentis, ed. Paris, 1667, XXXII, 285.
931 Cursus theol. (1679-1712, ed. Paris, 1882): tr. 23, disp. 13,
dub. 1, no. 2; XVIII, 759.
932 Meditations sur l'Evangile, La Cene, Part 1, 57th day.
933 Card. Billot and his followers, Tanquerey, Pegues, Heris, etc.
934 Gonet, Billuart, Hugon.
935 IIIa, q. 48, a. 3, ad 3: Non fuit sacrificium, sed maleficium.
936 In genere signi.
937 De civ. Dei, X, 5: Sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii
sacramentum. This text is often cited by St. Thomas; IIa IIae, q.
81, a. 7; q. 85, a. 2, c. and ad 2.
938 Christum passum.
939 Ia, q. 83, a. 1.
940 IIa IIae, q. 85, a. 3, ad 3.
941 Sacrum and facere.
942 As he does when he says "Oremus."
943 Heb. 7: 25.
944 IIIa, q. 82, a. 1.
945 Ibid.: a. 7, ad 3; q. 78, a. 1.
946 IIIa, q. 82, a. 4.
947 IIIa, q. 82, a. 5, 6; q. 83, a. 1, ad 3.
948 With Scotus, Amicus, M. de la Taille.
949 Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 5.
950 Denz.: no. 940.
951 Heb. 7: 25; Rom. 8: 34. Cf. IIa IIae, q. 83, a. 11. Cf. also
the Salmanticenses, Cursus thcol.: De euchar. sacramcnto, disp.
XIII, dub. 3, nos. 48, 50.
952 De incarn.: disp. XXII, a. 2.
953 Cf. our work, Lc Sauveur et son amour pour nous, Paris, 1933,
pp. 356-85.
954 Cf. the Salmanticenses, De euch.: disp. XIII, dub. 1, no. 107.
955 IIa, q. 85, a. 3, 4; Suppl.: q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. l, 2, 3, 4.
956 Sess. XIV, chap. 4.
957 Denz.: no. 1207.
958 St. Augustine often sets these two words in mutual opposition.
959 Denz.: no. 1305: Attritio, quae gehennae et poenarum metu
concipitur, sine benevolentia Dei propter se, non est bonus motus
ac supernaturalis.
960 In IIIam, q. 85. See especially his opusculum, De contritione,
reprinted in the Leonine edition of the Summa theol.: after
Cajetan's cormnentary on the articles of St. Thomas relative to
penance.
961 See opusculum, De contritione, q. 1. See also the
Salmanticenses, De poenit.: disp. VII, no. 50; Billuart, De
poenit.: diss. IV, a. 7; p. J. Perinelle, O. P.: L'attrition
d'apres le concile de Trente et d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1927
(Bibliotheque thomiste, X sect. theol, 1).
962 Attritio pure formidolosa.
963 Ethice bonus.
964 The Council of Trent, Denz.: no. 798. Note also, ibid.: no.
898, that the Council speaks thus in a context which deals
explicitly with the difference between attrition and contrition.
965 Loc. cit.: no. 50. See note 7. See also Billuart, De poenit.:
diss. IV, a. 7, § 3; also Perinelle, op. cit. This last work is a
careful and well constructed study of the acts of the Council of
Trent.
966 Sess. VI, chap. 6; Denz.: no. 798.
967 Denz.: no. 898; Sess. XIV, chap. 4. See Perinelle, Op. Cit.
968 See note 12.
969 Sess. XIV, chap. 4.
970 IIIa, q. 85, a. 2, 3; q. 86, a. 3.
971 IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 1.
972 A living together.
973 Semen gloriae.
974 Opusc. De contritione, q. 1.
975 Sess. VI, chap. 6 (see note 12).
976 Sess. VI, can. 16, 26, 32; Denz.: nos. 809, 836, 842.
977 Opusc. 5, De meritis mortificatis, disp. II.
978 IIIa, q. 89, a. 5, ad 3.
979 Ia IIae q. 52, a. l, 2; q. 66, a. 1.
980 IIIa, q. 89, a. 2.
981 Ia IIae, q. 52, a. 1, 2; q. 66, a. 1.
982 IIIa, q. 89, a. 5, ad 3.
983 De sacramentis, II, 5th ed.: p. 120.
984 In IIIam q. 89, a. 1, no. 4.
985 De merito disp. V, nos. 5, 6, 8.
986 De poenit.: diss. III, a. 5.
987 Thus Cardinal Billot and Father Gardeil, and more recently Ch.
Journet, in his work, L'Eglisc du Verbe incarne, Vol. 1, Desclee,
De Brouwer (Bruges, 1943).
988 Christus ut caput ecclesiae: IIIa, q. 8.
989 Ibid.: a. 3.
990 IIa IIae q. 1, a. 10; q. a, a. 6, ad 3; Quodl. IX, a. 16.
991 Ia IIae q. 60, a. 6, ad 3.
992 IIa IIae, q. 10, a10; q. 12, a. 2.
993 Turrecremata, Summa de ecclesia Cf. E. Dublanchy,
"Turrecremata, et la pouvoir du pape dans les questions
temporelles, " in Rev. thom.: 1923, pp. 74-101.
994 Other noteworthy works in this field: Cajetan, De auctoritate
papae et concilii; Cano, De locis theologicis. More recently: De
Groot, O. P.: Summa de ecclesia, 3rd ed.: Ratisbonne, 1906;
Schultes, O. P.: De ecclesia catholica, Paris, 1926; Garrigou-
Lagrange, De revelatione per eccl. cath.: proposita, Rome, 3rd
ed.: 1935; A. de Poulpiquet, O. P7 L'Eglise catholique, Paris,
1923.
995 Bk. IV, chaps. 91-96. In particular, chap. 95.
996 See, again, in chap. 91: Statim post mortem animae hominum
recipiunt pro meritis vel poenam vel praemium.
997 In Iam, q. 64, a. 2, no. 18.
998 In Cont. Gent.: chap. 95.
999 De gratia, de merito, disp. 1, dub. IV, 36.
1000 John 9: 4. See II Cor. 5: 10.
1001 Per primum non esse viae.
1002 Ia IIae, q. 5, a 4.
1003 Ia IIae, q. 1-5.
1004 Cf. A. Gardeil, Dict. theol.: s. v. Beatitude, cols. 510-13.
1005 Ia IIae, q. 1.
1006 See our work, Le realisme du principe de finalite, Paris,
1932, pp. 260-85.
1007 In Iam IIae, q. 2, a. 7.
1008 Cf. Ia, q. 60, a. 5; IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 4.
1009 Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 4-8.
1010 Ibid.: q. 4, a. 1-8. We have treated above the beatific
vision (Ia, q. 12, a. 1) and the natural desire, conditioned and
inefficacious, to see God without medium.
1011 IIa IIae, q. 6-21; cf. A. Gardeil, Dict. theol. cath.: s. v.
Actes humains; Dom Lottin, O. S. B.: "Les elements de la moralite
des actes chez saint Thomas" in Rev. neo-scholast.: 1922, 1923.
1012 Ia IIae, q. 8-17.
1013 Primum velle: q. 8, a. 2.
1014 q. 12.
1015 q. 11.
1016 q. 15.
1017 q. 13.
1018 q. 19, a. 3.
1019 q. 19, a. 3.
1020 q. 14.
1021 q. 13, a. 3; q. 14, a. 6.
1022 q. 17.
1023 q. 16, a. 1.
1024 q. 18.
1025 q. 19.
1026 q. 20.
1027 q. 21.
1028 q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4.
1029 Ibid.: a. 8, 9.
1030 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 11I, a. 2.
1031 Ia, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4; IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1.
1032 Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3: per conformitatem ad appetitum
rectum.
1033 In Iam IIae, q. 19, a. 6 (1577).
1034 Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Freres Precheurs, col. 919.
1035 Ibid.: s. v. Probabilisme.
1036 Tractatus de conscientia, Paris, ed. by A. Gardeil, O. P.
1037 In dubio standum est pro quo stat praesumptio. Cf. M.
Prummer, O. P.: Manuale theol. mor.: Freiburg-in-B.: 1915, I, 198.
1038 As does p. Deman, O. P.: Dict. theol. cath.: s. v.
Probabilisme.
1039 Ia IIae q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
1040 Ibid.: q. 24, a. 3.
1041 Ibid.: q. 26-28.
1042 IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 3.
1043 Ia IIae, q. 49-54.
1044 Objectum quod.
1045 Objectum quo.
1046 For more detailed treatment, see Act. Pont. academiae romanae
S. Thomae, 1934, especially our article, "Actus specificantur ab
objecto formali, " pp. 139-53.
1047 Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2.
1048 Initium fidei et salutis.
1049 Ia IIae, q. 57.
1050 Recta ratio agibilium.
1051 Recta ratio factibilium.
1052 Ia IIae, q. 58-61.
1053 Ibid.: q. 62.
1054 Ibid.: a. 1.
1055 Ibid.: q. 63, a. 4.
1056 Ibid.
1057 1 Cor. 9:27.
1058 Eph. 2:19.
1059 In statu virtutis.
1060 Ia IIae, q. 54.
1061 q. 68.
1062 Rom. 5:5; q. 68, a. 5.
1063 q. 66, a. 2.
1064 q. 71-89.
1065 q. 79, a 1-4.
1066 q. 84.
1067 q. 72, a. 1.
1068 q. 88, a 1, corp. and ad 1.
1069 q. 85-87.
1070 q. 89. a. 1.
1071 q. 88. a. 3.
1072 q. 87, a. 5.
1073 Cf. the Salmanticenses, Cursus theol.: De peccatis, tr. XIII,
disp. XIX, dub. I, nos. 8, 9; De incarn.: in IIIam, q. 15, a. 1,
de impeccabilitate Christi.
1074 q. 81-82.
1075 q. 82, a. 3.
1076 q. 83, a. 2-4. For further detail, see above, where we
treated of man and original justice.
1077 q. 90, a. 4.
1078 q. 92, a. 2.
1079 q. 93, a. 1.
1080 q. 94, a. 2.
1081 q. 106, a. 1.
1082 q. 107.
1083 q. 95. a. 3.
1084 q. 96, a. 4.
1085 Theod.: II, 176.
1086 See Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Gerson.
1087 Ia IIae, q. 109.
1088 Ibid.: a. 1.
1089 Supernaturalis quoad substantiam vel essentiam.
1090 Cf. the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart,
on Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 1.
1091 IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.
1092 Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 2.
1093 Ibid.: a. 3.
1094 Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a. 3.
1095 q. 109, a. 4.
1096 Ibid.: a. 8.
1097 Ibid.: a. 6; q. 112, a. 3.
1098 John 6:44.
1099 Lam. 5:21.
1100 Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 3.
1101 In Jo.: tr. 26.
1102 q. 109, a. 7.
1103 De dono perseverantiae.
1104 II Pet. 1:4.
1105 De amore Dei, q. 20, a. 2.
1106 Rom. 5:5.
1107 John 4:14.
1108 I John 3:9.
1109 Semen gloriae.
1110 q. 110, a. 2.
1111 Sess. VI, can. 11; chap. 16.
1112 q. 110, a. 1-4; q. 112, a. 1.
1113 Deitas ut sic est super ens et unum, super esse, vivere,
intelligere.
1114 See our treatise, "La possibilite de la grace est-elle
rigoureusement demontrable? " in Rev. thom.: March, 1936; also our
work, Le sens du mystere, Paris, 1937, pp. 224-33.
1115 Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2.
1116 IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2.
1117 Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 3.
1118 Ibid.: a. 4.
1119 Ibid.: q. 111.
1120 Gratiae gratis datae.
1121 In I Tim. 2:6.
1122 Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.
1123 Ia IIae, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2.
1124 Eph. 3:7.
1125 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. l, 2, 9, 10; q. 113, a. 7, 10.
1126 IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.
1127 Ia IIae, q. 79, a 2.
1128 Prov. 1:24; cf. Isa. 65:2.
1129 Matt. 23:37.
1130 Acts 7:51; cf. II Cor. 6:1.
1131 I Tim. 2: 4.
1132 Sess. VI, chap. II; Denz.: no. 804.
1133 De nat. et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50.
1134 Ezech. 36:26-28.
1135 Ecclu. 33:13; cf. Esth. 13:9; 14:13.
1136 John 10:27.
1137 Phil. 2:13.
1138 Denz.: no. 182.
1139 Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.
1140 134: 6.
1141 Against Gottschalk. Cf. PL, CXXVI, 123.
1142 See our work, La predestination des saints et la grace 1936,
pp. 257-64, 341-45, 141-69. Cf. "Le fondement supreme de la
distinction des deux graces suffisante et efiicace" in Rev. thom.:
May-June, 1937; "Le dilemme: Dieu determinant ou determine, "
Ibid.: 1928, pp. 193-210.
1143 I Cor. 4: 7.
1144 Ia, q. 20, a. 4.
1145 Concordia, Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 565, 617ff.
1146 Potentia proxima et expedita.
1147 Cf. Hugon, De gratia, q. 4, no. 9.
1148 De auxiliis, Bk. III, disp. 80. All Thomists, even the most
rigorous, agree with him. See Gonet, Clypeus, De vol. Dei, disp.
4, no. 147.
1149 Cf N. del Prado, De gratia, 1907, III, 423.
1150 Traite du libre arbitre, chap. 8.
1151 De gratia, diss. V, a. 4.
1152 Cf. Lemos, Panoplia gratiae, Bk. IV, tr. 3, chap. 6, no. 78.
1153 Word of St. Prosper, preserved by the Council of Quiersy;
Denz.: no. 318.
1154 q. 112, a. 1.
1155 I Kings 7: 3.
1156 q. 112, a. 3.
1157 Ibid.: a. 4.
1158 I Cor. 4:4.
1159 Ia IIae, q. 113.
1160 Ibid.: a. 1.
1161 Ibid.: a. 2.
1162 Sess. VI, chap. 7, can 10, 11.
1163 Ia Iiae, q. 113, a. 4, 5.
1164 Gonet, for example.
1165 Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 8, ad 1, 2.
1166 In diverso genere, causae ad invicem sunt causae. Cf. Arist.:
Mct. V, 2; comm. of St. Thomas, lect. 2.
1167 See note 76.
1168 Mark 9: 40.
1169 Ia IIae, q. 114. Cf. Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the
Salmanticenses, Gotti, Billuart, N. del Prado, Hugon, etc.
1170 Reatus poenae.
1171 q. 114 a. 1-6.
1172 De condigno.
1173 De congruo proprie dictum.
1174 De congruo late dictum.
1175 Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 1.
1176 Ibid.: a. 6.
1177 Ibid.: a. 3.
1178 Ia IIae, q. 114.
1179 Ibid.: 1-4.
1180 Matt. 5:12.
1181 q. 114, a. 1, 3.
1182 Ibid.: a. 4.
1183 Ibid.: a. 8.
1184 Ibid.: a. 5.
1185 Ibid.: a. 7.
1186 Sess. VI, chap. 13.
1187 De dono persev. (chaps. 2, 6, 17). Cf. Rom. 14:4.
1188 q. 114 a. 9.
1189 Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. 16, and can. 32.
1190 IIa IIae, q. 1-16.
1191 Ibid.: q. 1, a. 1.
1192 Veritas prima in dicendo.
1193 Veritas prima in intelligendo. See Vatican Council, Sess.
III, chap. 3: Auctoritas Dei revelantis.
1194 IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 1.
1195 Ibid.: q. 2, a. 2.
1196 Ibid.: q. 5, a. 1.
1197 Ibid.: q. 4, a. 1.
1198 Ibid.: q. 6, a. 1.
1199 Ibid.: q. 5, a. 3, ad 1.
1200 Ibid.: q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.
1201 Credo Deo revelanti.
1202 Credo Deum revelatum.
1203 Credo in Deum.
1204 IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.
1205 Ibid.: q. 4, a. 8.
1206 Pius credulitatis affectus.
1207 In I Sent.: dist. III, q. 3, nos. 24f.
1208 In III Sent.: dist. XXXI, no. 4.
1209 Ibid.: dist. XXIII, q. 1, a. 8.
1210 Biel, In III Sent.: dist. XXIII, q. 2.
1211 Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. XXXVIII, Paris, 1876, p. 213.
1212 De ente supernat.: Bk. III, dist. XLIV, no. 2; dist. XLV, no.
37.
1213 De fide, disp. IX, sect I, nos. 2, 3; disp. 1, sect. I, nos.
77, 100, 104.
1214 De divina traditione, pp. 692, 616.
1215 Etudes sur le concile du Vatican, II, 75 ff.
1216 De gratia, Bk. II, chap. 11; De fide, Part 1, disp. III,
sect. 6, 8, 12.
1217 Ultimo resolvitur.
1218 Id quo et quod creditur.
1219 Id quo et quod videtur simul cum coloribus.
1220 In III Sent.: d. 24, q. 1, a. 3.
1221 Credo Deo.
1222 Credo Deum.
1223 In lllam lIIae, q. 1, a. 1, no. 11.
1224 See Ibid.: q. 2, a. 2.
1225 I John 5:10.
1226 In Cont. Gent.: I, 6; III, 40, § 3.
1227 De gratia, disp. XX, a. 1, nos. 7, 9; De fide q. 1, disp. 1,
a. 2, nos. 1, 4.
1228 De gratia, disp. 1, a. 2, § 1, nos. 78, 79, 93; De fide,
disp. 1, a. 2, no. 55.
1229 De gratia, disp. III, dub. 3, nos. 28, 37, 40, 45, 48, 49,
52, 58, 60, 61; De fide, disp. 1, dub. 5, nos. 163, 169.
1230 De gratia, diss. III, a. 2, § 2; De fide, diss. 1, a. l, obj.
3, inst. 1. See also Gardeil, La credibilite et l'apologetique,
2nd ed.: Paris, 1912, pp. 61, 92, 96, and in Dict. de theol.
cath.: s. v. Credibilite. See also Scheeben, Dogmatik, 1, § 40,
nos. 681, 689; § 44, nos. 779805. And for extended treatment, see
our work, De revelatione, Rome, 3rd ed.: 1935, I, 458-511.
1231 In actu exercito.
1232 In actu signato.
1233 IIa IIae, q. 2, a 2, ad 3.
1234 Sess. III, chap. 3.
1235 Cf. IIa IIae, q. s, a. 3, ad 1. See also John of St. Thomas,
De gratia, disp. XX, a. 1, nos. 7-9; De fide, q. 1, disp. 1, a2,
nos. 1-8; also the Salrnanticenses, De gratia disp. III, dub. 3,
nos. 28-37, 40-49, 52-61.
1236 For more extended treatment, see our work, L'amour de dieu et
la croix de Paris, 2nd ed.: 1939, 11, 575-97.
1237 IIa IIae, q. 8.
1238 Ibid.: q. 9.
1239 Ibid.: q. 17-22.
1240 Ibid.: q. 17, a. 1, 2, 4, 5. Deus auxilians.
1241 Ibid.: a. 4.
1242 In IIam IIae, q. 17, a. 5, no. 6.
1243 Nobis et propter nos.
1244 IIa IIae, q. 18, a. 4.
1245 Ibid.: q. 22.
1246 Ibid.: q. 23-47.
1247 Ibid.: q. 23, a. 1, 2, 3, 5; q. 25, a. 1; q 27, a. 3.
1248 I will not now call you servants. But I have called you
friends: John 15: 15.
1249 IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 1.
1250 Ibid.: q. 17, a. 3.
1251 Ibid.: q. 27, a. 4.
1252 Ibid.: q. 26, a. 2, 3.
1253 Ibid.: q. 25, a. 1.
1254 Ibid.: q. 26, a. 1, 4-13.
1255 Ibid.: q. 23, a. 6.
1256 Ibid.: a. 7, 8. See the Salmanticenses, Billuart, etc.
1257 Ibid.: q. 24, a. 4.
1258 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 1.
1259 Ibid.: q. 44, a. 1, 2.
1260 For extended treatment, see our work, L'amour de dieu et la
croix de Jesus Paris, 2nd ed.: 1939, II, 597-632.
1261 Recta ratio agibilium.
1262 cf. IIa IIae, q. 47-57.
1263 Ibid.: q. 47, a. 8.
1264 Qualis unusquisque cst, talis finis videtur ei. Cf. Ia IIae,
q. 58, a. 5.
1265 Verum intellectus pratici est per conformitatem ad appetitum
rectum. Ibid.: q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
1266 Cf. IIa IIae, q. 53.
1267 Ibid.: q. 57-122.
1268 Ibid.: q. 61, a. 1, 2.
1269 Ibid.: q. s8, a. 6, 7; q. 60, a. 1, ad 4; q. 80, a. 8, ad 1.
1270 Summum jus summa injuria. Ibid.: q. 80, a. 1, ad 3, 5; q.
120, a. 1, 2.
1271 Ibid.: q. 29, a. 3, ad 3.
1272 Ibid.: q 66, a. 2.
1273 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 2.
1274 See Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Propriete; see also the
notes on IIa IIae, q. 66, in the French translation of the Summa
published by the Revue des Jeunes.
1275 IIa IIae, q. 81-119.
1276 Ibid.: q. 123-41.
1277 Ibid.: q. 123, a. 6.
1278 Ibid.: q. 124.
1279 Ibid.: q. 139.
1280 Ibid.: q. 141.
1281 Ibid.: q. 143.
1282 Ibid.: q. 144, a. 1.
1283 Ibid.: q. 152, a. 3.
1284 Ibid.: a. 4.
1285 Ibid.: q. 141-43.
1286 Ibid.: q. 141, a. 3.
1287 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 3. St. Thomas here explains the degrees
enumerated by St. Anselm.
1288 Ibid.: a. 5.
1289 Ibid.: q. 163.
1290 Ibid.: a. 2.
1291 Ibid.: q. 166.
1292 IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 1.
1293 Ibid.: a. 3.
1294 John 13:35.
1295 Ia, q. 82, a. 3.
1296 IIa IIae, q. 27, a. 4.
1297 Ibid.: q. 184, a. 3.
1298 I Tim. 1-5.
1299 Com. in I Pol.: chap. 3.
1300 De perfect. justitiae, chap. 8.
1301 Cf. Cajetan, In IIam, q. 184, a. 3; Passerini, Ibid.
1302 De statu perfectionis, chap. 11, nos. 15 f.
1303 Traite de l'amour de Dieu, Bk. III, chap. 1.
1304 Studiorum Ducem, June 29, 1923 (on St. Thomas) ; and Rerum
omnium, January 26, 1923 (on St. Francis de Sales).
1305 IIa IIae, q. 179 f.
1306 Ibid.: q. 188.
1307 Ibid.: q. 180, and 188, a. 6.
1308 In statu perfectionis acquirendae.
1309 In statu perfectionis exercendae et communicandae.
1310 IIa IIae, q. 185, a. 4.
1311 Gratiae gratis datae: IIa IIae, q. 171-78.
1312 Ibid.: q. 173, a. 2.
1313 Ibid.: q. 173 f.
1314 Ibid.: q. 174, a. 3.
1315 For extended treatment see our work, De revel.: per cccl.
cath. proposita, Rome, 1st ed.: 1918; 3rd ed.: 1935. Cf. 1, 153-
68; 11, 109-36.
1316 IIa IIae, q. 171-74; De Veritate, q. 12. Father Pesch (De
inspir. s. Script.: 1906, p. 159) writes thus: "St. Thomas Aquinas
so elaborated the essence of biblical inspiration that the
following centuries have hardly added anything of importance. "
Leo XIII, in Providentissimus Deus, has added the weight of papal
authority to the doctrine of Aquinas. Cf. Voste, De diuina inspir.
et verit. s. Scripturae, 2nd ed.: Rome, 1932, pp. 46 ff.
1317 IIa IIae, q. 171, a. 5; q. 173, a. 4.
1318 Ibid.: q. 174, a. 2, ad 3; De veritate q. 12, a. 12, ad 10.
1319 Ibid.: q. 171, a. 2; q. 174, a. 3, ad 3; De veritate, q. 13,
a. 1.
1320 Cf. Quodl. VII, a. 14.
1321 Cf. Voste, op. cit.: pp. 76-105.
1322 Pius XII, in Divino afflante Spiritu, insists on deeper study
of each inspired writer's personal character as a presupposition
to full understanding of his message. [Tr. ]
1323 For extended bibliography, see Voste, Op. cit.: who gives in
particular the works of recent Thomists, Zigliara, Pegues, Hugon,
de Groot, M. J. Lagrange, etc.
1324 Ia, q. 1, a. 3.
1325 See Revue de "Universite d'Ottawa, Octoba-December, 1936.
1326 Congreg. Stud. Sacr.: July 24, 1914.
1327 See p. 6, note 2.
1328 May-June, 1917. Cf. Guido Mattiussi, S. J.: Le XXIV tesi
della filosofia di S. Tommaso d 'Aquino approvata dalla S. Congr.
degli studi, Rome, 1917; Hugon, OP.: Les vingtquatre theses
Thomistes, Paris; Pegues, O. P.: Autour de saint Thomas, Paris,
1918, where each Thomistic thesis is set contrary to the
corresponding counterthesis.
1329 John 8:32.
1330 Wiener Kreis.
1331 Noesis noeseos.
1332 See our work, Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: pp.
604-69.
1333 We need so to view the world as to combine an idea of wonder
and an idea of welcome. Chesterton, Orthodoxy. [Tr. ]
1334 Cf. Ia, q. 28, a2; IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, corp. and ad 3.
1335 Cf. Acta Apost. Sedis, VI, 383 ff.
1336 Proponantur veluti tutae normae directivae.
1337 Can. 1366, § 2.
1338 Les vingt-quatre theses thomistcs, Paris, Tequi, 1922.
1339 Ibid.: p. vii.
1340 P. Guido Mattiussi, S. J.: had written already in 1917 a work
of first importance on this subject: Le XXIV tesi della filosofia
di S. Tommaso d'Aquino approvate dalla SacraCongreg. degli Studi,
Roma.
1341 Parmenides.
1342 Heraclitus.
1343 Real potency of movement, say, for example, in a billiard
ball, is not the mere negation, the mere privation, of movement,
nor even the simple possibility of existence; though the latter
suffices for an act of creation, which does not presuppose any
real subject, any real potency.
1344 Suarez holds that prime matter, since it is not pure
potentiality, but involves a certain actuality, can exist without
form. This view shows why he likewise maintains that our will is a
virtual act, capable, without divine premotion, of passing to
second act.
Leibnitz substitutes force for real potency, active or passive. In
consequence, passive potency disappears and with it prime matter
Movement too can no longer be explained as a function of
intelligible being, primordially divided into potency and act.
Further, force itself, supposed to explain all else, is a simple
object of internal experience, unattached to being, man's first
intelligible notion. This dynamism of Leibnitz breaks on the
principle that activity presupposes being.
1345 la, q. 2, a. 3.
1346 Created person, like created essence, cannot be formally
constituted by what belongs to it only as a contingent predicate.
Now only as a contingent predicate does existence belong to a
created person. Peter of himself is Peter, nothing more. He of
himself is not existence, and in this he differs from God, who
alone is His own existence. To deny the real distinction in
creatures, of person, of suppositum, from existence is to
jeopardize also the real distinction between essence and
existence. In every created substance, says St. Thomas (Cont.
Gent.: II, 52): quod est differs from existence. Quod est is the
person, the suppositum. It is not the essence of Peter, it is
Peter himself. Existence, says St. Thomas again (IIIa, q. 17, a.
2, ad 1): follows person as that which has existence. Now if
existence follows person, it cannot constitute person. Each of the
two concepts, created person and created existence, is a distinct
and irreducible concept.
1347 la, q. 14, a. 1.
1348 Cf. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.
1349 See above the words of Benedict XV (note 2).
1350 "La theologie dogmatique hier et aujourd'hui" in Nouvelle
revue theologique, 1929, p. 810.
1351 Pascendi and Sacrorum Antistitum.
1352 We may seem to repeat commonplaces. But, in fact, these
truths are seldom treated in relation to the problem of
contradiction.
1353 Cf. Denz.. nos. 1659 ff.
1354 Ibid.: no. 570.
1355 Ibid.: nos. 553ff.
1356 Cf. Olgiati, La filosofia di Descartes, 1937, preface and pp.
26, 66, 175 f.: 241, 322 f.
1357 We must add here a remark of Msgr. Noel of Louvain. In his
work, Le realisme immediate, 1938 (chap. 12, "La valeur reelle de
l'intelligence"): he has kindly quoted us often. We are
essentially in accord with his view. But we must note that we are
speaking here, not precisely of the real intrinsic possibility,
say, of a circle, but of the real impossibility of a contradictory
thing, a squared circle, for example. And we say that this
impossibility is real and absolute, and that even by miracle it
can have no exception. This necessity is not hypothetical as when
we say: It is necessary to eat, even though we know that by a
miracle a man could live without eating. The necessity we speak of
is objective and absolute
1358 Met.: IV, 3.
1359 Msgr. Noel, in the work just cited (see note 6) writes (p.
253): "We must not drink too freely the conquering allurement of
certain formulas. True, the essential necessities seen by the
intellect dominate all reality. They transcend all the limits of
experience, since they rule the metaphysical order. But of
themselves they do not in any positive way furnish us any
reality."
Msgr. Noel means that the principle of contradiction is not an
existential judgment, and we have never affirmed that it is. He
who here drinks too freely is the absolute realist after the
manner of Parmenides. He was really drunk on being, when he
affirmed that the universal exists just as it is conceived, when
he confounded God's being with being in general. But, without
drunkenness, or even tipsiness, limited realism affirms that he
who denies or doubts the objective and absolute validity of the
principle of contradiction will find every existential judgment
invalid, including "I think. " Further, whenever we affirm the
objective validity of the principle of contradiction, we have
simultaneously within us a spontaneous and indistinct judgment of
our own existence and of the existence of the body from which we
draw the notion of being. There is a mutual relation between the
subject matter of our knowledge (the sense object present) and the
form under which the principle of contradiction conceives that
matter. So close is this relation that to doubt the principle is
to see vanish every existential judgment, just as matter cannot
exist without form.
1360 See the illuminating article of Al. Roswadowski, S. J.: "De
fundamento metaphysico nostrae cognitionis universalis secundum S.
Thomam" (Acta secundi Congressus thomistici internationalis):
Rome, 1936, pp. 103-12.
1361 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1.
1362 In this formula the contradiction is less flagrant than if we
said: Contingency is incompatible with non-contingency. But the
most dangerous contradictions are hidden contradictions (which
abound in Spinoza). To deny the tenth characteristic of a circle
is less evidently contradictory than to deny its definition, but
it is still a contradiction.
1363 Cf. Ia, q. 88, a. 3; q. 76, a. 5.
1364 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad I. For the principle of finality,
which we do not treat here see our work, Le realisme du principe
de finalite, 1932.
1365 See Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie,
revised by the members of the Societe francaise de philosophie,
1926.
1366 Methode, 1, 7.
1367 See note I.
1368 Bulletin de le Societe francaise de philosophie, session of
May 7, 1908, p. 294.
1369 See Vocabulaire technique...: s. v. Pragmatisme, p. 611.
1370 Dogme et critique, p. 25.
1371 Denz.: no. 2026.
1372 De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10; la, q. 16, a. 1.
1373 Denz.: no. 2080.
1374 "Point de depart de la recherche philosophique" in Annales de
philosophie chretienne, June 15, 1906, p. 235.
1375 J. de Tonquedec, in his book Immanence, 1913, pp. 27-59,
shows the limitless consequences, unforeseen by its author, of the
new definitions. Here is one sentence from Tonquedec: "It will no
longer be possible to demonstrate by argument (independently o
action) the existence of God or the reality of the supernatural or
the fact of divine intervention" (p. 28).
1376 Denz, no. 2058.
1377 This reproach addressed to the philosophy of action was
expressed already in 1896 by our teacher, Father Schwalm, O. P.:
in Rev. thom.: 1896, pp. 36 ff.: 413; 1897, pp. 62 239, 627, 1898,
p. 578. We ourselves expressed the same view (in the same review,
1913, pp. 351-71.
1378 La science et l'hypothese, pp. 112-19.
1379 See our book, Dieu, 5th ed.: p. 778
1380 Being is being, non-being is non-being, or, being is not non-
being.
1381 Everything that exists has its raison d'etre, intrinsic or
extrinsic.
1382 Every contingent being depends on an efficient cause.
1383 Every agent, including natural agents not endowed with
cognition, acts for an end.
1384 Rom. 8:16.
1385 IIa Ilae, q. 8, a. 1, 2, q. 45, a. 2.
1386 This conception, that theology is nothing but a spirituality
which has developed its own regimen of intelligibility, comes in
great measure from John Moehler, in particular from his book, Die
Einheit in der Kirche, oder das Princip des Katholizismus
(Tubingen, 1825). This book would call for a critical and
theological study to correct its deviations. It reduces faith to
religious experience. Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Moehler, cols.
2057ff.
1387 la IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
1388 Ethica, VI, 2.
1389 la IIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.
1390 Ethica, VI, 2.
1391 In the corpus he had argued: Goodness in the will, speaking
properly, depends onthe object aimed at by the will. Now the
will's object is proposed to it by the reason. Hence goodness in
the will depends on the reason, just as it depends on its object.
1392 Denz.: no. 2058.
1393 See note 10.
1394 L'Etre and les etres, 1935, p. 415.
1395 Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 6: In truths to which the intellect
assents naturally, in first principles, we cannot choose between
assent or dissent, but our necessary assent is a work of nature.
1396 Ibid.: ad I, 2.
1397 La science et la religion, 1908, p. 290.
1398 Cf. De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
1399 We hold that St. Thomas would see, in this replacement of the
traditional definition of truth by the pragmatic definition, an
insensate enterprise, an unlimited imprudence, fated to destroy
all truth, even that of prudent judgment, which presuppose a
higher truth.
We speak thus to young seminarians, who, fearing not to be up to
date, prefer the doctrine of Maurice M. Blondel, or even that of
Henri Bergson, to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Now it is easy,
without being a prophet, to foresee that a hundred years hence
Henri Bergson will be forgotten, whereas St. Thomas, like St.
Augustine, will live forever.
Bergson, we admit, the author of Matiere et memoire and of Donnees
immediates de la conscience, has indeed liberated many minds from
materialism and mechanism, but his book, L'evolution creatrice,
has drawn many others away from higher certitudes, especially
during the epoch of modernism. I seem to hear him still, as, in
1904-1905, at the College de France, he was explaining Book XIl of
Aristotle's Metaphysics. His commentary on Aristotle's proofs for
God's existence ran thus: "Gentlemen, it is astounding that
Aristotle seeks to explain motion by aught else than itself,
whereas for us motion explains everything else. "
These words say, equivalently, that what is in process of becoming
is more than what is, more even than He who eternally is being
itself. To compare Bergson with Aquinas is to compare a pretty
villa with a Gothic cathedral. Surely it has been justly said,
"Anyone not informed by ancient learning can never read such works
without danger. "
1400 Rev. de met. et de mor.: July, 1907, pp. 448 f.
1401 Cf. Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 7th ed.: pp. 133 ff.:
156 ff.: where we examine the theories of Bergson and Le Roy.
1402 These positions return to that of Nicholas d'Outrecourt, who
held that all first principles are merely probable. As one example
of many who agree with us, see M. J. Maritain, Reflexions sur
l'intelligence, 1924, chap. 3, pp. 78-141. See also p. Descoqs,
Praelect. theol. naturalis, 1932, 11, 287ff. ; 1, 150. P. Descoqs
quotes a long passage from Archambault, one of the most faithful
of Blondel's disciples, and compares it with a proposition
condemned by the Holy Office in 1924.
1403 Cursus philos.: II, 341.
1404 Philosophers are often better than their philosophy. Hume, to
escape from his skepticism, would play billiards. Stuart Mill, to
escape empiricism, would assume the viewpoint of religion. Beneath
the philosopher, or rather above, is the man, the Christian. But
the question remains: Does not his philosophy lead men away from
wisdom rather than toward it? The Church thus questioned the
philosophy of that holy priest whom we call Antonio Rosmini.
1405 Acta Acad. rom. S. Thomae, p. 51.
1406 Ibid.: pp. 174-78.
1407 Conformity of mind with life must replace the abstract and
chimerical conformity of intellect with reality (Annales phil.
chre't.: 1906, p. 235). Metaphysics has its essence in the acting
will. It reaches truth only under this experimental point of view.
It is the science of what is to be rather than of what is
(L'Action, 1893, p. 297).
Accord of thought with reality must be replaced by immanent
conformity of ourselves with ourselves (L'illusion idealiste,
1898, pp. 12, 17).
1408 We quoted his retraction in Acta. Acad.: 1935, p. 54.
1409 La pensee, 1, 39, 130, 131, 136, 347, 355.
1410 Ibid.: II, 39, 65, 67, go, 96, 196.
1411 See the condemned propositions of Nicholas d'Outrecourt
(Denz.: nos. 553 f.: 558 567, 570). See also the propositions
condemned by the Holy Office (December, 1924): in Monitore
ecclesiastico, 1925, p. 194, in Documentation catholique, 1925, I,
771 ff.: and in Descoqs, Praelect. theol. nat.: 1932, I, 150, 11,
287 ff.
1412 We have, we may add, always admitted, as valid proof of God's
existence, man's desire for happiness (see la IIae, q. 2, a. 8).
But this proof presupposes the ontological validity of the
principle of finality; every agent, and in a special manner the
rational agent, acts for a purpose.
1413 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.
1414 See our review of his work in Rivista di filosofia
neoscolastica, January, 1944, pp. 63-67.
1415 In IIIam, q. 4, a. 2.
1416 Op. cit.: p. 158.
1417 We treated this question as early as 1909 (Sens commun, la
philosophie de l'etre et les formules dogmatiques, 5th ed.: pp.
365-77). A recent defense of Cajetan's view appears in Acta Acad.
rom. S. Thomae, 1938, pp. 78-92.
1418 See Tabula aurea, s. v. suppositum, persona, personalitas,
modus, assumere, substantia, substantla pnma, subsistentia, quod
est, quo est.
1419 In omni creatura differt esse et quod est. Cont. Gent.: II,
52.
1420 Solus Deus est suum esse. Esse irreceptum est unicum.
1421 Distinctio realis inadequata.
1422 Distinctio realis adaequata.
1423 Esse consequitur naturam non sicut habentem esse, sed sicut
qua aliquid est, personam autem seu hypostasim consequitur sicut
habentem esse. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad I. Ipsum esse non est de
ratione suppositi: Quadl.: q. 2, a. 4, ad 2. In Deo tres personae
non habent nisi unum esse: llla, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.
1424 I Sent.: d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4.
1425 la, q. 39, a. 3, ad 4.
1426 la, q. 3, a. 5, ad I.
1427 IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.
1428 De veritate q. 1, a. 1.
1429 De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 6.
1430 As personality corresponds to person, so subsistence
corresponds to "suppositum, " not to "subsistere. " The abstract
noun corresponding to the concrete "subsistere" is "existentia
substantiae. " An error of correlation has here beclouded the
question.
1431 In III Sent.: d. V, q. 3, a. 3, § 2.
1432 Here is, in reduced form, the argument of Cajetan: Requiritur
aliquid reale et positlvum quo subjectum existens est id quod est
(contra Scotum). Atque hoc non potest esse nec natura singularis,
quae se habet ut quo, nec existentia quae est praedicatum
contingens subjecti creati. Ergo requiritur aliquid aliud
positivum, quae est ultirna dispositio naturae singularis ad
existentiam.
1433 In IIIam, q. 2, a. 2, no. 8.
1434 Cf. IIIa, q. 16, a. 1, 2.
1435 Objicitur: Ex actu et actu not fit unum per se; sed natura
individuata et personalitas sunt duo actus, ergo ex eis non fit
unum per se Respondetur: Ex actu et actu non fit unum per se,
scil. una natura in I modo dicendi per se, concedo; non fit unum
suppositum, per se subsistens, in 3 modo dicendi per se, nego.
Ita in Christo est unum suppositum, quamvis sint duae naturae.
Insistitur: Sed anima separata est id quod existit, et tamen non
est persona.
Respondetur: Anima separata retinet suam essentiam, suam
subsistentiam et suum esse, sic est id quod est; sed non retinet
nomen personae, quia non est quod completum, sed pars principalis
Petri aut Pauli defuncti.
1436 See especially pp. 41-50, of the work cited above.
1437 Ezech. 36: 27
1438 Ps. 134:6.
1439 Esther 13:9; 14:13, 15:11.
1440 See also Prov. 21: I; Ecclu. 33: 13, 24-47; John 10: 27; 17:
2; Phil. 2:13.
1441 Denz.: no. 182.
1442 1 ad Bonif.: chap. 20
1443 Concordia, ed. Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 565. Cf. also the index,
s. v. Auxilium. Cf. also Lessius, De gratia efficaci, chap. 18,
no. 7: Not that he who accepts accepts by liberty alone but
because from liberty alone arises the distinction between the two,
not from diversity previous aid of grace.
1444 John 15: 5.
1445 I Cor. 4: 7
1446 See Aristotle, Met.: IX 3.
1447 In Ep ad Eph, chap. 3, lect. 2. See also la IIae, q. 109, a.
1, 2, 9, 10; q. 113, a. 7, 10.
1448 In Ep. ad Tim, 2: 6.
1449 Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.
1450 la IIae, q. 1o6, a. 2, ad 2.
1451 lla IIae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.
1452 Alvarez, De auxiliis, Bk. III, disp. 80; Gonet, Clypeus
thom., De vol. Dei, disp. 4, no. 147; del Prado, De gratia et
libero arbitrio, III, 423.
1453 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 3. See also Tabula aurea s. v.
Satisfactio, no. 36.
1454 la, q. 19, a. 6, ad I.
1455 Ibid.
1456 1a, q. 21, a. 4.
1457 See St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50
(PL., XLIV, 271) ; Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. II (Denz, no.
804).
1458 1a, q. 19, a. 6.
1459 PL, CXXVI, 123; Denz.: 17th ed.: p. 145 no. 320 note 2.
1460 Ia, q. 20, a. 3.
1461 1 Cor. 4: 7.
1462 la, q. 23, a. 5.
1463 Ia Ilae, q. 79, a. 2.
1464 Causalitas divina requisita ad actum physicum peccati
praescindit omnino a malitia.
1465 Rom. 9:14-24.
1466 In Joan., tr. 26.
1467 Ia, q. 23, a. 5.
1468 Does the phrase "ante praevisa merita" imply a succession in
God? This has been recently asserted. But it is clear that
Thomists recognize in God only one act, by which God wills
efficaciously the merits of the elect in order to save them. Not
on account of this does God will that, says St. Thomas (Ia, q. 19,
a. 5): but He wills (by one and the same act) this to be on
account of that. The principle of predilection (to be better than
another, one must be more loved by God) is independent of all
temporal succession
1469 See eg.: la IIae, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3.
1470 In his recent treatise Anthropologia supernaturalis, De
gratia, (Turin, 1943, p. 199): Msgr. P. Parente confused the
Thomistic sensus divisus with that of Calvin. Calvin said: Under
efficacious grace the power to the opposite does not remain, it
only reappears afterward. Thomists say nothing like that.
Parente's position is syncretistic, an attempted medium between
Thomism and Molinism. Now there can be no medium between these
[two contradictory propositions: God knows futuribilia before His
decrees, and God doesnot know futuribilia before His decree. God's
knowledge either determines, or it is determined; there is no
medium].
1471 Cf. Ia, q. 23, a. 4.
1472 See del Prado, De gratia, 1907, III, 417-67: Utrum
Bannezianismus sit vera comeodia Molinistis inventa.
1473 Concordia, Paris, 1876, p. 152.
1474 Ia, q. 23, a. 3.
1475 Rom. 9: 14-24; II: 33-36.
1476 OEvres completes, Paris, 1845, p. 664. See also his index, s.
v. Grace. See also his La defense de la tradition, XI, 19-27.
1477 Thus a grace may be efficacious for an imperfect act and yet
only sufficient in relation to the perfect act which ought to
follow. See del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, Fribourg,
1907, II, 5-23.
1478 Those Thomists, like Gonzales, Bancel, Guillermin, who extend
to the limits the field of sufficient grace, still maintain, as an
essential element of Thomism, that no fully salutary act can come
to pass unless God's consequent will have so decreed from
eternity. Actual and limited effects, says St. Thomas (Ia, q. 19,
a. 4): proceed from God's infinite perfection by the determining
decree of God's will and intellect. This terminology, it is clear,
antecedes Duns Scotus.
1479 See De praedest. sanctorum, passim.
1480 Nothing positive and good can exist outside God without
causal dependence on God. If this be denied, all proofs for the
existence of God are compromised. God is, without any exception,
the author of all that is good.